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Abstract
This thesis addresses a neglected dimension of Greece under German and Italian 
occupation and on the eve of civil war. Its contribution to the historiography of the period 
stems from the fact that it constitutes the first academic study of the third largest 
resistance organisation in Greece, the 5/42 regiment of evzones. The study of this 
national resistance organisation can thus extend our knowledge of the Greek resistance 
effort, the political relations between the main resistance groups, the conditions that led 
to the civil war and the domestic relevance of British policies. The thesis seeks to 
establish the nature of the 5/42, the factors behind its rise and fall and its significance 
within the national resistance movement.
The research for this thesis has been based on various sources. A large number of 
personal interviews (forty-seven) were conducted with veterans of the 5/42 and EAM- 
ELAS. This was placed alongside extensive archival research and documentary analysis. 
Both types of sources were supplemented by secondary sources on the history of the 
period.
This thesis distinguishes the history of the 5/42 regiment across three levels of analysis: 
The micro-level analysis highlights the agents, the circumstances and the events that 
influenced the emergence of the 5/42 in the Fokida region. It looks at the group dynamics 
of the 5/42. It examines the social political and economic environment within which the 
5/42 was formed, the group’s structure and internal politics, the strategies and objectives 
of the group’s leaders.
The meso-level analysis looks at the 5/42 in the context of the civil war between different 
resistance groups and highlights the role that the regiment played in the political 
antagonisms. It discusses the domestic politics of the 5/42 and the strategies that the 
regiment’s leaders adopted against EAM-ELAS, it depicts the actual military and 
political causes behind the regiment’s disbandment and it assesses the impact of Colonel 
Psarros’ murder during the last months of the occupation.
The macro-level looks at the place of the 5/42 in the context of the British policies in 
Greece during the occupation. It focuses on the political and military relationship 
between the British and die 5/42 and on the attitude that the British adopted against the 
regiment during the last 5/42-ELAS crisis that led to the final disbandment.
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INTRODUCTION
Historical context
The occupation period 1941-1944 is a profoundly dark era in twentieth century 
Greek history. Not only did the events of the occupation have a dramatic effect upon 
Greek contemporary politics, they also affected even the most personal aspects of the 
lives of millions of people who participated or just witnessed those events. Since the 
onset of the occupation, Greece entered a period of widespread devastation that lasted 
throughout the 1940s. The echo of that devastation was very loud until the collapse of the 
Colonels’ dictatorship in 1974, while for some Greeks it remains pretty loud even today.
Before the outbreak of the war, the political life of Greece had come to a 
deadlock. Although all seemed quiet on the surface of the Greek political scene, the truth 
is that a number of serious political and class-related conflicts simmered under the 
surface. The Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941) lacked popular support and its 
main source of power was the oppressive police state that it had established. Political and 
trade unionist antagonisms had come to a halt and the constitutional issue of Greece, the 
struggle between democracy and monarchy, remained in fact unsolved. The farming 
communities, which represented the majority of the population, were living in poverty, 
abandoned by the central government of Athens. Eventually, in 28 October 1940 Italy
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declared war against Greece. After five months of effective resistance against the Italians 
and the Germans on the Albanian and Macedonian fronts, the Greek army collapsed and 
the long night of the occupation began.
The tremendous effects of the occupation upon the Greek society and the memory 
of the recent war effort against the Germans and the Italians gave birth to the national 
resistance. The reign of oppression along with the colossal economic devastation made 
life in occupied Greece a nightmare. On the other hand, however, the victorious battles of 
the Greek army reminded everyone that the oppressors were not invulnerable. Gradually, 
the desire for action against the invaders was spreading fast among Greeks. Initially, the 
national resistance started as a spontaneous social phenomenon, as a struggle for survival, 
self-protection and revenge. Soon, nevertheless, national resistance was transformed into 
a movement with a political and organisational basis and three main resistance 
organisations appeared.
The largest resistance organisation nation-wide was EAM Ethniko 
Apeleutherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front), controlled by KKE (Greek 
Communist Party). EAM’s military branch ELAS Ellinikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos 
Stratos (Greek People’s Liberation Army) soon became a powerful and effective guerrilla 
force. The second largest resistance organisation was EDES Ethnikos Democratikos 
Ellinikos Syndesmos (National Democratic Greek League), of a republican, anti­
communist political orientation. The third one, which is this thesis’ case study, was the 
5/42 regiment of evzones controlled by the liberal democratic political organisation 
EKKA Ethniki Kai Koinoniki Apeleutherosi (National and Social Liberation).
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All national resistance organisations brought back to the surface a number of 
political issues. These issues and conflicts had much to do with unresolved pre-war 
discords, as well as with post-war visions. Along with the struggle against the invader, 
the Greek national resistance organisations made their own different proposals over the 
fate of post-war Greece. Eventually, the national struggle against the invaders by itself 
was not proven a sufficient ideal that could guarantee national unity. Disagreement over 
the fate of post-war Greece, reinforced by individual ambitions and self-interests of the 
people who led the resistance -as well as of those who followed them- proved more 
powerful than the common fight against the occupiers. The result was a civil conflict 
between EAM-ELAS and all major republican resistance organisations.
The 5/42 regiment of evzones played a major part in that civil conflict. Based on 
the mountainous region of Fokida in central Greece, the 5/42 regiment of evzones was 
formed in the spring of 1943 after the joint efforts of Colonel Dimitrios Psarros and a 
number of low-ranking local officers. Colonel Psarros along with ex-Minister Georgios 
Kartalis also founded the political resistance organisation EKKA which became the 
regiment’s political branch. Although EKKA-5/42 maintained a friendly attitude towards 
EAM-ELAS and despite the fact that the official line of the 5/42 regiment was the 
conduct of a resistance struggle disengaged from political objectives, in May 1943 ELAS 
disbanded the regiment. The circumstances under which the disbandment was decided 
were mysterious and eventually the disbandment was disapproved of by EAM-ELAS’ 
leadership. The 5/42 was reformed and EAM-ELAS officials guaranteed smooth 
relationships and co-operation between the two organisations. However, a few days later 
ELAS disbanded the 5/42 for the second time. Once more, there was mystery over who
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decided and ordered that disbandment and once again EAM-ELAS officials disapproved 
of it. It was agreed that the 5/42 should reform again and new guarantees were given on 
EAM-ELAS’ behalf about smooth relations and co-operation. After these two successive 
disbandments however, anti-EAM-ELAS sentiments had increased among the 5/42 
guerrillas and officers. This hostility against EAM-ELAS increased further after Captain 
Thymios Dedousis, a fanatic anti-communist officer, joined the regiment.
During the ELAS-EDES war in Epirus (October 1943), EKKA adopted an 
explicit attitude in favour of ELAS. This attitude on EKKA’s behalf caused serious 
agitation among the 5/42 officers and Captain Dedousis on behalf of the majority of the 
regiment’s officers officially denounced EKKA. Captain Dedousis and his faction defied 
Colonel Psarros’ command over the regiment and became more and more provocative 
against EAM-ELAS. After an incident between Dedousis’ company and a group of 
ELAS guerrillas, an open conflict broke out between the 5/42 and ELAS. Eventually, on 
17 April 1944 large ELAS forces disbanded the 5/42 for the third and last time. After a 
fierce and bloody battle the 5/42 regiment collapsed. Although Colonel Psarros along 
with tens of 5/42 officers and antartes surrendered to ELAS, they were murdered under 
mysterious circumstances.
An overview o f the literature
There is a vast amount of literature referring to the occupation period and this 
thesis reviewed a large number of books, memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, 
historical accounts, studies, journals, articles and conference papers. The purpose of this 
review was twofold: to search for additional information concerning the 5/42; and, to
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develop a broader perspective on the issues and arguments of the ocupation and civil war 
that ultimatelly frame the specific case study. The largest share of this literature has been 
produced by the political and military leaders of the national resistance organisations, but 
also by many veterans who participated in these events. The majority of these works are 
written in a polemical and highly controversial strain.
The literature produced by EAM-ELAS activists emphasises EAM’s massive 
appeal to the Greek society and ELAS’ military achievements against the invaders. On 
the other hand, it stresses the lack of popularity of the republican resistance organisations, 
their dependence on British support and their alleged ties with the occupation forces and 
the collaborationist government. In this context, the dominant argument throughout the 
literature of the left is that EAM-ELAS were the only genuine patriotic resistance 
organisations. Typical examples of this argumentation can be seen in the works of Glynos 
(Glynos, 1944), Sarafis (Sarafis, 1964), Lagdas (Lagdas, 1976), Partsalidis (Partsalidis,
1978), Hatzis (Hatzis, 1983), Kedros (Kedros, 1983), Skaltsas (Skaltsas, 1984), Moraitis, 
(Moraitis, 1985) (Moraitis, 1989), Avdoulos (Avdoulos, 1994), Mpekios (Mpekios, 
1994), Koutroukis (Koutroukis, 1996), Hatzipanagiotou (Hatzipanagiotou, 1997) and 
many more. Some of the most objective and justified historical accounts within the 
literature of EAM-ELAS veterans comes from KKE’s ex General Secretary Gregorios 
Farakos, (Farakos, 1996), (Farakos, 1997) (Farakos, 2000), Katsimbas (1966), Papadakis 
(1999) and Gregoriadis1.
The literature produced by EAM-ELAS’ rivals on the other hand, fall into three 
main categories. Firstly, there is the literature produced by the leaders and activists of the
1 The date of issue of Gregoriadiis’ book is not mentioned anywhere in his book, but it was probably 
somewhere in the mid-1960’s
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republican national resistance organisations such as Zervas (Zervas, 2000) Pyromaglou 
(Pyromaglou, 1965) (Pyromaglou, 1978) (Pyromaglou, 1988), Myridakis (Myridakis, 
1976), Houtas (Houtas, 1961), Papantoleon (Papantoleon, 1997), Flokas (Flokas, 1994), 
Ioannou (Ioannou, 2000), Papathanasiou (Papathanasiou, 1997), Gyftopoulos 
(Gyftopoulos, 1990). Secondly, there is the literature produced by the collaborators and 
the radical monarchists such as Ralis (Ralis, 1947), Logothetopoulos (Logothetopoulos, 
1948), Tsolakoglou (Tsolakoglou, 1959), Staurogianopoulos, Zalokostas (Zalokostas, 
1997), Papadopoulos (Papadopoulos, 2000). Thirdly, there is the literature produced by 
British officers, members of the British Military Mission in Greece such as Myers 
(Myers, 1975), Woodhouse (Woodhouse, 1976) (Woodhouse, 1976), Clive (Clive, 1985), 
Marinos (Marinos, 1994), Chandler (Chandler, 2000), Hammond and Hamson.2 The 
central argument in the literature of EAM-ELAS’ rivals is that EAM-ELAS monopolised 
the national resistance struggle in order to assume power after the end of the occupation. 
The literature emphasises ELAS’ aggression towards competing national resistance 
organisations and the British; it tries to undermine the importance of ELAS’ military 
achievements; and it stigmatises KKE’s control over EAM-ELAS. The most well 
justified and substantial criticism of EAM-ELAS comes from Pyromaglou (Pyromaglou, 
1965) (Pyromaglou, 1978) (Pyromaglou, 1988), Myers (Myers, 1975) and Woodhouse 
(Woodhouse, 1976) (Woodhouse, 1976) (Woodhouse, 1982) -the latter also gives a well- 
justified account of the British policies in Greece during the occupation.
Apart from the literature produced by the leaders and activists of the national 
resistance movement, there is also a number of works produced by Greek and foreign 
academics, scholars and researchers. Although the quantity of these studies is
2 The dates of issue of Hammond’s and Hamson’s books are not mentioned enywhere in the Greek edition.
considerable, there is a serious disproportion between the amount of research done in 
each and every research field. In general terms, these studies cover a very limited and 
narrow field of knowledge of the occupation history. They study exhaustively some 
specific aspects of the history of the occupation, while they leave out many others of 
equal importance. Overall, current research covers two main areas: British intervention in 
occupied Greece and the policies of KKE.
Iatrides (Iatrides, 1972) (Iatrides, 1984) who has organised a number of 
conferences about Greece in the 1940s, examines British and American intervention in 
Greece during the occupation and until the end of the 1946-49 civil war. Papastratis 
(Papastratis, 1984) and Pashalidis (Pashalidis, 1995) (Pashalidis, 1997) highlight British 
foreign policy towards occupied Greece, while Richter (Richter, 1986) focuses on British 
intervention in Greece from the end of the occupation until the onset of the civil war in 
1946. Clogg (Clogg, 1975) (Clogg, 1984) focuses on the role and strategy of the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) in occupied Greece, while Smith (Smith, 1990) focuses on 
the attitudes of the SOE officers towards the Greek national resistance organisations. 
Mathiopoulos (Mathiopoulos, 1977) highlights the German perspective on British 
intervention in the Greek national resistance movement based on a number of German 
documents. As far as KKE and its role is concerned, O’Ballance (O’Ballance, 1966), 
Smith (1993), Koussoulas (Koussoulas, 1973) and Vlavianos (Vlavianos, 1992) examine 
the strategy of KKE during and after the occupation period. All of them focus on the 
reasons behind KKE’s rapid rise during the occupation and on the causes of its dramatic 
fall during the 1946-49 civil war. Finally, Eudes (Eudes, 1970) gives a very interesting 
account of the domestic politics of KKE and EAM-ELAS. Based on a number of
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testimonies, he highlights the personal and political conflicts within KKE and EAM- 
ELAS from the occupation until 1949.
Apart from these two main research fields, there has been research in certain other 
areas as well. Mazower (Mazower, 1994) (Mazower, 2000) gives an overview of daily 
life under the occupation. He highlights the ways in which the occupation and resistance 
were experienced by the national resistance leaders and the ordinary people while he also 
gives a fascinating account of German perceptions of the occupation. Fleisher (Fleisher,
1979) (Fleisher, 1982) (Fleisher, 1982) (Fleisher, 1995) is also one of the few researchers 
who have focused on German perceptions of the occupation. Based on a large amount of 
primary sources, he highlights the German policies and strategies against the national 
resistance movement, while he has also done a considerable amount of research on the 
issue of collaboration. Koutsoukis (Koutsoukis, 1997) and Haritopoulos (Haritopoulos, 
1997) (Haritopoulos, 2001) focus their research on ELAS* military leader Aris 
Velouchiotis. Finally, Zaousis (Zaousis, 1987), Gasparinatos (Gasparinatos, 1998) and 
Richter (Richter, 1975) have also written extensive general historical accounts covering 
the whole of the occupation period.
Within this extensive literature, attention to the history of the 5/42 has been very 
limited. The only EAM-ELAS’ veterans who include some extended references about the 
regiment in their works are ELAS officers Foivos Gregoriadis “Vermaios”3 and Dimitris 
Dimitriou “Nikiforos” (Dimitriou, 1965). Both of them were Commanders of ELAS 
bands stationed in the same area with the 5/42 and they both played important roles in the 
ELAS-5/42 conflict. Their testimonies are historically valuable references to the history
3 The date of issue of Gregoriadiis’ book is not mentioned anywhere in his book, but it was probably 
somewhere in the mid-1960’s
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of the 5/42 not only because they give insight over a number of events, but also because 
they depict the attitude of EAM-ELAS towards the 5/42. Other ELAS officers with minor 
references to the 5/42 are Hatzis (Hatzis, 1983) and Hatzipanagiotou (Hatzipanagiotou, 
1997), while Farakos (Farakos, 1996), (Farakos, 1997), (Farakos, 2000) has issued a 
number of important EAM-ELAS documents concerning the regiment in his books. 
References to the 5/42 are also very limited throughout the bibliography of EAM-ELAS’ 
rivals. Apart from EDES’ Sub-Commander Komninos Pyromaglou (Pyromaglou, 1965) 
who has written the biography of EKKA’s leader Georgios Kartalis, only Petimezas 
(Petimezas, 1991) and Zalokostas (Zalokostas, 1997) give some reference to the 5/42 in 
their works. Attention to the history of the 5/42 and its significance within the national 
resistance movement is also very limited within the studies of researchers and academics. 
The most thorough historical account of the regiment’s history comes from Gasparinatos 
(Gasparinatos, 1998), even though his references are based entirely on secondary sources. 
Moreover, Fleisher (Fleisher, 1995) discusses to some extent the policies of EKKA in the 
political arena of the national resistance movement, while Haritopoulos (Haritopoulos, 
1997) (Haritopoulos, 2001), comments on the murder of Colonel Psarros.
The literature that refers exclusively to the history of the 5/42 regiment of evzones 
numbers five books, all of them written by 5/42 officers who played prominent roles 
within the regiment. In chronological order, the first of these books is “Thymios 
Dedousis, Captain-Parliamentarian: The National Martyr and Fighter” by Thymios 
Dedousis’ brother Ioannis (Dedousis, 1949). This biography of Captain Thymios 
Dedousis is a valuable reference since it gives a full account of the actions of one of the 
most controversial officers within the 5/42. Although profoundly biased, what is unique
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about this book is its disarming sincerity over Captain Dedousis’ extremism and 
maliciousness against EAM-ELAS as well as against EKKA. That was not just due to the 
fact that the author was a fanatic royalist and anti-communist himself, but also due to the 
circumstances under which the book was written, since it was edited almost two years 
after the death of Captain Dedousis, and while the 1946-49 civil war had reached its 
peak.
The second book about the history of the 5/42 regiment of evzones is “The 
National Resistance o f the 5/42 Regiment o f Evzones o f Colonel Psarros 1941-1944” by 
Lieutenant Georgios Kaimaras (Kaimaras, 1953).4 Kaimaras was one of the pioneers of 
the 5/42 and maintained a leading role within the regiment throughout its existence. 
Although Kaimaras’ book is much more moderate than Dedousis’ it is also rather biased. 
In many cases Kaimaras exaggerates over issues which have to do with his own 
contribution to the regiment, while in other cases he conveniently ignores to discuss 
several embarrassing issues. Nevertheless, Kaimaras’ book is considered as the principal 
reference on the 5/42 because it gives a full account of events from the formation of the 
5/42 until its collapse and his book is used as a reference throughout the national 
resistance literature.
The third book is “National Resistance 1941-1944: Causes o f the Disbandment o f 
the 5/42 Regiment o f Evzones -  The Murder o f  Psarros ” written by Captain Athanasios 
Koutras (Koutras, 1981), another pioneer of the 5/42 and one of Psarros’ close associates. 
Captain Koutras enjoys the appreciation of the 5/42 veterans and sympathisers and is also 
respected by many EAM-ELAS veterans. From all of the books written by 5/42 veterans,
4 Kaimaras’ book was re-edited another three times since 1953. This thesis used the 1979 edition.
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Koutras’ is the most objective. The book not only describes the events in a moderate and 
accurate manner, but also has the objectivity to accept responsibility for many of the 
author’s and of his comrades’ mistakes.
The last two books about the 5/42 regiment are “5/42-Psarros: The Bloody 
Legend” by Sub-Lieutenant Takis Papagianopoulos (Papagianopoulos, 1981) and 
“National Resistance Organisation EKKA” by Major Ioannis Papathanasiou 
(Papathanasiou, 2000). Papagianopoulos was not one of the protagonists of the 5/42, 
however, he had some influence on the course of events concerning the regiment. In 
some cases, he includes some important information about several events, but most of 
what he writes in his book does not come out of his own experience and the book often 
adopts the views of third persons uncritically. The book also suffers from a strong anti­
communist bias. On the other hand, Papathanasiou’s book is far more objective, but 
lacking originality. His book follows almost exactly the structure of Kaimaras’ book and 
copies large extracts from Kaimaras’ as well as from other books which refer to the 5/42.
Despite their individual merit for the understanding of some aspects of the 5/42’s 
history, none of the above references provide a full and objective account of the 
regiment’s rise and fall. Current historiography tells us nothing about the social factors 
that affected the rise of the 5/42. It does not give proper attention to the significance of 
the 5/42 within the national resistance movement and to the role that it played in the 
conflict between EAM-ELAS and EDES. It does not assess the significance and the 
political effects of the regiment’s tragic fall. Furthermore, the historiography fails to shed 
light on a number of mysterious aspects of the regiment’s history. The causes behind the 
murder of Psarros remain unknown, while the British attitude towards the 5/42 still
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remains inexplicable. To the present day, our knowledge of the 5/42 regiment remains 
rather fragmented and has never before been subjected to an independent academic study. 
The historiography needs to be enriched with a scholarly study about the rise and fall of 
the 5/42 and this thesis aims to make both a limited and a broad contribution to the 
academic understanding of the occupation period. The limited contribution can be made 
by giving a substantial account of the history of the 5/42, whereas the broad by setting the 
history of the 5/42 in the wider context of the national resistance movement and the civil 
war.
Arguments and research objectives
The ambition of the leaders of the 5/42 was to establish a “third pole” within the 
national resistance movement. Their ambition was to give to the 5/42 the status of a non­
political national resistance organisation that served no other purpose than the resistance 
struggle against the invaders. Their objective was to place the 5/42 and EKKA as a 
breakwater in the middle of EAM-ELAS and EDES and win the support of the moderate 
centre. A moderate and independent third pole could have been expected to redefine the 
cleavage on which the civil war was based. The growth of an alternative third pole 
between the main adversaries EAM-ELAS and EDES could potentially smooth down the 
balance of power between them and contribute in decreasing the polarisation within the 
national resistance movement.
However, historical events went in a different direction and the 5/42 did not 
manage to survive within the polarised environment of the Greek resistance. The 
argument of this thesis is that the 5/42 had a number of vital structural deficiencies that
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prevented it from becoming a viable third pole. The first of these defects was the 
geographic isolation of the 5/42. The regiment was formed much later than EAM-ELAS 
in Fokida and that had a major impact on the regiment’s growth since it was always 
surrounded by superior hostile forces. The second was the political inefficiency of the 
leaders of EKKA-5/42. Kartalis and Psarros failed to develop a realistic and consistent 
strategy that could potentially safeguard the status of EKKA-5/42 as equal players within 
the political arena of the national resistance movement. The third was the lack of 
ideological coherence and mutuality of political objectives between the leaders of 
EKKA-5/42 and the regiment’s fighters. Due to that alienation, the regiment was brought 
to a state of ideological confusion that undermined its integrity and military discipline. 
The fourth was the lack of external support by the British. The survival of the 5/42 was 
highly dependent upon British political and military support. Nevertheless, the British 
were not confident over the political reliability of EKKA or the military effectiveness of 
the 5/42 and they withdrew their support.
Furthermore, the argument of this thesis is that the emergence of the 5/42 within 
the political arena of the national resistance not only did not contribute in decreasing the 
polarisation, but instead, it contributed to the escalation of the crisis within the Greek 
national resistance movement. The rise of the 5/42 intensified the political antagonism 
between EAM-ELAS and its enemies. The regiment became the apple of discord, rather 
than the breakwater, between the two extremes. Both EAM-ELAS and the radical anti- 
EAM groups tried to undermine the regiment’s independence and to pull the 5/42 
towards their respective sides. The 5/42 was caught in the middle of a tug of war. It did 
not manage to resist the tremendous pressure from both sides and eventually it collapsed.
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Moreover, the regiment’s demise and the murder of Colonel Psarros fuelled the anti­
communist sentiment in Greece, it contributed to the coherence of the radical anti-EAM 
camp and sharpened the polarisation between EAM and its enemies. The murder of 
Colonel Psarros was also a major issue in the Lebanon conference that was a major 
turning point in the future of Greece and the course of the civil conflict during and after 
the occupation.
The main task of this thesis is to study the reasons behind the rise and the fall of 
the 5/42 regiment of evzones and to assess its significance within the course of the Greek 
resistance movement and the outbreak of the civil war. The academic value of such an 
understanding is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the study of the 5/42 
illuminates some of the social context of the national resistance and the civil conflict 
during the occupation. The 5/42 was a national resistance organisation with an obvious 
local identity. The regiment’s rise was dramatically influenced by the geographical, 
economic and political conditions of the Fokida region before and during the occupation. 
On many occasions, these local conditions played a more decisive role by far in the 
regiment’s formation than other important developments on a national level. Therefore, 
the assessment of the impact that these local conditions had upon the rise of the 5/42 
gives insight into some of the social and micro-historical aspects of the national 
resistance movement. In doing so, it is hoped that this study will contribute towards 
expanding our knowledge over the micro-social history of the resistance, an area which 
has systematically been neglected by current historiography and research.
Secondly, there is plenty of scope for an academically sound appreciation of the 
history of the 5/42 as an episode of the polarisation within the national resistance
21
movement. In this sense, the value of studying the history of the 5/42 is not simply 
confined in the narrow geographical area where the regiment grew. It also reflects some 
of the structural features that gave the outbreak of the civil conflict among Greek resisters 
an air of inevitability. The failure to establish a third pole within the Greek resistance 
illuminates several aspects of the political antagonism between EAM-ELAS and its 
opponents, while it highlights some of the reasons that created an increasingly polarised 
environment during the last months of the occupation.
Thirdly the study of the relations between the 5/42 and the British gives deeper 
insight over the British intervention in Greece during the occupation. The role of the 
British in the Greek national resistance remains even today one of the most controversial 
themes of the occupation history. Based on a number of primary sources, this thesis will 
try to separate the myth from reality regarding the relations between the British and the 
5/42. The objective analysis of the British attitude towards the third largest resistance 
organisation is a valuable analytical tool for the better understanding of the British policy 
towards the overall Greek national resistance movement.
Structure o f  analysis and research questions
In its attempt to analyse the reasons behind the establishment, growth and 
eventual collapse of the 5/42, as well as to assess its role within the national resistance 
movement and the civil conflict, this thesis will study the 5/42 regiment through a three- 
level analysis:
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The micro-level looks at the group dynamics of the 5/42. It examines the social 
political and economic environment within which the 5/42 was formed, the group’s 
structure and internal politics, the strategies and objectives of the group’s leaders.
The key question that the micro-level analysis aims to answer is:
• Who were the agents, what were the circumstances and the events that influenced the 
emergence o f the 5/42 in the Fokida region?
The purpose of this question is to highlight all those factors that contributed towards the 
regiment’s formation. The argument of this thesis is that these main factors were: (a) 
geography, (b) the pre-war economic condition of the community, (c) the community’s 
political culture, (d) the impact that the occupation had upon the local community and (e) 
the initiatives taken by the pioneers of the 5/42.
This first question will be discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 looks at the 
social, economic and political conditions of the Fokida community during the pre-war 
decade. This is necessary since the 5/42 was a national resistance organisation closely 
linked to the community of Fokida. The pre-war economic and political institutions that 
were dominant within the community affected the formation of local resistance. The 
widespread poverty among the population during the pre-war decade had a serious impact 
on the membership of the 5/42 during the occupation, while the pre-war political culture 
of the community had also a major impact upon the ideological orientation of the 
regiment.
Chapter 2 examines the circumstances and events that led to the formation of the 
5/42 regiment during the early months of the occupation. A principal factor that benefited 
the development of resistance activity in the Fokida region was geography since the
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landscape in the area was ideal for such a purpose. Furthermore, the economic 
devastation along with the Italian reign of oppression caused frustration within the 
community and a widespread willingness to resist the occupying forces. Moreover, 
Chapter 2 looks at the pioneers of the 5/42 and the role they played towards the formation 
of the regiment. The purpose is not only to highlight their activities during the early 
months of the occupation, but also to discuss their personal motives and ambitions since 
the decisions that Colonel Psarros and the local officers took during that period had a 
major long term effect upon the regiment’s fate.
The meso-level looks at the 5/42 in the context of the civil war between different 
resistance groups and highlights the role that the regiment played in the political 
antagonisms. It also discusses the domestic politics of the 5/42 and the strategies that the 
regiment’s leaders adopted against EAM-ELAS. Furthermore, the meso-level analysis 
depicts the impact that the regiment’s collapse had upon the political developments 
during the last months of the occupation.
The key questions that the meso-level analysis aims to answer are:
• What were the policies that the 5/42 leaders followed in order to cope with EAM- 
ELAS and what was the effect o f EAM-ELAS’ aggression on the regiment’s domestic 
coherence?
• What were the official grounds upon which EAM-ELAS disbanded the 5/42, and what 
were the actual military and political causes behind the regiment’s disbandment?
• What were the motives behind the murder o f the leader o f the 5/42 Colonel Psarros 
and what were its political consequences?
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The first of these questions is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, the second in Chapter 5, 
while the last one in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3 discusses the outbreak of the first two conflicts between the 5/42 and 
ELAS. These two conflicts increased the hostility of the 5/42 men against EAM-ELAS. 
Furthermore, these two incidents had a crucial impact on the decision making of the 
leader of the 5/42. The regiment’s leaders did not follow a common policy towards 
EAM-ELAS and the first signs of discord started to appear amongst them. Chapter 4 
discusses the events that led to the regiment’s final disbandment. In its first half, it 
highlights the causes of the EKKA-5/42 schism that resulted in a mutiny of the 5/42 
guerrillas against Psarros and EKKA. In its second half, the chapter discusses the 
escalation of the crisis between the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS that eventually led to the final 
bloody conflict.
Chapter 5 focuses on the causes behind the disbandment of the 5/42. In the first 
part, Chapter 5 discusses ELAS’ official justification upon which the 5/42 was disbanded, 
while in the second part, it discusses the political and military objectives behind the 
disbandment.
Chapter 6 discusses the murder of Colonel Psarros. This is one of the most 
mysterious events of the regiment’s history and this chapter attempts to highlight the 
motives behind the murder. Moreover, this chapter’s second objective is to depict the 
impact of Psarros’ murder to the polarisation between EAM-ELAS and its opponents.
The macro-level looks at the international dimension of the 5/42 regiment of 
evzones. More specifically it looks at the place of the 5/42 in the context of the British 
policies in Greece during the occupation.
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The key question that the macro-level analysis aims to answer is:
• What was the British policy towards the 5/42 regiment and what was the attitude that 
the British maintained during the last conflict between the 5/42 and ELAS?
This question is considered in Chapter 7. In the first half, this chapter focuses on the 
political and military relationship between the British and the 5/42. In the second half, 
Chapter 7 focuses on the strategy that the British adopted against the regiment during the 
last 5/42-ELAS crisis that led to the final disbandment.
Sources and methodology
In pursuing the objective of answering the above questions, this thesis made an 
exhaustive and scholarly investigation of the available primary and secondary historical 
material that has been produced related to the 5/42 regiment of evzones and the 
occupation period. Firstly, it retrieved and used a large amount of primary documents. In 
using this material, the process and the circumstances under which every document came 
into existence was taken into consideration. The whole of this material is divided into two 
main categories. The first category includes all those documents that came into existence 
during the actual period discussed in this thesis. These documents include proclamations, 
reports, orders, telegrams, letters, memorandums, propaganda material, personnel files 
etc produced by the 5/42, EAM-ELAS and the British military services. The second 
category includes a number of published and unpublished documents that came into 
existence after the occupation period. These documents include unedited manuscript 
memoirs, personal reports and records, personal letters, diaries, articles from national and
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local newspapers and periodicals, newsletters, obituaries, brochures produced by people 
who played various roles in the actual events.
The reliability, in terms of bias, varies between the documents of these two 
categories. In general terms, the documents of the first set are less biased since they were 
produced serving the functional or bureaucratic purposes of the 5/42, EAM-ELAS and 
the British services. On the other hand, there is more bias in the documents of the second 
set, since most of these documents served specific purposes on the writer’s behalf and in 
many cases, they were produced with the purpose to affect the writing of history. 
Furthermore, in some cases the documentary material from both categories was 
substantial to provide a clear outline of events, while in some other cases it was rather 
fragmented and not enough to give efficient information. In any case though, these 
primary documents have been valuable sources for the writing of this thesis.
All of the above material was retrieved in the archives of various institutions and 
associations such as the Public Record Office in London, the archives of the Greek 
Army’s History Bureau in Athens, the Benaki Museum in Athens, the Library of the 
University of Athens, the Archives of Contemporary Social History (ASKI) in Athens, 
the 5/42 veterans association in Athens, the Panhelenic association of EAM national 
resistance fighters (PSAEEA) in Athens, the EDES veterans association in Athens, the 
Amfissa Prefecture, the Public Library of Amfissa, the Fokida Studies Society in 
Amfissa, the Laographical Museum of Amfissa, the Galaxidians association in Pireaus, 
the private archives of Mr Koutsoklenis, Mr Papathanasiou, Mr Protopapas, Mr Talantis, 
General Kaimaras and General, Dr Mannaios. (All of the specific references are listed in 
the bibliography section)
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Another valuable research method used in this case study was interviewing. A 
total of forty-seven interviews with thirty-seven individuals were conducted in Athens 
and in various towns and villages in Fokida throughout the period of this research. The 
interviewees fall into three main groups. The first group includes individuals with leading 
positions in the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS who played influential roles in the events. The 
testimonies of these individuals were quite substantial. As far as a number of issues and 
events is concerned, these people have developed solidified views frequently expressed in 
their memoirs and autobiographies. Therefore, the main objective in interviewing these 
individuals was not to insist on these saturated issues, but to draw information on less 
scrutinised aspects concerning the history of the 5/42 and their personal experiences. The 
second group includes veterans and sympathisers of both the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS with 
less influential roles. The major difficulty in interviewing this group of people was to 
identify and separate primary, personal experience from collective memory. In many 
cases, this was achieved and the results of some of these interviews were very interesting. 
The testimonies of these people over their personal journeys during the occupation, 
provided valuable information on the 5/42’s membership and structure, while they gave 
more insight into the basis of the 5/42-ELAS conflict. The third group includes offspring 
of 5/42 veterans, as well as other individuals with good knowledge of the topic. Although 
these people did not have direct experience with the events, their contribution to this 
research was very significant. They showed a great interest in this research and were keen 
to provide useful information and material. During all interviews notes were taken and at 
the end of every interview a summary of those notes was read back to the interviewees
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who were then asked to sign a certification. The names of the interviewees and the dates 
and venues of the interviews are listed in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis.
Furthermore, throughout the research period, the author made a number of visits 
to the Fokida region where in addition to interviews and archival research, he attended 
the annual ceremonies of the 5/42 and ELAS veterans associations, visited the battle­
fields and most of the areas that were connected with the history of the 5/42. The purpose 
of these visits was the familiarisation with the region of Fokida and the landscape, and 
the better understanding of the local people and culture.
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CHAPTER 1
Pre-war Fokida and the roots of the 5/42: Poverty and
Conservatism.
One of the major objectives of this thesis is to highlight the social context of the 
history of the 5/42 regiment of evzones. This is essential because, although the 5/42 was 
the third most important resistance organisation nation-wide, it was still a resistance 
group with a clearly local identity. The regiment was based in the Fokida region of 
central Greece, it was formed and manned almost exclusively by locals and it limited its 
activity uniquely within that region. Fokida was the 5/42 regiment’s vital space and there 
was a very strong link between the regiment and the local community.
The micro-level analysis focuses on the economic, social and political 
environment out of which the 5/42 emerged. In many aspects, the 5/42 was a product of 
Fokida and, therefore, it would be impossible to study the 5/42 regiment as a historical 
phenomenon unless great attention is given first to the community that produced it. 
Moreover, many of the events that occurred during the occupation in Fokida and which 
affected dramatically the formation and development of the 5/42 have their roots in the 
history of the 1930s. Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will focus on the condition
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of the local community before the outbreak of the war. The main sources that were used 
in this chapter are a number of local newspapers issued throughout the 1930s. These 
newspapers provide useful information about the region’s economic and political profile.
This chapter will start with a brief account of Fokida’s geography, since terrain 
was a major agent that contributed to the development of resistance activity in the area 
during the occupation. Secondly, the research will focus on the pre-war economic and 
social stratification of the local population. It is necessary to understand the region’s 
economy and the economic inequalities or class divisions among the population, since the 
rise of the 5/42 during the occupation was influenced by the pre-war economic condition 
of the local community. The third and final aspect that will be studied in this chapter is 
the political culture and the dominant patterns of political behaviour in Fokida during the 
1930s. The three main issues that will be highlighted are: electoral behaviour in the 
region, the ideology of the Greek right which was the dominant political force in Fokida, 
and the non-institutional patterns of political antagonism that were widespread during the 
1930s. The purpose is to understand the community’s political identity, the political 
attitudes and patterns of political behaviour that were dominant in the region. It is 
essential to understand the ways in which the people of Fokida had been politically 
socialised before the war since many aspects of that pre-war political culture survived the 
occupation and had a major influence in shaping the 5/42’s political identity.
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1.1. Geography
The Fokida region is a part of the Roumeli territory in central Greece. The 
region’s capital is the city of Amfissa. Fokida is divided into two provinces: the 
Pamassida province in the eastern part of the region and the Dorida province in the 
western part. Amfissa is the capital of Pamassida, while Lidoriki is the capital of Dorida.5
The region’s population in 1940 was 65,971 people, out of which 36,520 lived in 
the Pamassida province and 29,451 in the Dorida province. The largest towns of 
Pamassida were: Amfissa (5,466 inhabitants), Desfina (3.590), Itea (2,532) and Galaxidi 
(2,240). Dorida was less populated and its largest town was Lidoriki (1,611).
From the overall population of the region, 23% lived in those large towns, while 
the rest 77% lived in villages. There were 93 villages in the region out of which 61 were 
mountainous (above 500 metres) where 58% of Fokidas population lived and 32 were on 
hills and valleys (below 500 metres) where the rest 42% of the population lived. 6
Fokida is one of the most mountainous regions of Greece. High mountain chains 
cover almost the whole of its terrain, while between those mountains there are small and 
narrow valleys. The biggest and highest mountains of Fokida are Ghiona (2,510 metres), 
Vardousia (2,350) and mount Pamassos (1,714), while the largest valley is the valley of 
Amfissa.7
5 See list of maps
6 See Ministry of National Economy, 16 October 1940 census. Statistical data are based on the same 
source.
7 For details over the role that geography and terrain played in the formation of the 5/42 see ch 2.1, p 65.
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1.2. A Community sunk in Poverty: Social stratification in pre-war 
Fokida.
Before the outbreak of the war, Fokida was the poorest of the seven regions of
Roumeli and one of the poorest regions nation-wide (Drivas, 1980). The standards of
living were far below the national average and there was widespread poverty in the
community. Over half of the population was illiterate and only a small percentage of the
children who went to primary school continued their studies in high school. The region’s
road-network was almost non-existent. According to the “Amfissaiki” local newspaper:
‘Transportation with many towns of our region is done with primitive means. 
Transportation to Desfina, a town of 4.000 people, can be achieved only with the 
use of donkeys...during the winter, many villages are blocked for long periods”
(Amfissaiki, 3 November 1932).
Fokida was a dry region, there was no water supply system, and people had to carry water
from springs or wells for their daily needs. The condition of public hygiene throughout
Fokida was terrible. There was no drainage system and the garbage collection system was
poor. According to “Fokis”, another local newspaper:
“The primitive conditions of hygiene favour the development of various pestilential 
diseases. Especially typhus is extremely widespread in our region” (Fokis, 8 
September 1934).
The local health system was also poor and apart from a few private clinics, throughout
the region there was no public hospital:
“On a daily basis we see the poor suffering from various diseases since there is no 
medical care for them. These diseases along with famine cause tuberculosis and 
most of these people soon die” (Amfissaiki, 28 September 1933).
Although the vast majority of the population lived in poverty, there were still
some differentiations in their economic condition. During the pre-war period, Fokida was
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an especially agricultural and stock-farming region and consequently, the ownership of 
agricultural land along with income were the main dimensions of inequality within the 
community. Although there were economic inequalities within the community, these 
were minor. If Fokidas’ social stratification system during the 1930s was to be 
represented by a triangle, that triangle would have a very wide base and a very obtuse 
angle. In the bottom of that triangle, there was the peasantry of the mountainous areas, 
above them the olive-oil producers of the valleys and especially of the Amfissa olive- 
grove of Amfissa and on triangle’s top, the tradesmen, businessmen and public servants 
of Amfissa and the other larger towns.
In the mountainous villages where the 58% of the overall population of Fokida
lived, the vast majority of the peasantry lived in poverty and under very difficult
circumstances. The main reason for that poverty was the lack of available land for
cultivation. Fokida was a particularly mountainous and infertile region. Mountains
covered 96.6% of its overall surface, while 1.6% were hilly areas and just 1.8% were
valleys (Fokika Gramata, 1979). Just 13% (28,500 hectares) of its overall surface was
under cultivation (Drivas, 1980) and of course most of those areas were in the valleys.8
According to Richter:
“In 1936, the average income of a peasant family in Greece was 21.000 Drachma 
per year, while the minimum necessary amount for the survival of a family was 
28.000 drachma” (Richter, 1975, vol. I: 35).
8 The respective percentages for the whole of Greece were 68% mountains, 32% valleys while 30% of the 
overall Greek territory was under cultivation. (Richter, 1975, vol. I: 34). The conclusion that becomes 
obvious by comparing these figures is that Fokida was by far more mountainous and infertile than the rest 
of Greece.
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Taking into consideration the fact that Fokida was one of the poorest and most infertile 
regions nation-wide, it would be safe to assume that the average income of a peasant 
family in Fokida was even less than 21.000 drachma.
Agricultural land in Greece was divided into seven categories according to the 
size of fields:
a) very big (100 hectares and more)
b) big (99-50 hectares)
c) middle (49-20 hectares)
d) lower-middle (19-5 hectares)
e) small (4.9-2 hectares)
f) very small (1.9-1 hectares)
g) nano (less than 0.9 hectares) (Igoumenakis, 1987: 38).
According to estimates, 0.75 hectares was the minimum necessary land to cover just the 
survival needs for a family with 6 members (Igoumenakis, 1987: 55). Before the war, the 
vast majority of the peasantry in Fokida owned “nano” fields and just very few families 
owned some “very small” fields in the olive-grove valley of Amfissa (Koutsoklenis, 
interview 17 May 2000, Karavartogianos, interview 19 May 2000). Most families 
depended for their survival exclusively on the cultivation of these small pieces of land 
and in fact they struggled just to sustain themselves. The fields in the mountains were 
very infertile, small and scattered (due to the fact that children inherit an equal amount of 
the family land and thus fields were cut in very small pieces along time). In addition, the 
peasantry used primitive methods of cultivation and productivity was low. The biggest 
part of the production was to be consumed by the family that owned the land (self­
consumption) and the rest was to be sold or bartered for other products. For most families 
in mountainous Fokida, meat was a luxury and it was consumed only at Easter, while 
those who ate wheaten bread throughout the year were considered as wealthy, since white
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bread was in fact a status symbol in the mountainous communities of Fokida (Xiriotis, 
1962).
Poverty was also widespread among the peasantry in the hilly areas and the valley 
of Amfissa. The economic condition and standards of living of these communities was 
also poor and only slightly better than that of the peasantry in the mountainous areas. 
Amfissaiki wrote:
’’Due to the lack of land, fields are divided in small, insufficient pieces. The income 
of those agricultural families is by virtue poor. Furthermore that income is 
undermined by various factors such as weather disasters, plants and animals 
diseases, trade exploitation, heavy taxation and debts, many debts, debts to usurers, 
debts to tradesmen, public debts, debts to the National Bank, debts to the 
Agricultural Bank” (Amfissaiki, 17 July 1936).
The olive-grove in the valley of Amfissa was one of the largest in Greece and the
only product in that area was olives and olive oil.
“The life and existence of our town is unluckily dependent upon olives, our only 
product. I say unluckily, because experience has proved that monoculture is totally 
unfavourable for the producers” (Amfissaiki, 1 February 1933).
Due to monoculture there was no available land for the cultivation of other necessary
products. That caused serious unemployment among oil producers since they worked for
just four months and consumed for the rest of the year. Furthermore, the lack of
alternative cultivations meant that oil-producers were forced to cover their needs in other
products entirely through the market, something that seriously undermined their income.
Although oil was one of the most important products of Greek agriculture, the fact 
that it was an exportable -and to a certain degree a luxurious- product made it vulnerable 
to various international economic crises. Between 1929-1933 for example olive-oil 
exports dropped to one third, while there was a 22% drop in profits (Vergopoulos, 1978: 
49). Apart from that, the persistence of the local oil-producers in the traditional methods
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of cultivation, collection and manufacturing was unproductive and decreased the
competitiveness of the Amfissa olive oil against the products of other domestic and
foreign areas.9 Furthermore, local politicians also bare a large amount of responsibility
since they did not take any measures to support the local product. Amfissaiki complained:
“...while in Volos, Evia and Crete, all council taxes have been abolished, in our 
region not only do they remain, but they have also increased dramatically”
(Amfissaiki, 30 October 1934).
At the top of the social stratification pyramid of the local society there were the 
craftsmen, businessmen and public servants of Fokida. In the region there was no 
industry but only a number of small handicrafts occupied with the processing of olives 
and other agricultural products (oil and wheat mills etc) as well as the production of 
merchandise necessary for the farmers (barrel makers, blacksmiths, carpenters etc). 
Those handicrafts were small family businesses run exclusively by family members. A 
precise picture of the economic condition and the income of those handicrafts and 
businessmen was given in the “Amfissaiki” newspaper during March -April 1934. In 
those issues, lists of all craftsmen, traders and businessmen of Pamassida were published, 
along with their classification on the taxation scale. (Figure 1.1)10
9 Olive-trees are also extremely vulnerable to disease and the elements and of course the lack of fertilisers 
made the situation even worse.
Figure 1.1. Taxation scale of craftsmen, traders and businessmen of Parnassida
TAXATION
SCALE
EARNED 
PROFITS 
(in Drs)
PAYABLE 
TAX (in Drs)11
NUMBER OF 
BUSINESSMEN 
(383 in total)
AS % OF 
TOTAL
f t 20.000 300 98 25.5
1 25.000 600 155 40.5
2 30.000 900 60 16
3 35.000 1.200 34 9
4 40.000 1.600 11 3
5 45.000 2.000 4 1
6 50.000 2.400 5 1.3
7 55.000 2.900 4 1
8 60.000 3.400 3 0.8
9 65.000 4.000 0 0
10 70.000 4.600 4 1
11 75.000 5.300 0 0
12 80.000 6.000 3 0.8
13 90.000 7.500 1 0.2
14 100.000 9.000 0 0
15 110.000 10.500 0 0
16 120.000 12.000 1 0.2
// // // // //
30 300.000 39.000 // //
* Source: “Amfissaiki ", various issues March-April 1934
The nation-wide taxation scale went on until the 30th rank, but in Pamassida the 
wealthiest businessman reached just the 16th rank. Although the 383 businessmen listed 
above constituted the main nucleus of the upper class in Pamassida and they were on the 
top of the local social stratification pyramid, their economic condition was still poor 
compared to national standards. That becomes obvious if the income of those 
businessmen was compared with the salary of a traditionally badly paid public servant
10These businessmen, craftsmen and traders were: barrel makers, wheat and olive mills owners, 
shoemakers, tailors, barbers, blacksmiths, carpenters, electronic engineers, grocers, mechanics, coffee shop 
owners, bakers, printers, restaurateurs and fish mongers (see Amfissaiki March-April 1934).
38
such as the gendarme. During that time, the annual salary of the average gendarme was 
approximately 30.000 drachma.12 That means that 82% of the supposed upper class of 
Pamassida (the 313 businessmen that belonged to taxation scales lA, 1 and 2) earned less 
than a badly paid public servant. Another 12% earned just a little bit more (the 45 
businessmen that belonged to taxation scales 3 and 4), while the wealthiest businessman 
of the rest 6% (25 people) who were Pamassida’s “bourgeoisie”, was just in the middle of 
the nation-wide taxation scale (in the 16th place out of 30). Unfortunately, similar data 
concerning the economic condition in the Dorida province were not available. However, 
given the fact that (a) Dorida was situated in an even more mountainous terrain than 
Pamassida, (b) it was by far a poorer region and (c) its population was for 1/3 smaller 
than Pamassida, it can safely be assumed that its upper class was both smaller in numbers 
and less well off.
The study of social stratification in pre-war Fokida therefore reveals that the local 
community was economically and socially homogeneous since (a) wealth disparities 
amongst people within the same class were small, and (b) wealth disparities between 
different classes were small. That was mainly due to the fact that the main dimensions of 
inequality, land, capital and income were distributed without big deviations amongst the 
population. Highly unequal distribution of land had always been the source of 
polarisation and division among agricultural communities (e.g. in Thessally). In Fokida 
however, there was an extended homogeneity within the agricultural community both in 
the mountains and the valleys, since there were no big deviations in the size of land that
11 These amounts do not include council taxes (10% over the tax) that every businessman had also to pay 
(see Amfissaiki, March-April 1934).
12 See Amfissaiki, 4 September 1937. After graduating from the academy, the new gendarme’s salary was 
25.220 drachma, after three years in service it increased to 29.120 drachma and after six years it reached
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each farmer owned. Despite the fact that certain cleavages of conflict (such as for 
example the feuds between farmers and stockbreeders, or disputes between villages about 
the distribution of water) remained strong, there is no evidence to suggest that such 
conflicts were class-related.
In addition, there was no inter-group polarisation between the farming 
community and the upper class of Fokida. That was mainly due to the economic 
proximity between these two economic groups. The income of the businessmen and 
traders was in most cases poor and equivalent to the income of the farmers. Furthermore, 
those two economic groups were not related to each other through production relations, 
which caused exploitation and conflict, but through market relations, which were more or 
less stable and demanded the consent of both parts. Two more factors contributed to the 
lack of class related conflicts in pre-war Fokida. The first was the total lack of heavy 
industry and consequently the lack of an industrial proletariat, while the second was 
immigration. Poverty urged many young people to leave Fokida and look for a better life 
either in Athens and the big cities or abroad. As Meynaud argued:
“Immigration facilitates the protection of social order and the status quo by
diminishing the political pressure of the outcasts”(Meynaud, 1966: 24).13
33.020 drachma (These salaries do not include other small benefits such as uniform benefit, transference 
benefit etc).
13 For more details over the consequences that occupation had in the local economy and how these 
consequences affected the 5/42’s formation see ch 2.1 p 62 and ch 2.2.i, p 68.
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1.3. Political Culture and Patterns of Political Behaviour
1.3.i. Electoral Behaviour in Fokida: The Politics of Conservatism^
The pre-war political situation in Fokida was characterised by a widespread 
conservatism in the political and electoral behaviour of the community. Throughout the 
1930s, the wider anti-Venizelist, royalist, right wing faction was the dominant political 
force in the region.
The term “anti-Venizelist, royalist, right-wing” might sound abundant, but it is 
still the most accurate term to describe that specific faction. The rise and dominance of 
Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek politics caused an immediate and strong reaction by his 
opponents. Anti-Venizelist sentiments became the binding agent for a wide range of 
conservative groups, which rallied around Venizelos’ opposite, King Konstantinos. The 
outbreak of the schism between Venizelos and King Konstantinos during the First World 
War was therefore the landmark of the faction’s formation. According to 
Diamantopoulos:
“For the opponents of Venizelos, the crown was the common denominator of their 
peculiarities and differences, the unifying force of their faction, their true leader 
and their alternative proposition against Venizelos’ legend” (Diamantopoulos, 
1993).
The fundamental vital ideological belief of that faction was the preservation of a political 
establishment that would guarantee the protection of traditions and the existing social 
order.
The second most important political force in Fokida during the 1930’s was the 
Venizelist, liberal faction. This faction rallied around Venizelos and the Liberal Party and 
it had the support of more progressive and liberal groups, as well as a major part of the
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newly risen bourgeoisie classes. They opposed the traditional, reactionary and oligarchic 
establishment of the Monarchy and their objectives were the abolition of the Monarchy, 
or at least the submission of the monarch to the parliament and the modernisation of the 
economy and the state.
The study of the various electoral results in the 1930’s reveals the electoral 
strength of both camps in pre-war Fokida.
A) 25 September 1932 National Elections
Figure 1.2. 1932 National Election Results
PARNASSIDA DORIDA FOKIDA NATION­
WIDE %
DEVIATIO 
N %
VOTES % 14 VOTES % VOTES %
PEOPLE’S 15 3.363 43% 2.088 40% 5.451 41% 34% + 7%
LIBERAL 1.964 24% 1.650 31% 3.614 27% 33.5% - 6.5%
PROGRESSIVE 1.779 22% 1.432 26% 3.211 24% 8% + 16%
LABOUR + FARMERS 
UNION
781 10% 154 3% 935 7% 6% + 1%
KKE N/A 16 N/A N/A N/A 155 1% 5% -4%
♦Sources: "Amfissaiki ” 30 September 1932, Greek Editions Department
In the previous elections of 1928, the Liberal Party had won the national elections 
with the incredible percentage of 71.2%. In the 1932 national elections however, the 
electorate “punished” Venizelos. During the four years that Venizelos was in power 
(1928-32) there was a major financial depression in the Greek economy, caused by the 
international economic crisis in Europe and America. During those four years, the cost of 
living tripled, wages dropped by 13% and unemployment increased dramatically. That 
economic depression ignited many strikes and violent riots in the big cities and the 
Venizelist regime took a series of authoritarian measures in order to cope with the civil
14 The method of approximation has been used in the calculation o f  percentages.
15 The electoral results and percentages o f the Anti-Venizelist, Royalist, right wing parties have been 
highlighted.
16 Figures not available.
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discontent. In 1929 the government issued the “Idionymo” law against communism. The 
“idionymo ” was an entirely anti-constitutional law that violated fundamental democratic 
liberties and gave the police extensive authorities in the pursuit of communism and the 
protection of the established social order.17 From 1929 to 1932 the police killed 18 people 
and injured another 1.335 during riots. A total of 11.400 people were arrested for political 
reasons 2.130 of which were jailed and 200 were exiled (Alexatos, 1997: 234). 
Eventually, the oppression by the Venizelist government, combined with the economic 
crisis, caused the collapse of the Liberal Party which lost in these elections more than the 
half of its voters (the Liberal Party took 71.2% in the 1928 elections and it fell to 33.5% 
in the 1932 elections). All the opposition parties benefited, especially the People’s Party, 
which won the elections with 34% (while in the 1928 elections it managed to take just 
7.6%). Eventually, with the alliance of Metaxas’ royalist party that had won a mere 1.6%, 
the People’s Party came to power.
B) 5 March 1933 National Elections
Although after the 1932 elections the People’s Party with the support of Metaxas formed 
a government, they did not have the absolute majority and they ruled with the tolerance 
of the Liberal Party. In 1933 however, Venizelos overthrew the People’s Party’s 
government and he announced new national elections. Once more, the People’s Party 
won the elections with 38% (it increased its power by 5% from the previous elections), 
while the Liberal Party’s percentages remained the same (Figure 1.3).
17 For more details about the “idionymo ", see Mavrogordatos, 1983: 99.
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Figure 1.3.1933 National Elections Results
PARNASSIDA DORIDA FOKIDA NATION­
WIDE %
DEVIATIO 
N %VOTES % VOTES % VOTES %
PEOPLE’S 4.023 51% 2.703 55% 6.726 53% 38% + 15%
LIBERAL 3.831 49% 2.198 45% 6.029 47% 33% + 14%
KKE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.5% N/A
^Sources: "Amfissaiki” 6 March 1933, “Fokis” 6 March 1933, Greek Editions Department
The victory of the People’s Party was mainly due to the fact that its leader 
Panagis Tsaldaris officially and publicly acknowledged the legitimacy of parliamentary 
democracy. That was a very important decision since it meant that the People’s Party was 
abandoning its main objective which was the re-establishment of the monarchy. By doing 
so Tsaldaris won the support of all those democrats who were standing between 
Venizelos and the People’s Party. These were the people who feared that a People’s Party 
government would result in the re-establishment of the monarchy, but who at the same 
time had become indignant towards Venizelos’ authoritarian politics (Mavrogordatos, 
1983: 41-42).
C) 9 June 1935 National Elections
During the 1933 elections and while the counting of votes had not yet been 
completed, a group of democratic officers under the leadership of Nikolaos Plastiras 
attempted a military coup the purpose of which was the prevention of the monarchy’s re­
establishment. Those officers feared that an eventual People’s Party victory in the 
elections would bring the radical pro-monarchists (Metaxas and Kondylis) in leading 
governmental positions, something that would certainly lead to the re-establishment of 
the monarchy. Their coup was suppressed and finally the People’s Party won the 
elections, while Metaxas and Kondylis became Ministers of Internal affairs and Defence
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respectively. After the suppression of the movement, large-scale persecutions against 
democrats in the military and the public sector followed. Moreover, in 6 June 1933, there 
was an assassination attempt against Venizelos with the tolerance and cover-up of the 
police (Vlantas: 216). The danger of the re-establishment of the monarchy was then more 
than obvious and in order to prevent that outcome, a group of democratic officers, again 
under the leadership of Plastiras and with Venizelos’ consent, organised a new military 
coup for March 1935. Due to the lack of social support however, the coup was again 
suppressed. The people had become suspicious and frustrated towards all those 
successive military coups and the associated political instability. After the suppression of 
the new coup, the People’s Party government declared martial law and proceeded with 
new massive persecutions of democrats in the military and the public sector. In order to 
legitimise its rule however, the People’s Party proclaimed new national elections for 9 
June 1935. Venizelists boycotted these elections. They believed that they would not be 
conducted fairly since the country was still under martial law and the persecutions of the 
Venizelists were ongoing. Eventually the percentage of abstention from voting was just 
20% and the elections turned to a competition between moderate royalists (People’s 
Party) and the more radical ones (Metaxas). Something that was notable from these 
elections however, was the rise of KKE’s percentage that reached 10% (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4.1935 National Election Results
PARNASSIDA DORIDA FOKIDA NATION­
WIDE %
DEVIATIO 
N  %
VOTES % VOTES % VOTES %
PEOPLE’S 5.617 80% 4.686 87% 10.303 83% 65% + 18%
ROYALISTS
(M ETAXAS)
1.135 16% 353 6.5%
ooOO 12% 15% -3% :
KKE 109 1.5% 20 0.5% 129 1% 10% -9%
INVALID/BLANK 180 2.5% 322 6% 502 4% 6% -2%
*Sources: “Amfissaiki” 12 June 1935, “Fokis” 14 June 1935, Greek Editions Department
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D) 26 January 1936 National Elections
After the 1935 national elections, the Prime Minister and leader of the People’s 
Party, Tsaldaris was overthrown by his radical monarchist Minister of Interior Kondylis. 
After becoming the new Prime Minister, Kondylis concentrated his efforts on ensuring 
the restoration of the monarchy. He proclaimed a referendum for 3 November 1935 over 
the issue of the monarchy’s fate. The referendum was scandalously forged since it gave a 
percentage of 98% in favour of the restoration of the monarchy, while the sum of the 
votes outnumbered by far the sum of the registered voters. Almost immediately after the 
referendum, King George returned in Greece and regained his throne. The King released 
his benefactor Kondylis of his duties and appointed Demertzis as the new Prime Minister.
Demertzis’ government increased the oppressive measures taken by the Kondylis regime
PARNASSIDA DORIDA FOKIDA NATION­WIDE %
DEVIATIO 
N %
VOTES % VOTES % VOTES %
ROYALISTS 1.612 24% 2.655 48% 4.267 35% 20% + 15%
PEOPLE’S 2.499 38% 238 4% 2.737 22.5% 22% + 0.5%
LIBERAL 1.365 21% 1.784 32% 3.149 26% 37% - 11%
DEM COALITION 1.127 17% 888 16% 2.015 16.5% 4% +12.5%
KKE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6% N/A
*Sources: "Amfissaiki" 31 January 1936, Greek Editions Department
Venizelist parties together (royalist and the People’s Party), were greater than the one of 
the Liberal Party.18
The 1936 elections were the last free elections before the war since after 4 August 
1936 the King along with Metaxas imposed a dictatorship. During the Metaxas 
dictatorship censorship of press was imposed, hence local newspapers cannot be 
considered as objective sources, which can be used in the study of the community’s 
attitude towards the regime. Throughout the dictatorship’s period, “Fokis-AmflssaikT’ 
was full of propagandists articles in favour of Metaxas and his regime (Fokis-Amflssaiki 
5 June 1937-9 December 1940). In June 1939, Metaxas visited Amfissa and according to 
Fokis-Amfissaiki “the people of Amfissa welcomed him with magnificent enthusiasm” 
(Fokis-Amfissaiki 19 June 1939). Not many documents are available concerning the 
political climate in Fokida during 1936-1940, however Rekaitis (Rekaitis, 1978: 3-13), 
Karavartogianos (Karavartogianos, interview 19 May 200), N. Mamareli (N.Mamareli, 
interview 19 May 2000) and Talamangas (Talamangas, interview 20 May 2000) argue 
that peace within the community was not disturbed during that period and that the 
majority of the local people were sympathetic to the regime.
The analysis of the electoral results in Fokida during the 1930’s can produce 
several conclusions about the electoral behaviour as well as about the political trends that 
were dominant within the community.
• The anti-Venizelist, royalist, right-wing parties (People’s Party and Metaxas’ Party) 
easily came first in all the elections throughout the 1930’s.
• Apart from the 1932 elections, combined percentages of all the parties that belonged 
to the wider anti-Venizelist, royalist, right-wing faction were larger than the
18 See Mavrogordatos, 1983: 51-54
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combined percentages of all the parties that belonged to the Venizelist, liberal, 
democratic faction. The 1932 elections was the only time where the proportions were 
in favour of the anti-Venizelists (anti-Venizelists 41% -Venizelists 58%). In the 1933 
elections the proportion changed in favour of the anti-Venizelists (anti-Venizelists 
53% - Venizelists 47%). In 1935 anti-Venizelists won 95 % since Venizelist and 
democrats boycotted the elections19, while in the 1936 election the proportion was 
again in favour of anti-Venizelists (anti-Venizelists 57.5% - Venizelists 42.5%).
• In all national elections during the 1930’s, the overall percentages of the anti- 
Venizelists in Fokida were by far greater than the average percentages of the anti- 
Venizelists nation-wide. So in 1932 the difference was +7%, in 1933 it was +15%, in
1935 also +15% (People’s +18%, Metaxas -3% which equals 15%) and for 1936 it 
was +15.5% (People’s +0.5, Royalists +15% which equals 15.5%).
• The percentages of the Communist Party (KKE) in pre-war Fokida were negligible. 
In 1932 KKE took just 155 votes (1%), in 1935 just 103 (1%), while in the 1933 and
1936 elections local newspapers did not even mention KKE’s votes.
The study of electoral results in Fokida during the pre-war decade shows that the 
dominance of conservative right-wing parties in the region was overwhelming. Fokida
19 In order to find the percentage of abstention from voting the number of votes has to be subtracted from 
the number of the registered voters. The problem here was that although the number of votes was available, 
the number of the registered voters was not. Consequently the only way to get an idea about the percentage 
of abstention from voting in Fokida in the 1935 elections would be the comparison of the overall number of 
votes (participation) in those specific elections with the number of votes (participation) in the previous and 
next elections. These numbers were:
1932 13.366 votes
1933 12.755 //
1935 12.412 //
1936 12.168 //
What becomes obvious is that in the 1935 elections, the levels of participation and abstention remained at 
their usual levels. That means that the vast majority of Venizelists and Democrats in Fokida disobeyed 
Venizelos’s directive for abstention from voting and eventually voted for the People’s Party or Metaxas’ 
Party (Both Parties almost doubled their votes from the previous elections and won 11.791 votes).
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was a conservative, right-wing stronghold. A major reason that contributed to its
conservatism was the fact that Fokida was a region with a long history and its community
was attached to tradition and traditional values. According to Greek mythology,
Prometheus, the creator of humankind created the first humans in Fokida. Ancient
geographer and traveller Pausanias mentioned that he had seen stones in Fokida that had
the odour of human flesh and it was believed that they were the remains of the material
out of which Prometheus had created humans (Kolias, 1974). During the 1821 war of
independence, Fokida was one of the regions that played a very important role. Many of
the revolution’s leaders came from that region and a number of great battles against the
Turks took place there. Fokida was a part of old Greece and one of the first regions that
composed the diminutive Greek kingdom of 1830. According to Meynaud:
“It would be impossible to explain the Greek electoral behaviour without taking 
into consideration the longevity of every region within the Greek state. The social 
and economic conditions of every one of those regions and the conditions under 
which their integration with the motherland was accomplished influenced and still 
influence the political beliefs of the local societies. In other words, historical 
experience is an important factor in the political and party orientation of every 
region. Anti-Venizelism and conservatism in old Greece (Roumeli and the 
Peloponnese) was by far greater than in the new lands (Macedonia, Thesaly, 
Thrace) where anti-Venizelism remained a permanent minority” (Meynaud, 1966: 
45).20
1.3.ii. Fokida “The Acropolis of Conservatism”: An Ideological Outlook of the 
Greek Right.
In order to get a more complete picture of the local community’s political culture 
and understand the political background out of which the 5/42 regiment emerged, it is
20See also Mavrogordatos, 1983: 274.
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necessary to take a brief overview of the conservative political attitudes, beliefs and 
ideologies that were prevalent in Fokida during the 1930’s.
The study of the Greek conservative ideology and of the conservative political 
attitudes within the Greek society during the 1930’s is a quite difficult task mainly due to 
the conditions under which this ideology was shaped. The cohesion of the Greek right 
was not based upon the common economic or social interests of the groups that it 
represented, but rather upon a commonly shared hostility against Venizelos 
(Meletopoulos, 1993). That had a strong impact on the construction of the ideology of the 
Greek right. This ideology was not a product of long political and social procedures, but 
rather a product of instinctive and rapid political reactions. These rapid procedures upon 
which the right wing ideology was formed, caused a lack of rationalism. In other words, 
the ideology of the Greek right was not a system of beliefs that supported the economic 
and social interests of the social groups that it represented (Lipovac and Demertzis, 1998: 
22). A typical example would be the peasants of Fokida during the 1930’s who despite 
the fact that they lived in absolute poverty, they defended with great zeal the 
establishment, the preservation of social inequalities and the monarchy.
The motto that really captured the ideals of the right wing during the 1930’s was
“Motherland-Religion-Family”. These three ideals together represented the attachment to
tradition and the protection of the established social institutions and order. As Kanakari-
Roufou suggests, that conservatism was relatively simple in spirit:
“Conservatives are those who love whatever they have got used to, who are 
suspicious towards anything that is new, who do not believe in free quest, but in the 
example of the past. Conservatives are totally comfortable in their environment and 
do not want to change it. They do not believe in utopia and they tremble towards 
the idea of change.... They believe that the social order and hierarchy that they live 
in is the right one simply because it has been tested” (Kanakari-Roufou, 1993).
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The ideological profile of the People’s Party which during inter-war Greece was
the nucleus of the right wing was outlined by the party’s mentor Georgios Vlachos:
“The People’s Party is the party which is going to respect the law even if that is 
going to be against the country’s interest. It is the party of law and order, of the old 
customs, the old methods and traditions respective of the pros and cons of all these 
values. The People’s Party is probably not going to achieve much, but it is also not 
going to destroy. It is not going to practice great policies, but it is also not going to 
pay the price of such great policies” (Kathimerini 22 June 1932).
The ideological device of “Motherland-Religion-family” was quite shallow and
could not easily stand on itself. It needed an ideological scapegoat in order to become
more effective in unifying all conservatives. That scapegoat was none other than
communism. Anti-communism along with monarchism constructed the ideology of the
right wing during the 1930’s. In the Fokida region of 66.000 people, KKE managed to
gather just an average of 100-150 votes in every election. Although KKE’s power in
Fokida was obviously insignificant, the People’s party “Folds”, in its article “Social
research-Our Youth and communism” claimed that:
“Communism is spreading fast in our region and has started poisoning many 
youngsters in the traditionally conservative Pamassida...This article calls 
everybody to unite and fight effectively the spread of communist ideas in our 
region.. .it is a matter of honour that communists should not increase even by 
one.. .not even one communist must be left in Pamassida” (Fokis 20 May 1934).
Communism represented everything that was evil and communists were 
considered as:
“Lazy scum, who’s only objective is to grab other people’s property and abolish 
today’s social order by destroying religion, the church, the family and impose 
instead, polygamy and so many other evils” (Fokis 23 March 1934).
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According to the “intellectuals” of ‘Fokis-Amfissaiki ”,21 it was wrong to consider
communism as the ideology of the indigent working class, simply because there was no
such thing as an indigenous working class.
“Let’s examine the reasons for the so called working class misfortune and poverty. 
For any rational and objective person it is obvious that the working class is by no 
means underprivileged. Those who are indigent are themselves responsible for their 
poverty simply because they are spending more than what they should and thus 
they cannot support themselves and their families” (Fokis-Amfissaiki 5 June 1937)
Conservatism however was not just the monopoly of the People’s Party’s
supporters in Fokida during the 1930’s. On many occasions, the attitudes of the
supposedly progressive and liberal Venizelists were even more conservative than the
attitudes of their reactionary opponents. Although the discord among the two factions
was deep, it seems that the “Holy Trinity” of Motherland, Religion and Family were
common values. The Venizelist newspaper “Amfissaiki” protests strongly because:
“In the Amfissa high-school students gave a theatrical performance which had 
nothing to do with patriotism.. .because patriotic morale is low anything that is 
irrelevant with patriotism must be abolished in our schools” (Amfissaiki 16 March
1933).
As far as religion was concerned, the newspaper indicated that:
“While the churches are vacant from believers, coffee shops and taverns are full 
and that is something that leads to a complete disintegration of our religion and 
family values” {Amfissaiki 20 October 932).
Finally, the fact that the newspaper considered “the sight of young women smoking
cigarettes in front of the public as a sign of deep moral decay” {Amfissaiki 16 February
21 After the establishment of the Metaxas regime, both newspapers merged and issued the “Fokis- 
Amfissaiki”.
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22 •1934) is indicative about the attitudes concerning the family or the place of women in 
society among local Venizelists.
1.3.iii. The Unclear Rules of the Game: Antagonism, Patronage and Non- 
Institutional Politics.
Polarisation and the widespread use of non-institutional political patterns were the 
main features of political antagonism in Fokida during the 1930’s. The Greek rural- 
agricultural class never managed to form a distinct political identity, or an independent 
and wide political faction that would represent and defend its own political and 
economic interests. Eventually, the bourgeois parties during the inter-war period 
managed to cover that political vacuum. Venizelist and anti-Venizelist parties managed 
to engage the farmers in their dispute over the constitutional issue, an issue that was in 
fact a purely intra-bourgeous conflict and had nothing really to do with the interests of 
the rural classes.
As in the whole of Greece during the 1930’s, politics in Fokida were polarised 
around the issue of the monarchy. Although the anti-Venizelist, royalist, right- wing 
faction was dominant, there was a considerable number of Venizelists in the region. The 
degree of polarisation and discord between the two camps was clearly illustrated in the 
pages of Venizelist newspaper “Amfissaiki” and People’s Party-inclined “Fokis” The 
antagonism between the two papers was demagogic, while the lack of rational
22 On the other hand the newspaper of the People’s party '‘Fokis" constantly misspells the word 
“Feminism” (e.g. Fokis 23 March 1934).
23 The proportion of power between the two camps is also obvious in the size of both newspapers since 
Peoples party "Fokis ” was twice the size and the number of pages than Venizelist "Amfissaiki
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argumentation and the ideological clarity was obvious. Rhetoric and vocabulary were 
pompous, while both papers were full of spelling mistakes and bad use of language. 
Although “Fokis ” wrote that “The press should be above party interests and never add 
fuel to the fire, but should only serve social order and the prosperity of all citizens” 
(Fokis 26 August 1934), it characterised Venizelists as “indecent criminals and tyrants”, 
(Fokis 14 March 1933). A similar rhetoric was adopted by “Amfissaiki”. The libels from 
both sides often resulted in legal action and members of the two camps confronted each 
other in court {Amfissaiki 1 April 1934), while during the pre-electoral periods violent 
clashes among Venizelists and anti-Venizelists were quite usual {Amfissaiki 31 August 
1933).
The second major characteristic of political antagonism in Fokida during the 
1930’s was the lack of legal status in the conduct of the political game. Political 
antagonism was usually conducted outside a legitimate, institutional framework. The 
most common pattern of antagonism adopted by all parties was informal clientalism, the 
“rousfet?\  The “rousfeti” was based on the patron-client system. Clients gave their votes 
to patrons on the condition that the later would carry out certain private services or 
benefits for them when elected. According to Amfissaiki, “The laws of supply and 
demand is fully applicable in elections” {Amfissaiki 22 September 1932) and the vote, 
which is supposed to be an anonymous and impersonal act, was turned in to a 
commodity.
Poverty and informal clientalism were complementary to each other, since the 
larger the extent of poverty within a region, the larger the needs and the dependence of 
the clients on the local patrons. According to Meynaud:
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“These people were so poor that in many cases a rousfeti was in fact the only way 
to survive. Since the vote was one of the scarce privileges society had given to 
them, it was quite logical for them to use it in the most profitable way” (Meynaud 
1966: 43).
Fokida was one of the poorest regions nation-wide and consequently informal 
clientalism played a more dominant role in the local political antagonism. For many 
people in Fokida, political antagonism was in fact a struggle for survival since a possible 
failure of the patron to be elected could result in economic disaster for the voter.
For example, after the People’s Party won the 1933 elections and while only its 
own candidates were elected from the region, all Venizelists public servants were fired 
or transferred far away from Fokida in order to punish them for being Venizelists and to 
create new employment positions for the voters of the People’s Party. According to 
Amfissaiki:
“The People’s Party regime continues its brilliant work with transfers. The customs 
directors of Itea and Galaxidi, the forester inspector of Galaxidi, telegraph 
operators Vakalis, Ypsilandis, Stefos and Rigos are transferred. Their rage is also 
turned against Mr Karaliotis a well respected and hardworking public servant who 
has a health problem and who supports a whole family by himself. Mr Karaliotis is 
transferred to Palamara in Trikala and by that he is doomed to economic 
destruction.” (Amfissaiki 28 April 1933).
The dominance of the patron-client system in political antagonism during the pre­
war era resulted in a personal attachment of the clients to their patrons and vice versa. 
The link between the two was personal, not political. Clients kept supporting their 
patrons even if they swapped parties -something that was quite usual during that time- as 
long as they fulfilled their promises. On the other hand, when the patron did not keep 
their part of the deal, clients abandoned him and started looking for another patron. 
Informal clientalism distorted and undermined the role of political beliefs and ideologies 
in the political process. According to Mavrogordatos:
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“Political parties in particular, regardless of labels, programs and other 
paraphernalia of modernity, merely consist of unstable coalitions of patrons at the 
head of their respective clienteles...Moreover, [voters] respond to private 
inducements rather than policies, issues or group identification and interests” 
(Mavrogordatos, 1983: 12).
Politics were fundamentally non-ideological. Political coalitions were not built upon
shared beliefs and collective demands, instead the core of political coalitions was the
patron and the possible benefits that the clients could get from him. That had a serious
effect on the people’s understanding of politics. The institutional aspect of politics was
almost eliminated, while the importance of leaders and patrons was overemphasised in
people’s perceptions. Although the whole pre-war political establishment collapsed from
the very first day of the occupation, that interpersonal and self-interested attitude over
politics was preserved and was to become an important agent in the membership of the
5/42 regiment. Many were those who joined the regiment not due to political and
ideological motives, but who were motivated by their personal needs or their
interpersonal relationship with the 5/42 pioneers.24
Conclusion
If it is assumed that patriotism and the urge to fight the invaders were the only 
agents and motives upon which the 5/42 regiment of evzones was formed, then probably 
it would not be necessary to include in this thesis an overview of the pre-war economic 
and political condition of Fokida’s community. Nevertheless, the emergence of the 5/42
24 For more details, see ch 2.3.i, p i l l .
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like all other national resistance bands nation-wide was determined by several local 
peculiarities and factors which have to do less with patriotism and more with geography, 
economic conditions and political culture. The formation of the 5/42 and the course that it 
followed throughout its existence was influenced by all these local peculiarities.
The Fokida community was settled on high and impassable mountains. It was a 
rather classless community sunk in poverty. It was a conservative community attached to 
tradition, while political antagonism in it was not caused due to political or class related 
disputes, but due to personal conflicts and alliances. All these factors were to shape the 
5/42. As will be highlighted in the following chapter, Fokida’s mountainous terrain 
facilitated resistance activities and played a decisive role in the development of the 
regiment.25 Furthermore, the widespread poverty during the pre-war decade was also a 
major agent that affected the regiment’s leadership and membership. The young officers 
who later on became the regiment’s pioneers and played leading roles were in some way 
products of that poverty since due to the lack of career opportunities in the region these 
young men pursued careers in the military.
The pre-war political culture of the local community had also a major influence in 
shaping the 5/42’s political and ideological identity. Fokida was a community dominated 
by conservative, right wing ideologies and values. Although war and occupation brought 
the collapse of the pre-war political establishment, it did not also bring the collapse of the 
local pre-war political culture. Several aspects of the community’s political identity and 
several political attitudes and ideologies that were dominant during peacetime managed 
to survive and remain popular during the occupation. The 5/42 was a resistance band with
25 For more details see ch 2.1, p 62.
26 For more details see ch 2.2.i, p 68.
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a clear local identity and therefore, its political orientation was inevitably bound with the 
local community’s pre-war political culture. Although the regiment was formed on an 
entirely non-political basis and although it was officially a resistance organisation that 
served no political objectives, the regiment’s men maintained their pre-war personal 
political beliefs and gradually, they developed a collective political identity similar to the 
political ideologies that were dominant throughout the community during the pre-war 
decade.27
27 For more details see ch 2.3.iii, p 120.
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CHAPTER 2
Towards the formation of the 5/42
Since the early days of the occupation, Colonel Dimitrios Psarros and a group of 
low-rank officers from Fokida took a series of initiatives towards the formation of a 
national resistance band in the Fokida area. Eventually their joint efforts resulted in the 
formation of the 5/42 regiment of evzones28 in the spring of 1943.
The objective of the micro-level analysis in this chapter is to focus upon the 
leaders and members of the 5/42 regiment of evzones. This chapter will highlight the 
backgrounds of the 5/42 pioneers. It will discuss the motives, actions and ambitions that 
led the local officers, Colonel Psarros and their followers to join the resistance. This is 
important because the ambitions of the 5/42 pioneers and the decisions that they took 
during this early stage had a serious long-term effect on the regiment’s growth. These 
decisions influenced the regiment’s membership, its political and ideological identity, its 
strategy and in many ways sealed the regiment’s fate.
The chapter will begin by providing an overview of the impact that the occupation 
had upon the local community and of the circumstances that motivated many local
28 Before the outbreak of the war, the 5/42 regiment of evzones, or “the 5/42” as it was called by the locals, 
was a regular regiment of the Greek infantry based in Roumeli. For the reasons that Psarros gave his 
guerrilla band the same title see ch 2.3.ii, p 116.
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officers to take resistance initiatives. The purpose is, firstly, to highlight the reasons that 
made the formation of resistance activity in the area possible and, secondly, to stress the 
reasons that made die local officers pioneers of such activity. The widespread frustration 
caused by the economic devastation, the stifling reign of the German and Italian 
oppression, the fact that morale was preserved on the population’s behalf, and of course 
the mountainous terrain formed the ideal conditions for the emergence of resistance 
activity in the area. As far as the local officers were concerned, the severe hardships and 
persecutions that they faced soon after they returned to their homes from the Albanian 
and Macedonian fronts, combined with the sense of national duty that many of them 
maintained led them to take the lead in co-ordinating such activity.
Later, the chapter will focus on the 5/42’s leader, Colonel Dimitrios Psarros, and 
his early activities towards the formation of resistance groups. Firstly, the motives that 
led Psarros to undertake a leading role within the resistance will be discussed, and then 
Psarros’ activities will be presented in chronological order, starting with his premature 
resistance attempt in Macedonia. That aspect of Psarros’ activity remains overlooked in 
the current literature, nevertheless the bitter lesson that Psarros learned in Macedonia had 
a serious impact upon the strategies that he adopted later on towards the formation of his 
second resistance endeavour, the 5/42 regiment. Further in this chapter, the political 
resistance organisation EKKA, formed by Psarros and other political officials will be 
highlighted. EKKA was to become the 5/42 regiment’s political branch and this chapter 
will focus upon its political objectives and ideology. Moreover this chapter will give 
some explanation about the deeper reasons behind two major strategic mistakes that 
Psarros made during the period that he was preparing the 5/42’s formation. The first was
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his considerable delay in forming the regiment, while the second was his absence from 
the sabotage on the Gorgopotamos bridge. It is very important to understand the causes of 
these two mistakes because they both had tremendously negative effects on the 
regiment’s development and expansion.
The final section of the chapter will focus upon the 5/42’s men and upon the 
regiment’s political and ideological orientation during its early life. Firstly, some of the 
motives that led many individuals to join the 5/42 will be highlighted. This is important 
in order to understand that participation in the regiment was not only due to patriotism or 
due to the urge to fight the invader, but it was also due to a series of personal motives that 
were rather irrelevant to the ideals of national resistance. Secondly, the regiment’s 
official political and ideological line will be highlighted and this will be compared 
against the political attitudes that were widespread among the regiment’s men. Colonel 
Psarros and the local officers had an equally important role in shaping and defining the 
regiment’s political identity. Although Colonel Psarros was the one who defined the 
official political line of the 5/42, the local officers and their men maintained several 
political attitudes that were beyond the official line.
A number of personal testimonies by protagonists, as well as by less influential 
people have been used in this chapter. These were collected from primary unpublished 
sources (e.g. personal reports), interviews and the literature. Most of these sources 
however, have been produced not during the period that this chapter is concerned with, 
but subsequently. The reason for that is that during that period, the 5/42 had not yet been 
formed, consequently there was not any means by which to produce documents such as 
orders, proclamations, newspapers etc.
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2.1. The Early Months of the Occupation in Fokida: Building the Pillars 
of National Resistance.
For the Fokida region, the “long night” of the occupation began officially with the 
capture of Amfissa on 29 May 1941 (Karavartogianos, 1988). Although the Germans 
were the first to enter the region, they handed command over to the Italian forces which 
were responsible for the administration of central Greece (of which Fokida was a part). 
Large Italian garrison headquarters were established in all major towns of the region 
(Amfissa, Lidoriki, Galaxidi and Itea).
Since the first day of the occupation, a series of restrictive measures were 
imposed. Those measures included the requisition of buildings and means of transport, 
the surrender of all arms -even hunting rifles and antiques, the forbidding of traffic after 
18:00, the forbiddance of travelling without written permission, the blocking of radio 
transmitters, even the change of street names which disturbed the Italian command 
(Galaxidi, 22 April 1950). Despite all the restrictive measures however, little by little 
disobedience started growing and a series of resistance activities were soon manifested. 
Many weapons were not delivered to the Italians, but instead were hidden. People 
unblocked the radios and kept listening to the BBC broadcasts (Skiadas, 1999: 217), 
while others assisted the escape of many British soldiers who had not caught up with the 
retreat of the British corps and were hiding in the region (Koutsoklenis, manuscript 
memoirs). Nevertheless, despite the stifling reign of oppression, the first days of the 
occupation passed in tranquillity.
During the winter of 1941-42, “the winter of the great famine”, however, the 
climate started to change. During that winter approximately 100-150.000 people starved
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to death nation-wide, most of them in Athens and the other big cities (Gasparinatos, 
1998, vol.l: 47, Magriotis, 1949: 75-80). The main reasons for this tragedy were the 
confiscation of production and national wealth by the occupation forces, the separation of 
the country in three occupation zones, the allied blockade of the sea routes, the 
uncontrollable rise of inflation, profiteering and the black market etc (Kazamias, 1990: 
47-49). In occupied Fokida the situation was tragic and it had dramatic consequences 
upon the local population. Even in times of peace, the economic condition of the vast 
majority of the local people was very bad, but during the occupation the situation became 
really hopeless (Kolovos, 1995: 184). As a mountainous and infertile region, Fokida was 
highly dependent on imports of food from other areas. Due to the restrictive measures 
that the occupiers had imposed, trade and generally the circulation of goods in and out of 
Fokida had become very difficult. Furthermore the Italians were confiscating large 
quantities of food, while sometimes they literally pillaged farmers during raids. An 
additional plague was the bands of rustlers and bandits who made their appearance 
throughout the region.
The occupation was an economic blow for the whole of the local community and 
led all local social and economic groups in Fokida to a state of complete poverty. The 
pre-war social stratification system collapsed. Poverty had become universal within the 
community and even the minor economic inequalities that existed in the community 
before the war had almost vanished. Due to the uncontrollable rise of inflation, the first 
group that was devastated was that of the civil servants and wage earners and generally 
all those people who supported themselves by their wage exclusively and who had no 
other source of income or considerable property. By the end of the occupation the price
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of food rose by 50.000%, while wages just rose by 2.000% and the average monthly 
wage was enough for the purchase of just 10 Kg of bread (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 58). 
The real value of all wage earners income had come to nothing. For example the smallest 
bank note during the occupation was 100.000.000.000 drachma, and while the pre-war 
price of an egg was 3 drachma, in October 1944 it had reached 700.000.000.000 drachma 
(Magriotis, 1949: 61). Along with wage earners, all traders and businessmen who traded 
anything other than food (e.g. mechanics, printers, tailors etc) were also devastated. The 
only thing that these people -the local “bourgeoisie class” of the past- could do to survive 
was to sell their property at knockdown prices on the black market for some food. By that 
way many houses, large pieces of land, expensive jewellery etc changed hands for a sack 
of wheat or a canister of oil (A. Mamarelis interview 3 December 1999, N. Mamareli 
interview 19 May 2000, Stathopoulos interview 8 January 2000, I.Kokoris interview 16 
August 2000).
The commodity that was the most scarce, the most necessary and the most 
valuable during the occupation was food. Thus farmers became the new “bourgeoisie 
class” of the occupation. In reality of course, the condition of the farming peasantry was 
very bad, but at least they had easier access to food and for them survival was easier than 
for the non-farmers, or for the people who lived in the cities. Before the war, the 
mountainous peasantry was the poorest group of the local community, while the 
economic condition of the peasantry in the valleys was better. During the occupation 
however, the condition of the peasantry in the mountainous villages was in many respects 
better than the one of the peasantry in the valleys. This fact played an important role in 
the development of the resistance movement in Fokida later on. The main reason for that
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was the presence of the occupying forces in the valleys and the larger towns of Fokida. 
Hence, although agricultural production in the valleys was better, the Italians managed to 
confiscate larger quantities since they had those areas under their control. Moreover, the 
circulation of goods in those areas was by far more difficult due to the restrictive 
measures that they had imposed. In the mountainous areas however, production might not 
have been good, but at least those areas could not be controlled effectively by the Italians, 
the circulation of goods there was more effective, while the quantities of food confiscated 
were fewer.
In many aspects, the climate in Fokida had become fruitful for the development of
national resistance nucleuses. Since the winter of 1941-42 and as the occupation
progressed, the conditions were becoming increasingly harsh and survival for the locals
was becoming extremely difficult. The Italians increased their aggression and adopted a
more provocative attitude.
“Their daily practices included constant provocation, attacks with no reason against 
individuals, bullying weak and old people beating up and arresting people with no 
reason etc” (Kolovos, 1995: 184).
Respectively, the discontent and hate of the local population against them were growing
day by day. Various minor acts of sabotage, such as the cutting of telephone wires or the
destruction of bridge pillars started (Koutsoklenis, manuscript memoirs), while many
individuals who were persecuted by the Italians or the gendarmery for various offences
started forming small armed bands in the mountains for their self protection.
Furthermore, the landscape in Fokida was perfect for the development of guerrilla 
warfare. The isolated mountainous villages were ideal for the formation of resistance 
nucleuses. The non-existence of a road network in the region made transportation of
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troops very difficult and the inaccessible high mountains of Fokida provided safety from 
the occupation forces. According to a Greek army’s manual of guerrilla and unorthodox 
warfare
“Mountainous terrain, forests, the lack of road-network etc favour the development 
of guerrilla warfare since regular troops face great difficulties in persecuting and 
exterminating the enemy. In mountainous terrain, it is very easy for a small 
guerrilla band to occupy hills or other narrow parts and exterminate much larger 
forces. By that way the deficiencies of small guerrilla forces over mighty regular 
forces are neutralised.... Furthermore, air cover or the use of artillery in the 
mountains is not effective since there are many places which can remain unbattered 
by fire and the effectiveness of explosions is limited” (General Army Command, 
1950: 3-4).
Apart from the frustration caused by the occupation and the ideal landscape, 
another important agent that made the development of resistance activity in Fokida 
attainable was the psychological preparation and readiness of the population. By virtue, 
the guerrilla struggle is always a struggle of a David against a Goliath. It is a kind of 
struggle where the psychological factor plays a by far more important role than logistics, 
military tactics or efficiency in arms and provisions etc. In many cases the psychological 
factor is the catalyst that equalises a small, unarmed guerrilla band with a large, fully 
armed, well-organised and trained regular army. In the case of Fokida as well as in the 
case of the whole of Greece during the occupation, the psychological condition that made 
many individuals receptive towards national resistance and urged them to undertake 
resistance activities was the enslaved winner’s syndrome.
That syndrome was shaped under the influence of two events: the victories of the 
Greek army on the Albanian front, and the subsequent occupation. Victory and defeat 
caused mixed emotions. These contrasting emotions shaped the enslaved winners 
syndrome which was a mixture of bitterness, rage and pride. Bitterness came from the
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final outcome of a victorious war effort. Rage came from the fact that the country was
occupied not just by the Germans -who were indeed victorious in the battlefield -  but
also by the Italians, which the Greek army had defeated, as well as by the Bulgarians:
“The cowardly and treacherous Bulgarian hyena that did not even dare to 
fight us and that was hiding in the dark waiting for the German tiger to throw a 
bone at her” (Fleisher, 1995: 102).29
Finally pride came from the fact that the Greek people lost with dignity after giving a
brave fight against two mighty empires.
“It was a collapse that had a tragic magnificence. It was not a moral defeat that 
paralysed the will for action. Moreover it was not a submission. The peoples’ soul 
remained an impregnable fort and even before the wounds of Albania were healed 
the wild flags of national resistance were risen.” (Papandreou, 1988: 17).
The fact that Fokida was within the Italian occupation zone made the effects of
the syndrome stronger. When for example the Italian headquarters issued an order forcing
all pedestrians who passed outside the headquarters to salute the Italian flag, “everybody
stopped passing from that road since they considered it humiliating to salute a symbol
that they had humiliated so much” (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 20, “Galaxidi” 22 April
1950). The enslaved winner’s syndrome is obvious in the memoirs and testimonies of all
the people who manned the 5/42 later on. According to Georgios Koutsoklenis:
“The belief that we were the winners gave us courage and inspired us with that 
fascinating thirst for revenge” (Koutsoklenis, manuscript memoirs).
According to Ioannis Dedousis:
“For the first time in his life Thymios [his brother] was so bitter. The occupation of 
his country after such a great struggle in which he gave everything was a torture for 
him. Optimism and faith though did not abandon him and he took the decision to 
fight” (I. Dedousis, 1949: 11-12).
29 Taken from a brochure issued by the PEAN “Panelinios Enosi Agonizomenon Neon” (Panhellenic 
League of Fighting Youth) resistance group In July 1943.
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The syndrome helped in overcoming the fears and doubts about the prospect of national 
resistance. In other words it rationalised national resistance, a goal which at first sight 
seemed impossible to achieve.
The pillars upon which national resistance in Fokida could be formed were ready. 
The terrain was ideal, the people were suffering and needed to find ways to survive, the 
occupants were arrogant, oppression was stifling and morale had survived. What was 
missing -but not for very long- were the people who would take initiatives and lead.
2.2. The Pioneers of the 5/42.
2.2.i. The Local Officers.
The people who led the resistance struggle in Fokida and who became the 
pioneers of the 5/42 were the region’s local military officers. The reasons that led these 
men to undertake resistance initiatives have equally to do with the officer’s destiny in 
times of war and occupation as well as with the specific economic and political 
conditions that prevailed in Fokida before and during the occupation.
The local officers were too many in number. During the early days of the 
occupation, there were approximately 200-250 local officers scattered all around the 
region.30 According to the 1939 army annual list, the total number of officers in service in 
the Greek army during that time was 4.500 men (Gerozisis, 1996, vol.2: 527). That
30 The estimation about the number of the local officer is based on a) post-war written requests for the 
awarding of medals and national resistance pensions that many veteran officers of the 5/42 submitted to the 
Ministry of Defence (e.g. DIS/GES F/929), b) name catalogues of 5/42 officers taken by memoirs and 
books (e.g. Koutras, 1981: 63), c) interviews, (e.g. Kaimaras, 11 May 2000, Protopapas 14 January 2000)
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means that almost one in every twenty officers of the Greek army came from Fokida, a 
quite high proportion for such a small region with a small population. The fact that 
Fokida had such a large number of officers was directly connected with the pre-war 
economic, social and political conditions that were dominant in the region. During the 
pre-war period, the vast majority of the local population lived in poverty.31 One of the 
very few ways for young people to escape that poverty and improve their standards of 
living was either to emigrate, or pursue a career in the army and the other forces (police, 
gendarmery, fire brigade etc).
Especially for the young men in the mountainous villages of Fokida, where the 
economic conditions were really bad and the chances for economic improvement within 
the village were negligible, a career in the army was truly a lifetime opportunity to escape 
not only poverty, but also agricultural hardship. Giorgos Kaimaras, one of the pioneers of 
the 5/42 writes:
’’The hardness and the difficulties that I faced during my childhood motivated me 
to become the best student in my class and reinforced my dream and ambition to 
leave my village and one day become a distinguished officer” (Kaimaras, 1994: 
13).
A career in the military offered not only occupational permanency and a stable income, 
but also social status “because then, the patriotic morale of the people was high, Greek 
youth was full of ideals and becoming an officer was something very honourable” 
(Kaimaras, 1994: 13). In Fokida where the non-agricultural occupations were very scarce, 
the officer’s status was even higher than in other more industrialised areas with a larger 
variety of occupations.
31 Seech 1.2,p 33.
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However the fact that many young men in Fokida followed military careers had 
also to do with political causes. Due to the extended persecutions against all Venizelist 
officers during the 1930’s, more than 4.500 officers were discharged or forced to resign.32 
These persecutions created a personnel vacuum in the military and a great need for new 
officers to man the Greek army. Moreover, the People’s Party government, the King and 
Metaxas wanted to have the military under their complete control and consequently, 
throughout the 1930’s thousands of pro-royalist officers were recruited mainly through 
informal clientalist networks. Fokida was a conservative pro-People’s Party stronghold 
and consequently the local People’s Party informal clientalist network was favoured by 
that political occurrence. Many local young men managed to enter the armed forces and 
almost in every village throughout Fokida there was at least one or two officers. In Klima 
for example, a village of 205 people with 102 men (Ministry of National Economy, 1940 
census), there were 6 officers (DIS/GES F/929/A/6).33 Therefore, at the dawn of the 
occupation throughout the region there was a lot of “raw material”, men that were 
capable to undertake resistance activity given time and chance.
During the occupation’s early days, a sense of responsibility was developed 
among many young and enthusiastic officers. Many of them considered that their duty 
was not over after the surrender, but that they should form resistance nucleuses and 
continue the fight against the invaders. These officers considered themselves as the 
designated people for such a mission since “in times like these, the nation depends on its 
officers” (Kaimaras, interview, 18 December 2000). The experience of the Albanian front
32 See Gerolymatos “The role of Greek army officers in the resistance” in Greece 1936-44 -International 
Historical Conference, 1990: 290-301. That number includes the 1933 and 1935 discharged and generally 
all the officers that were discharged by the People’s party government or the Metaxas regime throughout 
the 1930’s.
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was also a very important psychological motive that reinforced the determination and 
self-confidence of these officers to continue the fight against the invader and get a 
“rematch” (Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000). During those battles, the Greek army 
crushed the Italians which had the double manpower and which were by far better 
equipped and armed. The defeats of the Italian army made those officers to believe in 
themselves, abandon their hesitations and realise that the enemy was not unbeatable and 
that the continuing of the struggle was an attainable task that could lead to new victories.
The fact that local officers became receptive to the idea of undertaking resistance 
activity had also a lot to do with a series of difficulties that these men had to cope with 
when they returned to their homes after the collapse of the front. First of all the 
uncontrollable rates of inflation that daily increased made their wages literally worthless 
the next day they collected them (Protopapas, interview: 14 January 2000). The value of 
money was annihilated, people stopped using money for their purchases and trade had 
deteriorated to barter. Consequently, the condition of those officers, who had no other 
income or asset than their wage, was more than desperate. It was much worse than the 
condition of even the poorest peasants who had at least a small piece of land to cultivate 
and cover a few of their survival needs.
Their wage was useless, it had no exchange value and no one accepted to trade
goods for money. Kaimaras writes:
“During the 1941-42 winter, my family suffered from lack of food, especially olive 
oil and my small brothers suffered from avitaminosis. I went to Amfissa to find a 
solution to that problem and I begged some old schoolmates of mine (Tsimbouris, 
Argyriou and others) to sell me a canister of olive oil. Unfortunately they refused. 
That was the attitude and the lack of solidarity among some people during that 
time” (Kaimaras, 1994: 43).
33 DIS=”Dieuthinsi Istorias Stratou” Bureau of Army’s History. Special branch of the Greek General Army 
Command
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Kaimaras’ complaint is understandable, but what he probably had disregarded was the 
fact that since money had no actual value, by asking to buy a can of oil in cash, he was 
in fact asking to get one for free.
Furthermore, the return of those officers in their homes after the collapse of the 
front was a total economic disaster for them and their families. Before the war, those 
officers used to get transferred all the time and thus they usually lived alone, away from 
homes and they supported their families by sending them most of their wages.34 When 
they returned home, they ceased being the family’s providers and instead they became 
economic “liabilities”. Their salary was worthless and thus the family budget was 
deprived from its major source of income. Moreover, they burdened the family budget 
with an extra person. Survival for themselves and their families became even more 
difficult than for other people and that was probably an additional reason which led these 
officers to the resistance since among other things the resistance struggle was also a 
struggle for survival.
Along with all those survival difficulties that the Fokida officers had to cope with, 
their condition became even more desperate after the Italians launched extended 
persecutions against them. As soon as the Italian forces settled in Fokida, they made lists 
of all the officers that came or lived in the region and monitored their activities discretely. 
For that purpose they had also recruited Greek collaborators, who were roaming all over 
the region with several pretexts (hunters, black- marketers, fugitives etc) and who were 
collecting information about possible cases of resistance activity among officers 
(Dedousis, 1949: 15, Koutras, 1981: 40-41, Kolovos, 1995: 186). When rumours about
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the development of resistance groups grew, the Italians adopted more decisive tactics and 
started persecuting openly the local officers (DIS/F/929/A/1, DIS/F/929/A/6). They took 
members of the officers’ families as hostages, they made a series of arrests, raids or 
arsons in officers’ houses etc (Koutras, 1981: 40-41, Kaimaras, 1994: 44).35 After those 
persecutions many officers became fugitives.
The earliest initiative towards the formation of national resistance bands in Fokida 
was taken by the artillery officer Captain Thymios Dedousis. After the collapse of the 
front, Dedousis returned to his village, Tritea of Pamassida, and almost immediately 
(August 1941) started making plans for the formation of an armed resistance band in his 
region. He made contacts with other veterans from Tritea and the nearby area, he hid and 
helped a group of stranded British soldiers to escape Greece, while in July a shepherd led 
him to a hideout where he discovered 52 riffles hidden by Greek soldiers during the 
army’s retreat.36 Dedousis however did not take the necessary precautions and soon his 
activities drew the attention of the Italians who began prosecuting him. He fled to Athens 
where he tried to contact other officers and political friends, but eventually in January 
1942 he was arrested and imprisoned.
The most important and well organised of all the early resistance initiatives taken 
by local officers was that of EAS “Ellinikos Apeleytherotikos Stratos” (Greek Liberation 
Army). EAS was formed by the artillery officers Captain Athanasios Koutras and
34 For example, Kaimars’ father was disabled and before the war he was the one who supported his parents 
and brothers. (Kaimaras, 1994: 12)
35 The Italians raided Kaimaras’ house and took his mother hostage in order to force him to appear every 15 
days to the Italian headquarters, while later they arsoned Koutras’ house as well
36 See I. Dedousis, 1949: 11-15. Ioannis Dedousis was Thymios’ brother and the references come from his 
book “Thymios Dedousis, Captain-Member of Parliament. The national martyr fighter” Athens 1949
37 Dedousis stayed in prison for almost one and a half years suffering tremendous tortures. In May 1943 
however he managed to escape and later on he joined the 5/42 regiment. Dedousis’ later role sealed the 
regiment’s fate (For more details about Dedousis see ch 3.3.ii, p 161).
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Lieutenants Giorgos Kaimaras and Giorgos Douros in November 1941. The basis of the
small group were the nearby villages of Pamassida: Penteoria, Vounichora and Agia
Euthymia which were the birthplaces of the three officers respectively. All three knew
each other before the war and after the collapse of the front, they decided to co-ordinate
their efforts for the development of a guerrilla band “with an exclusive aim: the war
against the invaders, with absolutely no other political objective” (Koutras, 1981: 3).38
Soon the Italians discovered their plans and raided Koutras’ house, while later on they
burned Kaimaras’ house as well. According to Kaimaras:
“From that point onwards, willing or not I had to go underground and I stopped 
sleeping in my house. The same happened to my colleagues Koutras and Douros 
with whom I was frequently in contact” (Kaimaras, 1994: 44).
In the spring of 1942, EAS formed its first armed band. The band was manned by 
nine ex veterans of the Albanian front from the nearby area and a local rustler. They were 
armed with the weapons that they kept during the Greek’s army retreat (Koutras, 
interview: 9 January 200, Koutroukis, interview: 22 April 2000). The band’s main duties 
at its early stage were the persecution of theft and rustlery and the maintaining of the 
local population’s morale. In December 18th 1942 EAS undertook its first battle against 
Italian troops in co-operation with an ELAS band. Seven guerrillas from EAS and 
eighteen from ELAS ambushed an Italian truck with 24 men in the Dovrouvista area. The 
Italians suffered 11 dead and 11 captured, who were executed the next day, while EAS 
suffered its first casualty, Dimitrios Bartziotas (Koutras, 1981: 38-39, DIS/GES 
F.929/B112-3).39
38 See also Kaimaras, 1979: 19).
39 In addition to EAS, throughout the period between autumn 1941-spring 1943 where the 5/42 was 
eventually formed, a number of other local officers throughout Fokida probed the prospect of forming 
armed guerrilla bands in the region and started taking initiatives towards the formation of resistance
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2.2.ii. Colonel Psarros.
2.2.ii.a. Low Self-esteem, High Expectations: Inside Psarros’ Head.
The leader of the 5/42 regiment Colonel Dimitrios Psarros (1893-1944) was bom 
in the Hrisso village of Pamassida. He started studying philosophy, but at the age of 
twenty he dropped out of his studies and volunteered in the Balkan Wars. In 1916, he 
graduated from the military academy and took part in the Macedonian front during the 
First World War, in the Ukrainian campaign (1919) -where he was wounded- and in the 
Asia Minor campaign (1919-1922). Throughout his career he was promoted twice for 
valour in the battlefield. He was an officer with a high level of theoretical education and 
academic qualification. He studied in the French military school, while later he became a 
professor in the Greek military academy. As a democratic officer, he participated in the 
1935 Venizelist coup and after the coup’s failure he was discharged from the army.40 
After 1935 and until the outbreak of the war, he settled in Macedonia where he was 
occupied with the olive oil trade (Koutras, 1981: 157, Kaimaras, 1979: 179, 
Papagianopoulos, 1981: 16).
In their study of the revolutionary leadership phenomenon, Rejai and Philips
wrote:
“Some revolutionary leaders are driven by a compulsion to excel, to prove 
themselves, to overcompensate. This compulsion is most likely due to feelings of 
low self-esteem or inferiority complex. How this inferiority complex comes about
networks. Major Manaios, Captain Kokorelis, Major Kapentzonis and others started forming small and 
secret “struggle committees” in their villages and towns. These initiatives however were uncoordinated and 
they did not undertake combatant activity against the Italians. They were limited in collecting weapons and 
recruitment of members, while they joined the 5/42 much later after the regiment had already been formed. 
(For more details see Kaimaras, 1979: 25-7, DIS/F.929/A/1, DIS/F.929/A/6).
40 Seech 1.3.i,p44.
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is a question that requires treatment on a case by case basis” (Rejai, and Philips, 
1983: 54-55).
In Psarros’ case the emotional-psychological motives which reinforced his will to 
undertake a leading role in the national resistance were caused by two major traumatic 
experiences: his degradation in 1935 and his non-participation in the 1940-41 war. The 
effect of these two experiences over his self-esteem and self-perception was tremendous 
and devastating. Those blows resulted in an urgent psychological need to prove himself 
in order to restore his name and regain his dignity.
Psarros was one of the major participants in the Venizelist coup of 1935. 
Although his troops did not participate eventually in the coup’s clashes, after the 
suppression of the coup he was court-martialed and degraded along with 1.500 other 
officers who were also involved (Veremis, 1997: 213). After the court’s verdict was 
issued in 2 April 1935, the degraded officers were led to the Parapigmata square in 
Athens where they were publicly degraded. This was a totally humiliating procedure. In 
the square, large crowds of royalist mobs were gathered, and while the officer’s stripes 
and medals were removed from their uniforms the mobs were spitting, hitting calling 
them traitors, etc (Eleutherotypm (Historica) 2 March 2000 p22-25).
According to the military code and ethics, degradation is the ultimate humiliation. 
The degraded officer is considered incompetent to assimilate and adapt to the esprit de 
corps and the rest of the military ideals and virtues, something that almost equals treason 
against the motherland. The degradation experience, especially under those humiliating 
circumstances certainly was a major blow to Psarros’ self-perception and probably had 
overwhelming consequences on his self-esteem (Kaimaras, interview: 18 December 
1999, Protopapas, interview: 6 May 2000). The declaration of the war in 1940 was
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Psarros’ once in a lifetime chance to prove himself by offering his services to the country 
during its most critical hours. Nevertheless, once more he faced disappointment since all 
of his three requests for returning in action, even as a simple soldier, were rejected by the 
Minister of Security Maniadakis (Kaimaras, interview: 18 December 1999). The fact that 
he was considered unworthy to participate in “Greece’s finest hour” was the second and 
even more important traumatic experience (Kaimaras, interview: 18 December 1999, 
Protopapas, interview: 6 May 2000). The fact that the Greek army was giving victorious 
battles, while he was in stagnation was the coup de grace for his dignity and self-esteem.
All those successive blows to his ego probably caused him a stifling sense of 
unfairness and a deep urge to excel, to prove to everybody as well as himself that he did 
not deserve all this humiliation. National resistance was the chance that he had been 
waiting for in order to restore his name. Later on, while he was the commander of the 
5/42, Psarros used to wear the same old army coat that he was wearing on the day of his 
public degradation and according to Protopapas he used to say:
“Some day, those who ripped my stripes of this very coat, they will stick them back
on it” (Protopapas, interview: 6 May 2000).
With his resistance activity, he wanted to prove his devotion to the country and the 
officer’s values. In a sense, national resistance was the “therapy” that he needed in order 
to wipe out his inferiority feelings and boost his self-esteem which had been so heavily 
damaged since 1935. His eagerness to fight the invader and dispel the ghosts that haunted 
him since 1935 were so great that he started his first resistance endeavour while the battle 
of Greece was still ongoing.
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2.2.ii.b. The Bitter Macedonian Experience.
Psarros might have gone down in history as the commander of the 5/42 regiment, 
but in truth the 5/42 was his second resistance endeavour. His first attempt to form a 
resistance group was in Macedonia during the early days of the occupation. This aspect 
of Psarros’ activity is almost totally ignored throughout the literature.41 Nevertheless, 
although that attempt lasted for only six months and it ended in a fiasco, there are serious 
indications that Psarros’ Macedonian experience had a strong impact on his decision 
making and strategic planning which influenced the development of the 5/42 later on.
While the Greek army’s retreat was not yet completed from the Albanian and 
Macedonian fronts, Psarros went to Amfissa. He contacted Major Konstantinos 
Lagouranis and his brother Sub-Lieutenant Ioannis Lagouranis in order to discuss the 
potential of forming immediately a guerrilla band in Fokida, manned by a platoon which 
managed to reach Amfissa straight from the front, fully armed and under the command of 
reserve Lieutenant Andreas Mitalas. However that ambitious plan failed since in the 
meantime, the platoon’s men had defected. Then it was decided that the Lagouranis 
brothers would stay in the area in order to form a new band, collect and hide arms, recruit 
volunteers, collect information and store supplies, while Psarros and Mitalas would go to 
Athens and try to establish a link with the Middle East headquarters for the support of 
their band (Mitalas report) 42
Instead of following the plan however, Psarros went immediately to Macedonia 
and in late May 1941 he founded the Eleutheria (Freedom) organisation, in co-operation
41 For example Papagianopoulos (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 17) mentions Psarros’ attempt in Macedonia in a 
single page, while Koutras (Koutras, 1981: 157) and Kaimaras (Kaimaras, 1979: 179) just mention Psarros’ 
attempt in a single small paragraph,.
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with KKE’s Macedonian branch and along with a number of other non-political officers
and civilians. According to Papagianopoulos, Psarros’ rather utopian plan was:
‘To form frontward guerrilla groups in Northern Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and 
the Dodecanese... with the objective to re-animate Greece’s rights in those 
ethnologically vital areas, which due to various causes had pulled down the blue 
and white flag. That should be the starting point of the struggle, with unity and 
consistency, without political intentions. Our ideal -  the nation’s interests, our 
religion -  Greece” (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 17).
Psarros had told Papagianopoulos and Kaimaras that the reasons he wanted to 
concentrate his resistance efforts in Macedonia first, was the fact that he preferred to 
offer his help where there was a bigger need (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 17, Kaimaras, 
interview: 18 December 2000). The occupation of southern Greece just served the 
strategic interests of Germany. However, the Bulgarian occupation in Macedonia aimed 
at the permanent detachment of territories and therefore the Bulgarian occupation policy 
aimed at the ethnological and cultural “purification” of the region. Moreover, Psarros 
belonged to a generation of officers who had deeply believed in the Megali idea43 and the 
liberation of the “unredeemed lands” and maybe some traits of that irredentism and 
Byzantine romanticism were still alive in him (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 6, Protopapas, 
interview: 6 May 2000).
In the summer of 1941, Eleutheria issued an underground newspaper and it 
organised two resistance bands of 60 to 150 men each, which attempted a series of small- 
scale sabotages. They disarmed gendarmery men, they distributed confiscated food and 
supplies, while on 22 September 1941 one of the bands ambushed a German truck where 
two German soldiers were killed and one was injured (Fleisher, 1995, vol.l: 225). Their
42 Andreas Mitalas’ report (date unknown) was kindly given by Mr Stamatis Papathanasiou from his 
personal archive.
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activity however resulted in heavy counter-measures by the Germans, who executed more 
than 400 men and burned all the villages that were considered as guerrillas’ hideouts. 
Psarros then tried to expand guerrilla activity in Macedonia by contacting the YVE 
Yperaspistai Voreiou Elladas (Defenders of Northern Greece) organisation founded by 
Macedonian officers and of a right-wing orientation.44 His aim was to merge the two 
organisations for the benefit of the resistance struggle in Macedonia, but both sides 
showed suspicion towards one another and the attempt failed.45
During the last days of September 1941, a revolt led by the KKE-Macedonian 
branch with the participation of Eleutheria’s communist wing ignited in the region of 
Drama. The revolt nevertheless was uncoordinated and resulted in bloodshed. Within a 
few days the Bulgarian forces executed more than 3.000 people (Kedros, 1983, vol.l: 
121-125, Rodakis, interview: 21 April 2000). The failure of those resistance attempts 
terrified the local population which in many cases were turned against the guerrillas and 
gave them away to the occupation forces (Fleisher, 1995. Vol.l: 225). This bloodshed, 
along with the stifling oppressive measures imposed by the Bulgarians made the 
development of a resistance movement in the area almost impossible. Moreover KKE’s 
attempt to put Eleutheria under its complete control, led Psarros to his decision to 
abandon any plans for the formation of a resistance movement in Macedonia. In autumn 
1941, disguised as a priest (Kaimaras, interview: 18 December 2000) he returned to 
Athens persecuted by the Germans, the Bulgarians, as well as by the Macedonian 
communists.
43 Megali idea was the Greek nationalist doctrine according to which the limits of the Greek nation-state 
ought to include all those Balkan areas where Greek populations lived.
44 See Papathanasiou, 1997
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Unfortunately, there is little evidence concerning Psarros’ resistance activity in
Macedonia. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn if the dates that Psarros started
his initiative in Macedonia are taken into consideration. As mentioned above, Psarros
formed his first resistance organisation in Macedonia during mid May 1941,46 while the
occupation of Greece was not yet complete since the battle of Crete was still ongoing 47
On the other hand EAM was formed in 27 September 1941, while EDES in 9 September
1941. This means that Psarros’ “Eleutheria ” was formed four and a half months before
EAM and four months before EDES. More impressively however, Psarros formed his
first guerrilla groups in June 1941, a whole year before Aris Velouchiotis -the symbol of
the Greek national resistance and an undoubtedly brave fighter- formed his own guerrilla
group (June 1942). According to Haritopoulos:
“Psarros has the honour to be the first high rank officer who undertook resistance 
activity from the first day of the occupation” (Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 266).
2.2.ii.c. The Founding of EKKA.
After the failure of his premature attempt in Macedonia, Psarros tried to organise 
his second resistance endeavour on a more solid basis. Therefore, from the moment he 
arrived in Athens and for the next eighteen months, he was consumed with a long series 
of meetings and contacts with influential resistance officials, politicians, agents of the 
allied military headquarters from Cairo and many old comrades, former Venizelists, 
degraded in 1935.
45 See PSEAO “Panelinia Synomospondia Ethnikon Antistasiakon Organoseon” (Panhelenic Association of 
National Resistance Organisations), 2001: 135-164 , Fleisher,1995: 112-149
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The experience of those officers in conspiratorial and underground activity 
allowed them to mobilise more quickly and effectively under the occupation and 
therefore set their resistance networks more rapidly.48 Thus since January 1942, a series 
of contacts took place among the “pavement Colonels”49 such as Sarafis, Zervas, Spaes, 
Papageorgiou and Euripides Bakirtzis - a man who had a big influence on Psarros.50 The 
purpose of those contacts was to come up with a general plan for the development of 
guerrilla struggle in various areas of Greece. Throughout those meetings, Psarros 
received a series of proposals for co-operation from all resistance organisations, which 
during that time were being formed since "his fame and qualities were well known and all 
newly formed organisations wanted him as their military leader” (Gyftopoulos, 1990: 
67). EAM officials assigned to Major Thymios Zoulas the task to approach Psarros and 
convince him to join EAM.51 Psarros was positive towards the political objectives of 
EAM and towards the prospect of co-ordinating efforts in the future, however, he refused 
to join EAM (Hatzis, 1983, vol.l: 278-280). Respectively, he refused to join EDES 
because, just like Bakirtzis, he did not fully trust Zervas (Pyromaglou, 1965: 146).
46 “The meeting with Psarros was held in mid May (1941)... The foundation of the patriotic group 
Eleutheria was decided, as well as the issuing of a newspaper” (Hantzis, 1983, vol.l: 110) as quoted from 
KKE archives F.I - Vasvanas testimonies and documents.
47 The battle of Crete ended in the last days of May 1941.
48 See Gerolymatos “The role of Greek army officers in the resistance” in Greece 1936-44 -International 
Historical Conference, 1990: 291
49 Papadopoulos, interview: 10 May 2000. The “pavement Colonels” was a sarcastic characterisation given 
to those officers, due to the large numbers of movements and coups in which they had participated.
50 Bakirtzis was one of the most mysterious and contradictory personalities of the occupation. He as well 
was a Venizelist officer degraded in 1935 and he was known as “the Red Colonel” due to his leftist 
political sentiments and due to a rumour that he was a volunteer in the Spanish civil war. According to 
Woodhouse “Bakirtzis, in the first period of the occupation was an agent of the British secret services 
under the code name 333 and Promitheas I” (Woodhouse, 1976: 63). By mid April 1941, a while before the 
completion of the occupation, the British intelligence services had provided Bakirtzis with two radio 
transmitters and explosives, in order to maintain contact with occupied Greece and carry out any possible 
sabotages. Bakirtzis though did not show the necessary urge since his ambitions were much higher, and 
soon he was replaced by two other navy officers Koutsogianopoulos and Bardopoulos under the code name 
“PromitheasII”.
51 About Major Thymios Zoulas and his role see ch 3.1 .v, p 143 and ch 6.1, p 246.
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Bakirtzis and Psarros directed their efforts towards the formation of a third independent 
political organisation of their own.
EKKA Ethniki Kai Koinoniki Apeleutherosi" (National and Social Liberation) 
was founded in November 1942. Its founding members were Psarros, Bakirtzis and 
lawyers Kapsalopoulos and Katavolos, its political leader was ex Parliamentarian and 
Minister Georgios Kartalis. Kartalis (1908-1957) came from a wealthy family from Volos 
with a long political tradition. Since 1850 his family had founded and controlled the 
“Kartaliko ” party, a right wing anti-Venizelist party attached to the monarchy and since 
then his grandfather, father, uncle and finally himself were elected members of 
parliament. Kartalis was the typical member of the pre-war political elite. He was brought 
up within a cosmopolitan environment and had a high level of academic education. In 
1935, at the age of 27, he became deputy Minister of National Economy and later that 
year Minister of Labour. However, when the Metaxas dictatorship was established, 
Kartalis made an anti-monarchist turn. He became a champion of parliamentary 
democracy and participated in a political committee against the Metaxas regime 
(Pyromaglou, 1965: 32-144, Strogylis, 1997: 67).
In the early days of the occupation, Kartalis at 33 was one of the youngest 
resistance officials, full of political ambitions. Kartalis’ attitude towards national 
resistance was less sentimental and romantic and more realistic and pragmatic than was 
Psarros’. He wrote:
“A few months after the front collapsed, I considered that it was our national duty 
to organise a domestic resistance movement. I was completely against the defeatist, 
pseudo-moderate attitude that we should remain in stagnation against the enemy in 
order to avoid further hardships for our nation....Greece should not back down at 
that phase of the world war effort. After the end of the war, Greece should not be 
considered as absent from a war front.. ..The law of history reconfirms the fact that
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the ones who harvest the benefits of victory are not those who just fight a war with 
self-sacrifice and bravery, but those who endure and continue fighting until the 
end” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 144).
EKKA served both resistance and political objectives, but unlike EAM and
EDES it made a clear distinction between the struggle for national liberation and the
political struggle. According to Kartalis:
“For EKKA, the national liberating struggle must exclusively be directed towards 
damaging and driving out the occupants. Until liberation comes all political and 
ideological beliefs must remain silent and left aside. They must return in the agenda 
only when the last German will have left Greek soil” (Pyromaglou, 1988: 333).
EKKA’s national liberating plan was nothing else than the conduct of armed resistance
struggle. The political part of its program however -which would be applied only after
liberation- included many interesting aspects.
EKKA’s ideological orientation was shaped by Kartalis himself. Its program was 
radically socialist, while the group’s political objective was the establishment of a 
“Laokratia" (people’s republic) which would derive and be based upon the people’s 
verdict and the support of the trade unions. According to the group’s manifesto, 
published on 17 April 1943 in the first issue of EKKA’s newspaper “Apeleutherosi" 
(Liberation):
“1) The basic economic and technical means of production (banks, large industries, 
means of transport, mines, exports, imports etc) will be socialised directly.
2) All large properties above a certain value will be confiscated. Maximum and 
minimum limits of ownership and income will be imposed and no one will be 
allowed to exceed those limits. All debts, private and public will be abolished.
3) All means of production will be conveyed to the social groups that operate those 
means of production. These social groups will be organised in trade unions and the 
state will only supervise these trade unions. By that way the means of production 
will stop being instruments of exploitation and will be conveyed to the people that 
should really own them. These means of production will not be brought under the 
state’s control, instead they will come under society’s control. The state will just
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supervise and co-ordinate the application of the production’s plan.” (Pyromaglou, 
1965: 147-149).52
EKKA’s political program also included measures such as social distribution of labour, 
support for trade unionism, protection of religious and political liberties, education and 
social insurance and finally the restoration of Greece “within the borders of its ethnic 
unity” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 147-149).
The radicalism of EKKA’s manifesto was quite impressive, but those radical 
socialist views certainly did not match the backgrounds of an ex monarchist Minister 
such as Kartalis, a moderate democratic officer such as Psarros and the “number one 
agent of the intelligence service in Greece” such as Bakirtzis (Woodhouse, 1976: 63, 
PRO HS 5/534). That radicalism was rather an intentional political manoeuvre. For the 
people who joined the resistance, war and occupation buried once and for all not only the 
Metaxas regime but also the whole pre-war decayed political establishment. The vast 
majority of those people believed that after the war progressive, socialist regimes would 
be established based upon solid and socially just foundations. The tendency for radical 
change in post-war Greece was a widespread social demand and the resistance 
organisations realised that from the very beginning. EAM had already been established in 
public opinion as the most radical force within the resistance movement and therefore its 
competitive resistance organisations launched a “radicalism competition” (Rodakis, 
interview, 21 April 2000) in order to gain the wider possible support among the 
oppressed Greeks. EDES had also made its appearance with an anti-monarchist and 
socialist manifesto. With that radical manifesto Kartalis and the rest of EKKA officials
52 Pyromaglou was a very close friend of Kartalis. In 1965 he wrote his biography “Kartalis and his era 
1934-57”, while later on, Pyromaglou married Kartalis’ daughter.
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tried to cover the lost ground and put EKKA on the map of the Greek national resistance 
movement.
Kartalis had high hopes and expectations about the role that EKKA would play 
within the national resistance movement. He wanted to place EKKA in the middle of 
EAM and EDES and aimed to attract the centre, the people who were standing between 
EAM and EDES, the people who were frustrated by the involvement of politics in the 
national liberation struggle. He aimed to give EKKA the prestige of a moderate political 
force within the resistance movement which was giving priority to national unity rather 
than political dominance. That mission was certainly difficult and the policies that 
Kartalis adopted in achieving his objective were controversial and caused lots of criticism 
which is going to be discussed further in the thesis.53
2.2.ii.d. “The Hesitant Revolutionary”: The Reasons Behind Psarros’ Reversal
Psarros’ first resistance attempt in Macedonia was almost a suicide mission. 
“Eleutheria ” was formed hastily during the occupation’s very early days, it had major 
shortages of arms and funds, while its infrastructure and logistics (support network, 
political branch, contacts with the allies etc) were almost non-existent. On the contrary, 
Psarros spent almost one and a half years to form the 5/42 and when the regiment was 
eventually formed (March 1943) its logistical support was almost perfect. The 5/42 
regiment was efficient in weapons and funds, it had the support of a political branch 
(EKKA) as well as of the allies. The obvious contradictions in the circumstances and
53 See ch 3.3.i, p 156 and ch4.1, p 179.
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preconditions under which “Eleutheria ” on the one hand and the 5/42 on the other were 
formed indicate that there was a complete shift on Psarros’ strategy.
Psarros’ series of contacts and meetings with other officers and resistance 
officials continued throughout the first months of 1942. Those contacts and meetings 
aimed at the co-ordination of efforts towards the formation of a resistance movement 
independent from EAM. In April 1942, a meeting was held in Athens with the 
participation of Zervas and Pyromaglou from EDES, Psarros, Bakirtzis and 
Kapsalopoulos from EKKA, Koutsogianopoulos and Bardopoulos from Promitheas II 
and a special SOE agent (Pyromaglou, 1965: 149-152).54 According to the plan, Greece 
would be divided in four areas of command, where each officer would undertake the task 
to organise the resistance struggle in each area. It was decided that Psarros would 
undertake central and eastern Roumeli, Zervas and Pyromaglou would undertake Epirus 
and parts of Western Roumeli, Colonel Spaes, Eastern Thessaly and Colonel 
Papageorgiou Western Thessaly. Any plans for the development of resistance activity in 
Macedonia were not included in the general plan since Psarros assured the rest that “due 
to the existing conditions in Macedonia, the development of a resistance movement there 
would be impossible at least for the near future” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 150). Bakirtzis 
would have the general command of the project and would establish the general 
headquarters in Psarros’ area. According to the plan full-scale guerrilla warfare was to 
begin at mid August 1942 the latest, while on 10 September all officers would meet in 
Psarros’ area in order to update each other and co-ordinate their further actions.
However, that promising plan resulted in complete failure. Zervas was the only 
one to be in the mountains of Epirus almost in time, but nevertheless the formation of his
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own combatant guerrilla group was delayed. Papageorgiou devoted himself to the
Athenian branch of EDES and later on became a collaborationist, while Spaes was
arrested by the Italians. However, neither Psarros nor Bakirtzis followed the plan. Later
on in September 1942 and while it was obvious that the plan was not going well,
Pyromaglou and Bardopoulos contacted Psarros and asked for his excuse about his delay.
“After we questioned and criticised Colonel Psarros for his delay, he answered that 
the delay was due to Bakirtzis’s departure to the Middle East and Ioannis 
Tsigantes’ arrival in Greece from Egypt” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 153).
Bakirtzis believed that the Soviet Union would play a major role in the Balkans. 
Therefore, he believed that the Greek resistance should not only seek the support of the 
British, but also of the Soviet Union. For that reason, Bakirtzis decided to go to Istanbul 
and contact the Soviet consulate there and if possible to go to Moscow in order to 
examine whether the Soviets were willing to help (Gregoriadis, vol,l: 203, Fleisher, 
vol,l:1995: 243, Gasparinatos, vol,l: 267, Margaris: 16). Bakirtzis urged Psarros not to 
take any initiative as long as he was away and wait for his return from Istanbul. Psarros 
who was highly influenced by Bakirtzis55 agreed with his proposal as well as his 
instigation not to take any action.
Instead of going to Istanbul however, Bakirtzis fled to Cairo to meet British 
officials in person and request to be officially awarded the general command of the 
resistance struggle in Greece. Nevertheless, the British did not just refuse to award him 
General Commander of the Greek resistance, but instead they placed him under 
surveillance for almost a year (Istoria gia sas, July 1971, vol.l: 118). Bakirtzis’ isolation 
by the British was a very mysterious case. Two documents found in the archives of the
54 Pyromaglou who is the only source concerning this meeting does not specify who that special agent was.
Public Records Office in London shed some light on that case, but still they do not solve 
the mystery completely.
According to an Intelligence Service report sent to the SOE (Special Operations 
Executive)56:
“Colonel Bakirtzis is one of our oldest collaborators in Greece and did good work 
for us” (PRO H5 5/534).57
Nevertheless, there were doubts about Bakirtzis’ trustworthiness and serious concern
over the purpose of his mission. Another report wrote:
“ 23rd September 1942 From: D/HI 31. To: D/HI 09. The arrival of Promitheas I
CQ
[Bakirtzis’ code name] at Smyrna seems to raise again an important issue: 
namely, to what extent it is our policy to assist the Greek Communists politically, 
in particular by facilitating their contacts with the Russians. This is a general 
question, the answer to which appears to be that it is neither in our interests (nor 
particularly the desire of the great majority of Greeks) nor should it be SOE policy 
to stimulate Greek Communism or have relations with Greek Communists other 
than of a purely “business” [i.e. military, operational] character. In the particular 
case in question Promitheas I [Bakirtzis] is of the extreme left, and according to our 
information has been disillusioned with the British for some time.... His mission is 
doubtless to enlist Russian sympathy and help for the Communists in Greece. This 
would be contrary to our own policy, and would further complicate our basic task 
of achieving a fuller measure of Greek unity” (PRO H5 5/534).
However, all that suspicion about Bakirtzis’ mission and intentions were dispelled
when he contacted the British secret services in Cairo:
“13th November 1942. Dear Dixon...Colonel Bakirtzis did in fact come out of 
Greece shortly afterwards, but did not contact the Soviet authorities; instead he 
came straight to our people and made very constructive suggestions as to how 
subversive work in Greece could be rendered more effective. We understand that 
the Anglo-Greek committee in Cairo is considering these suggestions. The 
allegations that he was disgruntled have now been definitely proven wrong. The 
consensus of opinion in Mid East seems to be that although Colonel Bakirtzis holds 
leftist views, he cannot be classified as a communist” (PRO H5 5/534).
55 According to a rumour, Bakirtzis and Psarros were freemasons and belonged to the same lodge in 
Salonika. See “Euripides Bakirtzis The mysterious Colonel” in Istoria gia sas, July 1971, vol,l: 119
56 For more details about the SOE and the role that it played see ch 7, p 255
57 See footnote 62, p 95.
58 Bakirtzis went to Cairo via Smyrna
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Although British suspicion over Bakirtzis seemed to have been dispelled, he was still 
kept under surveillance and eventually he could not contact Psarros who was waiting for 
guidance and information from him.
After exhaustive research in the PRO files, no document was found to indicate the 
exact reasons for the British reaction against Bakirtzis. Maybe the early British fears 
prevailed, or maybe Bakirtzis tried eventually to contact the Soviets and thus the British 
arrested him in order to avoid the creation of a Greek-Soviet link. According to 
Gregoriadis however, Major Ioannis Tsigantes personally denounced Bakirtzis as an 
KKE agent to the British and proposed his arrest in order to protect his own “Midas 614” 
mission in occupied Greece that was sent forth during those days (Gregoriadis, vol. 1: 
204).
The “Midas 614” mission with Tsigantes in charge, was organised by the “Anglo- 
Greek committee”, a joint effort between the British secret services in Cairo and 
members of the Greek government in exile. Its objectives were the carrying out of a 
number of sabotages, and especially the blocking of the Corinthos isthmus and to co­
ordinate all scattered non-EAMic resistance organisations (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol,l: 
269-73, Gregoriadis, vol,l: 204.). Tsigantes and his men landed in Greece in August 
1942 and since then he started a long series of meetings and contacts with large numbers 
of officials. Tsigantes, who was Psarros’ brother in law and a very close friend, 
persuaded him to postpone his plans for the formation of a resistance group in Roumeli. 
He urged him to wait until the completion of his meetings, and until the maximum 
support by the Middle East headquarters was achieved, something that would guarantee 
the success of his endeavour (Zaousis, 1987, vol,2: 121). Due to Tsigantes’ long series of
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meetings and “academic” plans valuable time was wasted, while there was very little 
progress. The “Midas 614” mission failed completely to fulfil its objectives and 
eventually, in 14 January 1943 Tsigantes’ hideout was killed during a shooting with an 
Italian patrol.
Bakirtzis and Tsigantes were two people who influenced Psarros. Their
recommendations to Psarros not to undertake any resistance initiative unless they gave
him the “green light” were the main reasons that he delayed the formation of the 5/42.
According to several views however, Psarros’ excessive caution towards the formation of
his second resistance attempt had deeper causes. According to Gasparinatos:
“Psarros perceived guerrilla warfare under a military point of view and followed 
orthodox military strategies and methods. He would form his group only if he had 
ensured enough allied supplies, for the maintenance of a large and effective 
combatant force” (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 268).
Moreover, according to Pyromaglou:
“Another reason [apart from Bakirtzis’ and Tsigantes’ suggestions] that played a 
major role in Psarros’ delay was the following. Contrary to Zervas who did not 
have even a Swiss army knife when he started the formation of his own band in 
Epirus, Psarros thought that he should have everything ready before he went up the 
mountains. According to my opinion, that is unacceptable for a Roumelian warlord 
such as Psarros. Guerrilla warfare has its own distinctive principles, but Psarros 
was thinking in military terms. He wanted to form his band only when he was 
certain that British planes would make drops of arms, clothes and provisions and he 
wanted to apply a large scale mobilisation plan in the Pamassos area in order to 
ensure enough men for his force” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 157-158).
Finally Zaousis writes:
“Psarros was the typical officer. He did not want to give his band the appearance of 
a bearded gang, but he wanted to form and command a disciplined unit” (Zaousis, 
1987, vol,l: 122).
It is true that Psarros perceived the development of the 5/42 with a military 
mentality. He wanted to ensure first efficiency in weapons and money, recruitment of
91
experienced officers, collaboration with the allies etc. Only when he would have covered 
all those needs satisfactory would he form the 5/42 and begin the struggle. As a high 
ranking officer, he gave emphasis to strategy and planing and he took into serious 
consideration the long-term logistical needs of a guerrilla band. He was an officer with a 
notable theoretical, military knowledge, he had very good military-academic 
qualifications59 and probably his theoretical expertise influenced his perception of 
guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, guerrilla warfare is an unorthodox kind of warfare and its 
principles are totally different than those of conventional warfare. The comments of 
Gasparinatos, Pyromaglou and Zaousis are valid. All three of them however -  especially 
Pyromaglou -did not see the whole picture. They seem to forget Psarros’ first resistance 
endeavour in Macedonia. They forget that Psarros went up the mountains a whole year 
before Zervas and Velouchiotis did60 and they forget that when Psarros formed 
“Eleutheria ” in Macedonia, the prospects of success were almost nil. The difficulties that 
he had to deal with in Macedonia were by far more dramatic than those faced by Zervas’ 
“who did not even have a Swiss army knife”.
In Macedonia, Psarros was daring and fearless, almost thoughtless. On the other 
hand, towards the development of the 5/42, he made a clear and complete reversal 
towards more conservative strategies. He became excessively reserved, did not leave 
anything to chance and did not take any risks. In his second attempt, Psarros did not want 
to repeat the mistakes that he made in his first. Unfortunately there is no document or 
testimony coming straight from Psarros that would give a specific explanation about his 
shift of strategy, hence the causes are open to interpretation. The most likely reason for
59 See ch 2.2.ii.a, p 75.
60 See ch 2.2.ii.b, p 78.
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his reservation towards the formation of the 5/42 must have been the Macedonian fiasco
and its impact on Psarros. That fiasco made Psarros very cautious towards the formation
of his second endeavour. He would go ahead only when the circumstances and
preconditions would be positive and promising, so that there would be no chance for a
second failure. According to Papathanasiou:
“From his experience [in Macedonia] he drew the conclusion that without strict 
planning, centralised command and logistical efficiency, guerrilla warfare was 
doomed to fail” (Papathanasiou, 2000: 27).
The one and a half years that he wasted in Athens with his time-consuming contacts with
Bakirtzis, Tsigantes and the other resistance officials had the purpose to cover those
needs in the most effective way.
Moreover, the extreme counter-measures by the Germans and the Bulgarians 
which followed “Eleutheria’s ” activities and the Drama revolt, must certainly have 
contributed to Psarros’ caution towards his second resistance attempt. He did not want 
such a disaster to be repeated and expose the people of Fokida, his homeland, to the 
revenge of the occupation forces. Thus he preferred to form the 5/42 only when he was 
sure that the combatant ability of the regiment would be efficient not only to undertake 
serious action against the enemy, but also protect the local population from their revenge, 
and avoid the repetition of similar massacres (Protopapas, interview, 14 January 2000).
Whatever the reasons behind Psarros’ reservation towards the formation of the 
5/42, the time that he wasted had a tremendous effect on the regiment’s development and 
fate. In September 1942 - which was the final deadline by which Psarros should be on the 
mountains of Fokida according to the plan- the situation in the area was still fluid. On 
ELAS’ behalf there was only one small band of nine guerrillas under the command of
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Nikiforos and Diamandis. If Psarros had formed his band during that time, the 
preconditions of the 5/42’s development would be totally favourable since according to 
an old Greek saying “whoever gets in the mosque first becomes the muezzin”. 
Throughout the area a number of small bands of bandits were scattered. These bands had 
every reason to prefer to follow Psarros who was well known throughout his region, than 
join ELAS which was an unknown organisation manned by “communist outcasts” 
(Koutsoklenis, interview: 18 May 2000). The 5/42 would assimilate all those local 
officers, bandits and guerrillas that EAM-ELAS eventually assimilated and the Fokida 
region would undisputedly be considered as an area controlled by the 5/42.
In April 1943 however, when Psarros finally formed the 5/42 regiment of 
evzones, the situation in Fokida was entirely different. The “muezzin” was EAM-ELAS. 
All those scattered bands of bandits had either joined ELAS or had been dissolved by 
ELAS. In every village there were EAM’s committees and EAM’s network had become 
strong. The Dimitriou-Diamandis Company of ELAS in Pamassida had already reached 
200 men and 300 reserves. In Dorida there were 100 guerrillas and 100 reserves, while in 
the neighbouring areas (Lokrida, Ftiotida, Biotia, Naupactia) there were more than 600 
guerrillas and 900 reserves (Pyromaglou, 1965: 159). ELAS had already won its laurels 
through a number of battles and Aris Velouchiotis’ fame had already reached a legendary 
dimension. Moreover, Psarros was absent from the most important event of the 
occupation, the sabotage at the Gorgopotamos bridge.
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2.2.ii.e. The Gorgopotamos Sabotage: Psarros Turns his Back on his Destiny.
Towards the end of the summer of 1942, the Middle East Allied Headquarters was 
preparing feverishly for the El Alamein offensive which was scheduled to be launched in 
October. An important part for the plan’s success was the cutting of Rommel’s army 
supply lines. One of the main supply lines used by the Germans in Northern Africa was 
the Salonica-Pireus-Crete-Tobrouk axis. In the Roumeli area, there were three large rail- 
bridges: Asopos, Papadia and Gorgopotamos upon that exact axis. The destruction of 
any of those three bridges would interrupt the Salonica-Tobrouk supply line for many 
weeks and possibly months (Myers, 1955: 15).
On 4 September 1942, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE)61 in Cairo 
notified “Promitheas II” 62 for its operational objectives and asked whether a sabotage in 
one of those bridges was possible. “Promitheas II” replied that with the support of a 
small-specialised British commandos force and the necessary equipment, the operation 
would be possible. After “Promitheas II” gave the green light, SOE’s staff in Cairo 
started making the necessary arrangements for such an operation. That operation under 
the code name “Harling” resulted in the successful sabotage of the Gorgopotamos bridge 
on the night of 25 November 1942 conducted by British commandos and joint ELAS and 
EDES forces. The sabotage in Gorgopotamos was not just the most important event of 
the occupation in Greece, but also one of the most important acts of sabotage in occupied 
Europe during World War II.
61 SOE was founded in July 1940 and its purpose was the co-ordination and support of subversive anti-axis 
activity in occupied Europe.
62 Since mid-April 1941 a few days before the whole of Greece was occupied, Bakirtzis along with the 
British Secret Services formed the “Promitheas I” espionage and sabotage organisation (“Promitheas I” was 
Bakirtzis’ code name). In late 1941, either because Bakirtzis did not give the necessary attention to the 
organisation, or because he fell into disfavour with the British, he abandoned “Promitheas I”. The
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Psarros and his men had a serious involvement in the preparation of the 
Gorgopotamos mission, but eventually they did not actually participate in the sabotage. 
Due to a number of misunderstandings and serious mistakes, Psarros wasted a unique 
chance to become probably the most important figure of the resistance movement and 
alter completely the course of history. Certain aspects of Psarros’ non-participation in the 
Gorgopotamos sabotage remain mysterious even after the current research. A series of 
new documents and testimonies however shed some light on the reasons why Psarros 
became the great absentee of the Greek resistance’s finest hour.
Psarros’ involvement in the Gorgopotamos case started with Tsigantes’ “Midas
614” mission. In addition to its political objectives,64 Tsigantes’ mission included the
conduct of a series of sabotages such as the blocking of the Korinthos canal and the
destruction of various bridges. One of these targets was the Karyes bridge that was also
on the Salonica-Pireus axis (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 40-41). Tsigantes assigned to one of
his officers Spyros Kotsis to make an inspection of the Karyes bridge. Kotsis did his
inspection and gave his report to Tsigantes and Psarros. Dimitrios Gyftopoulos, member
of the “Midas 614” mission writes:
“After studying Spyros’ report about the security measures in Karyes bridge, 
Tsigantes and Psarros came to the conclusion that it would take the same number of 
men to sabotage the Gorgopotamos bridge, the destruction of which would bring a 
by far more serious blow to the enemy and would interrupt its communications for 
a longer period” (Gyftopoulos, 1990: 131-132).
organisation was reformed and was named “Promitheas II” with degraded navy officers Bardopoulos and 
Kondogianopoulos in charge. See Fleisher, 1995, vol,l: 239, Zaousis, 1987, vol,2: 70-71
63The first of these documents is a report written by Andreas Mitalas, a man who played a key role in the 
events of Gorgopotamos, which I was persistently looking for throughout my research. The second is the 
text of an interesting and revealing, speech that C.M Woodhouse gave in Athens in April 9th 1987, while 
the third series of documents are a number of letters among C.M Woodhouse and Mr S Papathanasiou. All 
documents were kindly given to me by Mr. S.Papathanasiou from his personal archives.
64 See ch 2.2.ii.e, p 102.
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Psarros and Tsigantes came to that conclusion because before Kotsis’ inspection,
Psarros himself had already done a series of scoutings of all bridges of the Salonica-
Pireus axis that were in Roumeli. Since August 1942, Psarros had assigned to some of his
men the task to watch carefully and report to him any movement in the Karyes, Asopos,
Papadia and Gorgopotamos bridges. Moreover, towards the end of July Psarros disguised
as a shepherd did an inspection of his own in all three of the possible targets (Mitalas,
report: 11, Papagianopoulos, 1981: 41). He gathered a lot of information about the
bridges, he made maps, he watched the guard posts, he studied the terrain etc and he
came to the conclusion that the Gorgopotamos bridge had the best potential for a
successful sabotage (Marinos, 1994: 33).65
According to Woodhouse:
“This event is very important and rather mysterious. Those three bridges (Asopos, 
Papadia and Gorgopotamos) were exactly the ones that were suggested to us as 
possible targets during our operational briefings in Cairo four months later. 
However, no one mentioned anything about Psarros’ ground inspection” 
(Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
Psarros was the one who did the ground inspection, a crucial part in any combat operation
and he was the one who designated the target of the sabotage however, he did not
participate in the sabotage. In order to solve that mystery, it is necessary to study
carefully a series of events that took place almost simultaneously in Athens, Cairo and
the mountains of Fokida.
While the “Harling” mission was being prepared in Cairo, Psarros was in
Athens consumed in a series of meetings and contacts with various resistance officials,
trying to achieve the maximum support for his regiment.66 The only time that he visited
65 Themis Marinos was also a member of the “Harling” mission)
66 See ch 2.2.ii.d, p 86.
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Fokida was in the summer of 1942 in order to do the ground scouting of the bridges and 
give orders to his local liaisons. Psarros’ main liaison in the Fokida region was his 
trustworthy Sub-Lieutenant Andreas Mitalas, who’s main task was to organise and co­
ordinate the resistance in Fokida on Psarros’ behalf. On 30 May 1942 Psarros notified 
Mitalas to receive four drops of weapons and ammunition for May, June, July and August 
(Mitalas, report: 5-11). The first scheduled drop was scattered in Ghiona and was taken 
by ELAS bands. The next two were cancelled, while the last one was not dropped in the 
designated area that Mitalas and his men were waiting, but on another drop zone 
controlled by ELAS (Mitalas, report: 12). The fact that the weapons were dropped on 
ELAS and not Psarros’ men was due to a series of misunderstandings surrounding lawyer 
Alexandras Seferiadis, a man with a key role in the events.
According to Woodhouse:
“Seferiadis was recruited by SOE.. .he was the liaison between “Promitheas II” and 
the guerrillas of Ghiona and a well-known member of EAM” (Woodhouse, 9 April 
1987).
Both the SOE and Psarros’ men however, misinterpreted Seferiadis’ role. Although
Psarros’ men knew that Seferiadis was a member of EAM, they considered him as the
“man of the Middle East Allied Headquarters and they hoped to get weapons from
him”(Woodhouse, 9 April 1987). In their thinking, it was beyond reason that the allies
would drop weapons to the “communists” and not to them. SOE’s drops in Ghiona were
arranged exclusively by Seferiadis, and SOE in Cairo was not fully aware about the
identity of the groups that the weapons were intended for. According to Woodhouse:
“The receivers’ identity was not yet fully clear. We knew them as “the guerrillas of 
Ghiona” and we understood that they were under Seferiadis’ orders. In reality they 
were ELAS and Aris Velouchiotis” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
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According to Themis Marinos, another member of the “Harling” mission:
“Seferiadis* activities played a decisive role in favour of ELAS and in restraining 
the formation of Psarros’ group” (Marinos, 199: 30).
Seferiadis was a member of EAM and his objective was to support ELAS’ forces and not
Psarros’ men. Consequently he directed the drops to drop-fields controlled by ELAS.
During that period SOE’s information and intelligence about EAM-ELAS and KKE’s
role in it were limited and vague.
“According to a brief information report dated 10 May 1942, EAM was a “Popular 
Front”. It included communists but according to the report it was not under their 
control. According to the same report, EAM was formed by former Venizelists 
with only a minor participation of communists” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
SOE was not aware that the weapons were sent to “communist” hands and moreover it
did not know that in Ghiona there was a second friendlier organisation that was under
formation (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987). Obviously, Seferiadis who was an EAMite did not
report anything about a competing guerrilla force in the area in order to safeguard the
monopoly of the British support for EAM-ELAS. That also explains Kaimaras’ question
why the British preferred to help “communists and generally suspicious people rather
than Greek nationalists” (Kaimaras, 1979: 34).
Psarros and Mitalas however were not completely ignorant about the drops and 
that is proven by the fact, that although they did not know the correct drop zones or the 
correct recognition signals, they still knew the dates of the drops. This can be explained 
by the fact that in Athens, Psarros had some connection with “Promitheas II” and 
probably that is where he got his information about the drops. The drop zones, the co­
ordinates and the recognition signals however were arranged by Seferiadis alone and that
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is why Mitalas and his men were always in the wrong drop zones and did the wrong
recognition signals. For example, concerning August’s drop Mitalas wrote:
“The weapons were not dropped to us but to ELAS although during the same night 
I was waiting east of the 2311 hill, gave the recognition signals on time and the 
plane flew many times in circles exactly above us at a very low altitude” (Mitalas, 
report: 12).
In that specific case, Seferiadis could have easily altered the co-ordinates of the drop 
zone and the recognition signal. Hence when the pilot saw two signals he probably 
double-checked and threw the canisters upon the correct signal where Seferiadis was.
In the meantime everything was ready in Cairo for the “Harling” mission. The 
mission’s commanding officer was Colonel Eddie Myers, while second in command was 
Major Chris ‘Monty’ Woodhouse. “Promitheas II” had already sent the details of the drop 
zone (Prophitis Elias hill in Ghiona) and the recognition signals that should be on the 
ground (cross of fires). The twelve members of the mission would be divided in three 
different planes. It was agreed that Seferiadis would be waiting for them at the drop zone. 
The drop was arranged for the night of 28 to 29 September 1942. Everything was in 
order, but a few days before the drop something unexpected happened. The Italians 
arrested Seferiadis, the only person in Fokida who knew what the planes would be 
carrying as well as the mission’s objective. The parachuters were going to be dropped in 
blind.
Apart from Seferiadis, Mitalas also knew that there was going to be a drop in the
same night. During that time, among Psarros’ men in Fokida morale was low due to the
continuous unsuccessful drops. Mitalas wrote in his report:
“The disappointment of our guerrillas and followers, was so big that towards the 
end of September, when new drop notifications arrived from Athens,67 none of the
67 That drop was the “Harling” mission
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officers wanted to take part in the mission of preparing the recognition signals and 
waiting for the planes. I was forced to personally undertake that mission as well, 
accompanied by 20 armed men, although I suffered from high fever due to malaria” 
(Mitalas, report: 12).
On the night of September 30 , Mitalas was waiting for a drop of weapons and
ammunition. Neither he nor Psarros were aware that out of those planes the members of
the "Harling” mission would be parachuted and certainly they did not know the mission’s
objective. That ignorance is also obvious in Mitalas’ report where he wrote:
“...the plane’s cargo was dropped at the spot where I was waiting. It was 
accompanied by four English officers, one of which was Major Chris Woodhouse” 
(Mitalas, report: 12).
Mitalas’ meeting with Woodhouse was completely accidental and that is also proven by 
the fact that Mitalas and his men built three fires which formed a triangle, while the 
correct sign was fires forming a cross. Moreover, Mitalas was completely unaware about
Woodhouse’s mission since he thought that his purpose was to accompany the plane’s
68cargo.
Consequently, the mystery covering Psarros’ involvement in the Gorgopotamos 
operation can be divided in two major parts: a) why did Psarros not participate in the 
sabotage, while he had executed a very important part of the operation such as the ground 
scouting, and why was he not aware of the impending sabotage? And b) since, even by 
chance half of the “Harling” mission was received by Psarros’ men, why did not he take 
any part in the Gorgopotamos sabotage subsequently?
68 See Myers, 1955: 26. The plane’s pilot carrying Woodhouse and his team did not see any of the correct 
recognition signals, therefore it was decided to drop the parachuters anywhere that there were signs of life. 
The second plane with Myers in charge was dropped near a shepherd’s fire and the group joined 
Karalivanos bandit and his men (Karalivanos later on joined ELAS). The third plane did not execute the 
drop and it returned in Cairo.
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As far as the first question is concerned, Seferiadis and the misunderstanding
about his role by SOE as well as Psarros’ men played a major part. Seferiadis, however,
was the tip of the iceberg. First of all it must become clear that in the case of the
Gorgopotamos sabotage two networks were involved. The first network was Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS)-Anglo/Greek committee-Tsigantes-Psarros-Mitalas, while the
second was SOE-Promitheas II-Seferiadis-EAM-ELAS local bands. Although both
networks were established by British Services and apparently they served the same
objectives, the two networks operated independently from each other and in many cases
they competed against each other. According to Woodhouse:
“SOE was a completely different bureau than SIS. All those who consider SOE 
officers as agents of the SIS as well, delude themselves” (Woodhouse, 9 April 
1987).
The hostility between Mitalas and Seferiadis reflected a wider and deeper antagonism
between the British Secret Services. According to Themis Marinos:
“There were excessive secrecy measures between SOE and SIS and both services 
competed with each other” (Marinos, 1994: 36).
SOE’s perspective on the war was military, while SIS’ was political. That was something
obvious throughout the war. In the Gorgopotamos case, SOE was exclusively interested
in the destruction of the bridge. Thus, it was available to co-operate with anyone who
could be useful for that task. On the other hand, SIS and the Anglo-Greek committee had
long-term political plans for Greece and they were far more suspicious towards EAM-
ELAS and anyone who was believed to be under its influence.
SOE and SIS might have been antagonistic towards each other, but Tsigantes and 
“Promitheas II” were in open conflict. Tsigantes believed that “Promitheas II” was under 
EAM’s control and on 16 September 1942 he sent a message to Cairo demanding from
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the British, to cease any co-operation with “Promitheas II” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
While the “Harling” mission was being prepared, the dispute between SOE and SIS and
their networks intensified. According to Woodhouse, throughout the period that the
“Harling” mission was being prepared in Cairo:
“A number of complaints came from and to Athens as well as among the various 
bureau’s in Cairo. People who had nothing to do with “Harling” made these 
complaints and their purpose was to pause it.... Things became even more tense 
when Tsigantes went to Greece” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
Both networks included ambitious people who craved for leading roles in the national
resistance and were suspicious and hostile towards each other. According to
Woodhouse’s comment:
“The Greeks who were in the Middle East had two things in common: limited 
knowledge about the situation of the resistance in occupied Greece and low 
appreciation for each other” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
The “Harling” mission was planned by the SOE-“Promitheas II”-Seferiadis network,
while Psarros and Mitalas were attached to the SIS-Tsigantes network. This explains
Psarros’ and Mitalas’ ignorance about the “Harling” mission and it answers the first part
of the mysteries covering Psarros’ non-participation in the sabotage.
The intrigues between the British secret services and resistance officials and a
whole series of misunderstandings excluded Psarros from the planning of the
Gorgopotamos sabotage. Luck however was unexpectedly kind on Psarros and sent half
of the “Harling” mission into Mitalas’ hands, like “deus ex machinez”. Nevertheless, in
the history of the most important event of the occupation, Psarros remained the great
absentee. In this second case, responsibility rests entirely on Psarros and his men.
When Woodhouse and his team fell in Mitalas’ hands, Mitalas was not only
surprised, but also disappointed. Myers writes:
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“When Woodhouse hit the ground, he met a Greek [Mitalas] who told him that he 
was an independent agent of ours and that he was waiting a drop of weapons and 
explosives from Cairo in order to block the Corinthos canal.69 Although he 
[Mitalas] was disappointed by the unexpected arrival of Woodhouse and his men 
instead of the weapons that he was so eagerly waiting for, he generously agreed to 
give two of his men, Cypriots Yianis and Panagiotis to us” (Myers, 1955: 41).
Another member of the “Harling” mission, Captain Denys Hamson also confirms the fact
that Mitalas was surprised by the arrival of the British that he did not know anything
about their objective, but also that he was disappointed by their arrival:
“The Greeks who had lit the fires were agents who were waiting provisions...they 
were surprised and disappointed when they saw four parachuters...they were 
insignificant, the fifth wheel of the carriage” (Hamson: 33).
For Mitalas, the crucial thing was exclusively to equip his men and the
unexpected arrival of Woodhouse and his team instead of the equipment that he was
impatiently waiting for disappointed him (Myers, 1955: 41). Oddly, Mitalas did not say
anything to Woodhouse about Psarros or about the ground scouting of Gorgopotamos that
he had done a few months ago (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987, Marinos, 1994: 48). After
collecting the canisters with the parachuters’ equipment and weapons, Mitalas hid
Woodhouse and his men and tried to find the other members of the “Harling” mission. In
the meantime Mitalas’ health deteriorated and he collapsed, that is why he handed the
British over to Captain Douros, who managed to connect the two groups of parachuters.
From the moment that the two groups joined each other, the British and Psarros’ men
went two separate ways. At a certain point, it seems that Mitalas or Douros abandoned
the British. According to Myers:
“Me and Chris [Woodhouse] were waiting for a Greek that Chris had met in 
Amfissa [That Greek was Mitalas since Mitalas had hid Woodhouse in Agios
69 This is another interesting point. The blocking of the Korinthos canal was one of the main objectives of 
Tsigantes’ mission in Greece. The fact that Mitalas mentioned that to Woodhouse proves again Mitalas’ 
ignorance about the “Harling” mission.
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Georgios village in Amfissa]...After four days70 we decided that it was not wise to 
wait any longer for the Greek from Amfissa” (Myers, 1955: 44-45).
After that Mitalas and the British went two different ways. The British attached
themselves to Karalivanos and Nikos Beis, who were the first people that the second
group under Myers had, also accidentally, met after their drop.
The fact that Mitalas and Douros let the British out of their hands is completely
inexplicable and probably both of them are blameworthy. First of all, it should be made
clear that there was no problem in communication with the British parachuters since
according to Mitalas:
“The English officers spoke Greek fluently and communication with them was 
easy” (Mitalas, report: 12).
About letting the British go out of his hands, Mitalas defence was:
“We would provide the British with more services if a) they had brought us 
weapons, b) if I had not got seriously ill, c) if the Italians had not burned the 
Prosilion and Karoutes villages -which were our bases- as counter measures for the 
assistance we gave to the British, d) if Chris (Woodhouse) was not hostile towards 
Captain Douros who replaced me, e) if Eddie (Myers) did not insist to connect him 
with Aris Velouchiotis” (Mitalas, report: 13).
None of these excuses seem well justified and strong enough to convince. As to
the first excuse, Mitalas’ reasoning is rather poor. His disappointment at the fact that he
did not get the weapons that he was expecting is understandable. The fact however that
he did not understand the seriousness of the situation is almost incredible. He witnessed
something unique, the dropping of allied officers in occupied Greece, but he failed to
respond and he did not mention anything about Psarros’ ground scouting. He did not
understand that something big was going to happen, and that is inexcusable for a member
of a secret resistance network. The same applies for Douros as well who replaced Mitalas
70 Georgios Koutsoklenis claims that Woodhouse and his men stayed in Amfissa for ten days.
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following his illness. As far as the third excuse is concerned, the burning of Prosilion and 
Karoutes was a blow for the 5/42 network. It caused problems and it probably 
discouraged many people from assisting the British, but still that was no reason to leave 
them in the hands of others.
With regards to Mitalas’ fourth excuse about Woodhouse’s alleged hostile attitude 
towards Douros, it is not cross-referenced by any other source.71 Consequently only 
assumptions could be made at this point. According to common sense however, that 
excuse as well must be considered as poor. Woodhouse was an allied officer who was 
dropped in enemy territory completely unknown to him and with no other local link than 
Mitalas and Douros. It would be highly unlikely for Woodhouse to have shown hostility 
towards his benefactors, the men who was literally holding his life in his hands. When 
Myers, for example, was also dropped in blind, he showed blind trust to Karalivanos and 
his men who were just bandits and who “looked like savages, like ghosts who came out 
of a bad dream” (Hamson: 28).
Lastly, Myers’ persistence in meeting Aris Velouchiotis can be explained by the 
fact that Myers was informed that Velouchiotis was the leader of a large band of 
guerrillas. Myers, however, was just looking to recruit men to take part in the operation. 
Indeed, when he found out that “Major” Karalivanos was not the leader of one hundred
*7 “5guerrillas, but a bandit with four men, he became desperate. There was no chance that 
he would exclude anyone from participating in the operation, but even if he was really
(Koutsoklenis manuscript memoirs and interview 17 May 200).
71 Woodhouse does not mention anything about that allegation, while due to his current state of health 
General Douros was not in position to give an interview.
72 SOE in Cairo had the false information that Karalivanos was a Greek army Major. See Woodhouse 9 
April 1987, Myers, 1955: 34-35, Hamson: 11, Marinos, 1994: 37.
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persistent in meeting Aris, that did not mean that Douros should let the British out of his 
hands. The least he could do was to get one trustworthy man of his, attached to them.
Psarros’ men showed a complete lack of conception, ability and initiative. 
Responsibility however always rests on the leader and at this point, Psarros’ share of 
responsibility was by far larger than that of Mitalas or Douros. Although Mitalas and 
Douros made a series of unforgivable mistakes, they at least notified Psarros of the 
arrival of the British.
“Woodhouse gave Mitalas a letter for Tsigantes. In that letter, Chris was asking 
Tsigantes to inform Promitheas and Cairo about the current situation since our 
radio was not working...Mitalas sent Woodhouse’s letter to Tsigantes, but he also 
sent a letter of his own to Psarros through the priest of the Kirra village who was a 
local liaison with both Psarros and Tsigantes” (Marinos, 1994: 50).
According to Petmezas the letter’s content was the following:
“3 October 1942. To Mr Psarros: I am the Sub-Commander of the British team that 
arrived in Greece the day before. I have not yet found the rest of my team members,
I have only found the other three that were dropped with me from the same plane. 
Altogether we are twelve people and if you have any information about the other 
eight please inform me. I am staying with Sub-Lieutenant M [most probably he 
means Sub-Lieutenant Mitalas] in his house. I would very much like to get in 
contact with some senior officers especially Mr Zervas and Mr Gonatas. I will be 
waiting information from you about their whereabouts and about how I can contact 
them. I am enclosing a letter which I urge you to forward to Colonel TS [most 
probably he means Colonel Tsigantes]. I will be waiting for your answer. In order 
for you to be certain for my identity, I am telling you the password that you have 
sent us a week ago. The name is GEVARA -but still the cryptogram might not 
have been accurate” (Petimezas, 1991: 310).
According to Michalis Kasoutsas who is the son of Argyris Kasoutsas -the priest 
of the Kirra village- his father delivered the letters to their destination (Kasoutsas, 
interview 23 August 200). Mitalas and Kaimaras also reconfirmed the fact that Psarros 
and Tsigantes were informed about the arrival of the British (Mitalas report, Kaimaras, 
interview 11 May 2000). According to Kaimaras:
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“The events concerning the arrival of the British was reported by the local officer’s 
committee to Colonel Psarros in Athens, and we requested orders for further action. 
Nevertheless, no orders came from Athens and no information was given about 
their mission’s objective”(Kaimaras, 1979: 33).
Unfortunately even after the current research, the reasons behind Psarros’ failure 
or unwillingness to contact the “Harling” mission remain unknown. The fact that he was 
informed about the mission’s arrival is proven beyond doubt. However, Psarros did not 
make the least effort to contact the British mission. From the day that they arrived in 
Greece and for the next six months, Psarros stayed in Athens and did not visit Fokida 
even once. The explanation for Psarros’ unwillingness to contact the “Harling” mission 
can only be subjective since there is no primary source that can shed light on that 
mystery. Maybe Tsigantes dissuaded Psarros from participating in the Gorgopotamos 
sabotage, either because he estimated that the operation would result in a fiasco, or 
because he did not want him to get involved in an SOE operation since he was in a SIS 
mission himself. According to Marinos and Woodhouse, Tsigantes did not want to have 
any co-operation with “Promitheas” due to the SOE-SIS rivalry, or for other security 
reasons” (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987, Marinos, 1994: 50). Given the fact that Tsigantes 
was a man with great influence on Psarros and that he also was a relative and a good 
friend, the argument that Tsigantes dissuaded him not to get involved in the “Harling” 
mission can be considered as a reasonable one, but the total lack of hard evidence makes 
it entirely subjective and hypothetical.
Independently from these reasons, Psarros’ absence from the Gorgopotamos 
sabotage had a negative impact on the success of the sabotage, as well as to the 5/42’s 
fate. Psarros’ expertise over the Gorgopotamos bridge was not used, and thus the 
operation started from scratch again, causing considerable delay. Moreover Myers wasted
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valuable time for the recruitment of the necessary number of men “From the other side of 
Greece”, (Woodhouse, Personal Letter to Mr Papathanasiou, 12 October 2000) since 
Velouchiotis was constantly moving from one area to another, and since Zervas was in 
Epirus. If Psarros had mobilised his men, “Harling” would have a considerable number of 
men much faster and easier. All the time that Myers and Woodhouse had to waste on the 
issues of operational planning and recruitment of fighters caused considerable delay. 
Eventually the sabotage was undertaken on the night of 25 November 1942 and although 
it was a serious blow against the axis, it failed to fulfil its objective, to cut Rommel’s 
supplies before the El Alamein battle, since the battle had already started since 23 
October 1942 (Woodhouse, 9 April 1987).
In addition to the damage that Psarros caused to the mission and consequently to 
the war effort of the allies, he seriously damaged his personal status, as well as that of his 
regiment. If Psarros instead of Zervas had undertaken the operation’s command, his 
status as a resistance leader would have reached its zenith. He would have changed the 
course of events of the national resistance as well as his own fate. If the 5/42 had the 
laurels of Gorgopotamos, its status as a resistance group would also have been totally 
different. It would have been established as a major resistance organisation and not as the 
“supernumerary” of the resistance movement. In the Gorgopotamos case, Psarros was so 
ungrateful to his destiny and kicked his luck so many times that eventually luck avenged 
him. From this point onwards, nothing went right for Psarros and his regiment.
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2.3. The formation of the 5/42.
From the early days of Spring 1943, “Urgent appeals were sent to Psarros from all
the liaisons in Pamassida, asking him to come to the area and start immediately the
struggle against the Germans and the Italians even with the poor means that were then
available to our organisation” (Mitalas, report). Psarros at last overcame his reservations
and arrived in Fokida in 25 March 1943, the national anniversary of the 1821 war of
independence. Immediately, he started co-ordinating in person his officers and ordered
them to gather their men. After some successful drops, the regiment’s men were armed
quite efficiently, while on the night of April 15th, the British liaisons of the 5/42 with the
Middle East Headquarters fell with parachutes above Ghiona. The team was under the
command of Captain Geoff Gordon Creed and it included Sergeant Bill Weatherley,
Sergeant Bob (surname unknown) and Greek Ioannis Symeonidis (Kaimaras, 1979: 47).
During its formation, the regiment included 200 antartes.73 Psarros was the commander
and Lieutenant-Colonel Lagouranis was the sub-commander. The regiment’s men were
divided in four companies commanded by Koutras, Kaimaras, Douros and Mitalas. On 20
April 1943 the 5/42 regiment was officially formed.
“In the Lykohoros area near Vounihora, our flag was raised and the ceremony of 
the regiment’s formation took place. The ceremony was attended by the British 
mission as well as by many of the local people. April 20th remained unforgettable 
for all the people who attended that moving ceremony. It is a historic date because 
it was the starting point of a struggle for the liberation of Greece and the protection 
of the Greek race” (Kaimaras, 1979: 47).
73 Antartes-Greek for guerrillas (plural), Antartis-guerrilla (single).
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2.3.i. Membership in the 5/42. “All for One and One for Himself’
The 5/42 was a group that was formed with a very specific objective: the national 
resistance against the occupation forces. Many of the regiment’s antartes, however, had 
their own reasons and motives for joining that were quite irrelevant with the group’s 
fundamental objective. In most cases those motives did not have anything to do with 
national resistance, but rather with the satisfaction of material needs, psychological 
motives, or even chance.
Participation in the 5/42, as in every underground resistance organisation, 
presupposed a strong moral and psychological motivation. According to psychiatrist 
Galanos:
“Joining an underground guerrilla group has a spell and a mystical attraction. It is 
the feeling that while before you were nobody, your life was unimportant and 
meaningless, now you have a mission in life, you are an active and aware human 
being, you create history” (Galanos, 1977: 17).
Illegality and the “outlaw culture” even in its criminal form were always combined with a 
sense of magnificence and power. When illegality is disinterested and illegal activity 
aims at the achievement of a noble cause, then the outlaw is transformed to a freedom 
fighter. That has a tremendous psychological effect and boosts the self-confidence, self­
perception and morale of the people who join such groups. Participation in the 5/42 gave 
a moral status, it gave the pride of belonging to a group with a noble mission against a 
powerful and immoral enemy. These psychological motives were the moral pillar of the 
overall national resistance movement and contributed a lot to the membership of the 5/42 
as well.
Machismo, the exhibition of bravery and the pursuit of adventure and action were 
other serious motives that led many young men to join the 5/42. Euthimios Karagiannis
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for example, joined the 5/42 at the age of twenty. Before he joined the regiment he was a
member of the Athenian secret royalist organisation “X”. “According to Karagiannis:
“In X they were just consumed in discussions and unrealistic plans just to justify 
themselves as resistance fighters. I was hungry for action though and that’s why I 
left Athens to join the 5/42” (Karagiannis, interview, 23 January 2000).
Many of the men who joined the regiment were aged 17 to early 20’s. Most of those
youths did not participate in the war. The Greek army’s victories in Albania, the veteran’s
stories of their heroic deeds, the hero’s welcome that these veterans received when they
returned home, made those youths envious of the veteran’s glory. They looked forward to
their chance of fighting the invader as well. The 5/42 was the chance that they had been
waiting for to prove their masculinity and bravery, to prove that they were “palikaria” 74
(A. Mamarelis, interview 15 January 2000).
Moreover, features such as military discipline or the gun culture always had an
appeal to young people. For those youths, becoming 5/42 antartes was in a certain way a
“ritual” of leaving childhood and becoming men, even if the riffle was many times taller
than them (A. Mamarelis, interview: 15 January 2000)! Typical was the case of Georgios
Koutsoklenis who joined the 5/42 at the age of 17. Before he joined, his older brother
used to bully him all the time. In his memoirs he writes:
“He thought that just because he was older than me he had every right upon me. He 
used to beat me, tease me all the time in front of others etc...all that harassment 
ended when I was actively involved in the national resistance” (Koutsoklenis, 
manuscript memoirs).
As 5/42 antartes those children were treated as adults, equals with other antartes much 
older than they were. They were considered worthy and brave and enjoyed the admiration 
of their friends, relatives and fellow villagers. When Koutsoklenis was in school, before
74 Palikaria =Young brave men, lads
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he joined the 5/42 he was a “loner” and did not have any friends. After joining the 
regiment however:
“...everything had changed. I was not any longer the scared and isolated village 
boy. I had made many new friends and comrades. My schoolmates saw me as an 
active member of the national resistance” (Koutsoklenis, interview, 17 May 2000).
That acceptance was something that young individuals needed desperately, it was
rewarding and boosted self-confidence and self-respect. Koutsoklenis and many other
young men satisfied those needs by joining the regiment.
Apart from those psychological needs that were satisfied through membership in 
the 5/42, a series of material needs were also covered. The regiment provided to its 
antartes food, clothes, boots -  one of the most valuable commodities during the 
occupation- shelter for those antartes who’s houses were destroyed, while later on it 
offered a golden sovereign per month to every antartis (DIS F/929). For many indigenous 
men who suffered from starvation, all those privileges mattered. Joining the 5/42 was for 
many people the only alternative that they had in order to survive and support their 
families (A. Mamarelis, interview, 15 January 2000, Talantis, interview, 23 August 
2000). The fact that for some people who joined the 5/42 their primary motivation was to 
cover their survival needs and secondarily to fight is rational and understandable 
especially if the dramatic condition of those people is taken into consideration. Still, 
however, even today this issue remains taboo among the regiment’s veterans. Obviously, 
that motive is considered self-interested and humble, something that does not match with 
the icon of the disinterested and altruistic national resistance fighter that most 5/42 
veterans want to maintain. A resistance fighter is supposed to be someone who ignores 
material goods and who puts his/hers ideals before his/hers well being and personal
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interest. Consequently, although it is quite certain that many of the 5/42 men joined the 
regiment in order to satisfy their material needs (A. Mamarelis, interview, 15 January 
2000), it would be rather odd for a 5/42 officer or antartis to admit that in his memoirs or 
in an interview.
Although being a member of the 5/42 involved a great amount of danger, at the 
same time it provided security for many of its members who were already under 
prosecution by the occupation forces. In the mountains of Fokida there were a number of 
scattered small bands (e.g. of 3 or 5 people) of rustlers, bandits and generally people who 
were under prosecution by the Italians and the Germans for a number of reasons. The 
5/42’s pioneers as well as ELAS’ ones were very keen to recruit those small groups 
because they were already armed and they could become the necessary nucleuses for the 
development of larger bands. When Captain Koutras, for example, started his attempt to 
form a resistance nucleus in his own village he first came in contact with a small band of 
rustlers.
“I was informed that in the nearby area there was an armed group of men from my 
village who were under prosecution by the Italians. I contacted the group and 
instructed them to avoid provoking the Italians, cease any illegal activity and 
become the guards of order and protectors of sheep and shepherds. Later on, I told 
them that they would soon have to play a major role in the national resistance for 
the liberation of Greece. Eventually they followed my instructions and that group 
of outlaws really became guards of order and a nucleus of national resistance” 
(Koutras, 1981: 30-31).
The two major things that these kind of outlaws achieved through their 
participation in the 5/42 were security and the “absolution of their sins”. They were 
already on the run by the occupation forces for their criminal offences. By joining the 
5/42 they would be more secure. They would get weapons, food and shelter, and 
generally they would protect themselves more efficiently as members of an organised
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resistance group than from continuing being on their own. Apart from that, they would
change their identities leaving their “sinful” past behind. Yannis Avoritis was a notorious
bandit leader of Roumeli whom Psarros contacted earlier in 1941 and asked him to join
the 5/42. Among others, Psarros told him:
“Kapetan Yannis, today our country is enslaved. Those who are going to fight for 
our county’s freedom are lucky and glorious. The country is not going to forget 
them and when our children go to school they are going to read in their history 
books that Kapetan Yannis from Kyriaki raised the flag of revolution and freed 
Elikonas and Levadia from our enemies” (Gregoriadis: 174-175).
According to Avoritis himself, Psarros promised him many things in order to convince
him to join the 5/42, but from all those promises, what excited him the most was that
argument (Gregoriadis: 174-175). By joining the 5/42 all those outlaws would be
transformed from bandits to resistance fighters. In that way they hoped that they would
stop being considered as outcasts by their community, but also that the post-war Greek
State would forgive their criminal past.
Moreover, the 5/42 became a refuge for many people who were involved in 
private vendettas and who had domestic enemies. For example, in Desfina there was a 
young man who was in love with a local girl and wanted to marry her. The girl’s parents 
however did not allow her to marry him. Therefore that man with the assistance of three 
of his closest friends kidnapped the girl. Soon a vendetta broke out and the girl’s relatives 
started looking for him and his friends to kill them. Major Mannaios contacted those four 
men and advised them to join the 5/42 and that was how the first armed band of the 5/42 
in Desfina was formed (Mannaios, interview, 5 May 2000). For those specific men, as 
well as for others who had to cope with similar vendettas, joining the 5/42 provided 
security and their enemies would think twice before they harmed them.
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Membership in both camps, 5/42 as well as in ELAS, was also motivated by 
reasons of revenge. Some people chose to join the one camp or the other with no other 
reason than just to revenge individuals with whom they had personal differences. For 
example in Penteoria, a young man joined the 5/42 just because his brother -with whom 
they were in serious conflict over property issues- had already joined ELAS (I. Kokoris, 
interview, 16 August 2000). In another case in Palaioxari, lawyer Andritsopoulos was the 
villages’ 5/42 co-ordinator. Due to some pre-war property disputes, Andritsopoulos was 
murdered by another local named Papageorgiou. After that, Papageorgiou joined ELAS 
in order to protect himself, but also in order to justify his action as politically motivated 
(Stathopoulos, interview, 8 January 2000).
2.3.ii. Ideology and Objectives.
The 5/42 regiment titled itself exclusively as a combatant resistance force with the 
war against the invaders as its single objective. It lacked any ideological or political 
identification and it served no apparent political purpose. That was the regiment’s official 
line and it was emphasised by Psarros in his speech to the regiment’s men at the 
formation ceremony (Kaimaras, 1979: 47, Koutras, 1981: 52, Papathanasiou, 2000: 58).
The 5/42’s non-political attitude was obvious first of all in its name. Evzones 
were Greek army troops dressed in the traditional Greek uniform worn by the Greek 
fighters during the 1821 war of independence. Before the war, the “5/42 regiment of 
evzones” was a special forces regiment of the Greek army stationed in Roumeli. The 
regiment’s soldiers came exclusively from the nearby regions of Fokida, Fthiotida,
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Euritania and Biotia. The 5/42 regiment had a glorious history and fame. It was 
commanded by Plastiras and it had fought in all Balkan wars, in the Ukrainian campaign, 
while it was the first Greek force which had landed in Smyrna during the Asia Minor 
campaign. As a Special Forces’ regiment, the 5/42 was always engaged in the bloodiest 
and the most important battles. During the Asia Minor campaign, the Turks called it 
“Seitan asker” (Devil’s soldiers), while in the Greek-Italian war, the regiment had fought 
in the infamous battle of the 669 hill where it lost 16 officers and 252 soldiers (DIS 
F/929/C). Contrary to EAM-ELAS or EDES, the regiment’s name referred to a genuine 
combatant-military formation and it did not include the words “popular”, “front”, 
“democratic” etc that contained elements of political rhetoric. Moreover, it did not even 
refer to a guerrilla band, but rather to a regular military force. By giving the title “5/42 
regiment of evzones” to his band, Psarros wanted not only to stress the band’s non­
political identity, but also he aimed to excite the local population since most men in 
Fokida had served their military service in that specific regiment.75
The 5/42’s total lack of political identity and its exclusive dedication in the war
against the occupation forces were also obvious in the regiment’s oath.
“I swear to protect the motherland, to fight the occupiers until the last drop of my 
blood is spilled, to consider any Greek who is fighting the enemy my brother, 
regardless to which organisation he belongs” (Kaimaras, 1979: 47, Koutras, 1981: 
52).
ELAS’ oath was rather more politicised, it had a political rhetoric and it was not just an
oath of dedication to the country, but also to the organisation:
“I, son of the Greek people swear to fight with loyalty within ELAS against the 
enemy, for the liberation of our country and for our people’s freedom, until the last 
drop of my blood is spilled” (Sakkas, 1998: 52).
75 Later on ELAS and EDES adopted Psarros’ idea and they also started naming their units after the names 
and numbers of pre-war military units.
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Moreover EDES’ oath was like an oath given to a pagan society:
“I swear to my honour and conscience that I will work with all my strength and by 
using any means for the accomplishment of EDES’ objectives. That I will execute 
incontestably any order given by the central committee and that I will safeguard the 
secret of our league with sanctity, until our objectives are achieved” (Istoriko 
Arheion Ethnikis Antistasis, vol.l).
Apart from the name and oath, the most solid proof about the regiment’s non­
political attitude and identity was its complete independence from its political branch 
EKKA. EAM as well as EDES had their respective military wings, ELAS and EOEA76, 
under their complete control. ELAS’ and EOEA’s antartes were also members of their 
political organisations and they were fully accountable to them. For example, in every 
ELAS company, there were three commanders: an officer, who was responsible for 
military-strategy issues; a “Kapetanios”, who was responsible for the company’s men; 
and, a political instructor who was assigned by KKE, responsible for issues of political 
propaganda and for imposing EAM’s doctrines to the company. 5/42’s case was totally 
different. The regiment’s antartes were by no means bound to EKKA.77 That was made 
clear to the 5/42 men from the first moment they decided to join the regiment. “After 
announcing the regiment’s oath, Colonel Psarros gave a moving speech and emphasised 
that the regiment’s exclusive objective was the country’s liberation. The regiment’s 
antartes and officers did not undertake any political, and constitutional obligation or 
commitment towards EKKA. That was also written in the regiment’s daily report” 
(Kaimaras, 1979: 47).
The fact, however, that the 5/42 and EKKA remained independent from each 
other was not only due to Psarros' determination to keep politics away from the 5/42 but
76 EOEA “Ethnikes Omades Ellinon Antarton” National Bands of Greek Antartes,
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it was also due to more fundamental causes. Firstly, none of EKKA’s officials (Kartalis, 
Kapsalopoulos etc) came from Fokida. They were not familiar with the area and the local 
people and respectively, the local people had never heard of them before (Interviews: A. 
Mamarelis, 16 May 2000, A. Koutsoklenis, 18 May 2000, Zacharias, 16 May 2000, A. 
Kokoris, 19 August 2000, Kouvelis 20 April 2000). Furthermore, throughout the period 
that the 5/42 was being formed, EKKA’s officials remained in Athens and they did not 
send any liaison to Fokida to propagandise EKKA to the locals. On the other hand, EAM 
and EDES were formed one year before their military branches ELAS and EOEA 
respectively. EAM as well as EDES produced their guerrilla branches, kept them under 
their strict guidance and maintained complete control over them throughout the 
occupation. EKKA and the 5/42 on the contrary, were formed simultaneously and 
independently from each other. Throughout the period that both organisations were under 
formation there were no links between them and consequently they developed 
autonomous identities and dissimilar objectives. There were considerable differences 
between the pioneers who formed both organisations. High rank officials formed EKKA 
in Athens, while low rank local officers and peasants formed the 5/42 nucleuses in 
Fokida. EKKA was a resistance political organisation with radical political objectives in 
its manifesto, while the 5/42 was exclusively a combatant resistance group formed within 
a traditionally conservative community. The 5/42 was concerned exclusively with the 
conduct of war against the invaders, while EKKA was also highly concerned with the 
post-war distribution of authority and power in free Greece.
All these fundamental differences between EKKA and the 5/42 caused a series 
of misunderstandings and misinterpretations from the very beginning. Kartalis and the
77 For more details on EKKA see ch 2.2.ii.c, p 81.
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rest of EKKA officials without having visited Fokida even once and without having any
link with the 5/42 men (apart from Psarros) had taken the loyalty of the 5/42’s men for
granted. On the other hand 5/42’s men had a completely false and vague idea about
EKKA. They perceived it as “some contacts that Psarros had in Athens with other
politicians and officials” (Interviews: A Mamarelis, 16 May 2000, A. Kokoris, 19 August
2000, Protopapas, 14 January 2000, Zaharias, 16 May 2000, Kouvelis, 20 April 2000).
Moreover, the 5/42 officers such as Kaimaras, who were better informed, were quite
reserved and mistrustful towards EKKA.
“The secret Athenian organisation EKKA was unknown in the 5/42 area. It did not 
have any administrative relationship with the 5/42 antartes. It had social and 
political objectives and that was in contrast with the 5/42’s objective which was 
strictly the nation’s liberation” (Kaimaras, 1979: 47).
Right from the start, EKKA and the 5/42 were two organisations alien to each other and
that alienation between them was soon to grow bigger.
2.3.iii. Beyond the Official Line: Ideological Taboos and Political Wishful Thinking 
within the 5/42.
The fact that the 5/42 regiment was officially a non-political combatant force 
serving no political objectives does not necessarily mean that politics and political beliefs 
were totally absent among the regiment’s 200 antartes and officers. Studying and 
measuring the dominant political attitudes within the regiment’s men however is a rather 
difficult task that cannot be based on solid evidence since these political attitudes were 
beyond the regiment’s official line, they were personal and rather hidden.
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In order to get a picture about those political attitudes, it is necessary to focus 
first on the political identities of the 5/42’s pioneers, Koutras, Kaimaras, Douros and 
Mitalas, who were the ones who did the recruitment of the 200 antartes. The study of the 
political views shared between those four men could suggest the political attitudes and 
tendencies that were common among the 5/42 men during the regiment’s formation.
All four of those officers entered the Military and the Police Academy78 and 
started their careers during the 1930’s.79 During that decade, the Metaxas regime as well 
as the People’s Party governments, had degraded all democratic officers from the armed 
forces and had managed to create an ideologically coherent and politically homogeneous
O A
military and police, loyal to the Monarchy and the pro-monarchist regimes. Almost the 
absolute majority of the officers who were in active service during that time were 
royalists, or at least they were loyal to the regime. The political attitudes that prevailed 
among those officers were conservatism, anti-communism and a defiant attitude towards 
politics and politicians.
Anti-communism was common among those four officers. When for example
Koutras, Kaimaras and Douros were connected with Psarros through Mitalas,
“the three officers had serious reservations about co-operating with Psarros since he 
had participated in the 1935 coup and since he did not take a clear stand against 
communism” (Mitals, report).
For that reason, all three of them insisted to Psarros that:
“the purpose of the struggle should be solely national liberation, no political 
substance would be given to the struggle and that we would undertake absolutely 
no responsibility towards any political organisation” (Kaimaras, 1979: 19).
78 Before the war Mitalas was a policeman
79 Kaimaras and Douros for example studied in the Euelpidon Military Academy during 1933-37. See 
Kaimaras, interview 18 December 1999
80 See ch 1.3.i, p 44 and ch 2.2.i, p 68.
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In addition to being communistophobic, those officers regarded politics as
something derogatory, or at least as something that was not compatible with an officer’s
duty. This perception was quite common among officers during the 1930's. Kaimaras’
attitude towards the 1935 movement was indicative. When the Venizelist coup broke out
Kaimaras was a cadet in the military academy:
“After the coup’s failure, the cadets who participated in it were court-martialed and 
degraded. Sadly the degradation ceremony took place inside the academy and all 
their stripes were taken off their jackets etc. It was such a humiliating event for 
those men that even today, 60 years later, I still remember it vividly. It was a good 
lesson though: an officer should never get involved in politics and should always 
remain dedicated to his military duties” (Kaimaras, 1994: 16-17).
The ideological beliefs of the 5/42 pioneers were similar if not identical with the 
ideological beliefs of the men that they recruited. This was due to the patterns of 
recruitment that the 5/42 pioneers used. Koutras, Kaimaras, Douros and Mitalas did not 
recruit their men openly and massively e.g by issuing proclamations and calling all the 
people of Fokida to join the regiment. They used secret and cautious patterns of 
recruitment and all of the recruited men were trustworthy individuals whom they had 
known for years (Kaimaras, interview, 11 May 2000, Koutras, interview 9 January 2000). 
Each one of the four officers had undertaken the task to recruit men from his own village 
and three or four of the neighbouring villages. Koutras recruited his men from Penteoria 
(his village), Amigdalia, Panormos, Eratini, Galaxidi and Vidavi, Kaimaras from 
Vounichora (his village), Malandrino, Skaloula and Karoutes, Douros from Agia 
Euthimia (his village), Agios Georgios, Semikaki and Tritea, while Mitalas from Segditsa 
(his village), Topolia and Amfissa (Koutras, 1981: 35).81 In fact, the regiment’s 200 men 
were a group of relatives, friends, schoolmates and fellow-villagers, since the regiment’s
81 See list of maps.
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network of recruitment was developed according to the friendships, family bonds and 
individual contacts of the four officers. For example, Koutras’ cousin was the 5/42 co­
ordinator in Galaxidi, while his brother in law was also a 5/42 antartis, Mitalas’ brother 
was the co-ordinator in Amfissa, Kaimaras’ brother was also an antartis etc (Mitalas, 
report, Zacharias, interview 16 May 2000, K. Koutras, interview, 9 January 2000).
The exact political attitudes of all the 200 men recruited by Koutras, Kaimaras, 
Douros and Mitalas cannot actually be measured. Nevertheless, it would be safe to 
assume that the political beliefs of the recruited individuals were similar to the political 
beliefs shared by the four officers who conducted the recruitment since one of the criteria 
used for their recruitment was also their political “trustworthiness” (A. Mamarelis, 
Interview, 16 May 2000). Kaimaras writes “The men who were recruited were veterans 
of the Albanian and Macedonian fronts, determined and combative people and generally 
nationalists (ethnikofrones) independently of political preference, who were willing to 
fight for the national resistance” (Kaimaras, 1979: 17). In contrast to the terms “royalist” 
or “socialist”, the term “Ethnikofron” depicted someone with no specific political 
preference. The term “Ethnikofron” nevertheless did have a strong anti-communist 
connotation.
According to ELAS’ antartis Bekios, all those who joined the 5/42 regiment from 
day one were fanatic right wingers and anti-communists (Bekios, interview, 8 May 
2000). On the contrary, according to Kaimaras, personal political beliefs were set aside 
among 5/42 men and the only thing that the regiment’s antartes were concerned about
a*y
was the war against the invader. Both statements are probably exaggerated and biased 
and probably truth lies somewhere in between. Officially, the 5/42 was a resistance band
123
with no political orientation, but still its officers and antartes shared conservative 
attitudes and ant-communist sentiments. Nevertheless, although these attitudes and 
sentiments were popular within the regiment’s men, they remained personal and they 
were not manifested in any collective way. These sentiments were to become more 
obvious, concrete and collective within the regiment later on when EAM-ELAS became 
openly hostile to the 5/42.
Conclusion
This chapter covered the period from the early days of the occupation until the 
formation of the 5/42. It focused upon the pioneers of the 5/42, Colonel Psarros and the 
local officers of Fokida, as well as upon the first group of men who manned the regiment. 
It examined the motives that led the 5/42 leaders and their followers to undertake 
resistance initiatives as well as their ideological, political attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, 
this chapter highlighted the strategies that the 5/42 pioneers adopted towards the 
formation of the regiment and the part that they played in shaping its ideological and 
political identity.
Colonel Psarros and the local officers maintained their leading roles throughout 
the 5/42’s life and their leadership and decision-making sealed the regiment’s fate. 
Therefore, in order to understand and explain their actions later on in the course of 
events, it has been necessary to understand first what were their personal, political and
82 See Kaimaras, interview, 11 May 2000
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ideological motives that led them to the resistance, what were their objectives and 
visions. Moreover, the decisions that Psarros and the local officers took and the mistakes 
that they made during the period that this chapter examined had a decisive effect upon the 
regiment’s fate later on.
As will be argued in the next chapters, the 5/42 regiment remained throughout its 
existence a small, locally based force of limited political and military power, always 
vulnerable to EAM-ELAS’ aggression. There were a number of other reasons that caused 
that vulnerability and they will be examined further in the thesis. However two of the 
most serious reasons were Psarros’ delay in forming the 5/42 and his absence from the 
sabotage in the bridge of Gorgopotamos. The impact that the fiasco in Macedonia had on 
Psarros’ strategic planning and Psarros’ dependence on Bakirtzis and Tsigantes were the 
main causes of these two mistakes. The effects that these two mistakes had upon the 
regiment’s fate were tremendous. Psarros and his men lost their chance to participate and 
even lead the most important act of sabotage in Greece and one of the most important 
acts of sabotage in occupied Europe. The glory and the laurels of the sabotage in 
Gorgopotamos were given to ELAS and EDES instead. Furthermore, Psarros’ hesitation 
to form the 5/42 caused a serious disadvantage towards ELAS right from the beginning. 
When eventually the 5/42 was formed, ELAS was already strong in Fokida and had the 
region under its control. In a certain way, ELAS was the “host” and the 5/42 was the 
“guest” in the area. If the 5/42 appeared in the mountains of Fokida before ELAS, 
probably the regiment’s fate would be totally different and the 5/42 would then be “a 
much harder nut for any teeth to crack” (Gregoriadis, vol.l: 23). Instead, the 5/42 became 
an easy prey for ELAS.
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Another major disadvantage that contributed a lot to the regiment’s collapse, 
which is going to be discussed in the next chapters, was the fact that there was no 
ideological and political coherence within the 5/42. The political objectives of Psarros 
and EKKA were very different from the ones of the local officers. The seeds of that 
internal disintegration existed from the first day of the regiment’s formation. As 
mentioned before in this chapter, the 5/42 regiment was officially a resistance force with 
no political identity and it served no political objectives. Nevertheless, the regiment’s 
political branch EKKA openly declared its political objectives and its radical political 
programme. On the other hand, the regiment’s officers were rather conservative. 
Moreover, the regiment’s antartes who were personally recruited by these officers, were 
personally attached to them and also shared similar political attitudes. During the 
formation phase, there was a peaceful co-existence between EKKA and the regiment’s 
men. Conservative and anti-communist sentiments remained strictly personal, while on 
the other hand it was made clear that the regiment’s men did not have to undertake any 
political obligation towards EKKA. This peaceful co-existence, however, was not to last 
for long.
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CHAPTER 3 
The End of Delusions: The 5/42 in the Turmoil of 
Resistance Politics
The meso-level analysis looks at the 5/42 in the wider context of the civil conflict 
within the national resistance movement. It focuses on the conflict between the 5/42 and 
EAM-ELAS as well as on the role that the 5/42 played in the polarised environment of 
the Greek resistance. Furthermore, it focuses on the different strategies of the 5/42 
leaders and it also highlights the domestic political antagonisms within the regiment.
In this chapter, the meso-level analysis will focus on the period between May and 
October 1943. During that period, a series of important events occurred, the first of which 
was the outbreak of an armed conflict between the 5/42 and ELAS. Within forty days, 
ELAS forces disbanded the 5/42 twice (on 13 May and 23 June). Although official 
apologies were given in both cases by ELAS to Colonel Psarros, the circumstances under 
which these two disbandments were ordered were rather mysterious. Those disbandments 
had an overwhelming effect upon the 5/42. They increased the hostility of the regiment’s 
officers and antartes against EAM-ELAS and they gave cause for serious political 
developments within the regiment. Furthermore, during the same period, two serious 
initiatives were taken on a national level towards the achievement of national unity and 
co-operation between all national resistance organisations. These were the founding of
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the Joint General Antartes Headquarters and the Cairo conference between 
representatives of EAM, EDES, EKKA, the exiled Greek government and the British. 
Although both the Joint General Antartes Headquarters and the Cairo conference aimed 
to achieve national unity and co-operation, they both failed to achieve that goal and 
instead -especially the fiasco of the Cairo conference- contributed to further corrosion 
between EAM-ELAS and EDES. However, the participation of the 5/42 in the Joint 
General Antartes Headquarters and Kartalis’ participation in the Cairo conference marked 
the entrance of EKKA and the 5/42 onto the political scene and strengthened the role of 
EKKA-5/42 within the national resistance movement.
During the period that this chapter discusses, important changes occurred in the 
5/42’s structure, membership and ideological, political identity. It was a period of 
transition for the 5/42 during which the regiment increased its manpower six to seven 
times, it developed in to a well-equipped guerrilla unit, while it launched a notable 
campaign against the Italian and German forces in Fokida. Furthermore, the regiment’s 
role within the national resistance politics increased. Kartalis and Psarros became 
important players in the political game, the regiment acquired a political identity and 
factions started being formed within the 5/42.
This chapter will begin by examining the circumstances of the two disbandments 
of the 5/42. Next, it will focus upon the Joint General Antartes Headquarters and the 
Cairo conference and their impact upon national unity and upon relations between the 
national resistance organisations. Finally, the political dilemmas that arose within the 
5/42 will be discussed, focusing upon the attitudes and policies of Kartalis and Captain
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Thymios Dedousis- the new key player within the 5/42 who would become a catalyst of 
the regiment’s fate later.
3.1. ELAS Against the 5/42: A series of Mistakes, or Premeditated 
Crimes?
3.1.1. The First Disbandment of the 5/42.
Three weeks after the 5/42 was officially formed and while the regiments’ 
recruitment of antartes and the provisioning of weapons were still ongoing, rumours of an 
impending Italian mopping-up campaign against all antartes forces in Roumeli spread. 
ELAS’ forces by then controlled a major part of the mountains of Pamassos and Ghiona 
and the Italians seemed determined to re-capture these areas and disband all antartes 
forces there during mid-May 1943. In view of that danger, a meeting was held between 
ELAS, Psarros and 5/42’s British liaison Captain Creed in order to develop a defence 
plan. According to that plan the 5/42’s mission would be to guard the Kaloskopi-Stromi 
road and for this reason the regiment camped in the Stromi village (Kaimaras, 1979: 50). 
On the other hand, ELAS’ units all over Roumeli (approximately 1,800 men) gathered in 
the Maurolithari village next to Stromi (Gregoriadis , vol.2: 376).
5/42’s officers were worried by the fact that such large ELAS forces had camped 
so close to them and they had some information indicating that ELAS was going to attack 
the regiment (Mitalas report, 15-16, Kaimaras, 1979: 50). Psarros however assured his 
officers that:
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“ELAS would never attack the regiment since the 5/42 was under the authority of 
the Middle East Headquarters and an attack would be devastating for the struggle 
of national liberation” (Kaimaras, 1979:51).
Nevertheless, Psarros’ officers were still suspicious and suggested to put their men on
alert, or at least take some preventive measures. Psarros argued with them and ordered
them “not to proceed in any action that would provoke ELAS” (Mitalas, report, 16).
During the same time in ELAS’ Headquarters in Maurolithari Aris Velouchiotis
was having lunch with the rest of ELAS’ kapetanios. Amongst them was kapetanios of
the Attica-Biotia Headquarters Andreas Mountrichas “Orestis” who had just arrived in
Maurolithari. Orestis claimed that he conveyed oral orders from Giorgos Siantos, KKE’s
General Secretary concerning ELAS’ policy and attitude towards the other resistance
bands. According to Foivos Gregoriadis “Vermaios”, member of ELAS’ General
headquarters of Roumeli, Orestis, Aris, himself and the rest of ELAS Kapetanios had the
following discussion:
“(Orestis to Aris) I heard that Psarros is in our area. You know ... 10 days ago, I 
was in Athens. I saw the old man [Siantos’ nickname] and he told me that from 
now on we will not allow any other group to be formed in the areas that we have 
liberated. Absolutely none. We are not going to kill ourselves just to allow others to 
come to the free territories and raise their own flags.
(Aris) Wait a minute, what do you mean by absolutely none? Here we’ve got 
Psarros.
(Orestis) Absolutely none means neither Psarros.
(Aris) How! What! Really him as well?
All other present kapetanios addressed ten similar questions and Aris took Orestis 
and Gregoriadis in an office for a private discussion.
(Aris) OK about the others, but for Psarros as well?
(Orestis) And for Psarros.
(Aris) Especially for Psarros?
(Orestis) Yeah!!
(Aris) Be careful about what you are saying. Are you talking about Psarros as 
well?
(Orestis) Yeah I am serious and I am serious about Psarros.
(Aris to Gregoriadis) What do you think Fotis?
(Gregoriadis) What can I say, filings are obvious.
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Almost immediately after the end of that discussion, Aris came up with a surprise 
attack plan.
(Aris to everybody) Listen, we are going to finish this job today. All of us 
kapetanios are going to Stromi to pay “a friendly visit” to Psarros and we are going 
to spend the night in Stromi. You Diamandis [one of ELAS’ kapetanios] will stay 
here with all your men. During the night you are going to surround the village.. .We 
will give Psarros an ultimatum and the disarming of his men will start immediately 
(Gregoriadis “Vermaios”, vol.2: 377-378).83
Aris and the rest of ELAS’ kapetanios visited Psarros for dinner. Psarros was very
friendly towards them and they discussed about the potential of closer co-operation
between both organisations (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 380, Kaimaras, 1979:52). After the
meeting Psarros ordered his men to find houses for the ELAS kapetanios to spend the
night. During the night however, a large number of ELAS forces surrounded the village
and at the break of dawn (14 May 1943), Aris with his kapetanios went to Psarros’
quarters, woke him up and delivered their ultimatum:
“According to our Central Committee’s orders we cannot allow the formation of 
any other armed group in our area. Consequently you and your men can either join 
ELAS, otherwise you will have to disarm and disband immediately” (Gregoriadis, 
vol.2: 384, Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 307-308).
Psarros became pale. He could not believe his ears.
“Why are you doing this...what you are doing is tragic. For god’s sake, please give 
me some time to inform my men, I don’t want anybody to get killed” (Dimitriou, 
1965, vol.2: 308).
Psarros wanted to avoid bloodshed at any cost and so he gave the order of surrender. 
However, some of his men who had camped outside Stromi, were not informed about the 
developments inside the village and they refused to surrender their arms. Psarros ordered 
them to comply with ELAS’ ultimatum and so bloodshed was avoided. After they were 
disarmed, all 5/42 men were free to either join ELAS or return to their villages. Apart
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from a couple of 5/42 men who joined ELAS the rest refused to do so and they returned 
to their homes. Psarros and his officers were held by ELAS for one day, but then they 
were also released.
3.1.ii. The Reasoning.
ELAS’ argument for disbanding the 5/42 was that it could not tolerate the 
formation of any other antartes band in the areas that it had under its control. The validity 
of that argument is highly subjective and depends almost exclusively upon individual 
perception of the national resistance struggle. According to one point of view held by 
5/42 veterans, the 5/42 regiment, like ELAS was also a resistance organisation and in 
simple terms, the existence of an extra resistance organisation would benefit the overall 
armed resistance struggle, and would cause more damage to the occupation forces 
(Protopapas, interview, 14 January 2000). Secondly, since the country was under 
occupation, everyone had the right to fight the occupants. Depriving the right of lawful 
defence against the invader was a direct violation of the Greek people’s freedom. It was a 
clear manifestation of arrogance and totalitarianism, and it weakened the overall national 
resistance struggle. ELAS at that time was the largest combatant resistance organisation 
but had neither the right nor the authority to decide who was qualified and authorised to 
take arms against the invaders and who was not (Kaimaras, interview 18 December 
1999). Lastly, ELAS’ argument about areas that were under its control could also be
83 The narration of the discussion comes from Gregoriadis himself. It appears to be genuine as it is also 
cross-referenced accurately by Dimitriou (Nikiforos) (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 306) who was also present 
until the point where Aris, Orestis and Gregoriadis went to talk in private.
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considered as groundless since in a country that was under foreign occupation, no stable 
fronts and permanently free areas existed (Mamarelis, interview, 15 January 1999).
On the other hand, according to the unwritten laws of guerrilla warfare, ELAS’ 
argument was quite valid and substantial. The existence of two different and independent 
guerrilla armies in the same area could cause serious problems in the command of the 
area, in the distribution of authority and responsibilities within the area, whilst it could 
easily lead to tensions and violent clashes. Guerrilla armies always depended for their 
provisioning in food on the support of local people. Due to the dramatic shortage of food 
during the occupation, it would be more difficult for the local population to support two 
guerrilla armies instead of one. The larger the guerrilla forces became in the region, the 
harder it would be for the local people to meet their needs in food. According to a 
guerrilla warfare manual of the Greek army, the increase of guerrilla forces in a small 
region creates more needs in logistics’ support (communications, transportation, medical 
support etc) and consequently makes the guerrilla forces less flexible (General Army 
Command, 1950: 6). From that perspective Gregoriadis’ argument “Roumeli is now ours. 
Whoever wants to make a new guerrilla band can go to Evia, the Peloponnese or 
elsewhere where there are no antartes bands at all” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 358) was valid.
ELAS’ antartes hostility towards the 5/42 grew also due to the fact that the 5/42 
was a “rich” guerrilla army, while ELAS was a “poor” one. The 5/42 had a small number 
of antartes and rather generous funding from the allied drops.84 It had enough funds to 
buy the necessary provisions for its men and pay the villagers for their labour (Kaimaras, 
interview, 18 December 1999). On the other hand, ELAS had much more antartes to feed 
and its funding from the allies was very limited, thus it had to impose taxation,
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requisition of food and compulsory labour. Those contrasts caused frustration among the
ELAS antartes (Bekios, interview, 8 May 2000) and as kapetanios Diamantis complained
“That’s nice, they buy their food and all is well and we have to impose taxation” 
(Gregoriadis, vol.2: 383).
ELAS’ antartes felt mistreated towards those of the 5/42. They felt that the British
were scandalously in favour of the 5/42 (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 330). For the mentality
of ELAS’ antartes who had fought a number of battles and many of whom had taken their
weapons as trophies from the battlefield, the fact that 5/42 men were armed before they
had fought any battle seemed provocative, unfair and obscene (Bekios, interview, 8 May
2000, Siderakos, interview, 18 August 2000). ELAS kapetanios Hatzipanagiotou
[Thomas] complained:
“Instead of providing with weapons Velouchiotis’ men who had risked their lives 
in Gorgopotamos and who had helped to save so many British lives in northern 
Africa, they [the British] were dropping unlimited supplies and weapons to Psarros’ 
men who had not even fought a single battle against the enemy and had not 
benefited the allied effort even once...We were the ones who got killed and they 
were those who were getting provisions and weapons” (Hatzipanagiotou, 1997: 
272).
3.1.iii. Orestis: Conspirator or Plain Deaf?
The person who played the key role in the disbandment in Stromi was the 
kapetanios of the Attica-Biotia Headquarters Orestis. EAM-ELAS’ official explanation 
and excuse was that the disbandment was an unlucky event due to a misunderstanding 
between Siantos and Orestis, and that Orestis alone was entirely responsible for the 
disbandment. According to the official explanation produced by EAM-ELAS, Siantos 
called Orestis for a briefing, in order to inform him about ELAS’ policy towards other
84 See ch 7.1.i, p 268.
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resistance bands. Siantos told Orestis that ELAS was not going to allow the formation of 
other resistance groups in the areas that it had under its control, but he did not say that the 
specific policy applied to the 5/42 as well. Orestis however misunderstood Siantos’ 
words and thought that his instructions referred to all resistance bands including the 5/42. 
Therefore, according to EAM-ELAS’ official excuse, Orestis’ order to disband the 5/42 
was a misunderstanding, it was his personal mistake and had nothing to do with EAM- 
ELAS’ official friendly policy towards the 5/42 (Gregoriadis: vol.2: 381-382).
Whether Orestis was authorised directly by Siantos to order the disbandment of
the 5/42, or whether he really misunderstood Siantos’ instructions remains quite unclear.
Orestis, however, took responsibility for the disbandment with a letter sent to KKE’s
Central Committee two weeks after the 5/42 disbandment.
“Comrades: A month ago I was called in Athens [by Siantos] to discuss some 
issues concerning ELAS’ Headquarters of Attica-Biotia. During the discussions our 
party’s policy towards all other newly formed non-EAMic resistance bands all over 
Roumeli was explained to me. What I understood from the discussion was that 
wherever we dominate, we were not to allow the formation of any non-ELASite 
group. Anyone who wishes to fight the occupiers can join ELAS.. .Having all these 
in mind, when I went to Ghiona -where Colonel Psarros had camped- I told Aris 
[Velouchiotis] what I mentioned above about non-EAMic groups. Psarros’ 
organisation had started becoming dangerous and after what I told him, comrade 
Aris decided to disband Psarros’ regiment. For that action I am entirely 
responsible.. .Now I submit the following question in order to get everything sorted 
and understand what my duty is. Should I say that I did a mistake (as I am already 
saying to everybody)? Because I understand that my position is very sensitive, I am 
asking you to tell me what I should do. I will do whatever the party tells me to and 
I declare myself a loyal soldier of the party” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 381).
At first glance, it seems that with his letter Orestis was taking full responsibility 
for the disbandment and apparently the mystery ends there. By using a feigned sincerity 
however, Orestis “was beating around the bush” and did not give any answer to the 
crucial question, which is whether Siantos gave him a clear order to disband the 5/42, or
135
whether Orestis took by himself the initiative to disband the regiment. The 5/42 was not 
like the various small insignificant groups of bandits that ELAS had repeatedly disbanded 
throughout Roumeli. It was the third largest resistance organisation nation-wide, 
commanded by a well-known and respected officer such as Psarros and had the full 
support of the allies. Disbanding the 5/42 was not minor issue and the decision could not 
have been taken without any serious thought. How was it possible for Orestis who was a 
quite important ELAS official not to ask Siantos clarification over ELAS’ attitude 
towards the 5/42 specifically? Arguably, such an important decision as to disband the 
5/42 could have only been taken by Siantos himself. Unfortunately there is no document 
on Siantos’ behalf that could shed some light in the case, but even if Siantos had ordered 
Orestis to disband the 5/42, such an order would have been given unofficially. It is 
impossible to solve the mystery completely, but the truth is that the alleged 
misunderstanding of Siantos’ instructions cannot be considered as an adequate excuse.
Orestis confession was not sincere. First of all, a clear political opportunism and a 
self-interested motivation were obvious in his letter, especially at its ending, where he 
gives lip service to KKE’s Central Committee. Moreover, in an adroit manner, Orestis 
tried to shift some of the responsibility on Aris and make him look like a partner in the 
crime - if  not the one solely responsible for the disbandment- by writing that “...after 
what I told, comrade Aris decided to disband Psarros’ regiment”. Soon afterwards 
however, Orestis wrote the pompous “For that action (the disbandment) I am entirely 
responsible”, but still he managed to present Aris as a perpetrator and as if Aris was the 
one who decided the disbandment of the 5/42. Of course, that was completely unjust for 
Velouchiotis, since from the moment that Orestis claimed that he had clear orders from
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Siantos about the 5/42, Aris was obliged to obey. According to Aris’ defender 
Hatzipanagiotou:
“Aris did not have any reason to think that Orestis was acting on his own. .. .Aris 
had no doubt that the orders were genuine and that they had been issued by Siantos 
himself’ (Hatzipanagiotou, 1997: 278).
Velouchiotis certainly had no doubt about the order’s validity since in the discussion that
he had with Orestis, he and the rest of the ELAS kapetanios asked repeatedly whether the
5/42 should also be disbanded.85
Although as mentioned above, EAM-ELAS officially considered Orestis as the
one who was personally responsible for the 5/42 disbandment in Stromi, no disciplinary
action was taken against him and he continued being the chief kapetanios of the Attica-
Biotia Headquarters. Whether that was due to excessive lenience, or whether it was a
cover up will be analysed more thoroughly later on in the thesis.
3.1.iv. Reformation and Second Disbandment: Another Devilish Coincidence?
A few days after the 5/42 was disbanded, the leaders of ELAS’ General
on
Headquarters called Psarros to a meeting in Karpenisi. In that meeting, Tzimas as well 
as Sarafis disapproved of the disbandment in Stromi as arbitrary, reprimanded Orestis 
and promised that similar events would never be repeated. Furthermore Sarafis urged 
Psarros to forget the incident and join ELAS.
85 In the discussion between Aris and Orestis Aris repeated the question “and for Psarros?” many times and 
for each time Orestis reassured him that Siantos had ordered the disbandment of Psarros’ regiment as well 
(seech 3.1.i, p 130).
86 See ch 5.2, p 230.
87 ELAS’ General Headquarters had been formed since mid May 1943 with Stefanos Sarafis as its Chief of 
Military, Aris Velouchiotis as the Chief kapetanios and Andreas Tzimas “Vasilis Samariniotis” as the Chief 
political instructor.
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“Psarros answered that he preferred to remain the commander of his own 
independent force but he offered the co-operation of his band when necessary. As 
far as the possibility of a future closer co-operation between us he said that he was 
not authorised to decide by himself and that he should consult EKKA’s Central 
Committee in Athens....He reassured me that his organisation’s objectives were 
similar with EAM’s objectives and that he would give his best effort not only for 
the avoidance of conflicts, but also for the development of friendly relationships 
between our political as well as our military branches” (Sarafis, 1964: 120-121).
Although Psarros refused rather diplomatically to join ELAS, Tzimas and Sarafis
promised him that ELAS would give him all the assistance to enable the 5/42 regiment to
be reformed. More specifically ELAS promised to return the 200 weapons that it took
from the 5/42 men in Stromi and to give the 5/42 a part of its own supplies in food.
ELAS’ General Headquarters condemned officially ELAS’ previous attitude towards the
5/42 and the other non-EAMic resistance groups and issued the following order:
“ELAS General Headquarters, 1st bureau, 28.5.1943. ORDER. After the recent 
incidents between ELAS’ bands and other organisations, it is ordered: From now 
on, no hostile activity is going to be taken against other bands and organisations. In 
the event of hostile activity from other bands or organisation against our bands 
these activities are going to be reported straight to the General Headquarters and 
the local English liaisons. From now on our behaviour towards other bands and 
organisations is going to be determined according to the agreement that is now 
ongoing between the Chief of the English Military Mission in Greece Major Eddie 
[Myers], the Middle East Headquarters and EAM-ELAS’ Central Committee. Even 
if the discussions fail and even if the agreement is not going to be signed, we are 
still going to behave according to the agreement’s spirit. Anyone who is going to 
violate the agreement’s terms or who is not going to behave according the 
agreement’s spirit is going to be strictly punished. Aris Velouchiotis, Stephanos 
Sarafis, Vasilis Samariniotis” (Kedros, 1983, vol.l: 330-331).
Myers and Woodhouse had already started a series of contacts with ELAS, EDES 
and Psarros in order to achieve smooth relations and co-operation between all resistance 
organisations.88 Since March 1943, Myers had already distributed to ELAS, EDES and 
Psarros a draft of “The National Bands Agreement”. Psarros was absolutely positive
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towards that draft agreement and he said that he would inform EKKA’s Central
Committee in Athens for the official acceptance of the agreement’s terms (Pyromaglou,
1965:168-169). Myers, as well as ELAS’ leadership (Sarafis, Velouchiotis, Tzimas) were
completely satisfied by Psarros’ guarantees and ELAS’ leaders assured Psarros that:
“Independently from whether or not EKKA is going to sign the National Bands 
Agreement, EAM-ELAS is going to assist the 5/42’s reformation by all available 
means and would behave towards the 5/42 according to the agreement’s spirit” 
(Pyromaglou, 1965: 169).
After those official guarantees were given on ELAS’ behalf and after getting 
Myers’ approval, Psarros went back to Fokida and started reforming the 5/42. He ordered 
his officers to gather their antartes to the Taratsa hill of mount Ghiona and asked the 
British Military mission to supply the regiment with enough weapons to arm at least 500 
men. After successive drops between 5 and 20 June the regiment managed to arm 200 
men (Kaimaras, 1979: 61-62, Koutras, 1981: 56). Nevertheless, ELAS’ promise for the 
return of the 200 weapons taken from 5/42’s men in Stromi was not fulfilled.
On 19 June and while the 5/42’s reorganisation was still ongoing, a cryptogram
was delivered in ELAS’ headquarters in Maurolithari:
“According to our position against those who have not signed the band agreement, 
you are allowed to disband the 5/42. Be cautious for ambushes by Italians and 
Psarianoi [Psarianoi=5/42 antartes]. 19 June 1943. For the general headquarters: 
Major Thymios Zoulas” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 470).
Captain Foivos Gregoriadis “Fotis Vermaios”, Chief of ELAS’ Headquarters in 
Maurolithari who received the cryptogram was surprised, but after a brief meeting with 
Captain Dimitris Dimitriou “Nikiforos” and Kapetanios Thiseas, they decided to act
88 Later on in July 1943, those contacts led to the establishment of the Joint General Antartes Headquarters” 
and the signing of the “National Bands Agreement” among EAM-ELAS, EDES-EOEA, EKKA-5/42 and 
the British military mission.
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immediately. They gathered approximately 300 men89 and marched to Taratsa where the 
5/42 had camped with the pretext that they were going to attack the Italian Headquarters 
in Lidoriki. Psarros’ men however understood that ELAS was marching against them and 
they prepared themselves for battle.
On the next day (23 June 1943), ELAS’ forces launched their attack in Taratsa. 
This time, the 5/42 men were determined not to allow the Stromi fiasco to be repeated. 
The feeling that dominated them was rage. That second attack, almost forty days after the 
first disbandment in Stromi and after all those guarantees were given by ELAS, proved 
that “ELAS was a deceitful enemy with no honour and dignity” (Kouvelis, interview, 18 
April 2000). This time they would defend their regiment’s honour “Let them come and 
they will see what we’ve got for them. They will not trick us like in Stromi where we 
trusted their word” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 480).
The fact that the shooting started from the 5/42 side (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 482) was 
indicative of the rage that 5/42 antartes felt about ELAS. The regiment’s men fought hard 
and inflicted considerable casualties upon ELAS who suffered 7 dead, 15 wounded and 
more than 40 captured, while 5/42’s casualties were 3 dead and 10 wounded (Koutras, 
1980: 60, Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 338, Gregoriadis, vol.2: 487, Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 
367 See Pyromaglou, 1965: 171). Throughout the battle 5/42 men kept shouting threats 
and insults to ELAS’ men “Forget about Stromi you scum, here its called Taratsa and 
now you’ll see what Psarros means” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 485, Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 
336). Even Psarros, who was a well known calm and moderate person, lost his temper
89 According to Gregoriadis the number of men was 250 (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 476), according to Dimitriou it 
was 300-320 (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 332), Kaimaras’ and Koutras’ estimation of 800 men is rather 
excessive (Kaimaras, 1979: 64, Koutras, 1981: 57).
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and when the first ELAS prisoners were presented to him, he spat at their faces, although 
he later released them unharmed (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 487).
The battle however, had another dimension. In many cases men from both sides 
showed unwillingness to kill and to risk their lives. Especially in the beginning of the 
battle the unwillingness of both sides to engage themselves was obvious. According to 
Koutras:
“The battle in the southern sector was not intensive. Many ELAS antartes 
surrendered themselves voluntarily although their position was not so difficult. 
Obviously they did not want to engage themselves in fratricide” (Koutras, 1981: 
59).
That unwillingness to fight was due to the familiarity between the men of both camps. On 
the opposite sides of the battlefield, there were friends, fellow villagers, old schoolmates 
and even brothers as in the case of Dimitrios and Nikolaos Kotronis who fought with 
5/42 and ELAS respectively (Kaimaras, 1979: 66).
That familiarity made the trigger harder to pull and prevented many more 
casualties. For example, Captain Koutras at a certain point stormed against a couple of 
ELAS men with his machinegun, but when he opened fire, his antartis Dimitris Polizos 
shouted at him to stop because he had recognised one of ELAS men who was 
Haralambos Giangis who came from the same village as Koutras (Koutras, 1981: 59, 
Giangis, interview, 17 August 200, Giangi, interview 17 August 2000). In another case, 
Kaimaras’ company faced Giorgos Katsimbas’ company of ELAS. The two company 
leaders were schoolmates and good friends. After recognising each other they agreed not 
to be engaged in battle. Eventually however, they were forced into battle due to the fact 
that some of their men opened fire (Kaimaras, 1979: 66). Similar altruistic incidents were 
also reported on ELAS’ side. ELAS’ antartis Tzivaras had 5/42’s Captain Kranias in the
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sight of his gun but he did not shoot him “I lifted my gun and I would have shot him, but 
I remembered his two children. What the hell, I said, I am not going to make them 
orphans” (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 340).90
The battle lasted for almost 12 hours and it ended with a Pyrrhic victory of ELAS’ 
forces. Eventually, the 5/42 men retreated from Taratsa and gathered in the Vounichora 
village. Psarros pleaded to the 5/42’s British liaison officer Creed to order new drops 
from the Middle East of at least 1,000 weapons within two days so that the regiment 
could protect itself from ELAS (Kaimaras, 1979: 67, Koutras, 1981: 69). Due to 
indifference -according to 5/42’ side- or due to the fact that something like that would be 
almost impossible to achieve in such short time, the weapons were not dropped and 
Psarros decided to disband the regiment.
The battle in Taratsa was a very important event that had serious consequences in 
the 5/42’s future. The first disbandment in Stromi was also a serious incident between 
ELAS and the 5/42, but at least it was a peaceful one. In Taratsa however, there was 
blood spilled. The suspicion and the aversion between the two organisations was 
transformed in to open conflict. There was nothing anymore which could convince the 
5/42 antartes that their regiment and ELAS were allied organisations engaged in a 
common cause. After Taratsa, the terms “friendly relations with ELAS” or “National 
resistance free from politics” became bogus and meaningless and anti-EAM-ELAS 
sentiments within the regiment’s men were growing fast.
90 During the battle, a rather symbolic event occurred. While the battle was at its peak, three German 
bombers flew by coincidence over the battlefield. According to Gregoriadis, “During those few moments 
the two opposite sides had the chance to consider how devastating was the conflict that they had been 
engaged into...The enemy’s appearance over the battle-field caused a brief seizure of fire. Gunshots and 
machine-gun bursts stopped for five minutes, enough time for everybody to think the disaster that was 
happening. However, the planes soon disappeared and with them so did the hesitations of the fighters and 
soon the battle-field was again in flames” (Gregoriadis, vol.: 490)
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3.1.v. Zoulas: Conspirator or Just a Frustrated Husband?
The causes and motives of the second disbandment in Taratsa were again
mysterious. Four days after the battle, Captain Gregoriadis who led the attack was called
to present himself before ELAS’ disciplinary board in Gardiki for his action. The
disciplinary board was composed of Sarafis, Velouchiotis, members of KKE’s and
EAM’s Central Committee Tasos Leuterias, Elias Maniatis and Orfeas Vlachopoulos and
Thymios Zoulas member of the ELAS General Headquarters of Roumeli.
“All of them were upset with the 5/42’s new disbandment and demanded the head 
of anyone who was responsible” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 497).
Throughout the board, all of EAM-ELAS officials were offensive and angry
against Gregoriadis. They told him that he attacked the 5/42 while in Athens discussions
were taking place between EAM and EKKA and that his action caused disastrous damage
to EAM’s policy of national unity (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 499). The only one who did not
say a word was Thymios Zoulas. At a certain point Gregoriadis got upset and he took out
of his pocket a small paper. According to Gregoriadis, the following discussion took
place between him and EAM-ELAS’ officials.
(Gregoriadis) Are you all through?
(Vlachopoulos) Yes we are.
(Gregoriadis) Comrade Leuterias, you are the Chief of the General Headquarters 
and you are telling me that you know nothing about the order I was given?
(Leuterias) Which order?
(Gregoriadis) This order? (And he showed everybody the order)
(Everybody) What are you talking about? Which order?
(Gregoriadis) I am impressed that you don’t know it. Listen “According to our 
position against those who have not signed the band agreement, you are allowed to 
disband the 5/42. Be cautious for ambushes by Italians and Psarianoi 19-6-43. For 
the general headquarters: Major Thymios Zoulas”.
(Everybody to Zoulas) What is this? Did you issue this order? Why didn’t you tell 
us anything
Zoulas remained silent and did not give any answer. The only thing he said in an 
angry tone was “Listen, all of you have your own lunacies, let me have mine. At
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the end of the day, I was living with a psychopathic wife for fifteen years” 
(Gregoriadis, vol.: 499-501).
It is true that Zoulas’ wife suffered from mental illness due to syphilis (Mannaios, 
interview, 5 May 2000), but surely his excuse was rather irrelevant. Obviously Zoulas 
was hiding something. In order to shed some light on the secret that Zoulas was hiding it 
would be helpful to understand ELAS’ hierarchy and the route that the decision to 
disband the 5/42 would follow under normal circumstances. Zoulas was a member of the 
ELAS General Headquarters of Roumeli. For any serious political issue, he was directly 
under the orders of Vlachopoulos and Leuterias (Papadakis, “Leuterias”, interview, 13 
September 2000). Similarly, Vlachopoulos and Leuterias were under the exclusive orders 
of KKE’s General secretary Giorgos Siantos. Since Vlachopoulos and Leuterias did not 
know anything about the disbandment order (Papadakis, “Leuterias”, interview, 13 
September 2000) there were only two possible scenarios: either Zoulas personally took 
the initiative to disband the 5/42, or Siantos gave him directly the order to do so but 
without informing any other EAM-ELAS official.
A definite answer cannot be given at this point for two reasons. The first reason is 
that -as with Orestis’ case in the first disbandment- there is no primary document to 
indicate that Zoulas was ordered to disband the 5/42 by Siantos, or that he was acting on 
his own. The second reason is that Zoulas is a person who played a key role throughout 
the regiment’s existence. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to draw any 
conclusions about him after his activities have been studied in full.91 What can be said at 
this point however is that Zoulas, like Orestis, did not suffer any disciplinary
91 For more details about Zoulas see ch 6.1, p 246.
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consequences from ELAS and that he remained a member of the ELAS General 
Headquarters of Roumeli until the final disbandment of the 5/42 in April 1944.
However, in addition to Zoulas, Captain Gregoriadis as well had a major share of
responsibility for the second disbandment of the 5/42. Gregoriadis admitted that he was
over-zealous in his decision to attack the 5/42. Firstly, the cryptogram that he received
wrote “.. .you are allowed to disband the 5/42” and that was not a clear military order, but
a conditional directive. Furthermore, Gregoriadis was not Zoulas’ subordinate. Both
Zoulas and Gregoriadis were equal members of ELAS’ General Headquarters of Roumeli
and the fact that Gregoriadis received a directive from Zoulas did not mean that he had to
obey it (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 471). Gregoriadis could have contacted the Headquarters and
discussed the issue, or at least reconfirm the order. Instead, he carried the order out
immediately and he marched against the 5/42. Gregoriadis admitted in his self-criticism
that soon after he received the cryptogram, a young member of ELAS’ youth branch,
EPON Eniaia Paneladiki Organosi Neon (United Greek National Greek League), urged
him to consult the Headquarters’ Chief Political instructor Tasos Leuterias before he
proceeded with his attack plan. Gregoriadis however, either due to his over-zealousness,
or due to the fact that he did not get on very well with Leuterias (Papadakis, “Leuterias”,
interview, 13 September 2000), answered the young EPONite:
“Get lost, who do you think you are, the instructors’ [Leuterias] henchman? Here 
we’ve got military orders and I am the boss. This ain’t no time for politics” 
(Gregoriadis, vol.2: 472).
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3.2. Steps Towards National Unity.
3.2.i. The Joint General Antartes Headquarters.
After the second disbandment, Psarros and some of his officers (Kaimaras,
Douros and Papavasiliou) went to Aegion on the shores of the Peloponnese. In Aegion,
Psarros kept receiving messages on a daily basis from the British Military Mission in
Greece asking him to arrange a contact with the British and to reform his regiment under
new terms and conditions. Psarros was uncompromising and refused even to discuss with
the British officers. He had lost his trust in the British and he was completely
disappointed with the course of events. He had started his resistance attempt with the
exclusive objective of fighting the enemy and against his wishes, he was forced into a
civil war. According to Pyromaglou, Psarros explained to him the reason why he took the
decision to disband the regiment for good.
“Political objectives are involved in the national resistance struggle...There is no 
integration and unity between the resistance organisations. Due to this discord, the 
leader of a resistance organisation must be prepared not only for the national 
resistance struggle against the invader, but also for a civil war. Is it worth it to 
waste Greek blood? Where is all this going to end? Furthermore why does Cairo 
keep making promises that it is going to support the 5/42, but eventually it does 
nothing on time?” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 171).
After a few days, EKKA’s political leader Kartalis also arrived in Aegion and 
persistently tried to convince Psarros to meet the British. Eventually Psarros was 
convinced by Kartalis and on 29 July 1943 both men went to the Pertouli village near 
Trikala (Pyromaglou, 1965: 175, Kaimaras, 1979: 69). During that time in Pertouli 
important negotiations between EAM-ELAS, EDES and the British Military Mission 
were taking place. The agenda of those negotiations were the signing of the National
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Bands Agreement and the formation of the Joint General Antartes Headquarters. Both the 
National Bands Agreements as well as the Joint General Antartes Headquarters were 
ideas of Major Eddie Myers and served military as well as political objectives. Their 
purpose was to unify all antartes bands, to determine the relationships between them so 
that in the future tensions and conflicts would be avoided, to co-ordinate the guerrilla 
warfare against the Germans, and to tackle a series of other issues concerning the 
administration of “mountainous free Greece”.
The main military objective was the achievement of full-scale co-operation 
between all resistance groups. The reason for that was that the Middle East Headquarters 
was preparing a military plan of the utmost importance for the allies, that involved the co­
operation of the Greek antartes forces. During the spring of 1943, the allies decided to 
launch large-scale operations in Italy. The role of the Greek antartes forces in these 
operations would be of a major importance for the success of the overall plan. Their task 
was to carry out continuous sabotages and attacks in the period between 21 June and 14 
July 1943 in order to create a diversion and mislead the Germans by giving them the 
impression that the new front would be opened by the landing of forces on the western 
coast of Greece (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 472). The Middle East Headquarters formed 
the overall operation under the code name “Animals” and the British Military Mission in 
Greece was ordered to carry it out. For the success of the plan however, a centralised 
command under the British Military Mission and the co-ordination of all antartes groups 
under a Joint Headquarters was necessary.
In addition to the success of the “Animals” operation, Myers and Woodhouse 
were seeking to find a way to halt EL AS’ aggression towards the rest of the resistance
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organisations. Through the National Bands Agreement, Myers hoped that he would 
increase the British influence on the Greek resistance movement, restrain ELAS and 
achieve peace between the various antartes forces. Hence, since March 1943 until June- 
July 1943 a series of discussions between EAM-ELAS, EDES and the British Military 
Mission concluded with the signing of the National Bands Agreement. According to the 
agreement, EAM-ELAS, EDES-EOEA and the 5/42 were proclaimed Advanced Allied 
Military Forces. Furthermore, the agreement included terms that guaranteed the freedom 
of forming antartes bands under the authority of the Joint Headquarters, the prevention of 
conflicts and brutalities between members of different bands, the division of Greece into 
military zones, the conditions of co-operation between the antartes groups and the 
respective British missions in each zone as well as the provision of supplies and weapons 
by the Middle East Headquarters etc.
Both EAM-ELAS and EDES-EOEA had already signed the National Bands
Agreement and had already became members of the Joint General Antartes Headquarters.
Due to its second disbandment however, the 5/42 did not have the chance to sign the
agreement and participate in the Headquarters. Therefore, a meeting was held between
Psarros, Kartalis, Myers, Aris, Sarafis, Tzimas and Colonel Rautopoulos from EDES in
Pertouli. Psarros and Kartalis were straight with ELAS’ leaders:
“We in EKKA intend to carry out the resistance struggle against the occupiers 
exclusively. We have no intention to engage in a civil war. If you in ELAS have the 
intention to disband us again, it would be better to tell us now with dignity. Then 
we are going to withdraw and abandon any attempt to form a guerrilla band in 
order to avoid even the slightest possibility of a civil war” (Papathanasiou, 2000: 
71).
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ELAS’ leaders apologised once more for the previous disbandments, they guaranteed that 
ELAS would treat the 5/42 as a friendly force and said that the reformation of the 5/42 
was a pressing need.
ELAS’ answer was considered satisfactory and after that, new conditions were 
given to Psarros and Kartalis from Myers and ELAS’ leaders in order for them to sign the 
National Bands Agreement and for the 5/42 to join the Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters. Those terms and guarantees were: a) the regiment would participate in the 
Joint General Headquarters, b) the reconstruction would proceed rapidly with the full 
support of the British Mission which was going to hasten the provision of guns and 
ammunition c) as a penalty, ELAS would have to transfer the weapon drops intended for 
it in Fokida to the 5/42, so that by late September, the 5/42 should have 1,000 well-armed 
men (DIS/GES F/929/B/2).92 d) Psarros was appointed General Commander of all 
antartes groups in Roumeli, e) ELAS officially apologised for the two previous 
disbandments and guaranteed future peaceful and productive relationship with the 5/42 
(Koutras, 1981:62, DIS/GES F/929/B/25).
On 31 July 1943, EKKA-5/42 signed the National Bands Agreement and the 
regiment joined the Joint General Antartes Headquarters. All the terms and conditions 
seemed to guarantee the future of the 5/42 and it seemed the opportunity had come for the 
regiment to develop into a considerable combatant force. Along with the new era that the 
resistance movement seemed to be introduced into, the 5/42 had for the first time the 
chance to be established as the third pole in the Greek resistance.
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3.2.ii. The Cairo Conference.
After the National Bands Agreement was signed and the Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters was formed, the comradeship and unity between the national resistance 
organisations was achieved, at least on the surface. The agreement and the Joint 
Headquarters however, tackled primarily military issues and were both intended to 
safeguard co-operation between the various resistance organisations. Nevertheless, there 
were a series of important political issues that remained unresolved. For that purpose, 
Major Myers again took the initiative to arrange a meeting between all resistance 
organisations for these issues to be discussed. Eventually, the meeting was held between 
7 August-15 September 1943 in Cairo with the participation of delegates from EAM 
(Tzimas, Rousos, Tsirimokos, Despotopoulos), EDES (Pyromaglou), EKKA (Kartalis), 
the pre-war democratic parties, the exiled Greek government and the British Foreign 
Office.
The conference’s key issues were: (a) the fate of the monarchy in free Greece; 
whether the King should return immediately after the liberation, or whether he should 
wait for a referendum to take place first; and (b) the formation of a provisional 
government immediately after the liberation. EAM, EDES and EKKA’s delegates 
consented and seemed united on both issues. They demanded: (a) an explicit statement by 
the King assuring that he had no intention to return to Greece until the people’s verdict 
was given first; and (b) the participation of representatives from the national resistance 
groups in a national unity government. EAM, EDES and EKKA’s delegates issued a 
common agreement according to which:
92 Pyromaglou writes that the number agreed concerning the manpower of the 5/42 was 4,000 (Pyromaglou, 
1965: 180-181), but the DIS/GES archives include the official document of the agreement among EKKA,
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“For the sake of national unity which is the only way to safeguard our nations’ 
struggle and the peaceful proceeding to political normality, we believe that it is 
absolutely necessary that the King declares officially that he does not intend to 
return to Greece before the people give their verdict about the system of 
government that they prefer” (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 496).
Irrespective of the differences in their political orientation EAM, EDES and
EKKA maintained unity in their demands in Cairo and remained optimistic that they
were going to achieve their goals. Eventually, they failed to achieve anything with
respect to either the issue of the King or that of the provisional Government and the
conference resulted in a fiasco. The main reason for their failure was the uncompromising
attitude of the British on the issue of the King and the refusal of the pre-war parties to
allow participation of the resistance groups in the national unity government. What had
become obvious was that the British were determined to restore King George to his
throne and that the King was unwilling to officially declare that he was going to return in
Greece only if the people’s verdict was given.
The common declaration of EAM, EDES and EKKA disturbed Churchill who
wrote to Foreign Affairs Secretary Anthony Eden:
“I am not going to submit to those bandits’ blackmail” (Apogeumatini 29 January 
1976, Gasparinatos, 1988, vol.l:510).
Having the full support of the British, King George became scandalously arrogant. When
he had a brief meeting with EAM’s delegates he came to meet them wearing shorts and
holding a whip under his arm. When he addressed the delegates he told them
“I have heard about your games (Kamomata), but I want to hear them by you as 
well” (Hantzis, 1983, vol.2: 315-316).
The King’s appearance in front of the struggling nation’s representatives and the word
“games” used to describe the bloody struggle that the national resistance was giving were
ELAS and Myers.
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provocative to say the least. In another case, Prince Paul had an unofficial discussion with
Navy officer, Commander Neofitos. Prince Paul asked Neofitos in front of a number of
other officers what was his opinion about the Greek people’s disposition towards the
monarchy. Neofitos answered that the Greek people did not want the restoration of the
monarchy. Prince Paul then stood up in anger and he shouted:
“Precisely because the Greek people do not want us, that’s why the Anglo- 
Americans are going to get us back” (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 510).
3.2.iii. The Corrosion Grows within the National Resistance Movement.
The Cairo conference had disastrous effects upon the unity of the national
resistance movement and it marked a new era of polarisation, which reached its peak in
October with the outbreak of the ELAS-EDES, armed conflict in Epirus. Although EAM,
EDES and EKKA maintained unity over their collective demands concerning the fate of
the monarchy and the provisional government, they failed to achieve anything. Taking
under consideration the fact that the British were determined to restore the King to his
throne by all means, EDES’ and EAM reshaped their policies. The time for the liberation
of Greece was near, Siantos and Zervas had to take specific decisions about the routes
that they would follow. According to Kartalis:
“.. .now the corrosion is going to begin. National unity is now in the hands of KKE 
and Zervas” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 200).
Zervas read the signs and chose to adjust his policy according to the facts. He 
became completely attached to the British, he wiped out his strong ant-monarchist past 
and became a champion of the King. Zervas knew that without the British support, EDES 
had no chance against EAM-ELAS and he knew that he had to do anything to please the
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British in order to secure their support. He was convinced that the will of the British was 
going to be enforced after the war and that “his [the King’s] return is certain” (Petimezas, 
1991: 261). Since March 1943, Zervas had made a pro-royalist reversal in his policy that 
had remained secret even from his Sub-Commander Pyromaglou.
Although EDES’ new recruits kept taking the organisation’s oath that included 
the words: “I swear that I am going to fight with all my strength for the establishment of a 
non-monarchist, socialist democracy” (Istorikon Archeion Ethnikis Antistaseos), on 9 
March 1943 Zervas sent to the King and the Middle East Headquarters a telegram that 
wrote:
“If the King returns after the people’s verdict, we will be the first to welcome him 
and we will consider the dispute over the constitutional issue as a case closed. If 
England for any reasons wishes the return of the King even without the people’s 
verdict, then we will not oppose. We are determined to co-operate with the Greek 
royalists to resist any attempt to establish a communist regime” (Gasparinatos, 
1998, vol.l: 398).
Even Woodhouse himself characterised Zervas’ lip service and double-faced attitude as 
either “cynical opportunism” or “blind obedience” (Woodhouse, 1976: 121).
Siantos on the other hand chose to follow a more radical and uncompromising 
political line towards the British, EDES and all other non-EAMic resistance 
organisations. He feared that the British would try to form a wide anti-EAMic block that 
would include all hostile forces and organisations, the security battalions included . In 
addition to the fiasco in Cairo, two other major developments contributed to Siantos’ 
increasing hostility. The first was the surrender of Italy to the allies in September 1943. 
During the Italian surrender, a whole Italian division in Epirus surrendered to ELAS and 
therefore ELAS gained full sufficiency in arms and was no longer depended on the
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British for the supply of weapons. The second development was that Siantos managed to 
achieve full control over ELAS and KKE’s Central Committee by removing Tzimas and 
Rousos, two of the most moderate officials of KKE who were in favour of smooth 
relations and co-operation with other resistance groups (Pyromaglou, 1965: 209). After 
having neutralised all KKE moderates, Siantos became in fact the supreme political 
leader of ELAS and KKE and had the power to take decisions exclusively by himself. 
That ended the wavering among moderates and extremists in KKE and ELAS’ leadership 
and Siantos adopted a hard line thereafter. His line was none other than the abolition of 
any other resistance force before the liberation so that on the eve of liberation ELAS 
would be the only armed force upon Greek soil. Hence in August, 1943, even before the 
delegates of EAM, EDES, EKKA left for Cairo, ELAS in Peloponnese had already 
started disbanding small republican bands, and Siantos ordered KKE’s political bureau to 
develop a military plan for the capture of Athens following the withdrawal of the 
Germans (Fleisher, 1995, vol.2: 195, Farakos, 2000, vol.l: 26).
In addition to the Cairo conference fiasco, a number of other reasons contributed 
to making the climate within the national resistance movement even more strained. The 
first reason was the withdrawal of Eddie Myers from Greece and his replacement by 
Chris Woodhouse in the command of the British military mission. The British 
ambassador in Greece, Leeper, and Churchill himself were enraged with the anti­
monarchist attitude that all resistance groups showed in Cairo. Myers became the 
scapegoat. He was considered responsible for letting anti-monarchist sentiments grow 
within the Greek resistance and he was replaced by Woodhouse. Myers was an SOE man
93 The security battalions were armed forces of Greek volunteers under the orders of the Germans and the 
Greek collaborationist government.
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under the orders of the Middle East Headquarters. He was a typical officer. He gave 
priority first to the struggle against the Germans and then to the serving of political 
purposes and that is why he tried to maintain unity between the national resistance 
organisations. That was the purpose of the Joint General Antartes Headquarters and the 
National Bands Agreement of which he was the instigator. Woodhouse, on the other 
hand, was a man of the Foreign Office and his mission was to support EDES and protect 
British interests in Greece. Woodhouse’s partial policy was certainly going to reinforce 
the crisis between EAM-ELAS and EDES as well as that between EAM-ELAS and the 
British even more.
The second reason that contributed to the polarisation within the Greek national 
resistance movement was the completion of the “Animals” operations. The objective of 
the “Animals” operation was achieved and the Commander of Allied Forces in the 
Mediterranean, General Wilson ordered all antartes bands to remain inactive, so that they 
could be used later on in the case of allied landing in Greece (Myers, 1975: 225-226). 
This inactivity also reinforced the crisis since as long as ELAS and EDES bands were 
engaged in joint combats and sabotages against the Germans, any possible conflicts 
between the two resistance organisations could be prevented. However, from the moment 
that ELAS and EDES bands ceased or reduced their activity against the common enemy, 
the outbreak of incidents between them became more possible (Gasparinatos v 1, p 482).
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3.3. Political Dilemmas within the 5/42
3.3.i. Flirting with ELAS: Kartalis9 Hermaphrodite Policies.
A week before Kartalis’ departure to Cairo, he and Psarros had a discussion with
Aris, Sarafis and Tzimas in Pertouli. ELAS’ leaders made proposals for the joining of
EKKA and the 5/42 in EAM-ELAS. According to the minutes of that meeting found in
the archives of the General Military Command, the discussion was as follows:
“ELAS: Why don’t you come and participate in EAM/ELAS since you have the 
same political and constitutional objectives with us?
EKKA’s answer: Our participation in EAM would not be useful for either of us 
because: (1) Due to our political position we have more direct contacts with the 
English than you do; (2) Most middle class people that refuse to join EAM will be 
keen to join EKKA and in that way the same goal is going to be achieved; (3) 
There are many democratic officers who hesitate to join ELAS due to its 
relationship with KKE. These officers would gladly join EKKA instead...
ELAS: Your participation in ELAS would be an event of the utmost 
importance...It is going to give the English the impression of a powerful and 
integrated democratic and anti-monarchist block
EKKA’s answer:...EKKA is an organisation that has not yet formed its antartes 
band.94 If we join EAM, that would not create the impression that we want [of a 
democratic, anti-monarchist block]. Furthermore [if we continue being 
independent] we are going to have two voices instead of one against the British. 
We have got similar objectives. Consequently your interest is to push the middle 
class towards EKKA. We are asking you to help us since we are leading the middle 
class towards the same objectives” (DIS/GES F/929/B/2).
What becomes obvious from that discussion is that EAM-ELAS’ officials had 
serious reasons for wanting EKKA-5/42 to join EAM-ELAS. On the other hand, the 
overall spirit of the discussion implies that although Kartalis did not want EKKA-5/42 to 
merge with EAM-ELAS, he found considerable similarities between EAM’s and 
EKKA’s political objectives. That sounds quite peculiar for two factions whose antartes
94 During the time that the discussions were taking place, the 5/42 had not yet reformed.
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branches had confronted each other twice on the battlefield. Obviously that flirtation 
between EKKA and EAM-ELAS was politically motivated.
A possible merging of EKKA with EAM would have tremendously positive 
effects on EAM’s prestige and power. EAM’s manifesto talked about a front of groups 
and parties:
“Any group or party which accepts the principles of this manifesto can be accepted 
in EAM on an equal basis...in order for any organisation to be accepted in EAM, 
its past and its views about the reconstruction of free and independent Greece are 
not taken into consideration” (Istoriko Arheio Ethnikis Antistasis).
Until that moment, however, only KKE and a few other small leftist parties constituted
EAM. KKE’s influence upon EAM was well known and it had given the impression to
the public opinion that EAM was nothing more that an instrument of KKE. No other
republican group had joined EAM’s front and just a few republican officers and officials
had joined EAM-ELAS individually. The most distinguished of them was Sarafis, but his
participation in ELAS -especially under the conditions that it was made95- failed to give
the impression that EAM was a genuine and independent front free from the control of
KKE and open to all political factions. The joining of EKKA -a democratic group,
controlled by bourgeois politicians and distinguished officers- would give EAM the
image of a genuine patriotic front, disengaged from KKE’s control and open to any party,
group and political ideology. Such a move would probably drive even more moderate
republicans in EAM’s camp, who although keen to participate in the national resistance,
were hesitant towards KKE.
95 Since October 1942, Colonel Sarafis along with Colonel Kostopoulos had formed a guerrilla band in 
Thessally. The group was eventually disbanded by ELAS and Sarafis was arrested and accused for treason. 
After negotiating with the central committee of KKE and EAM however, Sarafis became the military 
commander of ELAS. That caused a negative impression in the republican camp and for many people 
Sarafis became the “spited Colonel” since throughout his captivity he was abused and spited at by local 
EAM/ELAS members
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Moreover,the entry of EKKA during that time would contribute to the decline of 
the anti-EAM camp and would have negative effects on Zervas and EDES. The entrance 
of the third biggest resistance group in EAM would isolate EDES from the rest of the 
resistance movement. EDES, whose source of power came mostly from British support, 
would lose all of its popular support and would then be considered as a reactionary, 
monarchist group in the service of the British interests.96 If EKKA joined EAM, the 
British plan to form a wide anti-EAMic front would fail and instead a wide anti-EDES 
front would be formed.
Kartalis, however, diplomatically rejected EAM’s proposal for merging and acted 
to preserve EKKA’s independence and autonomy. He had higher aspirations for EKKA 
and he believed that it was time for EKKA to drop its secondary role as a spectator. He 
believed that it was time for EKKA to come to the front of the national resistance 
political scene and become the third pole in the national resistance movement. Several 
developments reinforced Kartalis’ confidence in EKKA’s potential. During August- 
September 1943, the 5/42 regiment was again reformed and had reached almost 800 
antartes, while many experienced officers kept joining the 5/42 regiment. During that 
time, there were no important problems between the 5/42 and ELAS in Fokida and the 
regiment gained its first resistance laurels by launching a notable campaign against the 
Germans and the Italians.97 EKKA was becoming established as a major political 
resistance organisation. The 5/42 was participating in the Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters, EKKA had signed the National Bands Agreement, while Kartalis
96 More about the impact of that issue, see ch 5.2, p 230.
97 Seech3.4,p 169.
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participated in the Cairo conference as an equal member among EAM and EDES 
delegates.
While polarisation between EAM and EDES was obviously rising, Kartalis aimed 
at playing an arbitrator’s role. Kartalis’ intention was to place EKKA in the middle of 
EDES and EAM in order to decrease the tension between the two extremes. Such a role 
would not only contribute to the unity and integration of the overall national resistance 
movement, but would also increase EKKA’s status and importance. According to 
Kartalis:
“On a diplomatic level, we will have to get for ourselves the role of the honest 
arbitrator, by representing with our small power the solution or rather the resultant 
of all tendencies in domestic, foreign and military politics” (Petimezas, 1991: 303).
Kartalis believed that EKKA should not shut any doors either to EAM or EDES.
However, in order to achieve that, Kartalis came up with a rather opportunistic plan. In
one of his letters to Psarros, Kartalis wrote:
“We’ve got to become the scale between ELAS and reactionary forces such as 
EDES. That is why we’ve got to have a close co-operation with KKE in terms of 
political orientation on the one hand, and close connections on the personal level 
with EDES on the other” (Petimezas, 1991: 303).
Before the delegates’ departure for Cairo, Siantos had demanded in an aggressive 
tone the joining of EKKA in EAM. Kartalis once again diplomatically rejected his 
proposal and then Siantos in an angry tone said the memorable:
“Whoever is outside EAM is a Gestapo man” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 176).
Kartalis knew that Siantos would increase the pressure for the joining of EKKA in EAM 
and that is why he decided to follow a quite delicate policy towards both EAM and 
EDES.
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‘Towards EAM bows and friendship, but without any explicit promises. We should 
ask for their assistance to take the middle classes on our side, but in the eyes of the 
public opinion we should maintain independence from EAM” (Petimezas, 1991: 
303).
On the other hand, Kartalis intended to use his personal friendship with Sub-Commander 
Pyromaglou98 for strengthening his connection with EDES and for keeping EDES as an 
ally of EKKA.
Although Kartalis’ plan was optimistic and ambitious, it was still rather risky and
he was not aware or did not take into consideration several peculiarities. As for the
EKKA-EDES connection was concerned, Kartalis did not take into consideration the fact
that there was deep suspicion between Zervas and Pyromaglou. Zervas had serious
doubts about Pyromaglou’s loyalty and considered him more or less a traitor. In one of
his letters to an associate, he wrote about Pyromaglou:
“He is not and never has been sincere. He plays a double game. He started with 
good intentions but soon he returned to his first love, communism. I’m keeping an 
eye on him and I won’t let him go anywhere again. That’s the best way to 
neutralise him. I will get him licking his puke” (Petimezas, 1991: 171).
Therefore, Pyromaglou who was Kartalis’ only connection with EDES was rather non-
influential and non-effective. Moreover, Zervas was also suspicious towards Psarros as
well, he considered him “a concealed EAMite” (Petimezas, 1991: 279) and he believed
that “Psarros and EAM are collaborating” (Petimezas, 1991: 230). On the other hand,
Kartalis put high stakes on ELAS’ understanding, tolerance and patience. Although
ELAS in the past had proved a rather unpredictable political opponent, Kartalis placed a
lot of trust on ELAS’ support and tolerance over EKKA’s hermaphrodite politics.
Kartalis took a gamble that was very difficult to pay off.
98 During the occupation Kartalis and Pyromaglou became very close friends. After the liberation, 
Pyromaglou married Kartalis’ daughter Emmy and in 1965 he wrote Kartalis’ biography
160
3.3.ii. Thymios Dedousis: The Defender of the Crown
3.3.ii.a. His early Activities
While Kartalis was developing his plans about EKKA’s policy, a major 
development had occurred within the 5/42. Captain Thymios Dedousis, a man who was 
to go down in history as one of the most controversial figures within the overall national 
resistance movement, had joined the 5/42. For ELAS, Dedousis was later to become a 
traitor and an agent provocateur. On the other hand, Georgios Papandreou said about 
him:
“I met Captain Dedousis in jail and I got the impression that he was a Greek that 
came out of the 1821 art gallery” (Petimezas, 1991: 355).
Thymios Dedousis was full of contradictory features: a decisive and exhortative man, a
brave officer and a passionate resistance fighter, consistent and irreconcilable towards his
ideals and beliefs, but also an intriguer, a megalomaniac, pathologically dogmatic, highly
tempered and a fanatic anti-communist.
Dedousis was bom in the village of Tritea in Pamasida in 1910 and came from a 
wealthy family. In 1934 he graduated from the Euelpidon military academy and during 
the war he served as Commander of an anti-aircraft battery. As mentioned in chapter one, 
as soon as the front collapsed Dedousis returned to his village and almost immediately 
(summer of 1941) he mobilised in favour of the development of armed resistance bands 
in Pamasida. Soon however, (January 1942) he was arrested by the Italians. During his 
imprisonment, he suffered horrible torture. First, he was imprisoned in the Amfissa jail 
where he spent three months in isolation in a toilet. The Italians took his teeth and nails 
out with pincers, they beat him up daily and starved him for long periods in order to make
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him reveal his associates, but Dedousis kept his morale and never revealed anything 
(Dedousis, 1949: 16-19, Koutras, 1981: 116, Koutsoklenis, manuscript memoirs)99. In 
May 1942 he was court-martialed and was sentenced to just three years in prison, for an 
offence (resistance activity) that was usually punished by death. That was because the 
judges were bribed.
Although bribing the judges was something rather common for Italian court- 
martials, the way that Dedousis’ brother claimed that the bribe money was raised is not 
entirely convincing.
“Even from the time that Thymios was in custody, awaiting trial, the nation’s 
emotion and concern about him was manifested. When his colleagues in the Middle 
East were informed about the danger that he was under, they did a collection and 
raised 400 golden sovereigns that were sent to Athens, while 500 more were 
contributed by his relatives, industrialists Elias and Thymios Kyriakis” (Dedousis, 
1949: 20).
As far as the contribution of Dedousis’ relatives is concerned, his brother’s 
testimony can be considered as sufficient and acceptable. The same, however, does not 
apply for the collection that Ioannis Dedousis claims that Thymios’ colleagues made in 
the Middle East, since the evidence produced cannot be considered as adequate. Although 
exhaustive research was undertaken to find evidence about the claimed collection among 
the Greek officers of the Middle East, such a collection was never cross-referenced by 
any other source or testimony. Additionally, by taking into consideration the conditions 
that prevailed during that time in occupied Greece, as well as in the Middle East, the 
conclusion is that something like that would be almost impossible to have happened. It is 
well known that it took months for an escape to the Middle East to be organised and for a 
return to Greece things were much more difficult. The span of four months between
99 Koutras claims that the signs of the tortures were obvious on Dedousis for many years
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Dedousis’ arrest and his trial was definitely too short for the news to be spread in Greece, 
then in the Middle East, then for the officers there to get mobilised and raise the 
considerable amount of 400 golden sovereigns, and finally for his colleagues to send the 
money back to Greece.
Eventually, Dedousis stayed in prison for almost a year and in May 1943 he 
managed to escape. He fled to Athens where he contacted the “Military Hierarchy” 
organisation through his personal political friends Christos Zalokostas and ex Member of 
Parliament Eungelos Kalantzis.
3.3.ii.b. “The Military Hierarchy”. The Cuckoo of the Greek Resistance.
“The Military Hierarchy” was an organisation that throughout the occupation 
adopted habits that were similar to those of the the cuckoo. Field Marshal Papagos was 
the leader of the “Military Hierarchy” organisation of Athens and Generals Pitsicas, 
Papadopoulos, Dedes, Bakopoulos and Kosmas were its leading members. Although 
“The Military Hierarchy” manifested itself as a resistance organisation, it never took any 
resistance activity against the occupation forces. Its main objectives mentioned in its 
manifesto were: (a) to try to preserve unity among the officers’ corps; (b) to protect social 
order and the established social structure against anyone who would challenge them; (c) 
To be totally obedient towards H. M. the King and his government (DIS/GES 
F/913/TH/246). In other words, the group’s main objectives were the opposition to EAM- 
ELAS’ plans and the restoration of monarchy in post-war Greece.
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For the accomplishment of its objectives, the organisation did not have the 
intention of forming an armed group of its own, but rather it aimed to undertake 
leadership of all the resistance organisations that already existed, and put all of them 
under the King’s orders. Indicative of the organisation’s attitude and its will to 
manipulate and exploit the resistance movement was the following incident: After the 
Joint General Antartes Headquarters was formed, “The Military Hierarchy” sent to the 
Headquarters General Tsipouras in order to have a meeting with the other resistance 
leaders and the British Military Mission. Although the Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters did not even invite General Tsipouras, he informed the leaders of ELAS, 
EDES and EKKA that he accepted to undertake the leadership of all resistance 
organisations and become the Chief Commander of the Joint General Headquarters. That 
provocation infuriated all the leaders of ELAS, EDES, EKKA and especially Psarros. 
Eventually, the only thing that Tsipouras managed to achieve was to be arrested and 
imprisoned as a collaborator, since it was soon discovered that he had served as the 
Prefect of Attica in the early days of the occupation (Hatzis, 1983, vol.2: 49-251, 
Gerozisis, 1996,vol.2: 641-642, Zalokostas, 1997: 101-102).
After failing to undertake the command of the overall resistance movement in that 
inelegant way, “The Military Hierarchy” adopted another more silent and underground 
method to promote pro-royalist sentiments within all republican resistance organisations. 
The problem for the achievement of such a plan however, was that both EDES and 
EKKA manifested themselves as democratic and anti-royalist organisations. Therefore, 
the leadership of “The Military Hierarchy” did not choose to challenge or boycott the 
resistance movement as most of the royalists did, but rather it chose to penetrate in it and
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manipulate it, in order to undermine quietly its democratic disposition and turn it to more 
pro-royalist tendencies.
“The Military Hierarchy” was in contact with almost 300 officers loyal to the 
King and the pre-war Metaxas regime throughout Greece (Gerozisis, 1996. Vol.2: 623). 
Its plan was to send small but solid groups of officers, in all republican resistance groups, 
in the Greek forces of the Middle East and even in the security battalions in order to 
create pro-royalist nucleuses under its command in all major anti-EAM armed forces. 
Inside those forces and especially inside the republican resistance groups those officers 
would slowly form pro-royalist factions. Given time, those factions would act according 
to the instructions of “The Military Hierarchy”. Many times, even the officers that were 
ordered to join EDES or the 5/42 were uneasy and unwilling to join because they 
considered those groups as traitorous due to their anti-royalist tendencies, but the leaders 
of the organisation
“...forced all those royalist officers who were distrustful towards Zervas or Psarros 
to join” (Zalokostas, 1997: 100).
In that safe and easy way and without having eaten “oak apples and boiled turtle”,100
“The Military Hierarchy” and its officers managed to penetrate many resistance
organisations, exactly like cuckoos penetrate other birds’ nests.
“The Military Hierarchy” used Thymios Dedousis to penetrate the 5/42. “The 
leaders of the organisation explained to Thymios what was his duty in national resistance 
and what was expected from people like him” (Dedousis, 1949: 33). Contrary to the 
majority of officers and antartes of the 5/42 who were ignorant about the role of EKKA 
and its relation with the 5/42, Dedousis through “The Military Hierarchy” was aware of
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the political programme and the constitutional objectives of EKKA and had taken certain 
orders or at least guidelines about the attitude that he should maintain towards EKKA. 
They gave him the command of 20 officers, all of them members of “The Military 
Hierarchy” and sent him to join the 5/42. After a short tour around the villages of 
Pamasida, Dedousis formed his first band with 50 men and joined the 5/42 during its 
third reformation101 “with strong faith to the sacred liberating struggle and with strong 
commitment exclusively to the motherland and the King” (Dedousis, 1949: 34). From the 
first moment he joined the 5/42, Dedousis made himself clear about his political beliefs 
and showed where he stood towards EKKA. During the reformation ceremony, Major 
Farmakis, one of the democratic officers of the 5/42 tore the crown from his cap and 
threw it away in front of everyone. Dedousis protested to Psarros and asked him to clarify 
whether he and his men assumed any political and constitutional obligations towards 
EKKA. Although Psarros answered that the 5/42 men were by no means politically 
committed towards anyone, that incident had a certain impact on the royalist officers that 
had just arrived from Athens. Indeed, some of them refused to join the 5/42 and returned 
back.
From his first moment in the 5/42, Dedousis worked for the disengagement of the 
regiment from the political guardianship of EKKA and for that reason he commenced “a 
large campaign of national propaganda, using loyal and trustworthy people” (Dedousis, 
1949: 36).
100 Expression used by the early antartes in order to indicate the difficulties they had to face in the early 
days of the resistance
101 As seen before, during the first two disbands and reformations of the 5/42 Dedousis was in jail, out of 
which he escaped just a few days before the third reformation.
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3.4. The new 5/42.
From the end of July until mid- September 1943, the regiment was reformed for 
the third time. For once more, Psarros ordered his officers to gather their men and start 
the recruitment of new volunteers. During that time there were considerable changes 
within the 5/42. The regiment became militarily advanced and well armed with machine- 
guns, mortars, explosives etc. It expanded all over Fokida, while it improved its supply 
networks, communications and intelligence. Many new officers (more than 70) came to 
join the 5/42 and the overall number of the regiment’s officers reached 100-130 
(Kaimaras, 1979: 71, Koutras, 1981: 63, Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000). These 
officers came not only from Fokida, but also from the nearby regions of Roumeli, 
Athens, and other parts of Greece. After the recruitment of officers and antartes was 
completed, the regiment’s manpower reached almost 800 men.102 The 5/42’s final 
structure (until its end) was:
Commander: Colonel Dimitrios Psarros 
Sub-Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinos Lagouranis 
Staff officer: Captain Athanasios Koutras 
The regiment was divided in two battalions:
• Pamassida Battalion (1st Battalion)
Commander: Major Christos Fotias (initially), Major Ioannis Papathanasiou (From 
7.3.1944 to 10.4.1944), Major Elias Baizanos (10.4.1944 to 17.4.1944)
1st Company (Vardousia) Commander: Captain Athanasios Koutras
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2nd Company (Northern Pamassida) Commander: Reserve Lieutenant Captain Andreas 
Mitalas
3rd Company (Southern Ghiona) Commander: Lieutenant Captain Georgios Douros 
4th Company (Northern Ghiona) Commander: Lieutenant Captain Georgios Kaimaras 
5th Company (Trikorfo) Commander: Captain Thymios Dedousis 
Machine gun Platoon, Commander: Lieutenant Captain Konstantinos Apostolopoulos
• Dorida Battalion (2nd Battalion)
Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Euthimios Papavasiliou (initially), Major Georgios 
Kapentzonis (later)
1st Company, Commander: Captain Georgios Liveris
2nd Company, Commander: Captain Anastasios Kouvelis
Independent Company, Commander: Major Georgios Kapentzonis
Machine gun Platoon, Commander: Lieutenant Captain Polikarpos Papadimitriou
• Southern Pamassos Headquarter (Fokida-Biotia border) Commander: Konstantinos 
Kokorelis (Limited manpower and activity)
• Desfina and Arahova Double-Company (Fokida-Biotia Border) Commander: Major 
Loukas Mannaios (Limited manpower and activity)
• Sabotage unit Commander: Major Georgios Giakoumakis
• Medical service Doctors Athanasios Pilalas, Ioannis Paulostathis, Athanasios 
Tserliagos.
102 Kaimaras claimed that the regiment’s manpower was 1,500-2,000 antartes, but these figures were rather 
excessive. (See Papathanasiou, 2000: 82, Koutras, interview, 9 January 2000, Protopapas, interview 6 May 
2000).
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• Apart from the above combatant units stationed in the wider Fokida area, the 
regiment as well as EKKA, had its own delegate in the Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters in Karpenisi manned by Lieutenant-Colonel Vlachos, Major Doukas, 
Captain Dedousis (Thymios Dedousis’ relative) and Sub-Lieutenant 
Papagianopoulos.103
Every Company’s manpower ranged between approximately 80 to 130 regular antartes. 
In addition to the regular antartes, every village had its own combatant group manned by 
villagers who continued living in their villages and who did not follow the regiment on a 
permanent basis, but who had the obligation to defend their villages from German raids 
and support 5/42’s regular bands when necessary (e.g. in cases of battles near their 
villages). These reserve fighters were almost 400-500 and along with the regiment’s 
regular antartes, the 5/42’s total manpower reached almost 1,200-1,300 men.
While the 5/42’s third reformation was still ongoing, the regiment undertook a 
rather notable combatant activity against the German and Italian forces in Fokida. During 
September and October 1943, almost daily 5/42 bands gave a series of battles against the 
occupying forces. The regiment started fulfilling at last its purpose as a resistance group 
and gained its first resistance laurels. The most important of those battles were:
• The Arachova battle (10 September 1943). The Germans assaulted the Arachova
village and a small 5/42 force (Manaios and Farmakis Company) defended the
village. 5/42 casualties: one dead. German casualties: unverified (DIS/GES
F/929/B/112, Koutras, 1981: 68, Kaimaras, 1979: 97).
• The Lidoriki battle (12-13 September 1943). After the surrender of Italy, almost the 
whole regiment (Pamassida and Dorida battalions) sieged Lidoriki, the capital city of
103 See Kaimaras, 1979: 74-75, Koutras, 1981: 65, Papathanasiou, 2000: 80-82
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Dorida in order to force the Italian guard there to surrender. The Germans however 
sent a big force to end the siege and force the Italians to surrender to them. Eventually 
the 5/42 withdrew from Lidoriki. During those battles the 5/42’s casualties were six 
wounded. 5/42 men managed to arrest three Italians, German casualties unverified 
(DIS/GES F/929/B/112, DIS/GES F/929/B/4/18, Kaimaras, 1979: 86-89, Koutras, 
1981:66).
• Disarmament of the Italian guard of Itea (13 September 1943). Captain Dedousis 
surrounded the Italian guard of Itea and arrested most of its men (DIS/GES 
F/929/B112, Dedousis, 1949: 38-39, Kaimaras, 1979: 97, Koutras, 1981: 68).
• The Skaloula battle (14 September 1943). After the Germans captured Lidoriki, they 
attacked the Skaloula village and started looting and burning the village’s houses. 
5/42 units (Mitalas, Kaimaras, Dedousis’ Companies along with the Karoutes village 
combatant group) attacked the Germans and forced them out of the village. 5/42 
casualties: one dead, four wounded. German casualties: six dead, fifteen wounded 
(DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Dedousis, 1949: 37, Kaimaras, 1979: 89-91, Koutras, 1981: 
66).104
• The Anathema battle (15 September 1943). 5/42 units of the Dorida battalion under 
the command of Papavasiliou ambushed a convoy of German trucks. 5/42 casualties: 
eight wounded. German casualties: two dead and two burned trucks (DIS/GES 
F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 90-91, Koutras, 1981: 66-67).
• The Tsakorema battle (17 September 1943). That was the regiment’s most important 
battle. 5/42 units from both the Pamassida and the Dorida battalions ambushed a large 
convoy of 50 German trucks, 2 tanks and a number of motorcycles that was going
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from Amfissa to Lidoriki. The battle was fierce and the Germans eventually failed to 
reach Lidoriki. 5/42 casualties: four wounded. German casualties: unverified, but 
rather serious (DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 91-95, Koutras, 1981: 67-68).105
•  The Vounichora area battles (25-30 September). After the Tsakorema battle, the 
Germans wanted to keep the Amfissa-Lidoriki road open. For that reason they had 
installed guard posts throughout the road. Kaimaras’ company attacked those posts in 
various occasions. 5/42 casualties: one dead and five wounded. German casualties 
unverified DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 95-96).
•  The Argomira incident (26 October 1943). A small 5/42 band from Dedousis’ 
company ambushed and destroyed a German truck. 5/42 casualties: none. German 
casualties five dead (DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 98, Koutras, 1981;68).
•  Zodochos Pigi incident (29 October 1943). A small 5/42 band from Douros’ company
ambushed a German truck. 5/42 casualties: none. German casualties: two wounded
(DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 97, Koutras, 1981:68-69).
• The battle in the 51st Km of the Gravia-Amfissa road (11 January 1944). Mitalas and
Kaimaras’ companies along with Vlaikos’ sabotage unit were ordered to block the
Gravia-Amfissa road from any German convoys. Eventually a German column of ten 
trucks and a tank attempted to break the 5/42 block unsuccessfully. During that battle,
104 Dedousis’ estimation of 140 Germans dead is totally imaginary.
105 During one of my field trips in Fokida, I had the chance to visit the Tsakorema area with my uncle who 
had also fought there and who gave me valid and objective information about that specific battle. Although 
the battle did not last for 6 hours and the Germans did not have 100 dead as Kaimaras claimed (Kaimaras 
91-95), my uncle assured me that the Germans had severe casualties and that the 5/42 casualties were very 
little. The Tsakorema area was ideal for a successful ambush since it gave the maximum cover and safety to 
the attacking forces, while it left the defending forces completely uncovered. Moreover, the fact that the 
5/42 suffered so little casualties, while the Germans had large casualties was due to the very good planing 
of the overall operation that included the mining of the road, diversion, firing the convoy from both sides of 
the road, blocking the convoy’s head and tale etc.
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the 5/42 had one dead from an accidental explosion of a mine. German casualties: 
unverified (DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 117-121, Koutras, 1981: 74-75).
• German mopping up operations (February 1944). The Germans launched a large- 
scale anti-guerrilla campaign in Fokida with the purpose of eliminating all antartes 
forces in the area and regain control over the region’s road-network. Although the 
5/42 and ELAS co-operated during this campaign, the Germans managed to regain 
control over most of the region’s strategic points (The Gravia-Lidoriki-Amfissa road 
etc). During the campaign, five 5/42 antartes were killed and nine were captured and 
died in German concentration camps. German casualties: unverified but rather serious 
(PRO H5 5/279, DIS/GES F/929/B/112, Kaimaras, 1979: 122-127, Koutras, 1981: 
77)
In addition to the regiment’s development as an advanced antartes force, during 
that period there were serious political and ideological changes within the 5/42. 
Officially, nothing had changed and the regiment’s men were taking the exact same oath 
of loyalty to the national resistance struggle and of solidarity to anyone who fights the 
invader that they were taking during the initial formation.106 Psarros kept repeating that 
no one had to take any political obligation towards EKKA and that the only cause that the 
regiment served was national resistance (Dedousis, 1949: 34). Apparently, nothing had 
changed in the 5/42’s official political and ideological doctrine. Kaimaras claims that 
politics was not an issue even during the third reformation and that everyone was 
dedicated exclusively to the war against the invaders (Kaimaras, interview 11 May 2000). 
Nevertheless, things had changed in the political attitudes of the 5/42 officers and 
antartes.
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In an unofficial manner, politics had become a central issue amongst the 5/42 
men. The regiment had already been disbanded by ELAS twice, 5/42 antartes had 
confronted ELAS in the battlefield and there was a number of dead from ELAS bullets. 
No one was convinced by the explanations that ELAS gave about the two previous 
disbandments (Kouvelis, interview 18 April 2000, Kokoris, interview 19 August 2000) 
and there was no chance that the 5/42’s men trust towards ELAS would ever be restored. 
It had become obvious that the 5/42 and ELAS belonged to opposite camps and it was 
reasonable for the 5/42 antartes to consider ELAS as a hostile force. It was impossible to 
forget and forgive and would take “the kindness of a missionary to disregard the two 
disbandments and consider ELAS as fellow antartes” (Kouvelis, interview 18 April 
2000). Although -as in the first and second reformations- anti-ELAS sentiments were not 
manifested in any collective way, certainly anti-ELAS sentiment among the regiment’s 
men had increased during the third reformation.
The more recent ELAS-5/42 conflict had also a serious effect upon the regiment’s 
coherence. During the first formation, the 5/42 was a totally homogenous group. During 
the third reformation however, this homogeneity did no longer exist and three main 
informal factions had started making their appearance within the regiment. The first was 
the EKKA-Psarros faction. That faction was composed of Psarros, a small number of 
high rank officers (Sub-Commander Langouranis, Majors Baizanos, Farmakis, 
Papathanasiou, sub-Lieutenant Mitalas) and the EKKA-5/42 delegate that was attached to 
the Joint General Antartes Headquarters in Karpenisi, (Majors Doukas, Vlachos, sub- 
Lieutenant Papagianopoulos). These officers were Psarros’ chiefs of staff, the regiment’s 
elite. They were democratic officers loyal to Psarros and connected with EKKA and
106 See ch 2.3.ii, p 116.
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Kartalis. Although all of them opposed EAM-ELAS, they knew that ELAS was a mighty 
opponent and they favoured peaceful relations and co-operation between ELAS and the 
5/42 (Papadakis, interview 13 September 2000)
The second faction within the regiment was Dedousis’ faction. That faction was 
composed of Captain Dedousis, his 20 officers who were members of “The Military 
Hierarchy” and the 100 antartes of Dedousis’ company. That faction also included 
Commander of the Dorida battalion Major Kapentzonis and his 200 antartes. Anti­
communist and pro-royalist sentiments within that faction were much more obvious and 
overwhelming and many of Dedousis’ and Kapentzonis’ officers and antartes wore the 
crown on their caps and sang royalist anthems (Koutras, 1981: 113). The Dedousis 
faction was hostile towards EKKA and they considered it as a concealed pro-communist 
organisation. Dedousis and his men were in favour of a more uncompromising line 
towards EAM-ELAS and believed that the regiment should not tolerate any more 
humiliation by ELAS.
Between these two factions there was the “silent majority” of the 5/42 officers 
and antartes. These men were faced with serious dilemmas. Although they were anti­
communists and hated ELAS, they were aware of ELAS’ power and they knew that the 
regiment should follow a moderate policy towards EAM-ELAS. On the other hand, 
although they were loyal to Psarros and considered him a man of virtue and a model 
officer, they were suspicious and mistrustful towards EKKA. During the reformation 
period everything within the regiment was still vague and these men were hesitant in 
joining any of the two factions. However, the new period of crisis that the 5/42 was soon
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going to enter was going to put an end to their dilemmas and it would be more difficult, if 
not impossible, for those men to maintain their neutrality.
Conclusion
Although the 5/42 was originally formed on an exclusively military, non-political 
basis and although officially it was dedicated to the national resistance struggle alone, it 
unavoidably became involved in the turmoil of the political antagonisms within the 
national resistance movement. EAM-ELAS’ aggressiveness was the proof that a national 
resistance struggle disengaged from politics was a utopia and that political manoeuvring 
was necessary for the regiment to survive. Furthermore, the participation of the 5/42 in 
the Joint General Antartes Headquarters, Kartalis’ participation in the Cairo conference 
and the development of the 5/42 as a considerable antartes unit increased the role and 
magnitude of EKKA-5/42 within the national resistance movement and made EKKA- 
5/42 a key participant in the political antagonisms among the national resistance 
organisations.
However, the response towards EAM-ELAS’ aggression was not uniform within 
EKKA-5/42. Kartalis and Dedousis had totally different views over the political line that 
the regiment should follow towards EAM-ELAS. Kartalis knew that the survival of 
EKKA and the 5/42 depended upon the good will of the mighty EAM-ELAS. Therefore, 
he chose to follow a friendly and diplomatic policy towards EAM-ELAS in order to 
achieve its tolerance and support, but at the same time to try to ensure the consensus of 
EDES and the British. Dedousis’ policy on the other hand, was by far less delicate and
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diplomatic. He was a dedicated royalist and anti-communist. His objective as well as the 
objective of “The Military Hierarchy” was above all the restoration of the monarchy in 
free Greece. There could be no peace between Dedousis and EAM-ELAS.
Apart from the different policies amongst the EKKA-5/42 leaders, the 5/42 
officers and antartes were also concerned about the policy that the regiment should 
follow in the future. Although some of them had already decided where they stood 
towards EAM-ELAS and towards Psarros, Kartalis and Dedousis, the vast majority of 
them were in a state of mixed emotions. Given time they would also make their stand and 
choose camps.
The period considered here was one of transition for the 5/42. It was a period of 
adjustments to new important developments and of planning about the future. Too much 
happened in too little time and these developments caused an identity crisis for the 5/42 
and affected the regiment’s coherence. Although during this period, there were no 
obvious signs of disunity within the regiment, or between the regiment and EKKA, the 
seeds of such disunity were planted. Factions were being formed; different and opposite 
strategies started to be processed. These factions were still vague and these policies had 
not yet matured, but as tension and discord within the wider resistance movement grew, 
lines would soon be drawn. Factions within the 5/42 would become more obvious and 
concrete, while the difference of opinion between Kartalis and Dedousis was to become 
more explicit and unbridgeable.
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CHAPTER 4 
Requiem for the 5/42
The meso-level analysis in this chapter will focus upon events that occurred 
between October 1943 and April 1944, the regiment’s dramatic last six months. During 
that period, the domestic political antagonisms discussed in the previous chapter 
developed into a full rupture within the regiment. That internal crisis disintegrated the 
regiment’s coherence and discipline and eventually contributed to its collapse.
This chapter will highlight the sequence of events that provoked the crisis within 
the 5/42 and the crisis between the 5/42 and ELAS, which led to the regiment’s final 
disbandment. The purpose is to highlight the causes and effects of the internal schism and 
to discuss the decision making and policies of Psarros, Dedousis and the regiment’s 
officers during this period of tension. Various documents, most of them found in the 
archives of Greek Army’s History Bureau depict the policies and strategies that 5/42 and 
ELAS leaders maintained during that period of crisis. These documents show that Psarros 
made desperate attempts to satisfy ELAS and find a formula that would resolve the crisis. 
Nevertheless, Psarros’ attempts proved ineffective since both Dedousis and ELAS 
seemed determined and eager to confront one another on the battlefield.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the events that caused a certain level of 
discord within the regiment, were the two successive disbandments. However, during the 
period that this chapter discusses the event that signalled the crisis within the 5/42 was 
the ELAS-EDES war in Epirus. EKKA and Kartalis personally maintained a favourable 
attitude towards EAM-ELAS throughout the ELAS-EDES war. Kartalis’ objective was to 
soothe EAM-ELAS and protect the 5/42 from a possible new disbandment. However, 
regardless of his motives, the vast majority of the 5/42 officers and antartes considered 
Kartalis’ attitude as treason. The rejection of EKKA was led and manipulated by Captain 
Dedousis who took the initiative to issue a memorandum that denounced EKKA and 
placed the 5/42 regiment under the direct orders of the King (February 1944). That 
memorandum was signed by most of the regiment’s officers and in fact meant the final 
schism between EKKA and the 5/42.
Dedousis’ memorandum along with his provocative behaviour caused not only a 
schism between the 5/42 and EKKA, but also a serious crisis in 5/42-ELAS relations. 
Soon after the proclamation was issued, minor incidents occurred between Dedousis’ 
company and ELAS’ forces in Fokida. During these incidents, an ELAS antartis was 
killed and that was an event that opened Pandora’s box. ELAS and the 5/42 were heading 
for a new conflict. Although Psarros took a series of initiatives to restrain Dedousis and 
calm spirits down, he was powerless to impose discipline against him and Dedousis kept 
pushing things to the edge. On the other hand, ELAS maintained a hard line towards 
Psarros and rejected all of his efforts to negotiate and find a peaceful solution to the 
dispute. Eventually on 17 April 1944, in the Klima area, ELAS launched its final battle 
against the 5/42 and within a few hours the regiment collapsed. Psarros surrendered to
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ELAS, but although a prisoner he was murdered along with tens of other 5/42 officers 
and antartes.
4.1. The Civil War within the Civil War: The EKKA-5/42 Schism
4.1.1. The EKKA-ELAS Alliance: Brothers in Arms, or for the Love of Big Brother?
Around 500 BC, Athenian politician and philosopher Solon issued a law 
according to which in the case of the outbreak of civil war in the city, all civilians ought 
to join one of the opposing camps. Those who kept a neutral attitude throughout the 
conflict and refused to join one of the opposing camps were punished with the penalty of 
the deprivation of their political rights, one of the most harsh and disgraceful 
punishments of ancient Athens (Manolopoulos, 1995: 61). Almost 2,500 years later, 
EKKA had to face a similar dilemma and the time had come when the group had to 
abandon its neutrality and openly support EAM-ELAS or the anti-EAMic camp.
During the first days of October 1943 and while the 5/42 was giving its first 
battles against the Germans and the Italians, dramatic developments occurred far from 
Fokida, in the mountains of Epirus. After a series of local incidents between ELAS and 
EDES bands, a full-scale conflict between the two resistance organisations broke out. The 
ELAS-EDES conflict lasted for almost four months and exceeded in violence any other 
conflict between Greek resistance groups which had occurred till then. The ELAS-EDES 
war in Epirus marked a new era of polarisation within the national resistance movement. 
The consequences of that polarisation had a dramatic impact upon EKKA and the 5/42.
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The day, following the outbreak of the war (10th October) ELAS’ delegates in the
Joint General Antartes Headquarters in Karpenisi demanded from EKKA’s delegates to
take an immediate and explicit stand towards the ELAS-EDES conflict and issue an
explicit official statement. EKKA’s delegates issued a statement according to which:
“EKKA was informed today that the camouflaged reactionaries threw away their 
masks and openly followed the path of treason...Sadly, EDES -as EAM’s 
committee of Roumeli denounced- betrayed the struggle, it co-operated with the 
Germans and turned arms against our brave brothers who defend Greece’s honour. 
Against such an unpatriotic attitude, the EKKA headquarters of Roumeli declares 
that it stigmatises this treason and supports the phalanx of the struggling Greeks. 
Our thoughts are turned to the heroic antartes of ELAS. We raise our voice in an 
oath of solidarity and brotherly love to them” (DIS/GES F/929/B, Gregoriadis, 
vol.4: 440).
Obviously, all that praising for ELAS was intended to serve some purpose.
1 0 7The editor of that proclamation was Sub-Lieutenant Papagianopoulos, but all 
other EKKA officers of the Karpenisi headquarters (Vlachos, Doukas, A. Dedousis108) 
also gave their approval. Their intention was to appease ELAS and avoid a new 5/42- 
ELAS conflict. According to Papagianopoulos, while he and the rest of EKKA’s 
delegates were in Karpenisi, isolated from the 5/42 in Fokida, they feared that ELAS 
would launch an attack not only against EDES, but against the 5/42 as well. Given the 
pressure that ELAS put upon EKKA’s delegates to take a clear position towards the 
ELAS-EDES conflict, Papagianopoulos thought that by issuing a pro-ELAS 
proclamation, ELAS would be satisfied, and the danger of a new 5/42 disbandment could 
be avoided, while on the other hand time could be won until orders arrived from Kartalis 
(Istoriki Epitheorisis, 1965, vol.8-9). After a week Kartalis along with Bakirtzis went to 
Karpenisi, where they met with EKKA’s delegates (Vlachos and Papagianopoulos) as
107 See “EKKA-Roumeli Headquarters” in Istoriki Epitheorisis, 1965,vol. 8-9
108 Alekos Dedousis was distantly related with Captain Thymios Dedousis
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well as with ELAS’ officials. Not only did Kartalis approve the proclamation, but he
went even further by sending a telegram to ELAS according to which:
“EKKA decided to participate in operations against EDES. Please notify me 
urgently in Sperchiada...Georgios Kartalis 18-10-43” (DIS/GES G.Agorou 
F/ST/38).
In the absence of Psarros, Kartalis and Bakirtzis decided to reinforce ELAS’ 
forces in Epirus against EDES with a small 5/42 company of 30 men. Kartalis informed 
Psarros about his intention two days later with a letter. That letter is an important 
document since in it, Kartalis’ explains to Psarros the reasons of his pro-ELAS actions:
“If you don’t agree with this decision [to support ELAS with 30 men against 
EDES], I urge you to disapprove of me personally by saying anything you want. I 
am taking full responsibility.. .please take your decision without any reluctance and 
condemn me if you think that the reasons I am going to mention to you do not 
justify adequately such a decision and do not protect EKKA’s interests.
At this point we have got to make the big decision between EAM and EDES. 
EAM is determined to succeed in this war against EDES.. .From a military point of 
view, Alexis [Bakirtzis] Vlachos and Doukas believe that EAM will achieve a 
decisive victory by exterminating EDES.. .Conclusions:
1) EAM is going to dominate. Our attitude in Kiseli [he means the contacts 
with ELAS’ Headquarters]109 caused us a lot of criticism by ELAS. We were 
accused as opportunists. In order to prove the opposite, I was forced to accept 
Rigas’ [ELAS’ officer] proposal to send a unit of 30 men as a symbolic proof that 
we are on their side. If we do not follow that policy, EAM -which as I foresee is 
going to win this war- will sweep us out like a pile of straws after the end of the 
hostilities with EDES, since on occasions like these, neutrality equals hostility. 
Now we have got many chances to survive as an independent organisation.. .and if 
we agree to join EAM we will be accepted with much more dignified terms than 
before. Who should we be afraid of?
Just the English...and even if we suppose that the English will refuse to 
help us, I think that EKKA is going to just get through a quick period of 
difficulties, but eventually return stronger along with EAM. Because the English 
need the Greek guerrilla army and as in Yugoslavia, they are going to support 
those, who are really powerful. At the end of the day, we had to chose among the 
certain and deadly hostility of EAM and the vague and weak friendship of the 
English. I chose to avoid the first. I hope I will be able to improve the situation with 
the English by letting them understand that due to their fault we have remained a 
small island of 400 rifles within an EAM sea,110 that we are in fact forced to follow
109 See ch3.3.i,p 156.
110 He means the negligence of the British military mission towards the provision of weapons for the 5/42.
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a pro-EAM policy and that we are trying to diminish the co-operation with EAM to 
the minimum.
2) Let’s examine the second scenario -the possibility of a settlement 
between EDES and EAM. In that case, the existing status quo is just going to be 
restored and EKKA is going to take back its place in the contemporary distribution 
of power, with a possible minor damage as far as the English support is concerned. 
This possibility is less likely to occur and the English support is not that worthy 
anyway, while EAM’s support is valuable and that’s why I believe that we can bare 
the possible consequences without any worry.
3) The third possibility of an EDES victory is absolutely 
impossible...(Petimezas, 1991: 359-361).
That was Kartalis’ reasoning for his most controversial action in the history of 
EKKA-5/42. For a start, Kartalis was convinced that ELAS would be victorious against 
EDES and he adopted his policy according to that hypothesis. Without a doubt, the 
outbreak of the ELAS-EDES conflict along with ELAS’ firm assertion towards EKKA to 
choose sides allowed Kartalis very limited choices and a very limited space for political 
manoeuvring. To maintain a completely neutral attitude towards the ELAS-EDES 
conflict was impossible, while to support EDES openly would probably mean suicide for 
EKKA and the 5/42. Kartalis had no other alternative than to follow a pro-EAM attitude. 
Nevertheless, Kartalis’ proposal to send a 5/42 company to fight next to ELAS against 
EDES was rather extreme. There was a major difference between the issuing of a 
supportive statement towards ELAS and of becoming comrades in arms with ELAS even 
with a small, symbolic force (Protopapas, interview 14 January 2000).
After these developments, EKKA was entering a new era. EKKA, which aimed to 
be established as a neutral agent of moderate politics and stay out of the discord within 
the national resistance movement, became involved in the conflict afterwards. It was 
obvious that EKKA’s neutrality and autonomy was permanently lost. Kartalis’ aspiration 
to give EKKA the profile of the honest arbitrator or the representative of the moderate
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“silent majority” had failed. From that point onwards, the big issue for EKKA would be 
just the survival of the organisation, even if that meant giving credit to ELAS. Obviously, 
the only way for EKKA to survive and to avoid the “big brother’s” menace was to get 
more attached to EAM-ELAS. Although Kartalis’ manoeuvres towards the ELAS EDES 
conflict rescued EKKA and the 5/42 on the short-run from a new disbandment, it had an 
impact with severe, long-term effects. Kartalis’ biggest mistake was that he did not 
include Captain Dedousis and the 5/42’s men in his political equations.
4.1 ai. Frustration and Conspiracy: The 5/42’s “Delicate” Mutiny.
EKKA’s controversial proclamation was printed in thousands of copies by EAM- 
ELAS and was distributed all around Roumeli. Soon everybody in Fokida was aware of 
the proclamation and EKKA’s overall attitude towards the EDES-ELAS conflict {Istoriki 
Epitheorisis, 1965: 8-9). The proclamation’s content caused major turmoil among the 
5/42 officers and antartes. The 5/42 had been disbanded twice by ELAS, while EDES on 
the other hand was considered by 5/42 men as a friendly organisation which was facing 
the exact arrogance and hostility by ELAS. For the average 5/42 antartis or officer, 
EKKA’s proclamation and its suggestion to send a 5/42 company side by side with ELAS 
against EDES was a scandalously provocative treason (Protopapas, interview 14 January 
2000). The 5/42 antartes and followers were oblivious to the political manoeuvring 
within the resistance movement. They could not understand the deeper purpose of 
EKKA’s proclamation and neither did they know the objectives of Kartalis’ policies 
(Zacharias, interview, 16 May 2000, Kouvelis, interview, 18 April 2000). They just saw
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the political branch of their group betraying them and allying with their enemy against a 
friendly organisation.
Among 5/42’s men, the hostility towards EKKA had become obvious, and that is
why in late October 1943 Kartalis, Bakirtzis, Vlachos and Papagianopoulos went to
Amfissa to explain to Psarros and the rest of the 5/42 officers the reasons and motives of
their actions. The meeting was held within a climate of anxiety and tension. The 5/42
officers were enraged with EKKA’s officials, while Dedousis joined in the meeting fully
armed and accompanied by his personal escort (Koutras, 1981: 72). In his speech Kartalis
highlighted the reasons that led him to issue the pro-ELAS proclamation and the purpose
it served and then he repeated his proposal about the 5/42’s symbolic support to ELAS
with a small company (Istoriki Epitheorisis, 1965, vol.8-9). Psarros rejected that proposal
and reassured everyone that the regiment would not place itself in the middle of the
ELAS-EDES conflict, but instead would struggle for the achievement of national unity.
“Dedousis then, as if he wished for Psarros to say something else got up, pointed 
his machinegun and with his finger on the trigger insulted not only Kartalis, 
Bakirtzis and Vlachos but also Psarros as traitors of the King” (Koutras, 1981: 72).
Psarros managed to calm down Dedousis and the incident ended.
From the first moment that Dedousis joined the regiment, his attitude towards
EKKA was negative. After the proclamation was issued however, Dedousis became more
and more radical. According to his brother:
“[After EKKA’s proclamation was issued] our company with Thymios on the lead 
drew the sword and entered a new phase of the national struggle: the open battle 
against communism” (Dedousis, 1949: 49).
Dedousis and his men launched a propaganda campaign and started touring the villages
of Fokida in order to recruit more antartes. During that campaign various minor incidents
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occurred (beatings, disputes etc) among Dedousis’ men and members of EAM-ELAS, but 
while ELAS was at war with EDES, Dedousis did not drew the line. Probably he waited 
for the war’s outcome in order to proceed with any further actions.
Eventually, the ELAS-EDES war ended in mid-February 1944 with the Myrofilo-
Plaka agreement. The agreement’s purpose was both to cease the hostilities between
EDES and ELAS, and unite all resistance organisations. Kartalis was voted unanimously
as chairman of the conference, while Major Doukas was appointed garrison commander
and chief of the conference’s security. Kartalis made a major effort for the achievement
of even a minor agreement.
“All of his energy and activity was focused more towards private intermediary 
meetings with all delegates outside the conference’s formal discussions, rather than 
to the task of co-ordinating the conference’s discussions” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 243).
The agreement’s objective was to find a formula in order to turn all resistance 
armies in to an integrated and united national army. The conference agenda was: (a) the 
assignment of all resistance forces’ command to a single Chief General and (b) the 
composition that the integrated national army would take. As far as the Chief General’s 
issue was concerned nothing was achieved since EAM-ELAS, EDES and EKKA failed to 
agree to a specific person.111 As far as the national army’s issue was concerned, EAM’s 
proposal to EKKA and EDES was the full integration of antartes bands of all 
organisations from the platoon level and upwards. EKKA and EDES refused such a 
suggestion since EDES and the 5/42 had their forces exclusively in the areas of Epirus 
and Fokida while ELAS had a strong nation-wide presence. If the forces of EDES and the 
5/42 were to be integrated with the ELAS forces from the platoon level and upwards, that
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would mean the full assimilation of EDES and the 5/42 by ELAS. Instead Psarros 
proposed the unification of all groups from the regiment level and upwards, where 
virtually the 5/42 would be left intact since the 5/42 was by itself a regiment and it would 
just form a common division along with another ELAS regiment. Kartalis went even 
further and proposed the unification from the battalion level and upward where the two 
battalions that formed the 5/42 would join two other ELAS battalions and form two 
common regiments, but eventually no agreement was made (Pyromaglou, 1965: 236).
In addition to military issues, the Myrofilo-Plaka agreement tackled some 
political issues as well. EAM proposed the formation of a provisional political committee 
in free Greece with the participation of EDES and EKKA until the country was liberated, 
and until a national unity government would be formed. EDES and EKKA refused to 
participate in such a provisional political committee, since according to Pyromaglou:
“In such a political committee EKKA and EDES would simply be spectators”
(Pyromaglou, 1965: 251).
Eventually, negotiations about all issues came to a deadlock and EAM-ELAS, EDES and 
EKKA failed to reach any agreement. One of the few things that was achieved however, 
was a universal agreement regarding the denunciation of the security battalions.
Throughout the period of the Myrofilo-Plaka negotiations, Kartalis made another 
diversion in his policy. He abandoned the pro-EAMic attitude that he had adopted 
throughout the ELAS-EDES conflict and instead, he tried to re-approach EDES. That 
reaproachement with EDES was due to the fact that Kartalis along with EDES’ delegates 
and Woodhouse had a closer co-operation and agreement about the attitude that they
111 EAM-ELAS suggested Generals Sarafis, Mandakas or Sarigianis, EDES suggested Generals Petsas, 
Soubasakos and Kotoulas, EKKA suggested Generals Othonaios, Manetas and Dromazos, while 
Woodhouse suggested General Bakirtzis
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would maintain towards EAM-ELAS. Nevertheless, Kartalis rejected Zervas’ proposal 
for closer co-operation between EDES and EKKA. According to Pyromaglou, Zervas 
promised Kartalis a starring political post after the liberation but because Kartalis was 
suspicious towards Zervas and believed that EDES was not going to be on top of things, 
or because he still wanted to protect EKKA’s independence, he refused the offer by 
saying that “everything is premature until liberation” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 255). The main 
conclusion that can be drawn from Kartalis’ overall attitude throughout the conference 
was that he did not want to get any more attached to EAM, but at the same time he 
wanted to maintain his distance from EDES. He still wanted to regain EKKA’s 
independence.
While the discussions were ongoing, Psarros was informed about suspicious
activities of his officers back in Fokida. Psarros left Myrofilo-Plaka hastily and returned
to his regiment in order to find out exactly what was going on. Amongst the 5/42 officer,
a memorandum was circulated according to which:
“The officers, deputy officers and antartes of the heroic 5/42 regiment of euzones 
declare to everyone that they do not intend to become instruments of political 
exploitation wherever that comes from. Consequently they denounce any 
organisation that proclaims itself as representing the 5/42 and consider the 5/42 
regiment and themselves as instruments of the military liberating struggle as this is 
determined by the Middle East Headquarters, the King and his government. 
Furthermore, they ask the Middle East Headquarters, the King and his government 
to set the 5/42 regiment under their direct orders. Finally they denounce the so 
called EKKA organisation towards the objectives of which nothing connects the 
officers, deputy officers and antartes of the 5/42 which are militarily devoted to the 
Middle East Headquarters, the King and his government” (Dedousis, 1949:56-58, 
Koutras, 1981: 81-83).
The memorandum was issued on 28 February 1944. It was issued by Dedousis 
and signed by 68 of the 5/42 officers, among which were Koutras, Kaimaras, Douros, 
Kapentzonis et al. During that time, the regiment included 100-130 officers overall.
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Consequently the 68 that signed the proclamation represented approximately half or the 
two thirds of the overall number of 5/42 officers. Through Kalantzis (Dedousis’ liaison 
with “The Military Hierarchy”), the memorandum was forwarded to the King and the 
Middle East Headquarters. Two important features need to be stressed about that 
memorandum: its content and the time that it was issued.
The memorandum had a clear political message. In addition to the clear 
denunciation of EKKA, the memorandum was also an indirect disapproval if not denial 
of Psarros’ command. Although the memorandum did not mention anything about 
Psarros personally, it was well known that Psarros was one of EKKA’s leaders.112 
Therefore, by denouncing EKKA, the memorandum was also denouncing Psarros, at least 
in an indirect manner. The memorandum however went even further by setting the 
regiment under the King’s orders. The 5/42 as indeed ELAS and EDES were officially 
under the military orders of the Middle East Headquarters, but certainly not the King. By 
setting the regiment under the orders of the King as well, the 5/42 was taking a de facto 
pro-royalist constitutional and political position. That was completely against the 
fundamental principles upon which the 5/42 was formed which were the total absence of 
political orientation and objectives, and the dedication to the military resistance struggle 
against the invaders.
In addition to the memorandum’s content however, it is also very important to 
take under consideration the time that Dedousis chose to issue it. As mentioned above, 
the memorandum was issued during the Myrofilo-Plaka agreement, where important
112 It is worthy to note that Kaimaras doesn’t mention anything about the memorandum in his book, 
although he had signed it. During our interviews he tried to give minor importance to the memorandum and 
change the subject. On the contrary Koutras who had also signed the memorandum not only mentions it in 
his book but also refers to it under the heading “Defection of the 5/42 officers” (Koutras, 1981: 81-83)
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discussions were taking place concerning the unity of the national resistance movement. 
Irrespectively of the deadlock that the discussions eventually reached, a possible 
achievement of those objectives (unification of resistance armies, formation of 
provisional political committee etc) would have been a very strong blow against the 
royalists and would have extremely negative consequences for the restoration of the 
Monarchy after the end of the war. The achievement of such an agreement would result 
in two possible scenarios; either in the formation of a wide and powerful democratic, 
anti-royalist block with the participation of the whole national resistance, or in the 
dominance of EAM-ELAS in the political and military scene and the submission of 
EDES and EKKA to EAM-ELAS. Both scenarios would bring the royalists in a 
disadvantageous position and would diminish the chances of the King’s return.
According to his brother Ioannis, Captain Dedousis was informed about the
developments of the Myrofilo-Plaka agreement by his patrons:
“Thymios was in continuous contact with head officials of the resistance and his 
fellow-countryman, ex Minister Kalantzis [Dedousis’ liaison with “The Military 
Hierarchy”] and was fully aware about the surrender of the national struggle to 
EAM’s objectives. Thymios was fully updated on details about the alliance 
between EKKA and ELAS. After the fiasco of the Myrofilo-Plaka negotiations, it 
was obvious that EKKA, the political organisation of the 5/42 had reconciled and 
had submitted to EAM’s intentions. Thymios understood that the communist 
menace was growing and that there was no space for compromise and tolerance 
anymore” (Dedousis, 1949: 55).
“The Military Hierarchy” updated Dedousis about what was happening in Myrofilo-Plaka
and the potential threat that a possible success of the negotiations would be for the
Monarchy’s fate in Greece. Dedousis estimated or was convinced by his patrons that
EKKA’s objective was to increase its influence upon the 5/42 and to force it to join
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ELAS. In order to avoid such a development the 5/42 had to be disengaged from EKKA’s
influence and so Dedousis decided to take action by issuing the proclamation.
“Thymios was not left inactive, the first step for clearing things up was to cause a 
split between the real fighters [he means the 5/42 men] and EKKA. That would 
put an end to the undermining of the 5/42 by EKKA” (Dedousis, 1949: 55).
At this point Ioannis Dedousis more or less admitted that his brother acted as an 
agent provocateur and that the split between the 5/42 and EKKA was premeditated.113 
From the first moment that Dedousis joined the 5/42 he manifested his anti-EKKA 
sentiments. EKKA stood for totally different principles and ideals to those of Dedousis 
and “The Military Hierarchy”. Probably a conflict between them would be inevitable, 
but the time that he chose to issue his proclamation and come in open rupture with EKKA 
suggests that it was not a spontaneous reaction by Dedousis. If, for example, he had 
issued a proclamation denouncing EKKA five months ago, immediately after EKKA had 
issued its own pro-ELAS proclamation concerning the EDES-ELAS war, then it could be 
argued that such an action was due to frustration or a spontaneous reaction. However, the 
fact that he chose to come in rupture with EKKA (a) five whole months after its pro- 
ELAS proclamation was issued, (b) while in Fokida the relations between 5/42 and ELAS 
were peaceful, (c) while the EDES-ELAS war had ended, (d) while discussions and 
compromises were taking place among all resistance groups for the finding of a solution
113 I. Dedousis’ book that was kindly given to me by editor Mr B. Gramenos, is a very rare edition and a 
truly valuable historical source. The book’s rhetoric aid style is deeply anti-communist and in many cases 
its sincerity is disarming to the degree of cynicism, mainly due to the conditions and circumstances under 
which the book was written. The book was issued in 1949, just two years after Thymios Dedousis’ death in 
an ambush by a communist band and while the civil war (1946-49) was at its peak. That explains why 
emotionalism and maliciousness over the enemy prevail throughout the book. Furthermore, during that time 
Ioannis Dedousis went into politics and was a candidate for the 1950 elections in the Fokida electoral 
district and like most right wing politicians of that time he used demagogic anti-communist rhetoric and 
proudly highlighted his anti-communist struggles.
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and (e) while Psarros was absent from Fokida suggest that it was a carefully premeditated 
action.
Whatever his motives, the appeal that Dedousis’ memorandum had among the 
5/42 officers marked the dominance of Dedousis’ faction within the regiment. The 
balance between Dedousis’ faction, the EKKA-Psarros faction and the “silent majority” 
faction114 had been broken. EKKA was condemned by the vast majority of the 5/42 
officers and men and the “silent majority” eventually got attached to Dedousis. Psarros 
and his loyal officers maintained their leading positions within the regiment, but they 
became alienated from the average 5/42 officer and antartis. Psarros was still the leader 
of the 5/42, he still had the respect of his men as an officer and as a man, but not as a 
leader, not as a safe pair of hands. The two disbandments and the humiliation that they 
caused, Psarros’ constant appeals not to provoke ELAS and to suppress their anti­
communist sentiments, his “Christian tolerance” towards ELAS (G. Koutsoklenis, 
interview 17 May 2000) caused a severe damage to the men’s morale and trust towards 
his leadership. On the other hand, Dedousis was much closer to the average 5/42 man’s 
mentality and attitude. Dedousis smashed all the taboos that haunted the 5/42 right from 
the start. He was a royalist and an anti-communist like them and he was not afraid to 
show it. He was not afraid of ELAS and that increased his personal appeal among the 
frustrated 5/42 men and lifted their morale. Many within the 5/42 started believing that 
Dedousis was the safe pair of hands that could restore the regiment’s honour and lead 
them to victory. Soon their hopes would be proven false in a tragic way.
1,4 Seech 3.4, p 173.
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4.2. Interlude: The Forty Last Days of the 5/42.
Soon after Dedousis’ memorandum was published, the relationship between the 
5/42 and ELAS entered a new period of polarisation. All over Fokida, a war atmosphere 
was prevalent and it was obvious that the outbreak of a new conflict between the two 
bands was just a matter of time. It did not take much time for an incident to occur. On 3 
March 1944, ELAS’ antartes under the command of Nikiforos surrounded the village of 
Semikaki and disarmed the village’s 5/42 combatant group and a small group of 5/42 
antartes who were on leave. Nikoforos’ antartes beat up the 5/42 men, took their guns, 
clothes, boots and provisions, while they kept 11 men as hostages. On the next day, 
ELAS’ antartes under Kronos disarmed another 6 of 5/42’s antartes in Eratini (Koutras, 
1981: 80, Dedousis, 1949: 59, Kaimaras, 1979: 131-32, Papathanasiou, 2000: 135, PRO 
H5 5/291, H5 5/279, DIS/GES F/ 929/B/51). The Semikaki incident was the spark that 
caused a chained reaction of violent incidents between ELAS and 5/42 antartes which 
eventually concluded with the regiment’s final disbandment one and a half months later.
As soon as Thymios Dedousis heard the news from Semikaki, he immediately 
proceeded to a series of counter-measures, either because “he thought that there was an 
organised general offensive against the 5/42” (PRO H5 5/291), or because he was 
anticipating to confront ELAS. Without even seeking permission from Psarros and even 
though his superior officer Major Baizanos ordered him to remain calm and not to 
proceed to any retaliation, Dedousis declared north Dorida as a territory under siege, he 
arrested 80 officials of EAM’s branch in Fokida and he disarmed ELAS’ reserves in the 
Pentagiou and Krokylion villages. During the disarmament of ELAS’ reserves in
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Krokylion, the village’s ELAS commissar Varsos was killed (PRO H5 5/291, H5 5/292, 
Dedousis, 1949: 60, Kaimaras, 1979: 133, DIS F 914/Z/1B).
Varsos’ murder by Dedousis’ antartes ignited the final ELAS-5/42 bloody 
encounter. According to the 5/42 side, Varsos’ murder was just an unlucky event and the 
whole incident occurred as a result of ELAS’ provocative activities in the Semikaki 
village (Koutras, interview, 9 January 2000, Kaimaras, interview, 18 December 2000). 
On the other hand, according to ELAS it was a murder in cold blood premeditated by 
Dedousis that could not be possibly left unpunished (DIS/GES F/14/Z/lb, DIS/GES 
F/928/Z/1). Varsos was the co-ordinator of ELAS’ reserves in the Krokyleion village. He 
was not an important EAM-ELAS official, but his murder -accidental or not- was clearly 
“an event that raised hatred between the two organisations and that determined the 
regiment’s tragic fate” (Kaimaras, 1979:133).
As in every war, what counts more is not the spark, the incident itself, but the will 
of both parts to engage in conflict. Hardliners from both ELAS and the 5/42 anticipated 
for such an incident to occur and Varsos’ murder was a very convenient way to realise 
their plans. ELAS at last got the convincing pretext that it was so eagerly waiting for in 
order to launch its final large-scale assault against the regiment and it used Varsos’ case 
in an extortionate way, as a means to cause the internal disintegration of the 5/42. ELAS’ 
officers demanded Dedousis’ head for Varsos’ murder even if they knew that there was 
no chance that Psarros would surrender Dedousis to ELAS. They did not show any will to 
compromise and end the tension even though they knew that Psarros kept loosing control 
over his regiment. On the other hand Dedousis and his faction at last got their chance to 
lead the whole regiment in conflict with ELAS. After Varsos’ murder, Dedousis not only
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did he refuse to come to some reconciliation with Psarros or ELAS, but he became more 
and more provocative instead.
From that point onwards, Dedousis became a red rag for ELAS. Immediately after
Varsos’ murder, ELAS demanded from Psarros the release of all the hostages, the return
of their weapons and the arrest of anyone who was responsible for the murder (DIS/GES
F/914/Z/1B). Psarros ordered Dedousis to release the hostages and return their weapons.
He ordered him to remain inactive and stop any action that could irritate ELAS and told
him that from that point he would handle the crisis personally. However:
“Thymios refused to execute Psarros’ order and said that he would follow the order 
only if the Communists let the regiment’s men [from the Semikaki incident] free 
and returned their weapons” (Dedousis, 1949: 60-61).
Dedousis’ disobedience towards Psarros had become open. Dedousis seemed determined
to proceed to open conflict with ELAS, while Psarros had lost almost completely his
control over Dedousis and his company. On the other hand, ELAS had set a price on the
heads of Dedousis and his close companion Major Kapentzonis and demanded from
Psarros, to hand over Dedousis to them. Later on, on two occasions, (the first in Eupalion
on 2 April and the second on Trizonia in 14 April 1944) ELAS’ forces ambushed
Dedousis and his men with a clear intention to murder him (PRO H5 5/279, PRO H5
5/291, PRO H5 5/292, PRO H5 5/279, Koutras, 1981: 93-94, Dedousis, 1949: 62-66, 70-
74, Kaimaras, 1979: 135-36, DIS/GES F/929/B/10).
Throughout March 1944 Fokida was on red alert and there were almost daily, 
clashes between ELAS and 5/42 bands all over the region. A vicious circle of clashes, 
counter-measures, disarmament of antartes etc was formed, causing casualties from both 
sides. Throughout that period, Psarros made desperate attempts to calm spirits down and
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put an end to the conflict. He tried on the one hand to appease ELAS and on the other to 
impose discipline upon Dedousis. While the clashes were ongoing, Psarros started a 
series of negotiations with ELAS and the British liaison officers. The key issue of those 
negotiations was Dedousis. ELAS demanded that Psarros removed him from command 
and surrender him to ELAS. However, that was impossible to happen due to ethical as 
well as practical reasons. From a military-ethical point of view something like that would 
be unthinkable. The surrender of an officer to the enemy in time of conflict was and still 
is beyond any military code of ethics of any army, guerrilla or regular. Psarros was a 
proud officer and there was no way that he would do something like that. During the 
negotiations about Dedousis’ fate, Psarros in a strict manner said to ELAS‘ 
representatives:
“I am going to court-martial Captain Dedousis myself, but there is no chance that I 
am going to hand him over to you. I would never do such a dishonesty” (Dimitriou, 
1965, vol.3: 179, Kaimaras, 1979: 134, PRO H5 5/279).
On the other hand, the surrender of Dedousis and even his removal from the
command of his company was impossible to happen even if Psarros had the will to do so.
According to Koutras:
“ELAS demanded from Colonel Psarros to arrest Dedousis. Now that’s a utopia! 
Who knows if  Psarros did not fear that he would be the one to be arrested from 
Dedousis and lose the Regiment’s command. During that time, Dedousis had the 
power to arrest Psarros and not the opposite” (Koutras, 1981: 81).
Dedousis’ company was manned by almost 150 men. His company was very well
equipped and his men were devoted to him. Furthermore, another 200 men manned the
Dorida Battalion, which was commanded by Dedousis’ close associate Major
Kapentzonis. In total, the manpower of the Dedousis-Kapentzonis faction included
almost the half of the Regiment’s men. If Psarros denounced or court-martialed Dedousis
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and Kapentzonis, that would have definitely meant that half of the regiment would be 
turned against him. Moreover it would also mean that he would definitely lose the 
support of the other half since the vast majority of the 5/42 men were sympathetic to 
Dedousis and all commanders of the rest of the 5/42 companies “expressed their 
solidarity towards Captain Dedousis and declared that they were determined to fall to the 
last for the Regiment’s honour” (Kaimaras, 1979: 134). The surrender of Dedousis and 
even his denunciation from Psarros would mean only one thing, the dissolution of the 
5/42 and the overthrow of Psarros.
The following incident is indicative of Dedousis’ disobedience towards Psarros.
According to Dedousis’ brother:
“During the last days of the 5/42’s existence, Psarros called all the officers to a 
meeting. He told them to have faith in his command and that they should avoid at 
any cost to come to open conflict with the communists because that would have 
disastrous effects. The officers disagreed with their commander and Thymios 
shouted that there was no chance that the Bulgarian’s henchmen [EAM-ELAS] 
would consider the motherland’s benefit. A serious quarrel between Psarros and 
Dedousis followed” (Dedousis, 1949: 69).
Nikiforos gave a description of that quarrel:
“Our information about that meeting was that Dedousis did not stop insulting 
Psarros, he was calling him incompetent, a whore and he threatened that he would 
bind him hands and feet. For Varsos’ murder Dedousis said that he had ordered it 
and that he did not have to apologise to anyone” (Dimitriou “Nikiforos”, 1965, 
vol.3: 180).
The Dedousis-Psarros rupture was open and it was obvious that the vast majority
of the 5/42 officers were in favour of Dedousis.
“Psarros had to face a tragic situation. He had valid information that even his most 
loyal officers were in favour of Captain Dedousis and did not wish to compromise 
with ELAS....Psarros found a suspicious letter from Major Kapentzonis to 
Lieutenant Colonel Papavasiliou. According to that letter, those two officers, along 
with some others planned a mutiny. They would remove the Regiment’s command 
from Psarros and would appoint Papavasiliou the new commander of the 5/42. The
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sad thing is that Psarros considered Papavasiliou as one of his most loyal officers” 
(Dimitriou “Nikiforos”, 1965, vol.3: 180).115
In order to find a way out of the deadlock, Psarros proposed ELAS to court- 
martial Dedousis in a 5/42 court with the participation of an ELAS representative and a 
British liaison officer. According to Psarros’ proposal he would do that only if ELAS 
would do the same for Nikiforos, who was responsible for the Semikaki incident (PRO 
H5 5/279, PRO H5 5/291, Kaimaras, 1979: 134, Koutras, 1981: 81). Psarros’ proposal 
was rejected by ELAS who continued demanding the surrender of Dedousis (PRO H5 
5/279), knotting in that way the rope around Psarros’ neck even tighter. Psarros probably 
was living the most dramatic days of his life. He was entrapped between Dedousis’ 
disobedience and ELAS’ unwillingness to compromise. To surrender Dedousis would 
mean the 5/42’s dissolution, to come in open conflict with ELAS would mean exactly the 
same. Psarros found no understanding from anyone, not even his close friend and 
comrade Euripidis Bakirtzis and his Sub-Commander Konstantinos Lagouranis who 
abandoned him in his hour of need.
The first who gave Psarros “the kiss of Judas” (Protopapas, interview, 6 May 
2000) was in fact his close friend and associate Bakirtzis. On 10 March 1944 in Euritania 
the PEEA Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleutherosis (Political Committee of National 
Liberation) was formed with Bakirtzis as its first president and Siantos, Mantakas, 
Tsirimokos and Gavrielidis its founding members. PEEA, which was also known as the 
“Government of the Mountain”, was an attempt by EAM to create an official 
governmental body. Although PEEA was under the control of KKE’s Central Committee, 
KKE’s leaders wanted to give PEEA the democratic profile of a coalition that represented
115 As quoted from an article written by Papagianopoulos in “Kathimerina nea” 15-12-45
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not only EAM, but also the whole democratic camp. For that reason, KKE tried
desperately to include in PEEA new, “fresh” officials outside EAM or KKE. Hence as
soon as Bakirtzis returned to Greece he started a series of negotiations with Siantos about
his post into PEEA.116 On the other hand, Bakirtzis tried to convince the 5/42’s Sub-
Commander Lagouranis to follow him and join EAM-ELAS. Eventually on 4 April
Lagouranis left the 5/42 and joined ELAS. Lagouranis also issued a proclamation calling
all antartes and officers of the 5/42 to follow his example and join ELAS:
“I took the decision to join PEEA and ELAS and I urge all of you decent EKKA 
followers and honest 5/42 antartes and officers to follow me” (PRO H5 5/279, 
DIS/GES F/914/Z/2ist).
ELAS printed the proclamation in thousands of copies and circulated it all over Fokida.117
Bakirtzis and Lagouranis’ defection from the 5/42 at those critical moments was a serious
blow to Psarros and the 5/42’s fragile coherence and it gave strong moral support to
ELAS’ overall case against the Regiment.
During the early days of April the number of violent incidents between the 5/42 
and ELAS increased and large numbers of ELAS reinforcements were marching to
116 Bakirtzis was one of the founders of EKKA and one of Psarros’ closest associates during the first days 
of the occupation. From the last days of the summer of 1942 and until mid September 1943 however, 
Bakirtzis was in Cairo isolated from Psarros, EKKA and the 5/42 (see ch ,2.ii.d, p 86). Nevertheless, as 
soon as he returned to Greece Bakirtzis became the Chief of the “EKKA Military Headquarters”. The 
“EKKA Military Headquarters” was in fact an artificial post created by Kartalis and Psarros just for 
Bakirtzis since he was a founding member of EKKA and ought to have a leading post within EKKA and 
the 5/42. Moreover due to the fact that Bakirtzis military rank was senior than Psarros’ he had to be placed 
at a higher post than him. Psarros agreed to that since Bakirtzis was a very dear friend of his and since 
nothing really changed in the hierarchy, and Psarros continued being the real commander of the 5/42. 
Bakirtzis never got involved with the commanding of the 5/42, but he gave Psarros and Kartalis his word of 
honour that he would remain in EKKA until liberation. Bakirtzis however soon started a series of contacts 
with Siantos, negotiating the terms of his entrance in EAM-ELAS (Pyromaglou, 1965: 217)
117 A few days before Lagouranis left the 5/42 and joined ELAS, his brother Ioannis Lagouranis was 
parachuted in Ghiona. Ioannis Langouranis was a liaison officer of the American intelligence services and 
his mission was to organise an information network that would keep the allies informed about enemy and 
resistance activity in the area. (Kaimaras, 1979: 139). In the PRO files, I discovered Ioannis Lagouranis’ 
file where it is written that his date of commission in the British secret services was October 1933. (PRO 
H5 5/405). Whether Ioannis Lagouranis and his capacity as an agent of the American and British secret
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Fokida from the nearby areas of Roumeli and Thesally. It had become obvious that ELAS 
was getting ready to launch its final offensive against the Regiment, hence Psarros 
ordered a series of preventive measures. He declared Dorida as a region under siege, he 
ordered the disarmament of all reserve ELAS forces in the area, he called all of the 
Regiment’s antartes who were on leave to return to their units and he ordered all of the 
regiment’s units to gather in the Trikorfo-Klima area. The total number of ELAS antartes, 
which had gathered in the Klima area, was around 1,400 men (Pyromaglou,, 1965: 301). 
On the other hand, 5/42 sources claim that ELAS’ forces were 5,000 (Kaimaras, 1979: 
146) to 6,000 men (Dedousis, 1949: 81), which are certainly excessive figures. The total 
number of the 5/42 forces in Klima was around 400-450 men (Pyromaglou, 1965: 301, 
Kaimaras, 1979: 146, Dedousis, 1949: 81).
The regiment’s manpower before the final conflict with ELAS had dropped to
half. Many 5/42 antartes and even officers refused to follow the regiment in Klima since
it was obvious that the 5/42 had no chance of surviving that conflict. Although all of
Kapentzonis’ men came from the Klima-Trikorfo area, less than half of them followed
the rest of the 5/42 in Klima (Kaimaras, 1979: 144). According to Koutras:
“Apart from Douros’ and Kaimaras’ men, during those last days very few officers 
and antartes came to thicken the regiment, although the regiment had a desperate 
need for every single one of its men. For example, from all of the officers of Major 
Mannaios’ unit [which was manned by 120 men (DIS/GES F929/A/1)] only two 
officers came to Klima, Lieutenant-Captain Koutriaris Loukas and Sub-Lieutenant 
Papadimas Loukas without any antartes...while from Major Farmakis unit just 
Farmakis himself along with Sub-Lieutenant Kokorelis and ten antartes came to 
help” (Koutras, 1981: 86).
Although a final conflict between the 5/42 and ELAS was imminent, Psarros 
continued his attempt to come to some compromise with ELAS and urged the local
services influenced his brother’s decision to abandon the 5/42 is something that the current research did not
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British liaison officers to mediate (DIS/GES F928/E/11, PRO H5 5/279).118 On 9 April
Psarros received a letter from Bakirtzis calling him to join PEEA and lead his regiment to 
join ELAS. Psarros gave the following answer:
You know that EKKA and I personally are pioneers of national unity.
We are now called to negotiations in order to enter PEEA while at the same time 
ELAS’ units turn their arms against us and while a new bloodshed with devastating 
consequences is about to begin. EKKA and the Regiment are eager to contribute to 
national unity. Consequently we agree to participate in the necessary negotiations 
about entering PEEA as soon as possible, on condition that ELAS stops every 
hostile activity so that our decision is taken freely and not under the threat of arms 
since such a humiliation would be unacceptable. Please inform us about the venue 
and time of the negotiations, because as you understand any decision is going to be 
taken by the whole of our organisation and not me personally. I hope that you and 
the rest of PEEA will agree with my views and that you will give your best effort in 
order to avoid the bloodshed and achieve national unity for the nation’s interest” 
(Kaimaras, 1979: 142).
Although Psarros was willing to come to some agreement with PEEA and end the
conflict, PEEA had already given the green light to ELAS to proceed with the
disbandment. Sarafis wrote:
“PEEA could no longer tolerate all that behaviour from Psarros’ 
officers...Therefore, PEEA ordered ELAS’ General Headquarters to send Psarros 
an ultimatum asking him to apply what was agreed [Dedousis and Kapentzonis’ 
arrest etc]...In the case where Psarros would not accept those terms, ELAS’ 
General Headquarters was authorised to order the disbandment of the 5/42 unit” 
(Sarafis, 1964: 282).
ELAS’ ultimatum included the following terms:
“[...]
a) Order immediately the seizure of any illegal activity against all Greek citizens.
b) Withdraw all restrictive measures that you have imposed in your area.
c) Immediately release and return to us in safety all hostages.
d) Return all arms, ammunition, provisions etc that you have seized from EAM- 
ELAS and other individuals.
e) Arrest Major Kapentzonis, Captain Dedousis and any other who is involved in the 
murder of Varsos or other antartes and members of our organisations. The above
manage to confirm or reject.
118 See ch 7.3.i,p284.
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named will be judged by a court-martial in which a representative of ours is going 
to participate.
After you submit and execute the above terms, a joint committee along with 
the British liaison officer John Ponder is going to be formed in order to settle any 
other issues between ELAS and the 5/42-EKKA.
In the case that you do not submit to the above terms, or in the case that you 
delay their execution, you will bare full responsibility of the consequences towards 
the Greek people and PEEA” (DIS/GES F/929/B/69).
Psarros agreed to all of ELAS’ terms and sent the following answer:
1) I withdrew my order about the siege condition of Dorida as well as all the other 
restrictive measures.
2) I am sending you all the hostages.
3) As far as the arms are concerned, I ordered the units that got them to collect them 
and deliver them to you.
4) Major Kapentzonis is under arrest and he is at the regiment’s disposal. Captain 
Dedousis is on a mission and he is going to return in 2 or 3 days where he is also 
going to be under arrest.119
About the 4th term of your message [the court-martial of Dedousis-Kapentzonis]
a) Let us know on which accusation should we court-martial Major Kapentzonis.
b) Name us your representative in the court-martial” (DIS/GES F/928/E/11, PRO H5 
5/291).
In addition to his reply to ELAS, Psarros issued an internal order found in the
archives of the Greek Army’s History Bureau according to which:
“Major Kapentzonis Georgios and Captain Dedousis Euthimios are to be held in 
order to be court-martialed for their actions. Psarros 14-4-44” (DIS/GES F/929).
Moreover he ordered the arrest of Bourdakos Gregorios, the 5/42 antartis who shot
Varsos in the Krokilion incident (DIS/GES F/929). These documents rather prove that
Psarros had the intention to court-martial Dedousis in order to satisfy ELAS’ demand.
The question is whether Dedousis would consent to be court-martialed. According to
Koutras:
“Psarros -always with Dedousis’ consent- assigned Major Papathanasiou the task 
to make the necessary arrangements for a court-martial. Papathanasiou would be
119 During that time Dedousis was in Galaxidi were he was gathering his antartes
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the court-martial’s president and Dedousis’ punishment would probably be death 
but on reprieve” (Koutras, 1981: 91).
Obviously, the court-martial that Psarros was planning was a farce since the consent of
190the accused was necessary and since the decision was judged beforehand. That farce 
nevertheless was probably the most efficient way to put an end to the Dedousis- 
Kapentzonis issue, to give some satisfaction to ELAS and to maintain unity within the 
regiment.
Although Psarros agreed to all the terms dictated in ELAS and PEEA’s 
ultimatums, ELAS kept increasing its aggression against the 5/42. While negotiations 
were taking place about Dedousis’ fate, ELAS forces ambushed once more Dedousis and 
his Company in Trizonia (Dedousis, 1949: 72-74, Kaimaras, 1979: 151-52, Koutras, 
1981: 93-4). On 13 April Aris Velouchiotis arrived in the Dorida area accompanied by 
his personal guard of 25 men. Velouchiotis’ mission was to go to the Peloponnese and 
organise the Pelloponesisan ELAS. However, since the 5/42-ELAS conflict was in 
progress and since he was the superior Kapetanios, he undertook the command of all 
ELAS’ forces in the area. Although Psarros had agreed to the terms of the ultimatum that 
he had received the day before, immediately after Velouchiotis took command, he 
increased the pressure upon Psarros and he sent him a new ultimatum of surrender 
according to which:
“The ultimatum that was sent to you by ELAS’ General Headquarters was very 
specific. Its main term was the arrest of Captain Dedousis and his reference to a 
court-martial. Since -regardless of the reason- the 5/42 did not fulfil that term there 
is no other way to avoid the bloodshed than to disband the 5/42 by yourselves and 
surrender your arms. In that way an end is going to be put to any causes that 
undermine the national unity. We guarantee the protection and freedom of all 
officers or antartes who have not been involved in treacherous activity, war crimes 
or murders of civilians. Due to the critical situation that has occurred, it is urgent to
120 Death on reprieve was a quite usual penalty in antartes court-martials of all resistance organisations.
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give us your answer immediately. In case of acceptance of our terms, your men are 
free to surrender to any of our units holding a white flag. Our men have been 
ordered to protect any of your officers and antartes who wish to surrender” 
(Gregoriadis, 1965, vol.5: 33-34).
Although Psarros had submitted to all of ELAS’ terms, he still received an
ultimatum of surrender. It had become clear that ELAS was not willing to compromise
and was determined to disband the 5/42. Psarros understood that his regiment did not
have a chance against ELAS’ superior forces. In a letter dated 15 April (two days before
the final battle), Psarros wrote to his officer Major Baizanos:
“[....] We have got to take into consideration that: (a) Many, if not all of the 2nd 
battalion’s [the battalion commanded by Kapentzonis] men are not going to fight 
bravely, (b) There is no chance for a victorious battle, (c) KKE will not hesitate to 
crush us” (DIS/GES F/929/B/85).
Psarros wanted to avoid the bloodshed at any cost and thus he decided to retreat even
more towards ELAS. His answer to ELAS’ ultimatum was:
“We have received your ultimatum and upon it we comment: Captain Dedousis’ 
arrest and his reference to a court-martial is possible and is going to be achieved as 
soon as he returns from his mission. Consequently all the terms of your ultimatum 
have been fulfilled or are under fulfilment -taking into consideration the logical 
time limits that are necessary. Your ultimatum claims that you want a united 
national liberation army and that if we disagree to such an army, you wish our 
disbandment. We also have the wish for a united liberation army and we think that 
instead of the regiment to be disbanded, either bloody or voluntarily, it would be 
better for the Regiment to join the national army. For that purpose we propose
1) The regiment is going to be an independent unit under the authority of PEEA
2) The 5/42 personnel is going to be manned by all of its existing fighters and any 
new antartes who wish to serve in it in the future.
3) Our geographical space of action will be the provinces of Pamassida and Dorida.
4) You will guarantee the safety of our personnel including those who have been 
accused for any offences.
5) The officers and antartes who do not wish to follow the regiment [in PEEA], will 
deliver their weapons, return to their homes and you will guarantee their safety.
6) You will proceed to no counter-measures and retaliation against our followers.
If you agree, please inform us about who is going to be your delegates in the 
negotiations. We believe that in that way:
a) National unity and the national army are protected
b) The bloodshed is avoided
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c) Peace is guaranteed in the Pamassida and Dorida provinces” (Gregoriadis, vol.5: 
34-35).
Although that telegram was a complete surrender to ELAS’ terms, ELAS did not 
even reply to Psarros’ proposals. Instead, on Easter Sunday 16 April at 5:00 ELAS’ 
forces launched their first minor attack against the 5/42. During that battle, the 5/42 men 
managed to maintain their positions and pushed back the attacking forces (DIS/GES 
F/928/Z/1, Kaimaras, 1979: 156-160, Koutras, 1981: 94-95). On the same afternoon, after 
the battle was over, Psarros sent ELAS his last declaration or rather his requiem:
t V i“ELAS’ 5 brigade has launched a series of accusations against the regiment about 
murders of ELAS’ antartes, pillages and crimes against civilians, about adopting a 
hostile attitude towards EAM-ELAS etc. All of those accusations are simply 
pretexts since EAM-ELAS’ utmost intention is to destroy the regiment in order to 
dominate and impose its own will. EAM-ELAS’ offensive against us was planed 
soon after the fiasco of the Myrofilo-Plaka negotiations and with all of these lies 
EAM-ELAS is just trying to give a moral support to its unprovoked attack against 
us.... The regiment’s decision to fight this defensive struggle which was compelled 
by EAM-ELAS is our loudest protest in the eyes of history and the Greek people 
for the accusations about treason and undermining the nation’s unity. For our 
weapon’s honour, for our regiment’s dignified past and with regret about the 
brotherly blood that is going to be spilled, we declare ourselves determined to fight 
by all means against EAM-ELAS’ attack” (Gregoriadis, vol.5: 37, Kaimaras, 1979: 
160, Koutras, 1981: 97).
On the next day, 17 April, at 3:00 ELAS’ final offensive was launched against the 
5/42. Dedousis’ post received the most fierce attack and after a brief but fierce battle his 
company retreated. After Dedousis’ retreat, the 5/42’s defensive line was broken. The 
regiment collapsed, within an hour, Psarros was watching the battle from a hill on his 
own and had lost contact with his units (Dedousis, 1949: 84). The Regiment’s men 
panicked and fled towards the beach. Kapentzonis and his men without even engaging 
themselves in the battle abandoned their positions, embarked in boats and fled to the
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Peloponnese.121 The rest of the 5/42 companies were gathered in the Skala Karaiskou 
beach. After a brief meeting, Kaimaras, Koutras, Douros and Dedousis decided to attempt 
to break ELAS’ encircle and flea, while Psarros told his officers that he would stay and 
surrender to ELAS “to save anything that can be saved” (Kaimaras, 1979: 163, Koutras, 
1981: 101). Psarros probably wanted to stay in order to protect the 5/42 injured or 
captured from any atrocities, while many other 5/42 officers and antartes also chose to 
remain close to their leader (Protopapas, interview, 6 May 2000, A. Koutsoklenis, 
interview, 18 May 2000, Karaliotis, interview, 4 May 2000).
The first ELAS force that arrived at the Skala Karaiskou was Nikiforos’ unit.
Psarros surrendered to him and Nikiforos ordered four of his men to escort Psarros and
some of his officers to the Agios Elias hill where Aris Velouchiotis and the rest of the
ELAS officers were. Nikiforos ordered his men:
“You will not let anyone harm the prisoners. You will use your weapons if anybody 
tries to harm them” (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.3: 209).
En route to the Agios Elias hill, however, Psarros and his escort met ELAS’ Lieutenant
Colonel Thymios Zoulas accompanied by two of his antartes. After a brief quarrel,
Zoulas ordered one of his men to shoot Psarros with his machine-gun. Psarros was shot in
the head and the chest and dropped dead.122
Along with Colonel Psarros, ELAS men murdered more than 66 of the captured 
officers and antartes of the 5/42 just a few hours after the battle was over (Koutras, 1981:
121 Kapentzonis’ cowardliness is reconfirmed not only from ELAS’ sources (Pyromaglou, 1965: 307 in an 
ELAS’ officer report) but also from 5/42 sources (Koutras, 1981: 101, PRO H5 5/292 (In a report written 
by one of Dedousis’ officers). Even in his own report about the battle in Klima Kapentzonis does not 
mention anything about his battalion’s contribution.
122 For Psarros’ murder see ch 6, p 244.
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1103). Most of them suffered horrible tortures in order to reveal the hideouts where the 
Regiment’s gold was, others were tortured due to reasons of personal revenge.124 After 
the battle in Klima and until liberation, ELAS launched a reign of terror against all ex 
antartes and followers of the 5/42 in Fokida. The status quo in the area had changed, 
ELAS was completely dominant and the people who were associated in any way with the 
5/42 were left unprotected against the vengeance of some of ELAS’ extremists’. 
According to Kaimaras, the 5/42 throughout its existence suffered the following losses: 
Antartes killed in battles against the invaders 27
Antartes killed by ELAS 206
Followers Killed by ELAS 70
Total 303125
However, according to a list of names submitted by Koutras to the Ministry of Defence 
on 19 September 1966 the number of the 5/42 officers, antartes and members of the 
combatant groups, killed throughout the occupation was 109, while there were also 47 
dead from the non-combatant people who belonged to the EKKA-5/42 support network. 
In total, according to Koutras’ figures, which can be considered as more accurate, the 
number of casualties that the 5/42 suffered throughout the occupation was 156 dead
123 According to other sources, the number of 5/42 men who were executed by ELAS after the battle was 
more the 100 men (DIS F928/E/11). Koutras however gives a detailed list of names and not an estimate and 
from that point of view, his numbers can be considered as more accurate.
124 See DIS F928/E/11, Koutras, 1981: 102-104, Kaimaras, 1979: 164-168, Anonymous memoirs, 
Papagianopoulos, 1981: 94-104, Protopapas, interview, 6 May 2000, Raptis, interview, 23 August 2000, A 
Mamarelis, interviews 3 December 1999, 15 January 2000, 11 January 2001, Karaliotis, interview, 4 May 
2000, A. Koutsoklenis, interview, 18 May 2000, Zacharias, interview, 19 August 2000.
125 See “Ethnikes Epalxeis”, 1999, vol.36: 58, Kaimaras, 1979: 187-208. The above figures cannot be 
considered as precise although they are not beyond reality. For example Kaimaras’ list of casualties include 
ex 5/42 antartes and followers who have been killed in the 1946-49 civil war as soldiers, on the other hand 
the marble slab in the Klima mausoleum there is the name of Captain Kokorelis who although was 
seriously injured in the battle of Klima and remained disabled for the rests of his life, he died in 1982. 
Furthermore Kaimaras’ list includes 30 names of the civilians who were executed in the Vounichora village 
by the Italians as retaliation for an ELAS assault against an Italian truck.
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(Koutras, 1981:160-161), still a heavy price for an organisation that aimed to decrease 
the polarisation within the Greek national resistance movement.
Conclusion
Officially, the 5/42 was formed with the exclusive purpose to fight the invaders 
and keep itself out of the political antagonisms concerning the fate of post-war Greece. 
However, this noble vision was impossible to fulfill and the 5/42 was dragged into the 
turmoil of the political antagonism within the national resistance movement. Politics had 
a prominent role within the national resistance movement and it was almost impossible 
for all national resistance organisations to make a clear distinction between the national 
liberation struggle and the fulfilment of their political objectives. Furthermore, the 
difference of opinion between Kartalis and Dedousis over the attitude that the regiment 
should maintain towards EAM-ELAS was impossible to bridge. Eventually, due to 
EAM-ELAS’ aggression as well as due to its own internal discord, the 5/42 collapsed.
Throughout its one year of existence (April 1943-April 1944), the 5/42 regiment 
of evzones was disbanded three times by ELAS, it suffered more than 150 dead and its 
leader Colonel Psarros was murdered in a brutal and contemptible manner. Without any 
doubt, the story of the 5/42 can be labelled as a tragedy, as one of the darkest stories of 
the occupation and the Greek national resistance movement.
Up to this point, this thesis has highlighted and discussed the events from the rise 
of the 5/42 up until its tragic fall in Klima. A number of issues were tackled concerning 
the formation of the regiment and the course that it followed throughout its existence.
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However, a number of important questions still need to be raised. In the next chapters, a 
series of issues will be tackled concerning the causes that led to the tragedy of the 5/42 as 
well as over the effect that the tragedy had upon the political and military developments 
of the civil conflict during the occupation. The first of these questions has to do with the 
causes of the tragedy in Klima. ELAS maintained a totally uncompromising attitude, 
even though there was some chance of a peaceful resolution to the tension and even 
though Psarros tried to find the most dignified way to satisfy their demands. This 
indicates that ELAS’ leaders had the clear intention to disband the 5/42 once and for all, 
therefore, the next chapter will discuss the political and military causes behind the final 
5/42-ELAS conflict.
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CHAPTER 5 
The Causes Behind the Disbandment of the 5/42
The purpose of the meso-level analysis in this chapter is to discuss the causes of 
the disbandment of the 5/42. This chapter will highlight the official arguments that EAM- 
ELAS gave for the disbandment and will investigate the plausibility of those arguments. 
Furthermore, it will comment on the political and military causes behind the disbandment 
of the 5/42.
In contrast with the first two disbandments of the 5/42, there is no mystery about 
who gave the order for the third one. The order was officially issued by PEEA and this 
time there was a consensus among all EAM-ELAS leaders that the 5/42 should go once 
and for all. After the battle in Klima, ELAS Headquarters issued a report over the 5/42- 
ELAS conflict. The official explanation that ELAS gave was that the 5/42 was 
collaborating with the Germans, hence it had to be disbanded for the sake of the national 
resistance struggle. ELAS’ report included a series of specific accusations against the 
5/42 which supported the case of collaboration.
In its first half, this chapter will discuss these accusations with reference to a 
series of newly recovered documents. These accusations demand the most thorough 
investigation for two main reasons. The first reason is to evaluate the 5/42’s consistency
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towards the principles of national resistance and to conclude on whether the 5/42 
betrayed or remained loyal to the struggle that it was supposed to serve. The second 
reason is to try to understand whether ELAS truly believed the validity of those 
accusations, or whether the accusations were fabricated by ELAS with the intention to 
create a case against the 5/42, a moral ground upon which to justify the third and final 
disbandment.
Although according to EAM-ELAS the casus belli against the 5/42 were the 
allegations of collaboration, this chapter in its second half will highlight the political and 
military causes that led EAM-ELAS to disband the regiment. EKKA-5/42 was standing 
in the middle of EAM-ELAS and EDES. EAM-ELAS was eager to assimilate EKKA- 
5/42 since this would place EAM-ELAS in an extremely advantageous political and 
military position against EDES. In achieving this objective, EAM-ELAS adopted an 
inconsistent policy towards EKKA-5/42. On the one hand they repeatedly tried to tempt 
and persuade Psarros and Kartalis to lead EKKA-5/42 into EAM-ELAS, while on the 
other ELAS had disbanded the regiment twice. Dedousis’ memorandum, signed by more 
than the half of the regiment’s officers was a clear sign that the 5/42 would never join 
EAM-ELAS. From that point onwards, EAM-ELAS reshaped its policies and strategies 
towards the 5/42. EKKA-5/42 was transformed from a potential ally into a serious enemy 
for EAM-ELAS. Therefore, it had to be eliminated.
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5.1. The Justification: Treason.
5.1.i. Defining the Traitor.
The official argument according to which ELAS justified its final assault against 
the 5/42 regiment was that it had turned collaborationist. The issue of collaborationism 
within the 5/42 and generally within any national resistance organisation is probably the 
most difficult area of research of the occupation period. It is a moral issue of the utmost 
importance and inevitably, that moral dimension causes serious problems to objective 
historical research. The first problem is that accusations of collaboration with the enemy 
(the term “enemy” includes: Germans, Italians, Bulgarians, the security battalions and the 
collaborationist authorities) have reached a saturation point.
Accusations about collaboration and treason have been abused and have been 
used so extensively to the degree that every single resistance organisation has been 
accused as collaborationist by competing organisations. Consequently, the real substance 
and value of such a serious accusation is inevitably diminished and it is very difficult to 
define when an accusation is genuine or when it is a fabricated accusation that serves 
political objectives. Given the discord between EAM-ELAS and the republican resistance 
organisations, the issue of collaborationism became a useful political weapon in the 
hands of all opponents and was used for the moral extermination of the opposite side. 
Accusing the enemy of being collaborationist was probably the ultimate weapon, in 
certain ways much more effective than bullets, since it could cause a great deal of 
damage to the accused with the least cost for the accuser. All opponents understood the 
effectiveness of that weapon and they started launching accusations of collaboration with
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the enemy against each other profusely. While tension between the opponents was 
escalating, the weapon of collaborationism was being used more and more thoughtlessly 
to the point that the terms traitor and collaborationist became “synonyms of all political 
opponents” (Fleisher, 1984: 91).
The second important difficulty in the study of the issue of collaboration is the
fact that it is a subjective and controversial term, which depends highly on individual
perception. The real meaning of collaboration with the enemy is highly influenced by
one’s sensitivity over the issue. For example, during the occupation, some Greek women
had love affairs with German or Italian soldiers. Dimitris Glinos -the most important
EAM intellectual- wrote in his propagandist booklet “What is EAM and what does it
want” about such women:
“Do not allow your women, sisters, mothers and daughters to associate with the 
foreigners. Condemn and disavow sexual encounters with foreigners. Stigmatise 
the women who give themselves to foreigners. Such women are collaborators and 
traitors. Use derogatory and insulting adjectives for them and let them know that 
after the war we are going to carve on both their cheeks a capital “II” which is 
going to mean ‘TI6pvr|” (prostitute) and ‘’IlpoSoxiooa” (traitor)”  (Glinos, 1944: 
60).
On the other hand, EAM’s critic Spyros Stinas had a totally different attitude towards the 
same issue:
‘’They [EAM-ELAS] killed poor women just because they washed the clothes of 
Italian and German soldiers. What a lethal crime, what a disgusting traitorous 
action! The fine brave lad who killed a mother who was washing clothes in order to 
get a peace of bread for her child was probably inflamed with patriotic 
passion...They killed women because they gave themselves to Italian or German 
soldiers for a piece of bread or a can of preserved food just to save themselves from 
hunger or just to save their children” (Stinas, 1997: 97).
As a moral issue, the meaning of collaboration with the enemy is controversial 
and open to different interpretations. The purpose of this chapter is not to engage in a
212
theoretical debate concerning the phenomenon of collaboration with the enemy, but 
rather to investigate any possible symptoms of collaboration between the 5/42 and the 
enemy. Nevertheless, it is important to define first what collaboration is. Collaboration is 
the consent and co-ordination of efforts between two parts for the accomplishment of a 
common or mutually desired objective. Therefore, any kind of joint effort between the 
5/42 and the enemy turned against EAM-ELAS or any other Greek or any other foreign 
ally is going to be defined in this thesis as collaborationist activity. ELAS’ accusations 
about collaboration between the 5/42 and the enemy, as well as the regiment’s 
consistency to the ideals and objectives of the national resistance struggle are going to be 
evaluated exclusively according to the above definition.
S.l.ii. ELAS’ Indictment.
On 2 May 1944 (fifteen days after the battle in Klima) ELAS’ General 
Headquarters issued a single-paged report concerning the final disbandment of the 5/42 
and the murder of Psarros.126 Two weeks later, on 14 May (twenty-seven days after the 
battle in Klima) ELAS’ General Headquarters issued a new supplementary report which 
according to KKE official Gregoris Farakos was “as exhaustive in arguments as possible 
and was processed by the Headquarters’ staff’ (Farakos, 1997: 288). This “improved” 
and “complete” ten-paged document (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1) was ELAS’ official reasoning 
about the causes of the final disbandment. The document’s major argument was that the 
5/42 regiment was disbanded because it had become a dangerous collaborationist 
organisation:
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Collaboration between the regiment’s reactionaries -who controlled the 
regiment- and the enemy was confirmed and proven beyond any doubt. Eventually 
the 5/42 reactionaries agreed with the Germans in Patras and Itea and with the 
security battalions to launch a joint assault against EAM-ELAS. Although ELAS 
tried to contain the 5/42 from its moral collapse, the joint attack of EKKA and the 
security battalions against ELAS was launched during 15 and 16 April (during the 
battle in Klima). After that assault, ELAS’ units were forced to defend themselves 
and counter-attacked on the night of 16-17 April and after a long battle they 
disbanded the 5/42 regiment. [...] Collaboration with the enemy and the enemy’s 
collaborators had become obvious. These are the most important actions which 
clearly prove that Colonel Psarros and the Dedousis-Kapentzonis faction had taken 
the decision to strike ELAS and which prove their collaboration with the Germans 
and the security battalions” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
First accusation
“On 10 April Major Kapentzonis sent Captain Dedousis to Galaxidi, by boat. 
Dedousis contacted the Germans of the Itea garrison and asked them to attack 
ELAS forces in the Ghiona area in order to create a diversion. The attack was 
launched eventually against the Kaloskopi village on 16 April where the Germans 
burned the village” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
The first step in order to test the validity of this accusation is to investigate the
whereabouts and activities of Captain Dedousis on 10 April. Koutras writes:
“By 10 April the regiment’s companies had occupied the following positions: The 
regiment’s headquarters with its staff along with Kapentzonis’ battalion and the 
companies of Dedousis and Douros in Klima...” (Koutras, 1981: 91).
The same order of the 5/42 companies is also confirmed by Kaimaras (Kaimaras, 1979:
144), while Dedousis writes:
“Within the first 10 days of April, all of the regiment’s units gathered in Klima in 
order to take specific decisions” (Dedousis, 1949: 68).
Dedousis’ brother writes that Captain Dedousis visited Galaxidi not on 10 April as ELAS
alleged, but four days later in order to gather his men who were on leave:
“On Good Friday 14 April, Thymios took 50 men and we all went to the beach. 
Then we embarked in a boat and in the early hours of Good Saturday we arrived in 
Galaxidi” (Dedousis, 1949: 70).
126 See Documenta Ethnikis Antistasis, vol.l, 1981: 332
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Kaimaras, Koutras and Ioannis Dedousis’ testimonies concerning Captain Dedousis’ 
activities during the disputable date are written in a narrative manner with the intention to 
describe some other irrelevant events. They are not written as defensive arguments 
against ELAS’ accusations. They do not give specific information about Dedousis’ 
activities during 10 April and they cannot be considered as proofs that a meeting between 
Dedousis and the Germans did not occur. However, although there is no solid proof to 
contradict that alleged meeting, there are much more solid evidence that knock down 
ELAS’ argument concerning the supposed diversion in Kaloskopi.
In the ELAS report, the date of the German attack against Kaloskopi was 
intentionally falsified. The Kaloskopi village was not attacked on the 16th of April but on 
the 17th. Even other official ELAS documents contradict ELAS’ official report. In 
another chronology of events issued by ELAS’ General Headquarters, the date mentioned 
about the assault was the 17th and the 18th of April which is the correct date (Documenta 
Ethnikis Antistasis, 1981, vol.l: 309). ELAS’ officials obviously attempted to falsify the 
dates in order to give the impression that the battle in Klima and the attack on Kaloskopi 
were silmutaneous. The truth is however that those two events not only were not 
silmutaneous, but that they also had nothing to do with each other.
ELAS’ final assault in Klima was launched at 03:00 of 17 April and was finished 
almost two hours later between 05:00 and 06:00 in the morning (Pyromaglou, 1965: 308, 
Kaimaras, 1979: 161-168, Koutras, 1981: 99-103). On the other hand, Kaloskopi was
f h  tViattacked and burned by the Germans during the 17 and the 18 of April and not on the 
16th as the ELAS report claimed. According to a newsletter issued by the Kaloskopi 
inhabitants association, on 16 April Kaloskopi was not attacked, instead:
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“Free Kaloskopi was celebrating, Jesus Christ’s resurrection as well as its own 
freedom. Throughout the village people lit fires in order to grill the Easter 
lamp...in the afternoon, everybody was dancing at the village’s square” 
(Koukouvista, vol.6, March-April 1976).
The Germans launched their attack against Kaloskopi at 07:00 in the morning of the next
10 7
day (17 April) -one or two hours after the battle of Klima was over. Consequently the
German attack against Kaloskopi did not benefit the 5/42 at all not only because it was
launched after the 5/42 no longer existed, but also because Kaloskopi was almost two
days (on foot) away from Klima. If the Germans had the intention to assist and relieve the
5/42 with a diversion, they would have launched their attack in an area near Klima so that
ELAS would withdraw forces from the battle.
Furthermore, the only ELAS force that was in Kaloskopi during that time was the
village’s few reserves. If the Germans wanted to make a diversion they would attack
large ELAS forces. The German attack against Kaloskopi did not intend to assist the
5/42. It was not even a mopping up anti-guerrilla operation. Their objective was to loot
the village and that is proven by the fact that:
“The Germans and the companies of their Rumanian, Slovak and Moroccan 
collaborators had brought with them a number of donkeys without any burden upon 
which they loaded their loot” (Koukouvista, vol.4, October-November 1975).
The fact that the assault against Kaloskopi had the objective of looting and not assisting
the 5/42 is also proven by the fact that the Germans stayed in the village looting and
burning for almost a whole day and they did not assault any other nearby ELAS band.
127 “Koukouvista” v.10 March-April 1977 “In the next day around 7:00 the first gunshots were heard from 
the Zaganas area”
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Second accusation
“On 10 April, a German motor-boat from Patras reached the shores of Monastiraki 
[a village near Klima] and delivered 150 weapons and other provisions for the 5/42. 
The Germans met with Major Kapentzonis, who officially represented 5/42-EKKA. 
According to positive information Major Kapentzonis asked the Germans to 
reinforce the 5/42 with security battalions which would attack ELAS from the 
Naupaktos area” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
That alleged incident was not mentioned in ELAS’ first report about the 5/42’s 
disbandment of 2 May. It is only mentioned in the second “revised” and “updated” report 
of 14 May. However, although there is no information about Major Kapentzonis’ activity 
during that day, it is a fact that the Germans had contacted Psarros on 4 April and made 
him an offer for collaboration. However, immediately after that contact, Psarros informed 
the Regiment’s British Liaison Officer Gordon Creed about that meeting with the 
following letter:
“Two days ago a German motor-boat carrying the German commander of Patras 
reached our beach. Out of the boat came a Greek liaison who expressed his will to 
meet with me in order to inform me that the Germans are willing to reinforce the 
regiment with troops in its struggle against ELAS. I repulsively rejected that 
proposal and I ordered the Greek liaison to get out of my sight immediately. I told 
him that even if I was attacked again by ELAS, not only would I never ask the 
Germans’ assistance, but I would attack them savagely if they appeared in the area.
I would rather be killed a thousand times by Greek bullets than to accept such an 
disgraceful collaboration with the Germans” (PRO H5 5/279).
Creed answered:
“Dear Colonel, I just received your letter and I would like to congratulate you about 
the uncompromising attitude that you maintained towards the German proposal” 
(PRO H5 5/279).
That was not the only case that the Germans attempted to approach Psarros. 
During November 1943, a German officer asked Psarros’ permission to negotiate with 
him. Psarros answered that the only issue that he was willing to negotiate with the 
Germans was their unconditional surrender to the 5/42. After that he notified not only the
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British Military Mission, but also EAM (Pyromaglou, 1965: 213). Although it is true that 
the Germans approached Psarros on 4 April, ELAS’ report claims that the meeting was 
held on 10 April. Whether the Germans contacted Psarros again on 10 April or whether 
ELAS was just misinformed about the exact date of the event can not be verified.
Documents indicate that there was no plan for a joint 5/42-German attack against 
ELAS from Naupaktos and eventually such an attack never happened. Furthermore, there 
are also two serious facts which indicate that such an attack was impossible to have 
happened anyway. Firstly, during that time there were no security battalions in 
Naupaktos. The Naupaktos security battalions were formed two months after the 
disbandment of the 5/42 (27 June 1944).128 Secondly, the only German force that was 
stationed in Naupaktos during that time was just a small garrison of 10 Germans along 
with 10 gendarmeries (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 180-187).
Third accusation
“Captain Psilogiannis, the 5/42’s commissary associated openly with the Germans 
of Amfissa” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
It was true that Psilogiannis was collaborating openly with the Germans since 
February 1944 (Koutras, interview, 9 January 2000, Kaimaras, interview, 18 December 
1999, Raptis, interview 23 August 2000). Although ELAS’ accusation is completely true, 
by no means can Psilogiannis’ collaboration with the enemy constitute an accusation 
against the 5/42 since:
128 See Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 214. Staurogianopoulos was an officer of the local security battalions and 
given the fact that in his book he praises the security battalions as the saviours of Greece, he would not 
have a problem to admit that the security battalions collaborated with the 5/42
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“During February 1944, Colonel Psarros issued a specific order about him 
discharging him from the Regiment due to undisciplined conduct” (Kaimaras, 
1979: 74).
More specifically, one day Psilogiannis was talking with Psarros in an office and after a 
while Psarros kicked and punched him out of the room probably because Psilogiannis 
proposed Psarros either to collaborate with the security battalions or to misappropriate the 
Regiment’s money (Kaimaras, interview, 18 December 1999, Koutras, interview, 9 
January 2000). After his discharge from the Regiment, Psilogiannis continued 
collaborating with the Germans and after the Regiment’s final disbandment he formed a 
security battalion in Amfissa (Fokikos Laos, 11 May 1949). The fact that he was 
dismissed from the regiment proves that there was no collective responsibility and thus 
his actions must be considered as individually motivated. Moreover, the fact that his 
dismissal was announced publicly by the 5/42 (Kaimaras, interview 18 December 1999) 
leaves no doubt that ELAS was aware that Psilogiannis did not any longer belong to the 
5/42’s personnel when they made the accusation.
Nevertheless, although Psilogiannis was discharged from the regiment, there is 
hard evidence which proves that he maintained unofficial contacts with his ex comrades 
of the 5/42. It is difficult however to classify those contacts as cases of collaborationist 
activity. During an interview with Koutras, I asked him to give his opinion about 
Psillogiannis and his collaboration with the enemy. By just hearing the name 
Psillogiannis Koutras became visibly emotional, he brimmed with tears and said 
“Psillogiannis was the most wonderful man within the 5/42.1 owe him my life”. Koutras 
explained that immediately after the battle in Klima, ELAS launched a large-scale 
manhunt for the arrest of all ex-5/42 officers. During that time Captain Koutras was
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hiding in Amfissa. ELAS soon was informed that Koutras was hiding in Amfissa and 
started searching houses that could be possible hideouts for him. Psillogiannis was aware 
that ELAS was looking for Koutras and as soon as he found out Koutras’ hideout, he 
hurried to the house and took him out of Amfissa in a German truck (Koutras, interview 9 
January 2000). In another interview with Nikos Raptis, I asked him to give his opinion 
about Psillogiannis’ collaboration with the Germans. Raptis answered that “It is true that 
Psilogiannis was a collaborator, but he always meant good” and he explained that he also 
owed his life to Psilogiannis. Raptis was a young 5/42 supporter who had no active 
participation in the regiment. During a raid in Itea, the Germans arrested him and 
imprisoned him in the Itea German camp. The next day after his arrest, Psillogiannis 
accidentally saw Raptis in Prison and let him go without even asking the German’s 
permission (Raptis, interview 23 August 2000).
Captain Koutras was one of the first people who undertook resistance activity in 
Fokida. He had participated in a number of battles against the occupation forces, many 
times side by side with ELAS’ antartes.129 He is considered as one of the most 
distinguished and brave men within the regiment who always remained loyal to the 
national resistance cause, even according to EAM-ELAS veterans and sympathisers 
(Gregoriadis, vol.l: 51, Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2, 272, Roupas, interview 24 April 2000, 
Koutroukis, interview 22 April 2000, Giangis, interview, 17 August 2000). On the other 
hand Raptis was just a 5/42 supporter, he was someone who did not have any 
participation in the resistance and in the 5/42-ELAS conflict. In order to give an answer 
whether these two cases were incidents of collaboration and whether Koutras and Raptis 
were also collaborators -since both of them benefited from a collaborator- another
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question needs to be answered first. What would be the benefit for the nation’s resistance 
struggle if eventually Koutras was killed by ELAS and if Raptis was executed by the 
Germans?
The fact that both Koutras and Raptis were saved by a collaborator does not by 
itself constitute a case of collaboration with the enemy. It was not an action that was 
turned against EAM-ELAS or any other Greek and it did not harm the interest of the 
national resistance struggle. It was an action motivated by interpersonal relations and the 
esprit de corps. It would be wrong to judge the actions of all participants in the national 
resistance and the civil conflict during the occupation according to a strict and inflexible 
perspective which places duty above all and which considers people as being motivated 
exclusively by their sense of duty. The people who joined ELAS, the 5/42 regiment and 
the security battalions and fought against each other, did not meet for the first time during 
the occupation, they were not alien to each other. They were friends, fellow-villagers, 
schoolmates, colleagues, in many cases even brothers. Some of these friendships and 
family bonds survived the civil discord and proved stronger than the sense of 
membership and duty.
Fourth accusation
“Major Kapentzonis and Captain Dedousis along with some other officers and 100 
men fled to the Peloponnese and they continued their treason by joining the Patras 
security battalions” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
As far as Captain Dedousis is concerned, ELAS’ accusation was completely 
untrue. Dedousis never joined the security battalions, instead after the battle in Klima he 
fled first to Amfissa and then to Athens where he tried to escape to the Middle East.
129 See ch 2.2.i, p 74.
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However, the Germans arrested him and Dedousis spent the rest of the occupation in 
Prison (Dedousis, 1949: 86-87, Kaimaras, 1979: 55, G. Koutsoklenis, interview 17 May 
2000).130 On the contrary, ELAS’ accusation about Major Kapentzonis is absolutely 
valid.
“Major Kapentzonis with a unit of 90 men, 10 of which were officers, went to 
Patras with their weapons and ammunition. Most of them joined the 2nd regiment of 
evzones [security battalion] (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 183)”.131
Those men under Kapentzonis maintained the tittle “5/42 regiment of evzones” and after
three months they returned to Naupaktos where they continued fighting ELAS.
Kapentzonis and his men joined the security battalions when the 5/42 did not 
exist. From the moment that the 5/42 was permanently disbanded, there was no such 
thing as collective responsibility and each man was personally responsible for his actions. 
Kapentzonis’ defection to the security battalions was definitely collaborationist, however 
his actions cannot blacken the 5/42’s reputation and by no means can justify a case of 
collaboration against the regiment. Moreover, it is rather irrational to present an event 
that happened after the 5/42 disbandment as a reason or argument for the justification of 
the disbandment.132 However, the case of Kapentzonis’ defection to the security 
battalions has a number of interesting moral aspects.
130 This is also reconfirmed by ELAS’ antartis and wireless operator attached to Velouchiotis’ guard Babis 
Roupas (Roupas, interview, 24 April 2000).
131 The rest of the 5/42 officers who joined Kapentzonis in the Security Battalions were: Lieutenant of 
Calvary Vitsas Dimitrios, sub-lieutenants Genovezos Nikolaos, Kokoris Sotirios, Karamazakis Ioannis, 
Koutsomanis Konstantinos, Zafiris Michael, Tzivas Konstantinos (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 215)
132 In addition to the above accusations, ELAS’ report includes three more alleged cases of collaboration 
between the 5/42 regiment and the Germans or the security battalions, “a) Many times, motorboats from 
Peloponnese delivered ammunition in the Monastiraki-Marathias beach for the 5/42 regiment of EKKA. B) 
There was positive information that they [5/42] expected reinforcements of officers and security battalions 
to arrive by motorboat from Athens via the Gerania area to strike us in the rear. C) Beyond any doubt 
information verified that they had a number of boats standing by in the Monastiraki-Trizonia area. Their 
purpose was to keep contact with the Germans and the security battalions in the Peloponnese and to carry 
reinforcements from there”. (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1) These accusations are very general and rather 
hypothetical and it was impossible to reconfirm them or reject them based on solid evidence. Any attempt
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ELAS with all the aggression that it showed against the regiment managed to 
provide a very convenient alibi to Kapentzonis and those who followed him. Kapentzonis 
and his men were beyond any doubt anti-communists. Their deep anti-communist 
sentiment however, was not probably the only motive that led those men to the security 
battalions. The circumstances and dilemmas that these men had to face after the battle in 
Klima need also to be taken under consideration in explaining their journey from national 
resistance to collaboration with the enemy. ELAS had set a price on Kapentzonis’ head as 
well as on the heads of almost every other ex 5/42 officer and antartes. These people had 
very slim chances to survive if they returned to their homes. Since Fokida was under the 
complete control of ELAS, joining the security battalions in the Peloponnese was for 
many who had been stigmatised by ELAS probably their only alternative to survive. The 
two things that these men tried to obtain by joining the security battalions were safety and 
revenge. They would increase their chances of survival and they would have the 
opportunity to revenge ELAS.
It was no coincidence, that Kapentzonis’ unit became the most combatant and
brutal security battalion in the area. According to General Staurogianopoulos who was a
security battalion officer in Naupaktos:
“That unit was distinguished for its combatant spirit and it carried out attacks 
against ELAS on a daily basis” (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 275).
to cross-reference them with other sources or testimonies proved unsuccessful. Interviewees from both 
sides either reconfirmed them in a rather mechanical or reflexive manner, without adding any clue (See 
Bekios, interview 8 May 2000, Koutras, interview 11 May 2000, Koutroukis, interview 22 April 2000, 
Deniozos, interview 21 August 2000), or rejected them in the same manner without also giving any proof 
(Interviews with Kaimaras, interview 11 May 2000, Protopapas, interview 14 January 2000). Any 
conclusion about these accusations should therefore be based by comparison with events. As far as the 
second accusation, such an attack never happened, and reinforcements of security battalions never came to 
assist the 5/42 regiment from Athens or anywhere else. As far as the third accusation, it is true that there 
were some boats standing by in the Monastiraki-Trizonia beach, but these boats were never used to carry 
reinforcements from the Peloponnese, instead were used to carry some of the regiment’s men to the 
Peloponnese after the collapse of the 5/42 defence.
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Nevertheless, even Staurogianopoulos who praises the security battalions in his books
considers the activities of Kapentzonis’ unit as one of the blackest stains in the history of
the security battalions.
“That unit was the most vengeful. Its men had suffered so much from EAM-ELAS 
and they thought that due to that, they could do whatever they liked [against 
ELAS]. Without any permission from the security battalion’s headquarters to which 
they belonged, they were arresting members of EAM and imprisoned them in a 
warehouse that did not fill even the minimum standards to accommodate people. 
Many times, their actions were completely out of line and they executed people 
without any permission from the battalion’s headquarters. Many of the battalion’s 
officers complained to Major Kapentzonis about his men’s behaviour and although 
Kapentzonis told us that he disapproved such activities, he did not take any 
measures to prevent them and such atrocities were repeated. Due to the tactics that 
Kapentzonis adopted, the relationships between him and the rest of the battalion’s 
officers were not good” (Staurogianopoulos, 1974: 274-275).
From one point of view, the defection of Kapentzonis and his men to the security 
battalions was understandable and many excuses and alibis could be given. On the other 
hand, however, whatever the motive, “just the sight of armed Greeks on the side of 
Germans is disgusting” (Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 295). To a large degree, Kapentzonis’ 
case is a moral issue and defining whether his defection was justified or not depends 
largely on individual perception and individual sensitivity over the issue of collaboration 
with the enemy. It would be very difficult to come up with a clear “verdict”, to condemn 
or acquit Kapentzonis and his men as traitors. Even Hagen Fleisher who is considered by 
many as an important researcher of the occupation falls in a contradiction in terms when 
in the same sentence he characterises the defection of Kapentzonis’ men to the security 
battalions as “understandable but inexcusable”.133
133 See Fleisher, “Contacts between German occupation forces and Greek resistance organisations” in 
Greece during 1940-1950 “A nation in crisis”, 1984: 92.
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Similar confusion and contradiction is also obvious among the 5/42 veterans and
the attitude that they maintained towards the “prodigal son” of their regiment. Most of the
5/42 veterans kept a short-sighted, thoughtless attitude towards the Kapentzonis case due
to a distorted sense of camaraderie and a false conception of the true meaning of the
esprit de corps. Many of the 5/42 veterans try to hide the fact that Kapentzonis joined the
security battalions. An ex-5/42 antartis who wishes to maintain anonymity said:
“It is true that Kapentzonis joined the security battalions, but you do not have to 
mention that in your research”.
Others try to find excuses to justify the actions of their ex comrade. General Athanasios
Mamarelis insists that:
“When your band has been disbanded three times by ELAS, when comrades of 
yours have been killed and when you face death, it is very difficult to maintain a 
moral attitude. You will join the security battalions a thousand times” (A. 
Mamarelis, interview, 3 January 2002).
Like General Mamarelis, General Kaimaras also tried to defend Kapentzonis’ action with
a letter that he sent to “Kathimerinr newspaper on 14 November 1999.
“What should these poor patriots do? Stay in Klima and say to Velouchiotis’ men 
yes, please kill me I want to become a martyr” 134 (5/42 regiment of evzones: 
Veterans association newsletter, vol.4: October-December 1999).
The attempt of the anonymous antartis, of General Mamarelis and of General 
Kaimaras to defend their ex-comrade is understandable. Participation in a resistance 
group creates bonds of solidarity between the members, and these bonds become even 
stronger when there is a common enemy and common negative experiences. The post­
war “abolition of sins” that was so generously given to all collaborators reinforced that 
sense of solidarity. However the anonymous 5/42 antartis, Mamarelis and Kaimaras seem 
to forget that they followed totally opposite journeys than Kapentzonis. After the battle in
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Klima Kapentzonis as well as the above 5/42 antartes and officers had to face exactly the 
same circumstances and had to deal with exactly the same problems, their lives were 
equally in jeopardy as Kapentzonis’ was. Nevertheless, instead of joining the security 
battalions, the anonymous antartis fled to Athens where he was hiding from ELAS until 
Greece was liberated, Athanasios Mamarelis returned to his home and was close to being 
executed by ELAS ((A. Mamarelis, interview 3 January 2002), while Georgios Kaimaras 
tried to escape to the Middle East in order to continue the fight against the invader, he 
was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned for the rest of the occupation (Kaimaras, 
1994: 54-55).
All of those three men who defend Kapentzonis with such zeal, were also 
desperate, they were also anti-Communists and thirsty for revenge, they as well had lost 
comrades and all of them had the chance to join the security battalions and retaliate 
against ELAS side by side with the Germans. However none of them did. They chose to 
remain loyal to the ideals of the national resistance no matter what the cost was. They had 
the moral strength to continue thinking as resistance fighters even at the time when their 
lives were in jeopardy. General Kaimaras explains the reasons why he refused to join the 
security battalions:
“After Psilogiannis’ proposal, the Amfissa security battalion issued an order to 
present myself to it. However, I did not want to blacken the national struggles that I 
personally gave with the 5/42 regiment and I did not come in touch with the people 
who served in the security battalions or the collaborationist government” 
(Kaimaras, 1994: 55).
Kaimaras’ attitude towards Kapentzonis is contradictory. On the one hand he like most of 
the 5/42 veterans argue that joining the security battalions was something derogatory, 
while on the other they defend Kapentzonis who joined them.
134 Greek slang expression
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In his book, Takis Papagianopoulos goes one step further than just defending his
ex comrade. Papagianopoulos was a 5/42 officer who was arrested successively by both
the Germans and ELAS and who suffered terrible tortures by both of them. In his book he
includes a number of pictures of many 5/42 officers and antartes. Below every picture,
there is a brief praising comment for every man. Below Kapentzonis’ picture,
Papagianopoulos writes:
“Major Georgios Kapentzonis: The legendary fighter who apotheosised the 
meaning of patriotic duty” (Papagianopoulos, 1981: 34).
The pompous adjectives and characterisations that so generously Papagianopoulos gave
to Kapentzonis, are more than unfair. Above everything else, they are unfair to himself
and the rest of the 5/42 resistance fighters who never betrayed the ideals of national
resistance. They are also unfair against those 5/42 men who were killed in the battlefield
or in the prisons of the Italians and the Germans, whom Kapentzonis served so loyally.
5.1.iii. The Verdict.
A number of documents and individual testimonies knock down ELAS’ argument 
about a case of collaboration between the 5/42 regiment and the enemy. Collaboration -at 
least in the sense that this thesis perceives it135 was not proven in any of the specific 
accusations that ELAS launched against the regiment.
In 1983, forty years after the disbandment of the 5/42, ELAS officer Nikiforos 
who was one of the officers who led the attack against the 5/42 in Klima rejected those 
accusations as fabricated:
135 See ch 5.1 .i, p 211.
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“[...] The report that ELAS Headquarters issued concerning the 5/42’s third 
disbandment is a document that has nothing to do with reality. [...] The alleged 
cases of collaboration between 5/42 officers and the Germans were just German 
attempts to exploit the regiment’s tough situation. These offers were rejected. The 
accusation that the German attack against ELAS in Kaloskopi was the result of 
collaboration between the 5/42 and the enemy is an unacceptable claim. The 
Kaloskopi village is two days away from Klima and the Germans attacked the 
village for their own objectives and certainly not to assist the 5/42. Finally, the 
claim that ELAS attacked the 5/42 because it was collaborating with the Germans 
is completely untrue and ridiculous. In other words, that official document that our 
side issued in order to justify the attack against the 5/42 is a farce. Even the 
accusation that some 5/42 survivors “joined ” the security battalions in Patras is a 
pathetic attempt to incriminate those people whom we had not left a chance to 
survive in their homeland” (Eleutheros Typos 4 December 1983)
Nevertheless, ELAS’ final attack against the 5/42 was justified upon these 
specific accusations. The question that arises is whether ELAS gave sincere faith in the 
validity of those accusations, or whether ELAS’ officials fabricated the accusations and 
intentionally distorted the actual events in order to construct the necessary moral ground 
upon which they could justify the disbandment.
The alleged diversion in Kaloskopi did not contribute anything to the 5/42 and the 
suspected diversion from Naupaktos did never happen and could have never happened. 
These were facts that ELAS could not possibly not have known. ELAS could not 
possibly not have known that Psilogiannis was discharged from the regiment and could 
not possibly have believed that Kapentzonis’ defection to the security battalions after the 
regiment’s disbandment was a collaborationist activity which proved that the 5/42 was a 
collaborationist organisation. All these along with the fact that ELAS’ officials were 
“processing” these accusations for twenty-seven days leads to the conclusion that these 
accusations were fabricated and that the presentation of events had been intentionally 
distorted. The purpose was to justify a tragedy.
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In contrast with the two previous disbandments of the 5/42 in Stromi and in 
Taratsa, events in the third disbandment ran out of control. A bloody battle took place, 
the regiment’s leader Colonel Psarros was murdered, whilst extensive atrocities were 
carried out against the regiment’s officers and antartes while they were prisoners. The 
tragedy in Klima was a major political mistake. It backfired on EAM-ELAS and it had a 
major negative political effect. EAM-ELAS had to give a rational explanation to an 
irrational political mistake. Therefore, for once more in the history of the national 
resistance struggle, the accusation of collaboration with the enemy was launched.
The accusations that ELAS launched against the 5/42 regiment cannot blacken the
regiment’s legacy. According to the chief of the German intelligence bureau during the
occupation Ronald Hampe:
“Throughout its existence, the 5/42 never collaborated and such allegations are 
unfounded and malicious”.136
Neither did the 5/42 collaborate with the security battalions. There might have been
proximity and a silent peace between the 5/42 and the security battalions, but it never
developed into a collaboration of any kind and they never joined their efforts against
EAM-ELAS. The security battalions were formed with the exclusive purpose to fight
EAM-ELAS. They never attacked the 5/42 and the 5/42 never attacked them. On the
other hand, EAM-ELAS fought the security battalions bravely and thousands of EAM-
ELAS fighters and followers were tortured and murdered by the security battalions.
Nevertheless, this contrast by itself cannot lead to an inductive conclusion that the
136 See Fleisher, “Contacts between German occupation forces and Greek resistance organisations” in 
Greece during 1940-1950 “A nation in crisis”, 1984: 92. (From a personal letter sent to Hagen Fleisher by 
Hampe himself)
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security battalions and the 5/42 were collaborating. Just the fact that the 5/42 and the 
security battalions had a common enemy does not necessarily mean that they were allies.
The 5/42 regiment might have not contributed much to the national resistance 
struggle and it might have not caused tremendous casualties to the enemy. However, 
there is hard evidence to indicate that the regiment did not betray the purpose that it 
served. It did not allow and it did not invite the Germans and their collaborators to 
engage in its own conflict with EAM-ELAS. Even at times when the regiment was under 
serious pressure from ELAS, the 5/42 did not give into treason. It managed to distinguish 
the domestic from the foreign enemy and it managed to distinguish civil war from 
national resistance.
5.2. The Real Causes: Removing the Thorns
EAM was a national resistance front, which numbered almost one million 
supporters nation-wide.137 It was a powerful and radical political movement with a 
tremendous popular appeal. Its military wing ELAS included almost 50.000 regular and 
reserve antartes (DIS/GES KKE archives),138 a mighty and effective guerrilla force with 
large units all over Greece. ELAS had fought many battles against the occupation forces 
and had carried out the lion’s share of the national resistance struggle. EKKA on the
137 It is rather impossible to calculate the number of EAM’s followers accurately. The figures concerning 
EAM’s supporters within the literature vary. According to Hatzis, EAM had 1,520,000 members and 
followers throughout Greece (Hatzis, 1983, vol.2, 328). Bartziotas raises the number to 2,500,000 (in 
Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 331). In general terms, these figures can be considered as rather excessive. 
According to more moderate and probably accurate estimations, EAM during the last year of the 
occupation must have had approximately one million supporters (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.l: 331)
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other hand remained throughout its existence a small society of political friends without 
any popular support, while the 5/42 regiment remained a small local guerrilla force of 
almost one thousand men, with very limited contribution to the resistance effort. In 
political and military terms, the difference between EAM-ELAS and EKKA-5/42 was 
enormous. EAM-ELAS however had a major political interest over EKKA and the 5/42 
regiment.
From day one of EKKA’s formation, the organisation was politically placed in
EAM’s right and in EDES’ left. As far as the 5/42 regiment was concerned, Colonel
Psarros declared that his regiment was a pure military force dedicated exclusively to the
resistance struggle and had nothing to do with politics. According to Pyromaglou:
“The leaders of EKKA perceived the resistance struggle in an idealistic manner. 
They were touched by the idea that the liberation struggle should aim exclusively at 
causing damage to the occupation forces and driving them out of the country. They 
believed that political and ideological beliefs should not come to the surface until 
liberation and only when the last German would have left Greece, then and only 
then should they be brought back to life and become agents of the country’s 
political life. It aimed to build a road side by side with the rest of the national 
resistance organisations that would lead to national harmony among all Greek 
resistance fighters” (Pyromaglou, 1988: 333).
Pyromaglou’s comments about the leaders of EKKA-5/42 were rather 
embellishing, but still they include elements of truth. It is a fact that EKKA and the 5/42 
regiment were moderate agents within the resistance movement. They adopted temperate 
political tactics and they maintained a moderate political profile while the tension and 
discord within the resistance organisations was rising. Although EKKA and the 5/42 
were small organisations with very few followers, they “silently” represented a 
significant number of Greeks. They represented the people who were between EAM and 
EDES. The people who disapproved EAM’s radicalism and ELAS’ arrogance, but who
138 This number refers to the last few months before liberation
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also disapproved Zervas’ political opportunism and his attachment to the British and the 
King. This “silent” group was not attached to EKKA or the regiment, but their attitudes 
were similar with the moderate attitude that EKKA and the 5/42 maintained towards the 
increasing polarisation within the resistance movement.
The importance of EKKA-5/42 within the political arena was the fact that it was a 
political group that represented the centre. As usual, the attitudes of the centre is what 
determines the outcome of a political struggle and EAM-ELAS was definitely aware of 
that rule. Although EAM-ELAS included moderates and even conservatives, their 
numbers were rather small. The vast majority of moderate and conservative political 
groups maintained their suspicion towards EAM-ELAS and their belief that KKE 
dominated both EAM and ELAS.139 One of EAM’s most important political objectives 
was to find ways to penetrate the centre and attract as many moderate and conservative 
political groups to it. EKKA-5/42 could become a Trojan horse for such a task.
EAM-ELAS would have achieved a very important political success if EKKA- 
5/42 -the third pole of the Greek resistance movement- eventually joined in. EAM-ELAS 
would have dispelled the impression that they were both controlled by KKE. 
Furthermore, the participation of a respectable and well known officer such as Psarros 
would also increase ELAS’ military credibility. A possible merging of EKKA with EAM 
would give the impression that EAM was a genuine, integrated and wide democratic front 
and that would probably make even more conservatives and moderates to abandon their 
suspicions towards EAM. Moreover such an achievement would bring a serious blow for 
EDES and would contribute to Zervas’ isolation from the centre.
139 See ch 3.3.i, p 156.
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On the other hand, EAM-ELAS would have to face serious negative 
consequences if it failed to assimilate EKKA-5/42. If EDES managed to form a political 
or military alliance with EKKA and the 5/42, EDES would then come out of its isolation. 
EDES would have a bridgehead to the centre and such an alliance would have dispelled 
the impression that Zervas had turn royalist and was entirely depended upon the British. 
Although that was a scenario that EAM-ELAS’ officials feared (Haritopoulos, 2001, 
vol.2: 134), it was not the worst case scenario. What would have been the most dangerous 
development for EAM-ELAS would have been the possibility for EKKA-5/42 to have 
maintained its independence. In that case, EAM-ELAS would have an extra competitor to 
confront in addition to EDES. It was well known that Psarros and Kartalis were 
democrats and that EKKA was a group with socialist tendencies. If EKKA-5/42 
remained, that would give the impression that opposite EAM-ELAS there was not just 
“the traitors and the British henchmen”, but a whole democratic block of organisations. 
Consequently EAM-ELAS’ could leave only two alternatives for the future of EKKA and 
the 5/42. They should either be assimilated by EAM-ELAS or they should be disbanded. 
There could be no alternative that would secure EAM-ELAS’ interests.
EAM-ELAS followed a tactic of inconsistent hostility against EKKA and the 
5/42, a contradictory and controversial tactic that resembled the primitive method of 
curing psychopaths with continuous cold and hot showers. On the one hand EAM-ELAS 
followed a line of unity and approach, while on the other they adopted a hard line of 
aggression. The problem however was not the fact that EAM-ELAS followed two 
different strategies against EKKA-5/42, but that it followed them simultaneously. That
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controversy was so inexplicable that it caused doubts and concern even within EAM-
ELAS’ officials such as KKE’s subsequent General Secretary Harilaos Florakis:
’’How is it possible to explain Comrades the fact that we disbanded Psarros three 
times and that still for another three times we sent people in every city and village 
of Pamassida and Dorida saying: forgive us, it was our mistake, Psarros is a patriot, 
we are going to help him form again his traitorous army” (5/42 regiment of 
evzones: Veterans association newsletter, vol.3: July-September 1999).
The explanation for that mysterious and controversial policy was the fact that the
hard liners who followed an aggressive strategy towards EKKA-5/42 operated in secret
and independently from the moderates who followed a temperate policy and who were in
favour of friendly relationships. According to Pyromaglou:
“Siantos maintained an aggressive and uncompromising line [...] that line was 
applied directly, without passing the institutional channels of EAM and ELAS’ 
decisionmaking” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 185).
In other words, while EAM’s official line was unity and co-operation with EKKA-5/42,
Siantos averted the official EAM-ELAS channels of decision making and enforced his
aggressive policy which was applied with the three successive disbandments of the 5/42.
That scenario probably explains satisfactory the “misunderstanding” of the first two
disbandments in Stromi and in Taratsa. It probably explains why Orestis who was a loyal
follower of Siantos and who was responsible for the first disbandment never suffered any
disciplinary action.140 It also explains why Zoulas who was responsible for the second
disbandment and who murdered Psarros also never suffered any disciplinary
consequences.141 It explains the ignorance and surprise of moderate EAM-ELAS leaders
(Leuterias, Vlachopoulos, Maniatis, Sarafis etc) about the two first disbandments.142 It
explains the fact that although these moderate EAM-ELAS leaders gave guarantees about
140 See ch 3.1 .i, p 129 and ch 3.1 .iii, p 134.
141 See ch 3.1.iv, p 137 and ch 3.1.v, p 143.
234
friendly relationships after the first disbandment, a few days later the regiment was 
disbanded for once more. According to Pyromaglou, the successive cold and hot showers 
that the 5/42 received from EAM-ELAS can be explained by the existence of an 
“invisible and unrestrained authority” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 173) within EAM-ELAS 
which enforced a totally different policy from EAM-ELAS’ official policy towards 
EKKA-5/42. According to Pyromaglou that invisible authority was Siantos.
The two first disbandments in Stromi and in Taratsa were not accidental. Most 
probably Orestis and Zoulas had clear orders from Siantos himself to disband the 5/42. 
Orestis’ excuse that he misunderstood Siantos’ orders concerning the 5/42 and Zoulas’ 
excuse that he ordered the disbandment of the 5/42 because his wife was a psychopath 
cannot be considered as genuine.143 The objective of those excuses was to protect Siantos 
from any responsibility. The 5/42 disbandments had to be presented not as parts of a 
carefully prepared plan, but as accidental events, as accidental deviations from EAM’s 
official policy that favoured unity and co-operation with the 5/42. Siantos’ policy had to 
be applied secretly in order to cause as less damage as possible to EAM-ELAS’ national 
policy of unity and co-operation with every other resistance organisation. Siantos’ short­
sighted and inconsistent policy was a complete failure and it led to completely opposite 
results than what he probably expected. On the one hand it undermined EAM’s official 
policy of national unity and made EAM’s declarations sound like farce, on the other 
hand, it also failed to disband the 5/42 for once and for all.
After the fiasco in the Cairo conference, the invisible and unrestrained authority 
was becoming less invisible and more unrestrained. EAM-ELAS’ official attitude
142 See ch 3.1.iv, p 137 and ch 3.1.v, p 143.
143 See ch 3.1.v, p 143.
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towards EKKA-5/42 was becoming more aggressive since Siantos was alone in defining
EAM-ELAS’ policy. All moderate members of KKE’s political bureau (Tzimas, Rousos,
etc) were set aside by Siantos and were allocated to less influential posts where they
could not participate in KKE’s decision making. According to Pyromaglou:
“Siantos became the undisputed political leader of ELAS, he became a leading 
member of ELAS’ General Headquarters and since he was also KKE’s General 
Secretary, he had the ultimate power within EAM-ELAS and he was capable to 
decide on his own” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 210).
In October 1943 Siantos personally left Athens and went up the mountains from where he
personally undertook the political and military command of EAM-ELAS. “From now on
where EAM, read KKE” (Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 232), or rather read Siantos.
Siantos did no longer have to use the secret policies and the intrigues that he used 
during the first two disbandments. The decision to disband the 5/42 regiment for the last 
time was sealed not only by ELAS’ General Headquarters (Sarafis, Siantos), but also by 
PEEA (Bakirtzis, Mantakas, Siantos) as well. In other words, PEEA -in which Siantos 
was the Secretary of domestic affairs- authorised ELAS -in which Siantos was the 
political leader- to disband the 5/42.
After the regiment’s second disbandment and until the end, EAM-ELAS adopted 
a hard line of political and military pressure towards EKKA and the 5/42. The purpose 
was to force EKKA-5/42 to join EAM-ELAS. In Fokida, ELAS had surrounded the 5/42 
and although there was peace between the two guerrilla bands, ELAS maintained a 
provocative attitude towards the regiment. This psychological war aimed to bring down 
the morale of the 5/42 men. On the political level, Siantos kept applying all of his 
pressure upon EKKA in order to convince or force its leaders to join EAM. Although that
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tactic did not lead to a merging of EKKA with EAM, EKKA still maintained a pro-EAM 
attitude throughout the ELAS-EDES war.144
As mentioned above EAM-ELAS left the 5/42 with only two alternatives: either 
to join EAM-ELAS or disband. The 5/42’s third disbandment was not accidental, nor was 
it due to Varsos’ murder or due to the alleged cases of collaboration with the enemy. The 
5/42 was disbanded when it had become obvious that there was no chance of EKKA-5/42 
joining EAM-ELAS. The first obvious indication of that was Dedousis’ memorandum, 
signed by 68 of the regiment’s officers. The issuing of Dedousis’ memorandum was an 
event of the utmost importance which played a very significant role in determining the 
relations between the 5/42 and ELAS. Relations between both organisations were never 
good. Even during the time where there was not any conflict between them, hostility and 
suspicion between them was obvious. Nevertheless, the 5/42 throughout its existence 
maintained a moderate, self-restrained attitude towards ELAS. Dedousis’ memorandum 
and the appeal that it had among the 5/42 officers was the proof that patience and self- 
restrain were diminishing. It was the proof that there was no chance for the 5/42 officers 
and antartes to join ELAS and furthermore it was the proof that they would not tolerate 
any more humiliation and provocation by ELAS. Moreover Dedousis’ mutiny was a 
proof that Psarros did no longer have the regiment under his control, therefore EAM- 
ELAS had realised that the promises given by Psarros could not be actualised. Kartalis as 
well was proven a not credible negotiator for EAM-ELAS. His reversal in the Myrofilo- 
Plaka conference and his identification with EDES and Woodhouse145 was clear evidence 
that EKKA would never join EAM and that the pro-EAM-ELAS attitude that EKKA
144 See ch 4.1,pl79.
145 See ch 4.1.ii, p 183.
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maintained throughout the ELAS-EDES war was nothing more than a political 
manoeuvre.
According to Gregoriadis:
“While EKKA-5/42 were closer to EAM-ELAS and further from EDES there was 
peace [between EKKA-5/42 and EAM-ELAS]. Nevertheless when EDES and 
EKKA came closer to each other after the Myrofilo-Plaka conference in February 
1944, ELAS stopped being tolerant towards EKKA” (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 620).
After the ELAS-EDES war was over and after EKKA and the 5/42 showed their true
colours, the value of EKKA-5/42 for EAM-ELAS fell to zero. EAM-ELAS had nothing
to gain from EKKA or the regiment since it had become obvious that they would never
merge with EAM-ELAS, while the signs that they were becoming more attached to the
anti-EAM-ELAS camp were becoming more and more obvious (Dedousis’
memorandum, Kartalis’ reversal etc). Therefore, since it was obvious that EKKA-5/42
would not join EAM-ELAS, the regiment did not have any reason to continue existing for
EAM-ELAS.
In addition to the political causes of the 5/42 disbandment, there were also a 
number of military and strategic causes. Fokida is a region with a tremendous strategic 
importance. Firstly, Fokida’s shores extend throughout the Corinthian gulf and they are 
very close to the Pelloponesian shores. Within and near to the region, there are the two 
main sea routes, Rio-Antirio146 and Aegion-Agios Nikolaos, which connect Roumeli with 
the Peloponnese. Secondly, Fokida is very close to Athens and the only road that 
connected Athens with northern and south-western Greece passed through the region. 
Therefore, the fact that Fokida region was under the control of 5/42 forces was a major
146 Antirio belongs to the Aitoloakamania region, but it is located upon the limits of Fokida- 
Aitoloakamania regions.
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strategic problem for ELAS and it was a serious obstacle in accomplishing two of ELAS’
most important plans.
The first plan was ELAS’ expansion in the Peloponnese. The Peloponnese was
traditionally a pro-royalist stronghold. EAM-ELAS was much weaker there than it was in
Roumeli or Thessaly. The fact that the first ELAS unit in Peloponnese was formed in July
1943 and was manned by less than 200 men (Fleisher, 1995, vol.2: 98) was illustrative of
how weak EAM-ELAS was in the Peloponnese. On the other hand, the security battalions
in the Peloponnese were powerful. According to Sarafis:
“The situation in the Peloponnese was very difficult because our troops were under 
constant pressure by joint security battalions and German campaigns” (Sarafis, 
1964: 283).
The situation was so unfavourable for EAM-ELAS that in March 1944 Siantos sent
Velouchiotis himself to organise local ELAS forces.147 He told him:
“We are losing the Peloponnese. Only you can sort things out there” (Haritopoulos, 
2001, vol.2: 56).148
In order to strengthen the Pelloponesian ELAS and neutralise the security battalions 
there, it was necessary to maintain continual communications with Roumeli. 
Communication with Roumeli via the Corinth isthmus was impossible since the Germans 
maintained large units in the area. Consequently the only route of communication 
between Roumeli and the Peloponnese passed through Fokida which was under the 
5/42’s control. The fact that this crucial route of communication was under the control of 
a hostile force, was a great jeopardy for ELAS’ expansion to the Peloponnese, therefore, 
disbanding the regiment was a necessary action for achieving that objective.
147 Velouchiotis got engaged in the ELAS-5/42 conflict while he was on route to the Peloponnese.
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The second and most important plan was the capture of Athens. Since August- 
September 1943, while the Cairo conference was ending in a fiasco, Ioannidis and 
Siantos along with the rest of KKE’s political bureau ordered Major Theodoros Makridis 
(Ektoras) -KKE’s Chief military advisor “to come up with a plan for capturing the Attica 
basin (Athens, Pireus, outskirts) simultaneously or immediately after the withdrawal of 
the occupation forces, which was expected to happen soon” (Farakos, 2000, vol.2: 108). 
Although a copy of that detailed plan was never found, according to Makridis it included 
a description of the political and military condition in Greece, an evaluation of the 
combatant ability of every Greek antartes force, the kind of activities and measures that 
had to be taken for the seizure of Athens etc. The plan was a clear proof that a year before 
the liberation of Greece, KKE’s leaders were preparing the ground, either to capture state 
authority with the use of force after the liberation (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 338), or at 
least to have the upper hand in terms of military strength towards every other military and 
political competitor during “zero hour” (Fleisher, 1995, vol.2: 195).
ELAS had to secure its rear in order to achieve free and safe communication to 
and from Athens. That was of the utmost importance and would play a decisive role for 
the success of the overall plan. ELAS forces in Athens included approximately 20,000 
fighters, but just 6,000 of them were armed. Athenian ELAS had a major shortage in 
weapons and ammunition and its supplies came almost exclusively from the nearby areas 
of Roumeli including Fokida. Furthermore, the plan for the seizure of Athens included 
the transportation of large ELAS units from Roumeli. These units should be on red alert 
and ready to move to Athens when the signal was given (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 341).
148 Apart from the fact that Velouchiotis was probably the only one who was capable to turn things 
favourably for ELAS in the Peloponnese, his transfer there served also some political purpose for Siantos
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The existence of the 5/42 in Fokida would be a major problem for ELAS. The 5/42 forces 
could cause serious problems to ELAS’ transportation of troops and supplies to Athens, 
while having a hostile force on ELAS’ rear would jeopardise the success of the whole 
plan (Kaimaras, interview 18 December 1999, Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000, A. 
Mamarelis, interview 15 January 2000). Finally, in addition to those strategic plans, the 
booty was another military profit for ELAS. The 5/42 was a “rich” guerrilla band. It had 
efficiency in weapons (machine-guns, mortars, etc), ammunition, money and provisions 
due to the British support.149 All that equipment and provisions were vital for ELAS and 
ELAS’ officers and antartes were eager to get them in their hands.
Conclusion
The moral ground upon which ELAS disbanded the 5/42 was treason and 
collaboration with the Germans and the security battalions. In order to back up this 
accusation, ELAS launched a number of specific accusations against the regiment. This 
chapter’s first purpose was to test the validity of those accusations. That was probably the 
most difficult task that this thesis had to deal with since the issue of collaboration is a 
highly subjective one, inseparably bound with morals and individual perception, while 
the search for hard evidence is a very hard task. Having all those difficulties in mind, this 
thesis tried to use the maximum possible amount of references and evidence concerning
who wanted to have Velouchiotis in some sort of political isolation (Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 254-257).
149 See ch 7.1 .i, p 268.
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ELAS’ accusations against the 5/42 and to evaluate these accusations according to the 
most objective term of collaboration.
According to the findings, the accusation that the 5/42 collaborated with the 
enemy was not substantiated. ELAS established the case of collaboration against the 5/42 
posthumously, after the disbandment had happened. The first purpose that these 
accusations served was to create a convincing moral ground that would justify the 
tragedy that happened in Klima. The second purpose was to create a smokescreen that 
would camouflage the real causes behind the disbandment of the 5/42.
This chapter’s second purpose was to highlight the real causes behind the 
disbandment of the 5/42. The regiment posed a serious threat against the political and 
military interests of EAM-ELAS, therefore EAM-ELAS had given the 5/42 two choices; 
either to join EAM-ELAS or be eliminated. Although ELAS had the military strength to 
disband the 5/42 at any given time, they did not do so as long as EKKA-5/42 remained 
potential allies. Nevertheless, as soon as it became obvious that the 5/42 had become an 
openly hostile force and as soon as it was understood that the gap between the EKKA and 
EAM was not going to be bridged, ELAS took the decision to disband the 5/42. EAM 
could not risk the existence of an additional competing political organisation next to 
EDES. That would be a benefit for the anti-EAM camp and would seriously jeopardise 
the political dominance of EAM in occupied Greece. In addition, ELAS could not risk the 
existence of a hostile armed force in Fokida because this would jeopardise ELAS’ 
military plans for expansion in the Peloponnese and for the capture of Athens.
The third and last disbandment of the 5/42 was a rational choice for EAM-ELAS. 
It was an offensive approved by ELAS’ General Headquarters and PEEA and it served a
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number of strategic objectives. Nevertheless, events ran out of control in Klima. ELAS 
did not just disband the regiment, but also murdered Colonel Psarros, one of the leading 
figures of the Greek resistance. That mysterious and inexplicable event will be studied in 
the following chapter
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CHAPTER 6
The Hidden Causes and the Obvious Effects of Psarros’
Murder
Although Colonel Psarros and his regiment had the same fate, it would be more 
appropriate to study the disbandment of the 5/42 and the murder of Psarros as two 
separate events. The first reason for that is that while the regiment’s disbandment was 
officially ordered by PEEA, Zoulas had no official order or authorisation to execute 
Psarros and his motives were rather dark. The second reason is that the political 
magnitude of Psarros’ murder was by far greater than that of the regiment’s disbandment. 
Throughout the occupation, ELAS had disbanded many other competing resistance 
organisations, while they had disbanded the 5/42 twice. However the murder of a 
resistance leader such as Psarros was an unprecedented event that caused much more 
serious political effects than the disbandment itself.
The meso-level analysis in this chapter will focus on the causes and effects of 
Psarros’ murder. In the first half of the chapter, the discussion will highlight the different 
versions and scenarios concerning the causes and motives behind the murder. Although, 
EAM-ELAS tried to cover up Psarros’ murder as an accidental event, facts indicate that it
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was a premeditated crime and that Zoulas had a clear intention to kill Psarros. However, 
his motives remain rather mysterious and controversial. According to one view, Zoulas 
killed Psarros on his own initiative due to personal reasons, while according to another 
view, Zoulas was ordered to assassinate Psarros by someone who was above him in 
ELAS’ hierarchy.
Psarros’ murder is surrounded by mystery. Primary sources are very scarce and in 
most cases, they certainly serve ulterior causes. On the other hand, although secondary 
sources and personal testimonies are more in number, they are still very subjective and 
biased. Therefore, the purpose in researching the causes of Psarros’ assassination is not to 
fingerpoint the mastermind behind the murder since that would be impossible due to the 
shortage of reliable evidence. The purpose here is to highlight the different versions 
concerning the murder’s causes and to comment on them using objective and rational 
criteria.
Whatever the causes, the effects of Psarros’ murder were tremendous and the 
unanimous opinion among national resistance protagonists and researchers is that it had 
devastating effects for EAM. In the second half, this chapter will focus on the impact that 
Psarros’ murder had on the political developments during the last months of the 
occupation. Psarros’ murder became a central issue in the Lebanon conference between 
the exiled Greek government, the national resistance organisations and the pre-war 
political parties. Although the conference’s objective was the achievement of national 
unity, the conference was turned in to a trial for EAM-ELAS based on Psarros’ case. 
Eventually, the conference resulted into a disaster for EAM-ELAS and the purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight the way in which Psarros’ legacy contributed to such a disaster.
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The legacy of Psarros’ murder however, influenced not only the outcome of the 
Lebanon conference, but it also had long term effects in the political antagonisms during 
the last months of the occupation. It had a great impact on Greek public opinion and it 
sharpened the polarisation. It fueled the anti-communist sentiment, it reinforced the 
coherence of the anti-EAM camp and it benefited the extreme anti-EAM organisations by 
giving them propaganda material. In its second half, this chapter will highlight the way in 
which extreme anti-EAM groups used Psarros’ murder in their propaganda.
6.1. Crime.
The murder of a prisoner is under any circumstance a brutal and unethical act;
therefore, Psarros’ murder has a fundamentally moral-ethical aspect. From the first
moment, EAM-ELAS’ leadership realised that they had to cope with a serious moral
issue that could have very serious consequences. That is why official EAM-ELAS tried to
cover up the murder and undermine its importance. According to ELAS’ official version
of events, Psarros was killed during the battle in Klima. In ELAS’ official 12 paged
report concerning the 5/42 disbandment, Psarros’ death is referred to in a single sentence:
“During the battle, there were many casualties from both sides, among which 
Colonel Psarros” (DIS/GES F/928/Z/1).
The same explanation was given by EAM-ELAS propagandist newspapers such as
“Roumeli” (PRO H5 5/279).
Nevertheless, the rumour that Zoulas was the man that had killed Psarros was 
spread all over Greece. Therefore, ELAS had to come up with a more realistic and
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convincing explanation. British liaison officer Lieutenant-Colonel Hamond made an
investigation on Psarros’ death. According to his report, ELAS officially gave him the
following explanation:
“The version of what happened between Marathias and Klima that seems to bear 
ELAS approval is as follows: Col Psarros, his men and the ELAS men who were 
conducting the group to Klima were met by Col Zoulas, 5th Brigade ELAS, and a 
group of ELAS antartes going from Klima towards Marathia: Col Zoulas stopped 
to talk to Col Psarros. Col Zoulas is reported to have said: “Psarre you are a 
whore”. Col Psarros drew a gun to shoot Col Zoulas, however Col Zoulas’ groom 
killed Col Psarros before Col Psarros fired. There is a discrepancy here with 
reference to where Col Psarros pulled a gun from; Some stories say from a 
sideholster and some say the gun was concealed in his sleeve” (PRO H5 5/292).
Although Lieutenant-Colonel Hamond rejected this version of events in his report and
assured that “A slight knowledge of Col Psarros leads me to doubt that he would draw a
gun” (PRO H5 5/292), another ELAS report went even further arguing that Psarros shot
Zoulas and Zoulas was forced to kill him in self defence (DIS/GES F/914/Z/lb). Hatzis,
one of KKE’s leading figures gave a far more convenient and “naive” explanation about
the murder:
“While Psarros and Zoulas were having an argument, Zoulas shouted in anger “Oh 
somebody kill him”. One of Zoulas’ men took these words as an order and he shot 
the unlucky Colonel. Psarros dropped dead” (Hatzis, 1983, vol.3: 170).
Although ELAS tried desperately to present Psarros’ murder as an accidental 
event, the vast majority of sources coming from both the 5/42 and ELAS agree that 
events happened as follows: When Zoulas met Psarros, Zoulas started shouting threats 
and insults at him and threatened to kill him. Then Psarros told Zoulas “Alright Thymios 
do as you please, here I am” and he opened his coat showing Zoulas his chest. Then 
Zoulas ordered his antartis Velentzas (nickname “dwarf’) to shoot and Psarros got hit on
247
the brow and chest and died on the spot.150 Without any doubt, Zoulas had the intention 
to kill Psarros. However, the key question is whether Zoulas killed Psarros based on his 
own personal motives, or whether Psarros’ murder was premeditated and ordered by 
someone who was above Zoulas in ELAS’ hierarchy.
According to the first view, Psarros’ murder was a crime of passion and the apple 
of discord between Zoulas and Psarros was Psarros’ wife. According to the cherchez la 
femme scenario, Zoulas had a secret love affair with Psarros’ wife and killed him out of 
jealousy. Most 5/42 and ELAS veterans however considered this version as unreal and a 
fabricated rumour.151 On the contrary, there is evidence that Zoulas and Psarros had been 
friends during the past. Both were in the same class (of 1916) in the military academy 
and both took part in the 1935 coup and both were degraded. Moreover, the biggest proof 
that their relations were good -at least until they joined different camps during the 
occupation- was that when in the early months of the occupation EAM was recruiting 
officers for ELAS, EAM officials sent Zoulas personally to try to convince Psarros to 
join ELAS (Hatzis, 1983, vol.l: 275). Obviously, if there was hatred between the two 
men, EAM would choose someone else to approach Psarros and not Zoulas. Whatever 
the personal relationship between Zoulas and Psarros, the hypothesis that Zoulas killed 
Psarros because of personal reasons must be treated with scepticism for two reasons. 
Firstly because in such a delicate issue that concerned the two men’s private lives it 
would be very difficult to make a distinction between gossip and fact and secondly
150 See PRO H5 5/279, Kaimaras, 1979: 164, Koutras, 1981: 102, Gregoriadis, vol.5: 49, Gasparinatos, 
1998, vol.2: 182, Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 287, Papadakis “Leuterias”, interview 13 September 2000, 
Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000, Rodakis, interview 21 April 2000, Roupas, interview 24 April 2000.
151 See Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000, Papadakis “Leuterias”, interview 13 September 2000, Roupas, 
interview 24 April 2000, Rodakis, interview 21 April 2000
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because such a simplistic explanation for such a serious crime can be considered as 
particularly “convenient” for ELAS.
The biggest proof that justifies the hypothesis that Psarros’ murder was 
premeditated and that Zoulas had the support and the cover of someone of his superiors 
was that ELAS never punished Zoulas for his action. As in the case of the second 
disbandment of the 5/42 -where Zoulas’ gave no excuse why he ordered to disband the 
regiment- Zoulas was not called to justify his action. ELAS never made an official 
enquiry for Psarros’ murder and Zoulas was not referred to any disciplinary board He did 
not go to trial not even by a puppet court-martial and he never suffered the slightest 
penalty for an action that was disastrous for EAM-ELAS. Contrary to Zoulas, other 
ELAS antartes and officers had been sentenced to death due to rather minor incidents 
such as the accidental wounding of fellow antartis and due to petty-crimes such as the 
theft of a chicken etc.
According to Haritopoulos:
“Anyone who is the least familiar with KKE’s hierarchy and with the way that 
things work in KKE can argue that it would be impossible for Zoulas to take such a 
serious decision on his own...Why was not there not even the slightest reaction 
from PEEA, not even a fixed court-martial” ?(Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 287)
Zoulas was not so high in ELAS’ hierarchy to be in position to decide the execution of
the leader of the third largest resistance organisation. Such a serious decision could only
be taken by someone who was superior to Zoulas, someone who was at the top of the
EAM-ELAS, PEEA and KKE pyramid.
However, all of EAM-ELAS and PEEA leaders seemed shocked and devastated 
by Psarros’ murder. For example, after having heard the news, Aris Velouchiotis did not 
speak to anyone for four days, he kept smoking and talking to himself “We have lost half
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of our struggle, we will pay for this dearly” he kept repeating (Bekios: 417, Haritopoulos,
2001, vol.2: 267). According to Sarafis, everybody in PEEA was shocked:
“Psarros’ death grieved not only Colonels Bakirtzis and Sarafis who were close 
friends with him for 25 years, but all other PEEA members as well, especially 
comrades Svolos, Tsirimokos and Siantos” (Sarafis, 1964: 283-284).
When Siantos heard about Psarros’ murder, he was thunderstruck:
“Disaster! They killed Psarros” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 326).
All of EAM-ELAS and PEEA’s leaders seemed surprised, but still someone must had
armed Zoulas’ hand.
In 1951 and while Zoulas was a political refugee in Romania, he wrote a personal 
report about his role in the disbandment of the 5/42 and in the murder of Psarros: 
“Supplementary report on my biographical curriculum:
I met Siantos through Polydoros before I joined ELAS. Siantos guided me 
personally and directly on mv relations with EKKA-Psarros-Kartalis. I killed 
Psarros when I captured him after the battle in Klima in April 1944. I was afraid 
that Bakirtzis was going to save him and that the 5/42 would be reformed again. 
That would cause serious problems in case when my regiment, the 36th, would be 
ordered to move for the capture of Athens. Along with Psarros, we killed some 
EDES officers who were also officers in EKKA. Nikiforos (who is now in the 
Aegina prison and is to be executed) captured Psarros. I had ordered Nikiforos -  
whose battalion was under my orders- to execute Psarros, but instead he sent him to 
my headquarters. I had agreed about Psarros’ execution with Aris. Siantos had not 
given me any orders about Psarros. During that time Siantos was in Athens and I 
know that he disapproved the two previous disbandments of the 5/42. He always 
agreed with the British liaison officers to reform the 5/42 and he was sending us 
orders about the relations that we would have (with the 5/42) in the future. 
3.3.1951, Thymios Zoulas (Farakos, 1997: 296).
Zoulas argued that his motive in killing Psarros was to prevent a possible new 
reformation of the 5/42, that he acted on his own and that he was not ordered by anyone 
to commit the murder. However, it would be wrong to assume that the mystery 
surrounding Psarros’ murder is dissolved with Zoulas’ report. Farakos, who found 
Zoulas’ report in the KKE archives, questions the report’s sincerity based on two key
250
points. Firstly the arrogant manner in which Zoulas confessed such a brutal act that had 
totally devastating effects upon EAM is definitely suspicious (Farakos, 1997: 297). 
Secondly, although Zoulas did not write that Velouchiotis gave him the order to execute 
Psarros, he wrote that he had agreed the execution with Velouchiotis. Zoulas leaves the 
impression that he negotiated Psarros’ murder with Velouchiotis and that eventually 
Velouchiotis was convinced and gave his approval. Taking into consideration the 
channels of decision making within ELAS, Zoullas’ claim sounds rather irrational. A 
serious decision such as the execution of the leader of EKKA-5/42 could come from the 
top (Velouchiotis) to the bottom (Zoulas) and certainly not vice versa.
The third and most obscure point in Zoulas’ confession however is a series of 
contradictions concerning Siantos. On the one hand, Zoulas claimed that Siantos was 
giving him direct and personal guidance concerning Psarros, Kartalis and EKKA-5/42, 
while on the other he claimed that Siantos was unaware of the two previous disbandments 
of the 5/42, that he disapproved of them and that he had not given him any orders what to 
do with Psarros. In other words, Zoulas who was responsible for the second disbandment 
of the 5/42, who was always being provocative against the 5/42 even while the ELAS- 
5/42 relations were calm and who had killed Psarros, claimed that he was always under 
the direct orders of Siantos, but at the same time he claimed that Siantos knew nothing 
and disagreed with all of the above actions.
152 There is no doubt that Siantos knew about Zoulas’ provocative attitude against the 5/42 during the time 
where the relationship between the two bands was peaceful. The letters of complaint that Psarros had 
personally sent to ELAS General Headquarters and Siantos prove that beyond any doubt. In those letters, 
found in the archives of the Army’s History Bureau, Psarros was complaining about Zoulas’ unwillingness 
to co-operate with him and generally about the hostile attitude that Zoulas was maintaining against the 
regiment and him personally, while he was asking ELAS Headquarters to remove Zoulas from his post. 
(DIS/GES F/929)
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Pyromaglou implies that Siantos’ surprise after he heard about the murder of 
Psarros was hypocritical and indirectly incriminates Siantos as the mastermind behind 
Psarros’ murder (Pyromaglou, 1965: 326). Although there is no solid evidence which 
proves beyond doubt that Siantos was the mastermind behind Psarros’ murder, it is a fact 
that Zoulas was appointed by Siantos as the “5/42 affairs secretary”. Zoulas was guided 
by Siantos and he enjoyed Siantos’ trust and protection before and after Psarros’ murder.
Firstly, the fact that Zoulas was never punished for the damage that he caused to 
EAM by murdering Psarros incriminates Siantos above all other EAM-ELAS and PEEA 
officials. Siantos was the leading figure in EAM-ELAS, PEEA and KKE and any 
decision to take disciplinary action against Zoulas was dependent on him. Secondly, 
among ELAS officers Zoulas was considered as a person attached to Siantos’ close circle, 
as Siantos* “henchman” (Papadakis “Leuterias”, interview 13 September 2000153). In 
fact, Siantos intended to make Zoulas the chief political instructor of ELAS. In 
September 1942 ELAS was still small and vulnerable and Velouchiotis had already 
started showing signs of disobedience towards KKE. Siantos and Hatzis started looking 
for a reliable officer, loyal to them in order to appoint him as the chief political instructor 
next to Velouchiotis so that KKE’s line would be enforced upon ELAS and so that 
Velouchiotis would be restrained. Siantos and Hatzis chose Zoulas for that task, but 
eventually they appointed Leuterias because in the meantime Zoulas got sick with icterus 
and he had to stay in Athens (Hatzis, 1983, vol.l: 317-320, Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 
284, Papadakis “Leuterias”, interview 13 September 2000). After the 5/42 was formed, 
Zoulas whose regiment was based in the Fokida area as well, was appointed member of
153 Papadakis’ view can be accepted as totally valid since he was also considered as an ELAS official loyal 
to Siantos.
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the ELAS General Roumeli Headquarters and his exclusive task was to monitor the 5/42. 
According to Leuterias who had Zoulas under his orders, Zoulas was instructed by 
Siantos “to keep an eye on Psarros and not let the 5/42 breathe” (Papadakis “Leuterias”, 
interview 13 September 2000).
After the end of the 1946-1949 civil war, ELAS antartis Babis Roupas met Zoulas 
in Romania and had a conversation with him. According to Roupas, Zoulas told him that 
he did not want to kill Psarros and that someone superior had ordered him to do so. 
Zoulas promised Roupas that he would talk one day, but eventually he did not keep his 
promise (Roupas, interview 24 April 2000). Zoulas died alone in a psychiatric asylum in 
Bucharest (Mannaios, interview 5 May 2000) and took his secret with him.
6.2. And Punishment.
6.2.i. The Haunted Conference: Psarros becomes Banquo.
Psarros’ murder was an act of political suicide for EAM. The consequences and 
the damage that EAM suffered were more than severe, they were irreparable and the echo 
of the shots that killed Psarros reached as far as Lebanon. In 17 May 1944, exactly one 
month after Psarros was killed, in the “Bois de Boulogne”154 hotel of Lebanon, the 
proceedings of the Lebanon conference started. The conference was organised by the new 
Prime Minister of the Greek Government in exile, Papandreou, and the British 
Ambassador, to Greece Leeper. Delegates from all national resistance organisations and
154 “The forest of Boulogne”
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all pre-war political parties took part in the conference. Svolos, Angelopoulos and 
Askoutsis from PEEA, Porfyrogenis and Stratis from EAM, Sarafis from ELAS, 
Pyromaglou, S. Metaxas and A. Metaxas from EDES, Kartalis from EKKA, Ventiris and 
Stathatos -who claimed that they represented 150.000 fighters from all Athenian 
“National Combatant Organisations”. In addition to the national resistance 
representatives and Ventiris-Stathatos, 12 more delegates from all political parties with 
parliamentary representation before the Metaxas regime took part in the conference, 
among which Venizelos from the Liberal party, Londos from the People’s party, Rousos 
from KKE.
The purpose of the Lebanon conference was once more the achievement of 
national unity. More specifically, the main issues in the conference’s agenda were the 
formation of a provisional national unity government with the widest possible political 
representation and the formation of an integrated national army with the participation of 
all national resistance organisations. Those might have been the conference’s official 
objectives, but according to an unnamed British diplomat, “the Lebanon conference was 
nothing more than the open mouth of a hungry wolf for EAM” (Pyromaglou, 964: 334). 
Leeper who had Papandreou under his direct guidance authorised him to adopt an 
aggressive and strict line against the delegates of PEEA, EAM-ELAS and KKE. Such a 
line could lead to two possible developments, both of which would be positive for the 
British and the anti-EAM camp. It could either push things to the edge and force EAM’s 
delegates to maintain an equally aggressive attitude, something that would lead to a 
fiasco, or it could prove effective and force EAM’s delegates to submit to Papandreou’s 
terms. In the first case, EAM would be exposed to the eyes of the Greek public opinion as
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the aggressor who undermined national unity, while in the second case, EAM would be 
neutralised. It would join the national unity government and would lose its control over 
ELAS since all antartes forces would either be disbanded or be set under the direct orders 
of the national unity government.155
The Lebanon conference was overshadowed by the recent murder of Colonel
Psarros. An empty seat in the conference table reminded gruesomely his absence
(Zaousis, 1987, vol.2: 433). In his opening address, Papandreou launched a frontal attack
against EAM with Psarros’ murder at the tip of his spear:
“Today the situation in our country is hell. The Germans slaughter, the security 
battalions slaughter, the antartes slaughter, they slaughter and bum. What is going 
to be left out of this poor country? EAM did not just intend to carry out a national 
resistance struggle; it aimed to prepare its post-war political dominance with the 
use of force. For that reason, EAM tried to monopolise the national resistance 
struggle. They do not allow anyone else to go up the mountains and fight the 
invader and they punish with the penalty of death any Greek who wants to fulfil his 
patriotic duty. An old example to that is the present Colonel Sarafis,156 while a 
recent one is the absent Colonel Psarros” (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 452).157
After Papandreou, Kartalis launched his own attack against EAM. Although
Kartalis was himself a victim of EAM-ELAS, his speech was by far less pompous and
demagogic than Papandreou’s was. In his two hours speech, Kartalis made a review of
everything that the 5/42 had suffered from ELAS, he also stigmatised EAM’s attempt to
monopolise the national resistance struggle and he spoke about the “terrorist campaign”
that ELAS had launched throughout the country (Pyromaglou, 1965: 347). At the end of
his speech Kartalis said:
“Mr Rentis in his speech said that EAM-ELAS did not conduct any national 
resistance struggle. I think that EAM-ELAS fought for national liberation, but “sui
155 See Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 580
156 At that point, Papandreou left a hint about Sarafis, since it was well known that Sarafis joined ELAS and 
became its military leader while he was under arrest from ELAS (see footnote 95, p i57).
157 All of Papandreou’s speech in Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 451-456.
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generis”. They fought with thrift and they had objectives beyond national 
resistance. They fought just because the English asked them to and because they 
wanted to gather as many weapons as possible from the enemy. However, they 
fought with thrift because they save the weapons for the civil war, for the moment 
that they will try to assume power by force” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 362).158
In respect to Psarros’ murder, Kartalis maintained an absolutely decent attitude. He did 
not use his murder to attack EAM-ELAS. Probably that was not necessary since the 
symbolism was overwhelming. Kartalis, “the ghost of EKKA” (Woodhouse, 1976: 287) 
gave the impression that Psarros was speaking from the grave.
The magnitude and the importance of Psarros’ murder was repeated and over­
emphasised by all anti-EAM delegates. Rousos, KKE’s representative wrote:
“All of them [anti-EAM delegates] like they were in a choir kept repeating the anti- 
EAM tune that Papandreou and the British gave them about “EAM’s terror” and 
Psarros’ death. Psarros was transformed to a Shakespearean ghost” (Gasparinatos, 
1998: 425).
EAM’s delegates suffered a total moral and political defeat.
“The murder of Psarros became a strong argument against EAM and added many 
arrows to the quivers of EAM’s opponents” (Gasparinatos, 1998: 424).
All of EAM-ELAS’ achievements were overshadowed by Psarros’ murder and were
conveniently ignored by anti-EAM delegates. The fact that EAM was the most popular
and massive political resistance organisation with approximately a million members was
ignored. The fact that ELAS had under its control most parts of Greece was also ignored.
The fact that ELAS was the largest and most effective resistance force which had carried
out a successful resistance war against the occupation forces and which had suffered
thousands of dead was forgotten. All that mattered was that ELAS had killed Psarros and
that was the most solid evidence of what anti-EAM delegates wanted to prove; that EAM
158 All of Kartalis’ speech in Pyromaglou, 1965: 347-364.
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was nothing more than a political organisation which intended to destroy any political
opponent and to assume power by force.
The “Psarros argument” was the strongest weapon that anti-EAM delegates had in
their hands. It was a genuinely unshaken argument and it was impossible for EAM’s
delegates to defend the crime or at least present a convincing explanation about it. Due to
the “Psarros argument”, EAM’s delegates had to follow a defensive line right from the
start and that created a vicious circle. Anti-EAM delegates escalated their attack, while
on the other hand EAM delegates became even more defensive. Since none of EAM’s
delegates were experience diplomats159 and since they were cut off from EAM’s
headquarters from Greece, they eventually collapsed (Kedros, 1960: 102).
The Lebanon conference was a disaster for EAM and EAM’s delegates were
highly responsible for that disaster. According to Gasparinatos:
“The unanimous opinion is that EAM’s delegates were trapped in the Lebanon 
conference, that their capability to handle the situation was far bellow average, that 
they did not follow the directions that they were given, that they caused severe 
dam age-if not betrayed- EAM’s struggle” (Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 573).
According to Woodhouse:
“PEEA, EAM-ELAS and KKE’s delegates received such a pounding that after a 
point they sunk into a state of mental lethargy and they were no longer responsible 
for their actions” (Woodhouse, 1976: 288).
They cracked beneath the burden of the continuous accusations, they retreated from all of
their demands and eventually they signed an agreement which:
“In the national resistance dictionary the word Lebanon means defeat, treason, 
disaster, submission” (Haritopoulos, 2001, vol.2: 329).
159 Surprisingly enough, Rousos who was one of the oldest and more experienced KKE officials and the 
most experienced politician and diplomat compared to the rest of EAM delegates, maintained the most 
compromising attitude. Sarafis on the other hand, who was a genuine military man, was the only one of all 
EAM delegates who maintained a non-pleading attitude towards anti-EAM delegates.
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Before EAM’s delegates left Greece, Siantos and Ioanidis had given them a series 
of instructions about the attitude that they should maintain in Lebanon and about the 
claims that they should make considering the provisional national unity government and 
the national army. Siantos and Ioanidis instructed them to demand at least 50% 
participation for EAM in the government, to get by all means the strategic Ministries of 
military and domestic affairs for EAM and to demand the immediate transfer of at least 
seven ministries on Greek soil, in mountainous free Greece. As far as the King’s issue 
was concerned, the instructions were to demand an explicit statement from the King 
himself declaring that he was not going to return to Greece before the people gave their 
verdict in a referendum. In regards to the national army, the instructions were to accept 
the formation of an integrated army along with EDES but with Sarafis or Sarigianis as 
Chief Generals. Furthermore, Siantos and Ioanidis instructed them to demand an explicit 
denunciation of the security battalions from all delegates
Every negotiation includes losses from the initial demands, however, in the 
Lebanon conference EAM’s retraction from its initial demands can be considered as a 
complete surrender. It was agreed that EAM would participate in the provisional national 
unity government, but there was no explicit agreement about how many and which 
Ministries EAM would get. (Eventually on 24 May when the first provisional 
government was formed, EAM did not get any ministries). It was agreed that both ELAS 
and EDES were going to disband and that a national army was going to be formed, but 
the process under which that was going to happen was not determined. (The vagueness 
concerning the issue of the national army was going to become latter the casus belli of 
the December 1944 conflict). The security battalions were denounced, but under the
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pretext that the national unity government was just provisional, it was decided that the 
next elected government of the Greek State should handle the persecution of the security 
battalions. Finally as far as the King’s issue, no explicit statement was made 
(Gasparinatos, 1998, vol.2: 548-563).
The Lebanon conference was EAM’s Waterloo, a total disaster. Before the 
Lebanon conference, EAM-ELAS and PEEA had the political and military situation in 
Greece under their control. On the other hand, the anti-EAM camp was weak and deeply 
divided. Militarily, the only considerable anti-EAM force was EDES, by far weaker than 
ELAS. Politically, the anti-EAM camp included just the powerless and isolated King, the 
exile Greek government, with no appeal to the public opinion, and finally the pre-war 
political parties, which were under a state of, complete disintegration. After the Lebanon 
conference however, the tables were turned and the status quo was overthrown. The anti- 
EAM camp was integrated to a united and mighty political front under the seal of the 
official Greek national unity government. That was the government that officially 
represented the nation and EAM-ELAS were simply instruments, or rather the outcasts of 
that government. EAM was still the most popular resistance organisation and ELAS was 
still the strongest armed force, however after the Lebanon conference they were no longer 
masters of the political situation.
The expression “timing is everything” is confirmed many times in history and in 
Psarros’ case this was certainly true. Not only Psarros’ murder was an event of the utmost 
importance, it also occurred at the worst time for EAM. The fact that it was so recent 
played a catalytic role in the Lebanon conference and it contributed significantly to 
EAM’s defeat in the conference. With Psarros’ murder so recent in EAM’s balance sheet,
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the Lebanon conference was transformed into a trial and EAM’s delegates were
transformed into defendants. In a rather malicious manner, right wing historian Zaousis
wrote about the Lebanon conference:
“In Lebanon, EAM paid the price for all of the acts of civil war that it had 
committed. Psarros’ murder was the most recent of those acts and that made EAM 
look like a criminal who was caught in the act. The final countdown of EAM’s 
continuous retreats had started” (Zaousis, 1987, vol.2: 444).
6.2.ii. The Abused Legacy of Psarros.
In addition to the political consequences that Psarros’ murder had on the Lebanon 
conference, it also had a major impact on the Greek public opinion during the last six 
months of the occupation. Psarros had the reputation of a decent man. He was one of the 
most moderate resistance leaders, while the 5/42 and EKKA were considered the 
breakwater between EAM-ELAS and EDES. The disbandment of the 5/42, but more 
importantly the murder of Psarros increased the gap between EAM and the anti-EAM 
camp and made the borderline between them more visible to the eyes of all Greeks.
Psarros’ murder was a moral defeat for EAM. According to the leftist historian 
Haritopoulos:
“Nothing ever had a more devastating effect upon EAM and the overall resistance 
movement than the murder of Colonel Psarros. It blackened ELAS and gave to all 
those who collaborated with the Germans or who were hiding and had contributed 
nothing to the nation’s resistance the alibi that they were looking for. From that 
point onwards, the indictment for ELAS was ready and all ELAS antartes were 
considered collectively guilty for that crime. They were all transformed from 
freedom fighters to Psarros’ murderers. The whole case of the tragic Colonel and 
his regiment was going to influence catastrophically the struggle” (Haritopoulos, 
2001, vol.2: 288).
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Psarros’ murder became a very strong propaganda weapon for the radical anti- 
EAM groups and especially the collaborators and the royalists. Although Psarros was a 
dedicated anti-royalist and his leadership was undermined by royalists and although he 
had repeatedly refused to collaborate with the enemy, the royalists and the collaborators 
were the ones who showed the greatest zeal in stigmatising ELAS about the brutal crime. 
The message that both of these groups wanted to send through their propaganda was that 
there could be no co-operation and conciliation with EAM-ELAS. Psarros’ example was 
ideal for that purpose. It was well known that Psarros always wanted to have good 
relationships and co-operation with EAM-ELAS. According to Gregoriadis “he was the 
most harmless and modest of all those who opposed ELAS” (Gregoriadis, vol.5: 44) and 
the fact that he eventually got killed by ELAS proved exactly the collaborators’ and the 
royalists’ point.
In June 1944, the collaborationist newspaper “The voice of Greeks” sponsored by 
the German Military Command of northern Greece, published an article titled “How did 
ELAS, the unfaithful Alii Pasha,160 kill Colonel Psarros and his comrades”. According to 
the article:
“On 19.2.44, EKKA and EDES signed a common agreement of co-operation with 
ELAS and agreed to launch a joint campaign against the German army with the 
pretext to “liberate” Greece161...All Greeks know which was the result of that 
agreement between the wolf and the sheep. ELAS, the unfaithful Alii Pasha, 
violated the agreement and during an ambush in the Klima-Karaiskos village in 
Akamania, they killed Colonel Psarros with all of his officers and his 200 men. All 
of them were butchered by ELAS’ “liberators” and their bodies were left unburied 
to be eaten by jackals and rapacious birds...That is the fate of everyone who co­
operates with Communists, either these are naive officers like Psarros or ambitious
160 Alii Pasha was the Pasha of Epirus during the late 18th century. He was a cruel ruler and an intriguer and 
was notorious for his conspiracies against his associates and allies. The expression “unfaithful Alii Pasha” 
is used in modem Greek in describing someone who is dishonest and plots against his/hers comrades and 
friends.
161 It means the Myrofilo-Plaka agreement signed in 29.2.44 (see ch 4.1 .ii, p 185).
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politicians. Communists co-operate and trust only fellow communists and fellow 
criminals and they have no trust for people with other political beliefs” 
(Anagnostopoulos, 1960: 31).
According to the same spirit, royalist ex-member of Parliament and Dedousis’ 
mentor Christos Zalokostas wrote a rather ironic and malicious comment about Psarros’ 
murder:
“He believed in democracy and democracy is what killed him. If he had not 
believed so much in democracy, he would have attacked the communists and he 
would have saved himself, but he was such a fanatic democrat. He used to wear the 
same tom up army coat that he was wearing in 1935 at the day he was degraded. 
The coat’s shoulder straps were tom and it was full of spittle, but for Psarros it was 
a symbol of democracy. He was killed and buried in that coat” (Zalokostas, 1997: 
218).
For collaborationists, royalists and generally for all fundamentalist enemies of
EAM, Psarros’ murder was literally a god-sent gift. They were all “proven right” and
their appeal to the public opinion increased, especially upon the moderates who were
sceptical towards EAM. These people were already suspicious and rather hostile towards
EAM, but still they condemned the radical anti-EAM groups and they closed their ears to
their anti-EAM propaganda of hate. However, after Psarros’ murder these moderates
made a shift to the right and became more hostile towards EAM and more sympathetic to
the radical anti-EAM groups. According to Omiros Papadopoulos, member of radical
anti-EAM organisation ”X”:
“Only after Psarros was killed did the Greeks wake up and realise what EAM was. 
Everyone realised that all the stuff they were saying about national resistance etc 
was crap and that they just wanted to assume power, but when we were saying that 
from the first moment, we were being called fascists and gestapites” 
(Papadopoulos, interview 10 May 2000).
The first irony concerning Psarro’s legacy was the fact that his memory was 
defended by all those who opposed him while he was alive. The second irony was the
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fact that although Psarros was a moderate resistance leader who worked towards the
achievement of unity within the national resistance movement, his legacy added more
fuel to the civil discord. Psarros’ murder was certainly an event that contributed to the
polarisation between EAM-ELAS and its opponents. His legacy helped in the integration
of the scattered anti-EAM factions. The anti-EAM camp got its martyr and that
contributed in making it more concrete. According to Petimezas:
“Without Psarros’ sacrifice, there would be no solid and convincing evidence about 
which were EAM’s objectives...Psarros’ sacrifice gave the signal for a full scale 
mobilisation against communism” (Petimezas, 1991: 310).
As the day of the liberation was coming closer, the issue of post-war political and 
military dominance was becoming more and more visible. The conflict between EAM 
and its opponents was escalating and during those last months there was a shift within the 
Greek public opinion. On the one hand, the appeal of moderate democratic nationalist 
organisations was declining, while on the other EAM was losing much of its popularity, 
especially in the big cities. Polarisation was increasing and the royalist and 
collaborationist propaganda called Greeks to chose between “the established social order” 
and “Bolshevism”.
For many years, Greece was a ‘communistophobic’ society and people were 
raised to hate and fear communism. During the occupation, the rise of EAM-ELAS 
increased the fear of communism among many Greeks, especially among the urban 
middle classes. EAM-ELAS’ aggression against all other competing republican resistance 
organisations, its attempt to monopolise the national resistance struggle and a number of 
atrocities such as the murder of Psarros justified those fears and made the danger of 
“Bolshevism” more clear. These fears were manipulated by radical anti-EAM groups
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who wanted to reinforce the Machiavellian attitude that anything that can prevent Greece 
from being “Bolshevised” was justified. That was the attitude that transformed the 
security battalions and the Athenian pseudo-resistance, semi-collaborationist 
organisations to crusaders of the anti-Communist campaign and eventually, in the eyes of 
many, to national heroes. The controversy is that the legacy of a consistent democrat and 
resistance fighter such as Psarros contributed to that.
Conclusion
This chapter’s two main objectives were to study the causes and effects of 
Psarros’ murder. As far as the causes are concerned, this chapter did not achieve to 
resolve fully the true motives behind the murder. In such a mysterious case, there are so 
many difficulties in recovering hard evidence that it would be almost impossible to 
achieve that ideal objective. Facts and testimonies however indicate that Zoulas did not 
take the initiative to kill Psarros based on his personal motives. On the contrary they 
indicate that Zoulas had the approval and the protection of one or more high rank PEEA 
or EAM-ELAS officials. The fact that PEEA and EAM-ELAS tried to cover up Psarros’ 
murder, the fact that they never undertook an official enquiry concerning the murder and 
the fact that Zoulas never suffered any disciplinary action reinforce that view.
Who was the official or officials who allowed or ordered Zoulas to kill Psarros 
was another mysterious issue that could not be answered beyond any doubt. The lack of 
documentary evidence or the reliability of the existing sources, make that question
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impossible to answer. Zoulas might have been Siantos’ “henchman” and he might have 
had Siantos’ authorisation in handling the 5/42 issue, but still those indications are not 
enough to consider Siantos as the mastermind of Psarros’ murder. Nevertheless, from a 
moral point of view, the whole of PEEA and EAM-ELAS’ leaders and primarily Siantos 
can be considered as collectively responsible since none of them ever officially 
disapproved of Psarros’ murder.
This chapter also tried to highlight the impact of Psarros’ murder on the political 
developments throughout the last six months of the occupation. Psarros’ murder was an 
inexcusable mistake for EAM. It caused nothing but damage and it benefited no one else 
than EAM’s most extreme enemies. According to Petimezas:
“The damage that dead Psarros caused to KKE was by far greater than the damage
that he caused while he was alive” (Petimezas, 1991: 365).
In the Lebanon conference, EAM suffered a total defeat and Psarros’ case played a 
decisive role in that defeat. Due to Psarros’ murder, EAM’s delegates were brought into a 
defensive position and soon the Lebanon conference was transformed into a trial for 
EAM-ELAS. On the other hand, Psarros’ legacy played a major role in the political 
antagonisms in occupied Greece, Psarros became a symbol for the anti-EAM camp and 
his legacy contributed a lot to the coherence of that camp. The most extreme anti-EAM 
organisations and groups used Psarros’ case in their propaganda in order to approach the 
moderate nationalists. The Greek Right might have had its own heroes, but contrary to 
the Greek Left, it never had many martyrs. Psarros’ murder gave to the Greek Right its 
martyr. Although Psarros had never been a genuine right winger, the Right appropriated 
his legacy and he became a point of reference for all of EAM’s enemies.
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CHAPTER 7 
The 5/42 and the British: 
R evisiting an Enigmatic Coalition.
The macro-level analysis looks at the 5/42 within the context of the British 
politics in Greece during the occupation. In general terms, the British policy towards the 
national resistance movement is one of the most controversial themes of the occupation. 
The British did not just contribute to the active resistance against the occupation forces, 
but also intervened in the most direct way to the political antagonisms between the 
national resistance organisations. Previous works and historical research has brought out 
a substantial amount o f documents concerning the British attitude towards EAM-ELAS 
and EDES (see Woodhouse, 1976, Myers, 1975, Fleisher, 1995, Mathiopoulos, 1977, 
Gasparinatos, 1998, Iatridis, 1981, Clogg, 1981, Hondros, 1983) and there is a quite clear
______ ___________ i . i . .  . i x i i  i  _  i L - i .  ^ .i_______________________  • * *■ « 1 ^
le towards the third national resistance movement. On the contrary, the British attitu<
scure and enigmatic largest national resistance organisation has remained a rather ob
not only against the issue. Although the British and the 5/42 were on the same side
mysterious attitude towards the regiment. The obscurity and mystery concerning the 
relationship between the 5/42 and the British becomes even greater due to the total lack 
of British documents covering that issue.
For the retrieval of such documents, the current research followed the advice that 
Chris Woodhouse gave to the son of the 5/42 veteran, Brigadier Ioannis Papathanasiou:
“It is my misfortune to have lived so long and forgotten so much. The only advice 
I can offer you is not to take other men’s advice or trust, but to go to the Public 
Records Office in London and study the documents on the Greek resistance, which 
are now open to the general public. The only difficulty is that they are vast in 
quantity. Like myself, you will learn far more about the Greek resistance than can 
be learned from impassioned reminiscences” (Woodhouse, letter to Papathanasiou,
29 December 1998).
A considerable amount of British documentation concerning 5/42 and EKKA were found 
in the Public Records Office. These documents include a series of reports, memorandums 
telegrams and letters (in Greek and in English) exchanged between British officers, as 
well as between British officers and the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS.
Based on these documents, this chapter in its first part will try to highlight the 
actual relationship between the 5/42 and the British. That is a very important and 
sensitive issue which needs thorough examination since according to EAM-ELAS 
veteran’s claims, the 5/42 was a political instrument of the British. Obviously such 
serious accusations question the credibility and the esteem of the 5/42 as a national 
resistance organisation and that is why these claims need to be carefully tested against the 
relevant documents found in the PRO files.
In its second part, this chapter will focus on the attitude that the British 
maintained during the last conflict between the 5/42 and ELAS in Klima. A number of 
5/42 and EAM-ELAS veterans as well as EDES’ Sub-Commander Komninos
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Pyromaglou, argue that the British abandoned the 5/42 to its conflict with ELAS. Both 
the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS veterans have developed their own conspiracy theories. 
According to the 5/42’s veterans’ theory that abandonment was due to a communist 
conspiracy plotted by British communist officers and Soviet agents. On the other hand, 
according to the theory supported by EAM-ELAS veterans, the British intentionally 
abandoned the 5/42 and caused the tragedy, because that would benefit their political 
objective which was to blacken ELAS’ record with a fratricide. A series of documents 
found in the PRO depict quite clearly the attitude that the British maintained towards the 
regiment during its last days and solve many the mysteries, while they overthrow 
established views over the relationship between the 5/42 and the British.
7.1. British Allies or British Henchmen?
7.1.1. The 5/42 Regiment of Evzones: Sponsored by H.M the King of England.
ELAS antartes used to sarcastically call the 5/42 “the golden resistance” due to 
the generosity of the British funding towards the regiment (Giangis, interview 17 August 
2000, Rodakis, interview 21 April 2000, Koutroukis, interview 22 April 2000, Bekios, 
interview 8 May 2000). That characterisation was rather justified since the 5/42 was a 
national resistance organisation whose resources and maintenance were entirely 
dependent on the British aid. The regiment had no alternative sources to sustain and arm 
itself and almost all of its weapons, equipment and ammunition, as well as the funds used 
for the purchase of food provisions, came exclusively from British airdrops. Two balance
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sheets including the overall amounts of gold sovereigns that the 5/42 received in total 
from the British were found in the PRO files (Figure 7.1):
Figure 7.1. Amounts of gold sovereigns received from the British
Table A
Particulars of sums dropped to mission 
stations connected with EKKA and not 
accounted for
Table B
Particulars of sums paid to EKKA by 
mission stations and shown as such in 
station accounts
Date dropped 
(night)
Amounts (Gold 
sovereigns)
Month Amount (Gold 
sovereigns)
19-20 May 1943 1,000 October 1943 800
11-12 July 1943 1,000 November // 800
19-20 Sep 1943 1,000 December // 1,500
27-28 Sep 1943 200 January 1944 600
Total amount 3,200'“ February // 1,600
March // 1.600
Total amount 6,900
*In addition to the above sums received by the 5/42, EKKA’s wireless station in Athens 
received an additional amount of 800 golden sovereigns on August 1943 (PRO HS 
5/575).
It is not possible to know the exact amount of golden sovereigns that the 5/42 
received until September 1943 (Table A). This obscurity is mainly due to the fact that 
until then “no amounts were rendered by mission stations” (PRO HS 5/575), but also 
because the 5/42 had been disbanded twice during that period. Nevertheless, until that 
period, the 5/42 had just 200 men and it can be assumed that even less than a third of the 
whole 3.200 golden sovereigns (Table A) would be enough to maintain the regiment’s 
men efficiently. However, since October 1943 (Table B) mission stations started keeping 
accounting books according to which the 5/42 received an overall amount of 6,900 
golden sovereigns for a six months period. In general terms, the above figures indicate
162 Due to the uncontrollable rates of inflation during the occupation, it is very difficult to calculate the 
monetary value of a gold sovereign. However, in order to get an idea of the actual value of a gold 
sovereign, it would be useful to mention that a single gold sovereign could sustain a person’s needs in food 
for a whole month (Kaimaras, interview, 11 May 2000, Kokoris, 19 August 2000).
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that the regiment’s funding by the British was certainly generous. After the regiment’s 
third reformation in September 1943, its manpower reached 800 regular antartes, while 
the Middle East Headquarters allowed 2 golden sovereigns as the maximum rate of 
monetary spending per antartis (PRO HS 5/575). Therefore the maximum maintenance 
contribution for the 5/42 would be 1,600 golden sovereigns per month and the British 
certainly delivered that target, or at lest they were very close to that.
Historian John Hondros has made a comparative research concerning the 
distribution of British aid among resistance groups. According to some of his findings, 
based on Foreign Office documents, throughout the period October 1943-mid January 
1944 ELAS and the 5/42 received the following (Hondros, 1983: 146-148):
Figure 7.2. Amounts of Gold Sovereigns and Supplies that ELAS and the 5/42 
received by the British
ELAS (Nation-wide) 5/42
9,737 Gold sovereigns 5,500 Gold sovereigns1^
56 tons of supplies, of which 16 tons of supplies, of which
22 tons of arms 14 tons of arms
34 tons of food, clothing, medicine 2 tons of food, clothing, medicine
A comparison between the above figures and the manpower of both organisations 
prove that the British funding towards the 5/42 was by far more generous than towards 
ELAS. During the period that these figures refer to, ELAS had almost 25 to 30.000 
antartes (regulars and reserves) nation-wide, while the 5/42 had just 800 regular and 400- 
500 reserves. In total, the proportion of manpower between the two organisations was 30 
to 1. However, the British supported ELAS and the 5/42 as if the proportion was 2 or 3 to
163 There is a slight difference between the findings of this research and Hondros’ findings. According to 
figures that this research came up (see previous page), the amount of golden sovereigns that the 5/42 
received during the period that Hondros mentions in his research (October 1943-mid January 1944) was 
5,300, while Hondros mentions that the amount was 5,500 gold sovereigns.
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1 since the 5/42 received more than the half of the golden sovereigns and almost a third 
of the provisions and weapons that ELAS received nation-wide.
7.1.ii. An Unemotional Alliance.
The complete dependency of the 5/42 upon the generous British aid has caused 
serious controversy concerning the actual relationship between the 5/42 and the British. 
EAM-ELAS veterans and sympathisers have launched a series of allegations against 
Psarros and the regiment. One of the most serious ones is that Psarros was an agent of the 
British secret services and that he was working for the protection of the British interests 
in Greece. According to that allegation, Psarros was recruited in the British secret 
services through his brother in law Major Tsigantes, and his task was to undermine and 
divide the national resistance movement.164 Obviously, this serious allegation undermines 
Psarros’ integrity as a Greek officer and questions his capacity as a national resistance 
leader.
Some documents found in the PRO give insight about the actual relationship 
between Psarros and the British, whilst they depict the British attitude over Psarros and 
the regiment. The first set of documents are two reports written by British officers after 
the occupation was over. In these reports, the two officers discuss their views about a 
post-war claim for economic relief submitted by EKKA’s central committee to the British 
military in November 1944. The first report was sent on 1 February 1945 from Lieutenant 
Colonel Dolby to Lieutenant Colonel Mulgan, an SOE LIQ (Special Operations 
Executive Liquidation) officer:
164 See Rodakis, interview 21 April 2000, Koutroukis, interview 22 April 2000, Bekios, interview 8 May 
2000, K. Angelidis, interview 7 August 2000, V. Angelidis, interview 7 August 2000
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“Subject: Claims for EKKA 
[....] Before examining in detail the merit of this case, the following points should 
be taken into consideration. The claim falls in three parts:
a) Claims on behalf of the Antartes of EKKA (casualties, hospital expenses etc)
b) Pension to the widow of the leader
c) Claims for the maintenance of the W/T set PAN165 and the intelligence service 
attached to it.
These three points raised the following question of Principle:
a) No claims of guerrilla organisations are recognised by SOELIQ. But EKKA, 
although technically an Antartes organisation, was for all practical purposes an 
artificial organisation created and sponsored by us. In spite of this, the fact remains 
that we may open ourselves to similar claims by similar organisations if we accept 
the principle.
b) The case of the widow of PSAROS comes under the same condition as given in 
above para (a). Again, however, we should take into consideration the fact that 
PSAROS was working almost under our direct orders, that his widow is a well 
known person in Athens and her sister Mrs TSIGANTES, whose husband was 
killed by the ITALIANS whilst leader of our THURGOLAND (Midas 614) 
Mission, received a pension of £1,050.
c) The Question of the W/T set PAN is slightly different in so far as there appears to 
be grounds for a claim. Force 133166 had several “political” W/T sets in die field 
(EDES, ELAS, etc) and a monthly budget was allowed for them (£200 monthly in 
the case of EDES).
[....] In view of the above considerations I feel that each point raised by EKKA’s 
memorandum should be dealt with separately on the principle that we accept 
payment for what can be defined as past commitments, but refuse liability for what 
could be defined as claims” (PRO HS 5/575).
Lieutenant Colonel Mulgan’s decision over the issue of compensation to EKKA-
5/42 was the following:
“As regards claims made on behalf of ANTARTES of EKKA -casualties, hospital 
expenses, pension to widow of PSARROS etc, SOELIQ (MED) have laid down 
that no claims will be recognised from ANTARTE organisations, but only from 
agents of SOE, or personnel definitely hired by SOE agents. I do not think we can 
therefore admit any EKKA claims in this category without exposing ourselves to a 
flood of similar claims from other political and resistance organisations. This rules 
out claims concerning medical expenses, maintenance of hostages, disbandment 
expenses, token pensions for antartes families. The question of a pension to 
PSAROS’ widow is surely a matter for the GREEK Governor; if it is felt that he
165 EKKA’s central committee had a W/T station (Wireless Transmitter) for communication with Cairo. 
That station was used along with the organisation RAN “Rilos Aulon Nisoi”. RAN was a small intelligence 
resistance organisation which made irredentist claims on large areas of Bulgaria (Rilos), Albania (Aulon) as 
well as the Dodecanese and Cyprus (Nisoi).
166 Force 133 was the bureau in the Middle East Headquarters responsible for all British clandestine 
activities in the Balkans and the Middle East
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died as a friend of ENGLAND, for a present from the BRITISH Government 
through the embassy; but certainly not a matter for Force 133.
W/T set “PAN” appears to be a Force 133 responsibility. We infiltrated the set 
so as to be in touch with EKKA in Athens and sent them on one occasion a sum of 
money for maintenance of this set. The position of “PAN” is certainly different 
from that of an organisation like “EXPEDITE” or “MIDAS” for example, which 
were wholly a Force 133 responsibility. It might be argued that “PAN” was sent in 
at request of EKKA for communication back to us and should be maintained by 
EKKA. I think EAM maintained W/T set “NIKO” without funds from us and 
regarded it as being there for their own convenience”. (PRO HS 5/575).
At the end of his report, Lieutenant Colonel Mulgan concluded that no claim should be
admitted neither to EKKA’s W/T station not only on grounds of principle, but also
because the intelligence transmitted from that wireless station was not of any value (PRO
HS 5/575).
The correspondence between the two British officers undermines ELAS veterans’ 
argument according to which Psarros was an agent of the British. It was a well-known 
fact that Psarros’ brother in law, Major Tsigantes, was recruited by the British secret 
services and that the “Midas 614” operation which he led was organised by them and the 
Anglo-Greek committee.167 Therefore, Mrs Tsigantes (who was Mrs Psarros’ sister) was 
awarded a pension as being the widow of a British agent. On the other hand however, 
although Mulgan in his report kept an open mind on the possibility of awarding Mrs 
Psarros a pension from the British Embassy in Athens as a gift from the British 
government, he categorically refused to award Mrs Psarros a pension as being the widow 
of a British agent.
Nevertheless, the impression that these two reports leave is that although Psarros 
was not a British agent, he was almost a puppet under the direct orders of the SOE and 
the Middle East Headquarters (Force 133) and that the 5/42 was an artificial organisation
167 See ch 2.2.ii.d, p 90.
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created and sponsored by the British. That colonial attitude towards the 5/42 generates 
some very important issues over the regiment’s degree of dependence towards the British 
both in military, but more importantly, in political terms.
Militarily, just the fact that the 5/42 was funded and armed exclusively by the 
British proves that the regiment’s military dependence upon the British was almost entire. 
In any case though, the whole resistance movement was in close military co-operation 
with the British and all national resistance organisations -ELAS included- were to some 
degree dependent on them. The 5/42 veterans not only denied that dependence, but 
throughout their memoirs and testimonies, they stress with pride that they were loyal to 
the military orders of the Middle East Headquarters. Nevertheless, although the military 
subordination of a resistance organisation to the British allies was considered permissible, 
on the grounds that it benefited the allied war effort, political subordination was a totally 
different and by far a more controversial issue since that would imply the interference of 
a foreign power to domestic affairs. Many radical EAM-ELAS veterans seem convinced 
that this was exactly the case with the 5/42. They argue that 5/42 and EKKA were under 
the political orders of the British and that both the regiment as well as its political branch 
were nothing more than a mere army of praetorians and mercenaries funded and 
maintained with the sole purpose to sabotage EAM-ELAS and serve the British interests 
in Greece (Bekios, interview 8 May 2000, Rodakis, interview 21 April 2000, V. 
Angelidis, interview 7 August 2000, K. Angelidis, interview 7 August 2000).
Documents found in the PRO files challenge that view and depict the actual 
political relations between 5/42-EKKA and the British, as well as the political attitude of 
the British towards the regiment and EKKA. A “most secret report of sub-committee on
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resistance organisations in Greece” dated 17 October 1943 gives a brief summary of 
EKKA’s political manifesto and on Psarros’ activities towards the formation of the 5/42. 
At its last paragraph, the report evaluates the political potential of EKKA and the 5/42:
“To sum up: Politically the organisation does not carry great weight. Its 
importance lies in the strength of its two bands168 whose value as a resistance force 
will depend largely on whether they succeed in avoiding further friction with ELAS 
and in co-operating with the Joint HQ (Joint General Antartes Headquarters)” 
(PRO HS 5/625).160
In another most secret report dated 5 December 1943 (probably from the same source)
the secret services in Cairo seem ill informed and confused about EKKA’s political plans.
“Recent reports of EKKA are somewhat conflicting. Their Thessaly branch170 was 
reported on 23 Oct 43 to have signed a declaration agreeing to co-operate closely 
with ELAS; and information to this effect has subsequently been repeated. It is 
denied by the EKKA representative at Joint GHQ (Joint General Antartes 
Headquarters) but may be true. One report states that Psaros would consider 
working with EAM/ELAS and is at variance on this head with the political backers 
of EKKA in Athens. One source specifically reported EKKA as being terrified at 
being disarmed again, and therefore likely to go with the winning side, though their 
sympathy lay primarily with Zervas” (PRO HS 5/236).
For once more, this report concluded:
“The political importance of EKKA does not appear great” (PRO HS 5/236).
The British services that produced these reports seem misinformed about serious 
political developments within EKKA-5/42, while the reports indicate that although the 
British had some appreciation about the regiment’s military strength, they had a rather 
limited appreciation and interest over the political potential of EKKA-5/42. Moreover, 
another report about the political crisis in Greece written by Woodhouse himself indicates
168 The report was ill informed over the 5/42’s manpower since although the 5/42 was a single regiment, at 
a previous paragraph, the report wrote, “On the military side, EKKA now has two strong bands each called 
a regiment” (PRO HS 5/625).
169 See ch 3.2.i, p 146.
170 By “Thessally branch” the report means EKKA’s delegate in Pertouli, attached to the Joint antartes 
Headquarters who issued the pro-ELAS proclamation during the ELAS-EDES war. (see ch 4.1.i, p 179).
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that the British were in serious doubt over the political credibility of EKKA and Psarros 
personally:
“EKKA
i) In EKKA, as in EDES, there seems to be a diversion between the leader (Psaros) 
and
the political backers. Psaros has several times shown leanings towards submission 
to EAM-ELAS; this was confirmed by photographed copies of letters undoubtedly 
in his handwriting, which were given me by Zervas in April and in September. On 
the other hand, many of Psaros’ officers and the only EKKA politician I have met 
(Kartalis) regard EAM-ELAS as the greatest menace to Greek freedom in 
existence.
ii) Psaros was reported in September to have gone to see EAM Central Committee 
in Athens with a view to joining EAM-ELAS. When fighting broke out between 
EDES and ELAS this month, EKKA produced a proclamation denouncing EDES 
(see App. E.I). this was signed by Major Vlakhos, a pleasant, conciliatory soldier 
who had worked hard for reconciliation. I have since been assured by Major 
Papathanasiou that this does not represent the views of EKKA or of Psaros. I am 
doubtful about this.
iii) The correspondence of Psaros, intercepted by Zervas, indicates that Psaros had 
successfully fooled various political parties, including both Communists and 
Metaxists to have confidence in him. I very much doubt whether Psaros has fooled 
anybody. He is a good soldier, but an inconsiderable diplomat. He is likely to 
become in the future more and more a tool of EAM-ELAS, especially if they win 
the present conflict” (PRO HS 5/270).
This doubtfulness over the political credibility of EKKA and Psarros personally, 
probably led the British to a more cautious and reserved attitude towards EKKA-5/42. A 
document found in the PRO files proves beyond any doubt that the British refused to 
provide EKKA-5/42 the necessary political and military assistance so that the 5/42 could 
become a large enduring and viable military force that could protect itself effectively 
from ELAS’ aggression and so that EKKA could become a considerable political player 
with a prominent role in the national resistance political arena. That document entitled 
“An appreciation of the results of arming EKKA bands in Roumeli” is a report produced 
by the Headquarters of the British Military Mission in Greece, dated 22 March 1944, 
(almost a month before the 5/42’s final disbandment). The document discussed the
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eventuality of increasing the regiment’s manpower to 3,000 antartes and the possible 
political and military implications of such a plan.
“Considerations
3) The organisation of EKKA in the field is connected, though not closely with 
EKKA in Athens. EKKA in the field, under the command of Col. Psaros, consists 
mainly of the reconstituted 5/42 Evzone Regiment. This regiment was commanded 
by Psaros before 1935171 and the present unit has a good reputation for efficiency, 
complete collaboration with BLO’s [British Liaison Officers], discipline and 
inoffenciveness to other bands. Col. Psaros himself is an excellent soldier. 
Recently, however, there have been signs of a slackening of discipline in the 
ELAS-EKKA dispute which has just ended. Politically EKKA (Athens) carries 
little weight: its political programme, though impressive on paper, is not of a kind 
to crusade with against such a program as that of EAM. The forces in the field are 
clearly of more importance, but both are at present politically insignificant. Psaros’ 
sympathies may be with Zervas but his military sense has led him to co-operate 
adequately with ELAS.
4) Present alignment of political parties with Zervas: The political parties and the 
Ethnike Drasis172 and Kanelopoulos groups of Athens organisations have recently 
expressed “deep confidence” in Zervas and are believed to have sent permanent 
representatives to his HQ. This action was probably due to the fact that it is widely 
known that Zervas has been receiving so large share of British support. These 
parties which did NOT associate themselves with Zervas included EDES (Athens), 
EKKA (Athens), The Military Hierarchy and EAM.
5) Situation in Roumeli: in addition to the numerous guerrilla bands and Security 
detachments at present in Roumeli there are many refugees from burned villages. It 
is likely that most able-bodied men from among the refugees have joined bands or 
the Security detachments in order to make a livelihood. To increase EKKA by 
2,200 implies:
either
a) Introducing that number of men into a crowded area of extreme food shortage 
or b) Converting that number of ELAS or Zervas followers 
or c) Drawing men away from the Security troops 
Assumption
6) Even if it were possible to bring the strength of EKKA armed forces in Roumeli 
to 3,000 without delay, this could not be done without EAM and Zervas learning of 
it before recruitment and arming could be completed.
Conclusions
7) Political
a) As soon as it were known that British support were being given to EKKA on a 
scale equal to that being given to Zervas, the political support now being given to
171 That is untrue, Psarros never served as the commander of the pre-war 5/42 regiment of evzones
172 “Ethniki Drasis” (National Action) was a small Athenian republican resistance organisation of 
intelligence and underground propaganda. It was commanded by P. Sifnaios, G. Drosos, T. Triantafilakis 
and A. Papadakis.
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Zervas by political parties in Athens (para 4) would probably be split. It seems that 
this could only be avoided if Psaros and Zervas were to unite. The reasons which 
have hitherto prevented this are presumably still valid.
b) Whether Psarros were to join Zervas or not it is likely that EAM/ELAS would do 
everything in its power to absorb or break EKKA. The political organisation and 
propaganda of EAM/ELAS would probably be strong enough to prevent any 
successful increase in EKKA without an armed rupture of the present truce. An 
armed rupture of some sort, however, is possible although the recent British threat 
publicly to denounce any band violating die truce may go far to restrain all parties
c) It is likely that EAM/ELAS will become more intransigent than they are at 
present if they consider that EKKA is being increased and armed for political 
reasons and not as a result of active resistance to the enemy particularly after they 
themselves have been encouraged to reduce their numbers to the force needed for 
planned operations.
d) The present good relations between Zervas* and Psarros’ bands would be likely 
to suffer through the development of a sense of rivalry between them.
8) Effect on the Antarte effort
a) From the point of view of specific operations the increase of Psaros’ forces who 
have a reputation for whole-hearted co-operation with the British, might well be a 
gain. On the other hand the additional 2,200 postulated would not at first be equal 
in discipline or military efficiency to the existing EKKA forces.
b) In general, the effect would be a weakening of potential resistance to the enemy 
either due to precipitation of a clash between EAM/ELAS and EKKA or the 
reopening of general hostilities between EAM/ELAS and the combination EKKA- 
Zervas; although in the latter instance it is unlikely that EKKA could rely on the 
full co-operation of Zervas’ forces (see 7 d above).
9) General Conclusions
To increase and arm EKKA for political reasons and not as a result of proved 
resistance to the enemy is likely to lead at least to increased political friction among 
the bands and, at worst, to a resumption of the civil war” (PRO HS 5/236).
Although the British equipped and funded the 5/42 to the end, the above
document proves that they were reluctant to provide to EKKA-5/42 their full support.
They chose to maintain EKKA-5/42 as their allies, but they refused to give them the
means for real military and political might. That was done for two main reasons. The first
is that the British regarded Zervas and EDES a much safer alternative than Psarros and
EKKA-5/42. In his memoirs Zervas admitted that he was suffering from “incurable love
for England” (Zervas, 2000: 14) and obviously the British appreciated that love. EDES
and Zervas personally was a much reliable and loyal British ally and a much more
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effective adversary to EAM-ELAS. The British did not want to jeopardise Zervas* 
unconditional alliance. The second reason is that the British were dubious over the 
reliability of EKKA-5/42 as effective counter-weights against EAM-ELAS. Especially 
after the period of the EKKA-EAM flirtation, the British felt insecure about the loyalty of 
Psaros and Kartalis to them. This insecurity by itself is a serious indication that the 
British did not have the political control within EKKA-5/42 as EAM-ELAS veterans 
argue.
7.2. Conspiracy Theories.
Although the British had their doubts about EKKA-5/42, they were on the same 
side with the 5/42 against the Germans, as well as against EAM-ELAS. Nevertheless, the 
attitude of the British towards the regiment is a rather controversial issue and many 5/42 
veterans and sympathisers have expressed a series of complaints. Most of these 
complaints are turned against the regiment’s British Liaison Officer (BLO), Major 
Geoffrey Gordon Creed or “Geoff* as he used to be called.173 According to their 
accusations, 20 year old Geoff was incompetent, lazy and totally indifferent towards the 
regiment. They accuse him for being a womaniser who was interested more in his 
girlfriends in Galaxidi rather than work for the resistance.174
173 All British Liaison Officers were used to be called by Greeks with their first names.
174 Moreover, the regiment’s veterans were also disappointed about Geoff’s post war behaviour. According 
to a rumour, after the war, Geoff became a mercenary in central Africa and his tracks were lost. However, 
in 1978 or 1979, the 5/42’s veterans association managed to locate Geoff in America where he had settled 
and they invited him to attend the annual memorial ceremony for Psarros and the 5/42 men. Geoff s answer 
was that he would attend only if air tickets, accommodation and expenses were covered by the 5/42
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According to Kaimaras:
“English Captain (who later became Major) Geoff was the liaison between the 5/42 
and the Middle East Headquarters. This young, well built English helped Psarros to 
form his regiment, but his help was very inadequate and it came at very slow rates. 
EAM-ELAS on the other hand, were getting much more support in weapons and 
equipment from the Middle East Headquarters and that is why ELAS was at all 
times stronger than the 5/42. This English officer maintained a very peculiar 
attitude towards Psarros and all Roumelian nationalists. Although his mission was 
to support Psarros, he was supporting ELAS instead. His whole attitude and 
behaviour prove that he was favourably inclined towards EAM and the communists 
rather than the Greek nationalists. Indicative to that was the fact that he used 
communists rather than nationalists for his personal guard” (Kaimaras, 1979: 45).
Geoff s ackward attitude towards the 5/42 was also reconfirmed in an incident
described by ELAS officer Dimitriou “Nikiforos”. While the battle in Taratsa between
ELAS and the 5/42 was at its peak, Geoff had just returned from the sabotage in the
Asopos bridge. He was not aware of the reasons of that conflict and he asked Nikiforos to
brief him about the situation:
“After a while, Geoff asked me apathetically “What is going on here”? We told him 
that we got engaged in a new conflict with the 5/42. “Fucking Psarros” said Geoff 
and then his interpreter said something like “Well done, they are getting what they 
deserve”. His attitude was abnormal, like he wanted to pass the message that he 
was on our side and that he was glad that we were disbanding the 5/42. “What the 
hell is this guy saying?” I said to myself. I was worried with that unexpected 
behaviour on the English officer’s behalf. I felt uncomfortable like I was caught in 
the middle of a mysterious plot” (Dimitriou, 1965, vol.2: 338-339).175
In addition to the above testimonies and complaints, there is also a series of much 
more serious allegations not just against Geoff personally, but against the overall attitude 
that the British Military Mission and the Middle East Headquarters maintained towards 
the 5/42. These allegations imply a conspiracy. They imply that the British betrayed the
veterans association and that was considered as an insult from the 5/42 veterans behalf. (All these 
accusations in Kaimaras, interview 18 December 1999, Karaliotis, interview 4 May 2000, Kouvelis, 
interview 18 April 2000, Protopapas, interview 6 May 2000, G. Karagianis, 12 May 2000).
175 ELAS’ officer Gregoriadis who also met Geoff during the battle in Taratsa reconfirms that his attitude 
was weird (Gregoriadis, vol.2: 491).
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5/42 and that they deliberately did not take any measures to protect the regiment from 
ELAS’ aggression. What is most interesting about those allegations is that they come 
from the side of both EAM-ELAS and the 5/42’s, as well as from EDES’ Sub- 
Commander Pyromaglou.
A conspiracy theory supported by many EAM-ELAS veterans and sympathisers
is based on a simple hypothesis and an equally simple assumption. The hypothesis is that
the 5/42’s disbandment and Psarros’ murder were disastrous for EAM-ELAS and that
above all others, those who were benefited by that disaster were the British. Therefore,
the assumption is that the British caused or at least contributed to the 5/42’s disbandment
and to Psarros’ murder. According to leftist historian Richter:
“Psarros’ murder was committed by some fanatic. More than anyone else, that 
action benefited the British and their policies. It divided the national resistance 
movement permanently. Not even the most elaborate and ingenious British political 
manoeuvre could have such successful results” (Richter, 1975, vol.2: 121).
ELAS’ veterans are even more explicit. Skaltsas argues:
“EKKA’s disbandment was no accident and it is useless to accuse Siantos, Aris or 
Mantakas. The causes were much deeper. It was a careful plan, organised by the 
British and the Dedousis-Kapentzonis faction. The disbandment of the 5/42 and the 
murder of Psarros were die fulcrums that overthrew the national resistance 
movement” (Skaltsas, 1984: 131).
ELAS’ kapetanios Bekios or “Lambros” claims:
“Looking back in the British colonial policies, we will find many cases where the 
British themselves wasted loyal allies of their own. In many cases, the benefits for 
the accomplishment of the British political objectives were being served much 
more effectively by wasting an ally rather than by continuing supporting him. 
Psarros served die British for a long time, EKKA and the 5/42 were British allies, 
they were aces in the sleeve of the British, but the British themselves wasted those 
aces....If Psarros was sacrificed, the benefits for the British would be far greater. 
Psarros’ sacrifice would be a devastating blow for EAM-ELAS. It would be a 
political and moral blow and EAM would fall in the British trap. It would have to 
bow in front of the British” (Bekios: 405).
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On the other hand, some 5/42 veterans and sympathisers have also developed
their own conspiracy theory. The explanation that they give is that although the Middle
East Headquarters and the British Military Mission in Greece had the political will to
support the 5/42 and to protect it from ELAS’ aggression; a communist conspiracy
sabotaged their efforts. Those who support that view claim that many communists had
managed to infiltrate the Middle East Headquarters, the Intelligence Service and the
British Military Mission in Greece. Some of these men were simply members of the
British Communist Party, or mere Leftist sympathisers, while others were genuine Soviet
agents. However, either because they were ordered by the Soviet secret services or due to
solidarity towards their Greek fellow communists, all of them tried to sabotage the
official British policy of support towards the 5/42 and they supported ELAS instead.176
For example, Dedousis claims that during February 1944 the British did not make any
airdrops and his brother’s company had a shortage of provisions:
“We were running out of patience and we were getting suspicious. All the time 
planes were flying above us but they were not dropping their valuable cargo. That 
was due to an evil communist sabotage. The English wireless operator was a 
communist and an ELAS agent” (Dedousis, 1949: 58).
EDES’ Sub-Commander Pyromaglou did not developed a conspiracy theory of
his own, but he highlighted some mysteries concerning the attitude of the 5/42’s British
Liaison Officers, the British Military Mission in Greece and the Middle East
Headquarters during the last days of the 5/42 when the crisis with ELAS was escalating:
“Majors Geoff and John177 were always near at the area where the 5/42 and ELAS 
forces had gathered before the final battle. However, which was their contribution 
in avoiding the bloody conflict and the executions, which followed it? Do they also 
share some responsibility for letting the conflict escalate? Are they also
176 See Dedousis, 1949: 57-58, “The 5/42 Regiment”, Veteran’s association newsletter, January-March 
2001, vol.9, Papathanasiou, interview 11 January 2000, Mannaios, interview 5 May 2000.
177 British Liaison Officer Major John Ponder was Geoff’s assistant.
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blameworthy? According to my experience and knowledge, I happen know the 
following:
a) Every sub-division of British Liaison Officers in every area had its own wireless 
set and was capable to communicate directly with the Middle East Headquarters.
b) In almost all cases, the Middle East Headquarter transmitted its orders directly to 
the sub-divisions of British Liaison Officers and only sometimes did the Middle 
East Headquarters inform the Headquarters of the British Military Mission in 
Greece.178
c) Although the sub-divisions of the British Liaison Officers throughout Greece were 
under the supervision of the British Military Mission Headquarters, the Middle East 
Headquarters had the right to send orders directly to the sub-divisions of the British 
Liaison Officers.
d) There can be no doubt that the British Liaison Officers in charge of the sub­
division of the 5/42 area sent a full report of the events that were taking place to the 
Middle East Headquarters. Which were the respond and the orders of the Middle 
East Headquarters?
e) On 9 April the local sub-division transmitted to the Middle East Headquarters an 
appeal by Psarros urging the Middle East Headquarters to take immediate action 
towards the resolution of the 5/42-ELAS conflict. The Middle East Headquarters 
did not give any answer.
f) Throughout that period of crisis, Majors John and Geoff appeared in the area only 
once or twice and their willingness to intervene and resolve the crisis was mild.
g) Since 10 April and moreover, since 14 April, the 5/42’s tragic fate was more than 
obvious. In similar cases, other liaison officers (Myers, Woodhouse, Barnes, 
Hammond) were on the field by the defendant’s side. Majors John and Geoff s duty 
was to be alert and at the spot at all times. One of them ought to be permanently at 
Psarros’ headquarters, while the other should be the messenger and negotiator 
between ELAS and the 5/42. However, neither at the 15th, the 16th or even at the 
morning of the 17th (final battle) did the two Majors appear anywhere. I believe that 
their presence at the field would at least prevent the massive murders of the arrested 
5/42 men.
I dare to express the view that the inactivity of the two Majors and their 
unwillingness to intervene was not due to negligence of duty” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 
37-328).
Conspiracy theories flourish when events cannot be explained by evidence and in
the case of the British attitude towards the 5/42, especially during its last dramatic days,
the lack of evidence was literally total. According to Pyromaglou:
“Unfortunately there is a total lack of evidence concerning the issue. Only the 
telegrams between the two Majors, the British Military Mission in Greece and the 
Middle East Headquarters could enlighten us” (Pyromaglou, 1965: 328).
178 The headquarters of the British Military Mission in Greece was in Pertouli and later on in Karpenisi and 
it was commanded by Woodhouse.
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Obviously, for Pyromaglou and all the other national resistance veterans who have 
developed the above conspiracy theories, access to these documents was rather 
impossible. However, large quantities of the telegrams described by Pyromaglou were 
found in the Public Record Office. These telegrams provide staggering information about 
the attitude that the British maintained during the last ELAS-542 crisis. They redefine 
established and stereotypical views over the term “ally”.
7.3. Revisiting the Term “Ally”.
7.3.i. “A Foregone Conclusion” and “A Useless Trouble”.
The tension between 5/42 and ELAS started on 3 March 1944 when ELAS
antartes surrounded the Semikaki village and disarmed some 5/42 men. Since the
Semikaki incident a chain of violent clashes followed. Fokida was on red alert and it was
rather obvious that the tension was escalating and that the 5/42 and ELAS were heading
for a new conflict.179 Nevertheless, British Liaison Officers seemed ignorant and not
worried about the recent developments. On 9 March, the British Liaison Officer attached
to ELAS General Headquarters Lieutenant Colonel Hammond informed the Senior
British Liaison officer in Roumeli Major Mulgan180 that:
“A new clash between the two organisations is not likely because ELAS would fear 
the onus of a second civil war” (PRO HS 5/355).
After two days, Mulgan sent a telegram to Cairo according to which:
179 Seech 4.2, p 192.
180 Probably that is the same officer who wrote the report on EKKA’s claim for compensation. See ch 7.1 .ii, 
271.
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“The EKKA/ELAS trouble is apparently not serious. I expect it to blow over” 
(PRO HS 5/355).
The British Liaison Officers (BLO) did not realise the seriousness of the situation. They 
seemed convinced that it was just a minor event and they did not undertake any initiative 
to intervene. That indifference by the BLO’s certainly contributed to the conflict’s 
escalation since the chance for an early resolution was lost.
The first British attempt to intervene and resolve the crisis came 10 days later 
after the Semikaki incident in 13 March where Geoff called Psarros and ELAS 
representatives in Lidoriki for discussions. During that meeting, Psarros agreed to all of 
ELAS’ terms (remove Kapentzonis from the command of his battalion, suspend Dedousis 
and return the weapons that Dedousis plundered from ELAS antartes in Pentagioi), but he 
refused to denounce Dedousis and surrender him to an ELAS court-martial. Geoff was 
optimistic and believed that the solution to the crisis had been found with that meeting. 
Hammond reported:
“The BLO [Geoff] commenting on the meeting said there were elements in the 5/42 
EKKA Regt which were inclined to be independent and he impressed on PSAROS 
the imperative need of asserting his authority. The BLO [Geoff] did not anticipate 
any further fighting” (PRO HS 5/291).
During the last days of March however, it had become obvious that the situation
was getting out of hand, Psarros was desperate and he put all of his hopes for a resolution
on a British intervention. In 4 April Psarros made an urgent appeal to Geoff:
“Dear Major.. .Two days ago I sent you a telegram for you to forward to the Middle 
East Headquarters and to the headquarters of the Allied Military Mission in 
Greece.181 However, I have no information about your activities towards the 
suspension of hostilities. Unfortunately, unless the Military Mission intervenes 
immediately, there is going to be a new civil war with disastrous effects. My 
whole-hearted wish is to avoid a fratricide and I have stressed that to the telegrams
181 After the Americans sent their own delegate to join the British Military Mission in Greece, the mission 
was renamed to “Allied Military Mission”.
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I have sent to ELAS General Headquarters and to the Allied Mission’s 
Headquarters. I believe that an immediate and decisive intervention on your behalf 
is absolutely essential for the sake of the allied war effort....Please keep me 
informed and if  possible meet me at my headquarters in the Klima village” (PRO 
HS 5/279).
On the next day Geoff sent the following answer to Psarros:
“Dear Colonel, I received your letters and I have to make the following comments.
I talked with Giotis [Harilaos Florakis, EAM’s secretary in Fokida]182 last night and 
with Nikiforos this morning in Palaioxari. Both of them reassured me that they 
have nothing against anyone else in the 5/42 than Dedousis. However, they said 
that they would not be responsible for the conflict unless you surrender Dedousis to 
them. They gave me guarantees about Lieutenant Colonel’s Lagouranis safety183. . .1 
am Keeping Cairo and the headquarters of the British Military Mission informed 
about events and I am doing the utmost to delay hostilities at least until we get 
some news about the intentions of ELAS General Headquarters. I fully agree with 
you that the outbreak of a new civil war at this moment will be disastrous for 
Greece and for the impending operations against the Germans. I understand that 
your position is very difficult since you are facing two possibilities, civil war or 
surrendering one of your officers. However, I have arranged a meeting with EAM 
delegates tomorrow and I will keep you informed. I am hoping that eventually a 
formula will be found before the situation gets out of hand” (PRO HS 5/279).
Probably Psarros did not get any news from Geoff, since two days later he sent
him another desperate appeal almost identical to the first one:
“Dear Major, I am coming back on my appeal to the Allied Military Mission and I 
am asking for your immediate intervention in order to avoid a new civil war, which 
as you understand will have disastrous effects upon the allied war effort.. .If the 
Allied Military Mission does not intervene immediately, the conflict will be 
inevitable. I whole-heartily wish to settle affairs with EAM-ELAS and I am ready 
to immediately start negotiations in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict. I 
am waiting for your information and proposals. My headquarters is at the Klima 
village” (PRO HS 5/279).
In 6 April, Geoff gave the following answer to Psarros:
182 During the 1970’s Harilaos Florakis became the Chief Secretary of the Greek Communist Party KKE
183 During the 5/42’s last days, the regiment’s Sub-Commander Ioannis Langouranis defected to ELAS (see 
ch4.2,p 197).
184 At the end of his letter, Psarros informs Geoff that he was approached by the Germans who asked him to 
join forces against ELAS. Psarros informed Geoff that he refused that proposal and told the Germans that 
even if he was attacked by ELAS he would still fight the Germans. (See that part of Psarros’ letter in ch 
5.1 .ii, p 217).
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“Dear Colonel, I just received your letter...Please be sure that I am doing the 
utmost possible to resolve the crisis which at this moment threatens Greece. Major 
John (Ponder) just arrived and is going to be your liaison officer. He will arrive at 
Klima tomorrow night...I have sent your telegrams (to the Middle East 
Headquarters and to Lieutenant Colonel Hammond of the British Military Mission) 
slightly altered due to their length, but I have not changed their concept to a bit. 
Until this moment however, I have to report that I have not received any comments 
neither from Cairo nor from Lt Colonel Hammond. I am anticipating for their 
telegrams” (PRO HS 5/279).
Geoff was giving Psarros nothing but lip service and false hopes. On 4 April, at 
the same day where he was reassuring Psarros that he was doing the outmost to prevent 
the conflict, Geoff was transmitting to Cairo the following telegram:
“Psaros reports Dadusis attacked by ELAS. Requests Hammond intervenes to HQ
a hope in hell even since their first disbandment last May. Owing to the continuous 
threats, ultimatums and pressure by ELAS, a proper flow of recruits has never 
really been forthcoming to Psaros. Those that he has for the most part owe rather 
shaky allegiance to EKKA and on Psaros’ own admission, he cannot enforce 
adequate discipline upon his men for fear that they either bugger off home, or 
worse still they are driven to Rallis Battalions [Security Battalions] across the 
water. The result of all this naturally is a useless trouble from our point of view. 
Who is to blame for it all? The pretext for them starting the attack was Psarros’ 
failure to fulfil his promises undertaken at the Lidorikion conference of March 13th.
Tme Psaros did fail in this, not because he wanted to fail, but because h e  186
well couldn’t help himself. Naturally enough, ELAS also took no measures to fulfil 
their part either. I have of course tried my best to at least postpone the major clash 
until something has been effected from your end, but the 5th Brigade when I spoke 
to them were abundant. Either Psaros hands over Dadusis immediately or else. 
What the hell can the poor old man do about it, if he does knuckle and hand over 
that officer, he will at once cause a division in his Regiment. The greater part of his
troops w ill to Kapitsonis and the remainder will go home fed up. By the way,
some Boche officers came over the other night trying to contact Psaros. They came 
to offer him German aid against the red peril. I’m glad to say he refused to see or 
contact with them. As usual I managed to, get myself involved in one of their little 
battles, this time in Palaioksari when they pinched Lagouranis. This time however, 
there has been no anti-British sentiments exposed at all, and I have been accorded 
the greatest help and courtesy the whole time. I enclose some of Psaros’ 
proclamations and pleas. He is conveniently forgetful sometimes. Perhaps you can 
enlighten me, has the EKKA great political influence in Cairo? I think it must have 
otherwise we should have left it fade out long ago.
All the best (Sgt) Geoff Gordon Creed Major (PRO HS 5/279).
Four days later, in 11 April, Geoff sent another letter to Hammond:
“My dear Colonel. Things have reached rather a deadlock for the moment. The 
ELAS appear to be gathering their strength and the 5/42 are engaged in a most 
remarkable display of bravado mingled with periods of sulking. John [Ponder] who 
has been running backwards and forwards from one side to the other ever since he
187 •arrived, put forward what was to my mind a practical solution. I am quite sure 
that Psaros Langouranis and the senior officers are agreeable, but had been shuted 
down by the extremist element. Anyway, the upshot of it is that the 5/42 are 
pretending to feel slighted and betrayed by us, have rejected the plan altogether,
have issued m ore against ELAS and appear to be waiting our next suggestion.
For my part they can go on waiting. I am bored stiff with the whole outfit. I shall 
do my utmost to prevent another clash for two reasons only. Firstly Cairo has 
summounded EKKA representatives in another conference188 and second I know
186 One illegible word
187 Ponder proposal to Psarros was to make the 5/42 “an independent unit directly under ELAS GHQ and 
PEEA” (PRO HS 5/291).
188 He means the Koutsaina conference
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perfectly well that at least 50% of them will join Ralis in the hope of getting a 
chance to avenge themselves should the ELAS disperse them. (Sgt) Geoff Gordon 
Creed Major” (PRO HS 5/279).
On 15 April, two days before the battle in Klima Geoff sent the following
telegram to the Middle East Headquarters:
“An ELAS force of approximately 1,000 is closing in on the 5/42 (EKKA) 
Regiment positions at Klima. Final battle seems inevitable and the result a foregone 
conclusion. I suggest we accept the new status quo this area and no more ado. Total 
lack of comment and suggestions from you during past two weeks of troubles has 
not helped our task” (PRO HS 5/355, HS 5/289).
Geoff s cynicism, ironic attitude and indifference towards the regiment’s fate are 
impressive and rather reconfirms the 5/42 veteran’s complaints about his unfriendly 
attitude towards the regiment. Furthermore, Geoff s letters reconfirm many of 
Pyromaglou’s arguments,189 since what becomes obvious from these documents is that 
Geoff had a very limited willingness to intervene and resolve the crisis, that he had 
frequent contact with the Middle East Headquarters and that he had informed them about 
the crisis. However, although the Middle East Headquarters had full knowledge over the 
seriousness of the situation, they did not give any feedback, orders or instructions to 
Geoff about how to handle the situation. That indifference was so unusual that even 
Geoff himself protested (see “Total lack of comments and suggestions from you during 
past two weeks of troubles has not helped our task”). The fact that the Middle East 
Headquarters did not even make the slightest suggestion or comment is certainly 
suspicious, but it was not unintentional.
Another document indicates rather clearly that the Middle East Headquarters as 
well as the high rank officers of the British Military Mission in Greece had written off the 
5/42 as a lost cause at least four months before the battle in Klima. On 2 January 1944,
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Colonel Hammond sent to Cairo the following telegram, which is probably an answer or
commentary to a report, sent to him by the Middle East Headquarters:
“On basis your reports have formed opinion EKKA will shortly succumb to ELAS 
attack or persuasion and cease to exist as independent force. ELAS presumably 
watching us supply EKKA without interfering because they intent these supplies 
eventually come into their own hands. Presume you have anticipated this and will 
not be taken by surprise. On the whole can see no point in trying to prevent this 
when time comes. Offers of moderate sympathisers may be more valuable to us 
inside ELAS than outside. Please keep me informed but do not involve yourselves 
in active measures to withstand what seems inevitable” (PRO HS 5/236).
These documents will probably be disappointing news to the existing 5/42
veterans. For the recently deceased 5/42 veteran and EKKA official Ioannis
Papathanasiou, they reconfirm his worst fears:
“On the basis of the existing evidence it is impossible to explain the idle 
interference of the Allied Military Mission, their non appearance and the lax 
intervention of both the Mission and the Middle East Headquarters. That 
indifference resulted in the encouragement of ELAS to proceed to the final bloody 
conflict. The coincidences are too many to be accidental. The attitude of all these 
organisations (PEEA, Allied Military Mission and Middle East Headquarters) was 
unvarying and indifferent not only before but also after the tragedy. They expressed 
no abhorrence or emotion whatsoever about the murder of Psaros and tens of his 
men (to talk about sanctions would be too much). Therefore there are strong 
indications that the disbandment of the 5/42 was decided in advance. I wish from 
the bottom of my heart that the above version was inaccurate. If not the destiny of 
our dead comrades would be doubly tragic since they were killed not only by the 
brotherly hand of some fanatics, but also with the cool consent of friendly forces 
(both Greek and allied) with whom we had united our forces in order to fight the 
fascist invaders” (Papathanasiou, 2000: 170).
7.3.ii. “Give EAM-ELAS Enough Rope”.
As Geoff mentioned in his letter to Hammond, the 5/42 “never really had a hope 
in hell”, and probably the British could not do much to alter the regiment’s fate.
189 See ch 7.2, p 282.
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However, the above documents indicate that both the British Military Mission and the 
Middle East Headquarters consciously and intentionally did not take any measures to 
prevent the collapse of the 5/42 and its tragic end. Moreover they indicate that the British 
anticipated such a development in a positive mind. That unfriendly attitude sounds 
awkward since although the 5/42 had a series of weaknesses, it was at the end of the day a 
pro-British force and an additional counter-weight against EAM-ELAS. Most of all it 
was an additional resistance force who was fighting the Germans side by side with the 
British.
W hat is even more awkward is the fact that the British maintained the same 
disinterested attitude towards the regiment even after the tragedy in Klima. They did not 
impose the slightest penalty to ELAS (e.g suspend air supplies) and they did not make
/g) Punishment or crime can not be achieved now and should not be sought until 
backed up by adequate Allied armed strength.
Best course seems leave area Charlie [Fokida] fallow for some time being as 
Hammond suggests, and add case to Ares’ crime sheet for post war action. Papers 
will be sent to you when all assembled” (PRO HS 5/291).
For Woodhouse, the 5/42 case was closed. That moderate and unemotional
attitude, however, was not due to lack of decisiveness on his behalf, and it was certainly
not due to leniency towards EAM-ELAS. Another document found in the PRO files
suggests that this attitude was the result of a very elaborate and sensitive policy that
Woodhouse had came up with since November-December 1943. On 6 May 1944 (two
days before Woodhouse sent to Cairo his previous telegram) he had already sent another
one where he gave his views about a proposal that he had received; probably from Cairo.
That proposal suggested the official denunciation of EAM-ELAS by the British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill and the withdrawal of all allied mission personnel from
Greece. In order to expose EAM-ELAS to the Greek public opinion and to prevent EAM-
ELAS from seizing power after the departure of the Germans:191
Woodhouse had a totally different view:
“Purpose of proposed plan is destroy power of EAM-ELAS. Can think of no better 
way to do precisely the opposite. Please see my Nov and Dec appreciation which I 
consider proved by events. Especially conclusion “Give EAM-ELAS a little more 
rope with which to pull their weight and in the end they will hang themselves”. 
Situation is that effective resistance to Huns ends with Allied Mission evacuation 
and gives EAM-ELAS post-war power for nothing whereas maintenance Allied 
Mission despite Present difficulties offers resistance to Huns and encourages self 
destruction of EAM-ELAS. Way to beat EAM-ELAS is send as many troops as 
possible and then more and NOT repeat NOT withdraw from Greece, assured from 
my tour Allied Mission Officers agree. Respectfully suggest EAM-ELAS attitude 
will always be weathercock to current of events outside Greece. They behave badly 
only when they think political game won and all our objectives can be achieved by 
convincing them it is not repeat not won. Would suggest Edgar be sent to talk to 
National Liberation briefing specially on gravity of situation. Cannot see any 
circumstances in which evacuation Allied Mission will do more good than harm
191 See PRO HS 5/223, HS 5/224
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and sincerely hope as Englishman and philhelene that this depressing suggestion 
will be reconsidered. Cairo comments our 429(429) to Mobility requested 
comments on scheme for possible evacuation of Allied Mission in event of Public 
denunciation of EAM-ELAS by Prime Minister
4. Enoch 240(240) of four from Stevens. From EKKA SHO crossed pels have 
received EKKA-ELAS correspondence leading disarming EKKA. Also report of 
incidents. ELAS action sounds like Hitler against Czechoslovakia. Have 
documents. If of any interest will send out next chance” (PRO HS 5/223).
On 11 May, another British Liaison Officer (most probably Hammond) sent Cairo
the following telegram with his views over the issue of the denunciation of EAM-ELAS
and the evacuation of the Allied Military Mission from Greece:
“All here in fullest agreement with Chris’ views especially par 3. And fear 
denunciation of EAM at this stage may well do more harm than good. However, 
unpalatable politically they are in certain areas of definite military value. Witness 
five trains destroyed in recent weeks. Only hope of discrediting EAM is to give 
them enough rope to hang themselves” (PRO HS 5/223).
The above documents are monuments of the “a means to justify the ends” 
mentality. Was it phlegm, realism, foresight, a marvellous exhibition of practical 
thinking, or an amoral perception of political manoeuvring? Whatever the reason, the fact 
remains that the British placed their political deliberations above their alliance to the 
5/42. They sacrificed, or more precisely, allowed the sacrifice of a friendly national 
resistance organisation in order to achieve a political objective which ironically was 
similar with the political objectives of the 5/42 men.
7.4. No Place for Losers.
The attitude of the British towards the 5/42 is only one of the controversies of the 
overall British policy in Greece during the occupation. In general terms, the source of all
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that controversy was the incompatibility of objectives between the short-term and the
long-term aims of the British policy. The short-term objective was purely military and it
had to do with the success of the war effort against the Germans. The purpose was to
maintain a strong and active resistance movement in Greece that would immobilise as
many Germans troops as possible. The long-term objective was purely political and it had
to do with the protection of the British post-war interests in Greece. According to Sfikas:
“Britain’s policy aimed at the restoration of her influence in post-war Greece and 
the establishment of a friendly regime that would underpin her imperial position by 
safeguarding sea communications, the routes to India and the oilfields of the 
Middle East” (Sfikas, 1994: 24).
It was proved impossible for the British to achieve both objectives efficiently. The 
achievement of the first objective presupposed the full British military support to the 
Greek national resistance movement and especially ELAS -the most effective resistance 
force. The achievement of the second objective presupposed the full British political 
support to the exiled King. The British tried to reconcile the irreconcilable. They 
followed a dual policy and they kept contradicting themselves. While the War Cabinet, 
the Middle East Headquarters and SOE were dropping arms to EAM-ELAS, the Foreign 
Office and the Secret Intelligence Service were doing the outmost in favour of the King - 
EAM-ELAS’ worst enemy.
Whatever the contradictions of the British policies towards Greece however, the 
British had very little to expect from the 5/42 in achieving any of their political or 
military objectives. Firstly, the 5/42 failed to become a strong and combative resistance 
force. Due to the successive disbandments by ELAS and due to its domestic conflicts, the 
regiment had a rather minor contribution to the overall war effort against the Germans.192
192 The battles that the 5/42 gave against the Germans and Italians are listed in ch 3.4, p 169.
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On the other hand, ELAS and EDES were by far more experienced and effective guerrilla 
forces and they could carry out the resistance struggle by themselves. Secondly, the 5/42 
never became an effective military opponent against ELAS. Large ELAS forces 
surrounded the regiment and they were capable to disband the regiment at any given 
time. On the other hand, EDES was a by far more effective and dependable anti-ELAS 
band. Thirdly, EKKA never became a reliable political force for the British. Kartalis* 
incoherent policies and his flirtation with EAM made the British suspicious over EKKA’s 
trustworthiness as political allies against EAM-ELAS. On the contrary, Zervas was a 
loyal and reliable British ally and the British preferred to pledge all of their trust upon 
him.193
During the last period of the occupation, the British had a rather clear picture 
about their position in Greece. It had become obvious that the war against Hitler was 
going to be victorious and that Greece was going to be free soon. The situation in Greece 
was becoming more and more polarised and the British were concentrating their efforts 
towards their post-war dominance. The gap between the opposite camps had become 
obvious and the British knew very well who were their enemies and who were their allies 
on which they could count on. As far as the 5/42 was concerned, things were not so clear. 
The 5/42 was certainly not the enemy, but it was not a reliable ally either. Although the 
British had invested in the 5/42, the regiment had become a liability rather than an asset 
for them.
193 See ch 7.1 .ii, p 271.
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Conclusion
The assumption that the British conspired in the collapse of the 5/42 cannot be 
confirmed by the documents examined here. On a purely pragmatic basis, the British 
cannot be blamed as accomplices to the 5/42 tragedy. They did not cause the tragedy and 
they did not compel ELAS to disband the 5/42 and kill Psarros. On the same basis they 
can even be considered as the regiment’s benefactors since they provided the regiment 
with their generous support in arms and funds until the end. However, documents prove 
rather clearly that the British abandoned the 5/42 to its fate. The British saw a friendly 
force heading straight to annihilation and they did not lift a finger to prevent that from 
happening. They intentionally did nothing to avoid or at least minimise the tragedy that 
happened in Klima.
To the veterans of both the 5/42 and EAM-ELAS, the British lack of solidarity to 
the 5/42 was a mystery. Since they had no available evidence, both sides produced their 
own conspiracy theories on this issue. In addition to the fact that those conspiracy 
theories lacked evidence, they were rather simplistic and convenient interpretations of 
events. Both sides placed all responsibilities for the 5/42 tragedy on the British and 
conveniently forgot to make their own self-criticism about their respective 
responsibilities to the happening of the 5/42 tragedy.
Without even taking into consideration the fact that their own insubordination was 
one of the main causes of the 5/42’s collapse and by stubbornly refusing even to consider 
the possibility that they were abandoned by their allies and champions, the regiment’s 
veterans found another more convenient theory. According to that theory, an evil
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communist conspiracy averted the 5/42 from becoming a mighty force and the unfriendly 
attitude of the British was due to the dark activities of communists and Soviet agents. 
However, many of the documents that this research came up with were written by people 
such as Woodhouse “a good friend of Greece” (“The 5/42 regiment of Evzones”, 
Veterans association newsletter, vole, 9), or Nicholas Hammond, a well known enemy of 
EAM-ELAS. These British officers were honoured by the Greek state (Cross of the 
Phoenix battalion) and Greek academia. They did their utmost to fight EAM-ELAS and 
prevent the “communist danger” from spreading to Greece. At the same time however, it 
was them who abandoned the regiment to its fate. The only way that the existing 5/42 
veterans could come to terms with that antithesis is to try to understand that the limits of 
allied solidarity stop at the point where the limits of political deliberation begin.
EAM-ELAS veterans on the other hand came up with their own convenient alibi. 
Their cliche is that the British used the “divide and rule” tactic in the case of the 5/42 and 
their own conspiracy theory is that the 5/42 tragedy was carefully planned by the British 
with the sole purpose to discredit EAM-ELAS. By that convenient theory, EAM-ELAS 
veterans washed their hand over their own responsibility to the making of the 5/42 
tragedy and burdened all responsibilities to the evil British plots. However, although 
EAM-ELAS veterans used the “divide and conquer” theory as an excuse, they did not 
really understand how offensive and derogatory that theory really was for them. By 
accepting that theory, they accept for themselves the role of the irresolute and willess 
native who was dragged by the will of the mighty colonist. Whatever the excuse or the 
theory, the fact remains that ELAS disbanded the 5/42 three times and murdered its 
leader and many of the regiment’s men while in captivity. The truth is that although the
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IBritish had every intention to discredit EAM-ELAS, they were not the ones who caused 
the 5/42 tragedy. The British just stepped out of EAM-ELAS’ way and just watched them 
discrediting themselves. They simply gave EAM-ELAS “enough rope to hang 
themselves”.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
The tragic demise of the 5/42 regiment of evzones indicates that there was no 
space for a third pole within the polarised environment of the Greek national resistance 
movement. The political antagonism was tod fierce and the regiment’s fall shows that it 
was very difficult for a small, moderate resistance group to pass through the smashing 
rocks in safety. In any case though, the 5/42 did not have the necessary prerequisites to 
become a prosperous third pole.
Firstly, the regiment had a very narrow vital space. Due to the fact that the 5/42 
was formed much later than ELAS in Fokida, the regiment was always surrounded by 
mighty ELAS forces and therefore it was always in a disadvantageous and defensive 
position. Secondly, the regiment did not have an efficient leadership. The leaders of 
EKKA and the 5/42 were not proven able to manoeuvre effectively within the political 
arena of the national resistance movement. Both Kartalis and Psarros failed to cope with 
EAM-ELAS’ aggressive policies and they failed to protect the autonomy and the political 
prestige of EKKA-5/42. Thirdly, there was no coherence between the leadership of 
EKKA-5/42 and the regiment’s antartes and supporters. Right from the beginning, EKKA 
and the 5/42 were alienated from each other. The political orientation of EKKA had
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Inothing to do with the political culture and ideology of the 5/42’s men and that alienation 
grew day by day. Moreover, Colonel Psarros also failed to impose firm military 
leadership upon his men. He failed to convince the regiment’s antartes that he was the 
safe pair of hands that could lead them to victory. Fourthly, the 5/42 did not have the 
necessary military and political aid from the British. The British chose not to back up the 
5/42 with their support, instead they abandoned the regiment to its fate.
The 5/42 had an influential role within the national resistance movement, but it 
completely failed to contribute anything of significance towards national unity. On the 
contrary, the regiment’s rise and fall had exactly the opposite results. The 5/42 failed to 
play an arbitratory role between the two extremes. Instead, it became the apple of discord 
between them. It failed to bring the two extremes closer to each other. Instead it brought 
them further away from each other. It failed to decrease the polarisation within the 
national resistance movement. Instead it added more fuel to the political antagonisms and 
worse, it added more dead to the body count of the civil conflict during the occupation.
This study covered the history of the 5/42 regiment of evzones from its rise to its 
fall. In particular, the case of the 5/42 regiment of evzones was studied across three levels 
of analysis. The micro-level analysis highlighted and discussed the factors that 
contributed to the formation of the 5/42. It looked at the community within which the 
5/42 was formed and at the impact that the local geographic, economic and political 
conditions had upon the regiment’s growth. Furthermore, the-micro level analysis also 
focused on the objectives and strategies of the group’s leaders as well as on the 5/42’s 
internal structure during the early days of its formation. The meso-level analysis 
highlighted the role that the 5/42 played in the political antagonism within the national
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resistance movement and at the impact of the regiment’s collapse upon the political 
developments during the last months of the occupation. The meso level analysis focused 
on three main points. Firstly, on the policies of the 5/42 leaders towards EAM-ELAS and 
on the effect of EAM-ELAS’ aggression on the regiment’s domestic coherence. 
Secondly, on the grounds upon which EAM-ELAS disbanded the 5/42, and on the actual 
military and political causes behind the regiment’s disbandment. Thirdly, it looked at the 
motives behind the murder of Colonel Psarros and at the murder’s political consequences. 
The macro-level looked at the 5/42 within the context of British policies in Greece during 
the occupation. The objective of the macro-level analysis was to highlight the political 
and military relationship between the British and the 5/42, but also to discuss the attitude 
that the British maintained during the last conflict between the 5/42 and ELAS.
This last chapter will revisit the findings of the thesis on all three levels of 
analysis and will make a concluding evaluation over the historical importance of the case 
study of the 5/42 regiment of evzones. The purpose is to highlight the findings of this 
study and place them within our existing knowledge of Greece during the occupation 
period. This concluding chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will 
discuss the importance of studying the micro-social context of the national resistance and 
the civil conflict. The second section will discuss the notion of “pure national 
resistance”. It will comment on whether it was possible for the national resistance 
organisations to make a clear distinction between the national resistance struggle and the 
achievement of their post-war political objectives. The third section will comment on the 
international dimension of the case study of the 5/42 regiment. Based on this specific 
case study, this section will make an evaluation of the alliances that were formed within
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the anti-axis coalition during World War II. Finally, the fourth section will make a brief 
comparison between some peculiarities concerning the regiment’s history and the 
stereotypes concerning the winners and losers of civil wars.
8.1. Back to basics: The Anthropology of National Resistance and Civil War.
The case study presented in this thesis indicates that in studying the roots of the 
resistance and the causes of the civil war, it is crucial to take into consideration the 
catalytic role that the peculiarities of each and every Greek region played in the course of 
events. Although the occupation had disastrous effects for the whole of the nation, every 
community followed its own unique course. For example, although the vast majority of 
Greeks shared an equal hate against the invaders, there was a major difference between 
the contribution that every Greek region made to the national resistance struggle. 
Roumeli, for example, became “a large German cemetery”, while on the other hand, there 
was absolutely no resistance activity in most of the Greek islands. Moreover, the result of 
the conflict between EAM-ELAS and its enemies was not uniform all around Greece. 
Epirus on the one hand was devastated by an intensive civil conflict, while on the other 
civil war was prevented in Crete. Moreover, although mountainous terrain benefited the 
development of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla activity was by far greater in the valleys of 
Thessaly than in the high mountains of the Peloponnese.
These contradictions can be explained by a number of factors. The landscape, the 
structure of the Greek state, the dominant patterns of political socialisation, the place of
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the family in the Greek culture and a number of economic, religious and ethnological 
conflicts, contributed in dividing the Greek country in numerous micro-worlds. Self- 
dependent communities settled in isolated islands or mountainous villages with no 
communication with the city or with each other developed their own distinctive identities 
throughout the centuries. In many cases, the identity and culture of a community on the 
one side of the mountain was very different with the one of the community on the other 
side. During the occupation all communities had to face the same enemy, they had to deal 
with similar problems. However, they reacted in quite different ways and the history of 
the community on the one side of the mountain was considerably different from the one 
on the other side.
It is impossible to study the phenomena of the Greek national resistance and the 
civil conflict between the national resistance organisations without taking into 
consideration a number of developments on the national level. Ideology, patriotism, 
leadership, international and national power politics played decisive roles both in the 
emergence of the national resistance movement and in the outbreak of the civil conflict. 
However, during the occupation, the country was the theatre of operations of the national 
resistance movement and the local communities were the arenas of the civil conflict. 
Often, the small affairs of life within the local communities played decisive roles in the 
course of events and sealed the fate of millions of people. In many cases, membership in 
competing resistance bands was determined by family vendettas and personal interests 
rather than political orientation. In other cases, personal decisions taken by local 
resistance leaders played a much more important role than the national strategy of each 
resistance organisation.
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IAlthough the 5/42 was the third largest national resistance organisation nation­
wide and an important player in the political antagonisms within the national resistance 
movement, it was still a resistance group with a clearly local identity. The regiment’s 
emergence was influenced by the economic, social and political peculiarities of the local 
community before and during the occupation. Probably the principal factor that facilitated 
the emergence of the 5/42 and generally the onset of guerrilla activity in the Fokida 
region was geography. The mountainous terrain, the lack of a road-network and the 
isolated villages provided the ideal conditions for the formation of guerrilla bands. Apart 
from geography, another equally crucial factor that also benefited the formation of the 
5/42 was the fact that there was a large number of officers in the region. This 
phenomenon was a direct result of the pre-war economic and political conditions of the 
local community. Due to the widespread poverty within the community before the war, 
career opportunities in Fokida were limited and therefore many local young men pursued 
careers in the military and the armed services to escape poverty. Eventually, through 
local political patrons and informal clientalist networks many young men from Fokida 
managed to become officers and these same men later played leading roles within the 
5/42.
The political identity of the 5/42 regiment was also highly influenced by the pre­
war political culture of the local community. During the pre-war decade, Fokida was a 
conservative stronghold. Right wing parties were dominant in the region, while the pro­
royalist and anti-Communist sentiments were extremely popular. This conservatism 
survived also during the occupation. Although the 5/42 was officially a non-political
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Icombatant force serving no political objective, the regiment’s officers and men 
maintained their conservative political beliefs and their prejudice against communism.
The history of the Greek resistance and civil war during the occupation is a large 
mosaic, made by hundreds of beads. Although our knowledge on the national level is 
good and the existing literature gives a quite clear picture of the whole mosaic, our 
knowledge on the local level is very limited and hundreds of individual beads are still 
covered in dust. This study did not just have the objective to increase our knowledge over 
the mosaic by highlighting the role that the 5/42 regiment played in the national context 
of the resistance movement and the civil conflict. It also had the objective to remove the 
dust from a single bead by looking at the social context in which the 5/42 functioned. As 
a research field, the micro-social context of the resistance and civil war is by far less 
saturated than the macro-national. Piles of valuable archives crammed in the basements 
of city and prefecture halls all around Greece wait to be opened. More importantly, the 
last of the remarkable people who have witnessed these tragic events have already 
entered the last period of their lives and wait to tell their stories. It is crucial to save and 
preserve their experiences not just for the sake of history and science, but for the 
preservation of memory itself.
8.2. “Pure National Resistance”: Illusions and hypocrisy
Throughout its existence, the 5/42 declared that it was a non-political organisation 
dedicated exclusively to the war effort against the invaders. Nevertheless, the history of
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Ithe 5/42 and EKKA from their rise to their fall proves that it was impossible to separate 
the national liberation struggle from the political struggle over the fate of post-war 
Greece. It also suggests that a purely patriotic national resistance struggle disengaged 
completely from personal or political ambitions was a noble but unattainable ideal.
In their memoirs and interviews, 5/42 veterans insist on drawing a clear line 
between national resistance and politics. They claim that they went up the mountains to 
serve the nation’s struggle against the invaders and that they did not have any political 
considerations in their minds. They view politics as a miasma, as something humble and 
self-interested that should have been left out of the nation’s magnificent struggle against 
the invader. They argue that a genuine national resistance fighter should not have any 
political beliefs and objectives and should concentrate exclusively on the war effort 
against the invaders. Consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, all of 
those who claim the above delude themselves.
Captain Thymios Dedousis, for example, did not have any illusions. He was a
dedicated anti-communist and monarchist. He remained loyal to his ideological beliefs.
“We are like mules with blinkers. We wear blinkers and we will go on wearing them until
the end” (Fokika Nea 17 April 1947) he kept saying. Dedousis did not join the national
resistance struggle only because he was a patriot, or just because he wanted to drive the
Germans and the Italians out of Greece. He also had a strong ideological motivation and a
very clear and specific idea of what he was fighting for. He kept repeating that:
“We went up the mountains to serve the national resistance struggle according to 
the orders and interests of the King and the Middle East Headquarters” (Fokika Nea 
17 April 1947).
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According to his mentor Zalokostas, “he was more royal than the king” (Fokika Nea 17 
April 1947) and the restoration of the monarchy after liberation was an equally important 
objective as driving the invaders out of Greece. Dedousis highlighted his pro-royalist 
beliefs from the first day that he joined the 5/42. Zalokostas wrote:
“At a time when Greeks competed with each other on who would show the most 
democratic zeal, you Dedousis kept from the first day your royalist ideals and your 
company within, the legendary 5/42 regiment never took the symbol of the crown 
off their caps” (Fokika Nea 17 April 1947).
Dedousis’ post-war personal journey also proves that he was more than simply a 
national resistance fighter. After the occupation was over in 1946 Dedousis was 
approached by the conservative People’s Party officials who proposed him to join the 
party’s list of candidates in Fokida for the forthcoming 31 March national elections. 
Dedousis accepted the offer and he came second in votes gathering 10,611 votes -a  
record for a first time candidate (Fokika Nea 11 April 1946). A year later however, 
Dedousis left the People’s Party and joined the more radical right wing “New Party”. In 
one of his statements in “Fokika Nea” Dedousis declared that he intended “to fight the 
domestic communist traitors until death” (Fokika Nea 22 February 1947). He kept his 
promise. In the next month Dedousis abandoned the parliament and formed a detachment 
of paramilitaries and ex-5/42 antartes in order to persecute the communist guerrilla bands 
that had started forming in the region. In 2 April 1947 during an ambush he was shot in 
the back (Dedousis, 1949: 100).194 For Dedousis, the parliamentary seat was not enough 
to calm his anti-communist obsession.
Georgios Kartalis did not have any illusions either. He was not the romantic 
freedom fighter that would withdraw to his privacy after the liberation. He was a genuine
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politician motivated by his personal political ambitions. Joining the national resistance
movement was an opportunity for him to increase his personal prestige during the
occupation, win the national resistance laurels and prepare a successful political career in
post-war Greece. The leadership of EKKA was a first class opportunity to achieve his
personal ambitions. Although Kartalis declared that the paramount objective was to fight
the invaders and that politics should be left out of the resistance struggle as long as
Greece was under occupation,195 in one of his letters to Psarros he wrote:
“[In post-war Greece]...the people are going to support only those parties and 
organisations which would have contributed to the national resistance struggle. All 
other parties will then be considered as zeros. The only organisations that have 
been acknowledged as resistance organisations are ELAS, EDES and EKKA. At 
this point these organisations are shaping the future political elite and government 
of free Greece” (Petimezas, 1991: 303).1 6
For Kartalis, the national liberation struggle during the occupation could not be 
possibly separated from the struggle concerning the distribution of power in post-war 
Greece. National resistance was the stepping stone for him to re-enter the political game 
when Greece would be free again and his post-war journey justifies that argument. After 
the liberation, he became Minister of Press in the national unity government under 
Georgios Papandreou; in 1951, under Plastiras’ government, he became Minister of Co­
ordination and later on Minister of Economics; while in 1954, he was elected Mayor of 
Volos.197
The ideal upon which the 5/42 was formed was a utopia and even the people who 
led and joined the 5/42 could not adapt to and practice that ideal. The national resistance
194 According to Thanasis Koutsoklenis’ version Dedousis was not shot by communist bands, but by 
People’s Party gunmen who were members of his detachment. (A. Koutsoklenis, interview 18 May 2000)
195 See ch 2.2.ii.c, p 84.
196 This letter was written in French probably for security reasons.
197 See Strogylis, 1996: 100-116
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movement was primarily a patriotic movement that aimed at inflicting damage to the 
invaders, but it was also a political movement that aimed to give solutions over a number 
of unresolved political, economic and social problems concerning the fate of post-war 
Greece. Just the fact that Greece was under the most brutal reign of oppression did not 
necessarily mean that these problems should not be taken into consideration. People had 
ambitions about the country’s post-war fate and the question “when was Greece going to 
be free” was equally important to the question “who was going to govern Greece after it 
was free”. Those who did not understand that were not better patriots, rather they were 
people with limited political perception.
What the 5/42 veterans do not realise or pretend not to realise is that the national 
resistance struggle did not necessarily contradict the political struggle. People have 
multiple identities and play multiple roles. The identity of the patriot can co-exist with 
the identity of the political follower and the role of the resistance fighter can co-exist with 
personal ambitions. In fact personal ambition was a major factor that contributed to the 
rise of national resistance. All those who joined the national resistance had some sort of 
ambition. In some cases these ambitions were noble and had to do with a series of 
, political and social issues concerning post-war Greece. In other cases these ambitions 
were humble and had to do with material needs or entirely personal and psychological 
desires. Whatever the case, it was impossible to take out the element of personal ambition 
out of the national resistance.
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I8.3. A small footnote in the history of World War II.
From a local point of view, the history of the 5/42 was a part of the history of the 
Fokida region during the occupation. From a national point of view, the history of the 
5/42 was a part of the Greek history during 1941-1944. However, the history of the 5/42 
has also some international dimension. From an international point of view, the regiment 
was one of the national resistance groups that joined the war effort against the axis across 
Europe. Although the regiment’s contribution to that war effort was certainly 
insignificant, the 5/42’s history still is a brief episode, a footnote, in the history of World 
War II. It would obviously be foolish to draw any conclusions about World War II, the 
momentous and consequential event of the 20th century, based on the sole case study of 
the 5/42. However, since there was some international dimension to the history of the 
5/42, it is relevant to place the 5/42’s history within the wider context of World War II 
and to make some observations, especially about the alliances within the anti-axis 
coalition.
The rise of Hitler was a call for unity among all those who had an interest to resist 
him and his allies for their own different reasons. That call for unity had an 
unprecedented and phenomenal appeal across the world and it brought together the 
United States and the Soviet Union, communism and capitalism. The anti-axis camp soon 
became a gigantic coalition of states, ideologies, movements, social, political and
'national groups. All those members that formed this multicoloured and bizarre coalition
?
had very little in common. Their coalition was not formed on the solid basis of mutuality 
of principles, rather on the fragile basis of mutuality of objectives, which was none other
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than to beat the common enemy. Most of the alliances that were formed within the anti­
axis coalition were formed hastily; they were occasional and rather unemotional. The 
alliance between the British and the 5/42 was only one of the numerous unemotional 
alliances that were contracted against the axis.
British policy towards Greece during World War II had more than one objective. 
The first objective was military and the purpose was to support the Greek resistance so 
that it would have the maximum contribution to the war effort against the axis. The 
second objective was political and the aim was to safeguard British political and 
economic interests in post-war Greece. The British allied with anyone that could help 
them achieve both their military and their political objectives, even though it was 
impossible to achieve both objectives at the same time.
The British allied with ELAS which posed the biggest jeopardy to the 
achievement of their political objectives, but which at the same time was the only 
resistance force that could fulfil their military objectives. They allied with EDES which 
could not compete with ELAS in terms of military strength and contribution to the 
resistance struggle, but which at the same time was the trustworthiest political ally within 
the Greek national resistance movement. They also allied with the 5/42. They provided 
the regiment with the necessary funds and arms, hoping that the 5/42 would become an 
effective resistance force and a reliable political and military counter-weight against 
EAM-ELAS. Eventually, the 5/42 did not meet British expectations. It never became an 
effective resistance force nor did it become a reliable anti-ELAS group. As soon as these 
deficiencies became obvious, the alliance came to an end and the British abandoned the 
regiment to its fate.
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/As with most of the alliances that were contracted during World War II the 
alliance between the 5/42 and the British proved to be short-lived. The unhappy ending of 
that specific alliance was a rather typical example of the way in which a number of 
alliances ended soon after World War II. As soon as the anti-axis bloc achieved its 
principal objective, the seams that connected all the members of that bloc broke. The 
common enemy no longer existed and all the conflicts and differences between the 
various members of the coalition were brought back on the agenda. According to 
Hobsbawm:
“From the moment that fascism was not any longer there to unite them, capitalism 
and communism were for once more ready to confront each other”. (Hobsbawm, 
2002: 230)
Along with communism and capitalism all states, ideologies, movements, social, political 
and national groups that participated in the anti-axis coalition were ready to reclaim their 
interests and confront each other in parliament, the economy and in some cases even in 
the battlefield.
The anti-axis coalition never became more than the sum of its members and the 
case of the alliance between the 5/42 and the British reconfirms that fact. The collapse of 
the anti-axis coalition soon after the end of World War II, was a rather rational 
development. However, the hopes of all those who had believed that the anti-axis 
coalition could become more than the sum of its parts and that the spirit of that coalition 
could continue to live on even after the wars end, were proven false. For the famous 
Greek writer and intellectual Nikiforos Vretakos, that failure was a direct insult to the 
memory of all those who sacrificed their lives in the international fight against fascism. 
He wrote:
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World War II: 50 million dead 
What is there to write?
We have abandoned our graves and we roam homeless.
While we were fighting, it did not even cross our minds that we are sacrificing 
ourselves just for our tombstones to serve as missile launch bases.
8.4. The victimised winners of a civil war
One of the most common cliches referring to civil wars is that “there are no 
winners and losers in civil wars”. The validity of this cliche depends on the perspective 
upon which civil wars are viewed and studied. If civil wars are viewed from a broad 
humanitarian perspective, then obviously there can be no winners and losers out of any 
civil war. Devastation and human suffering is universal in a society under civil war, it 
affects all opponents and probably no individual can escape a civil war unharmed. 
However, if civil wars are viewed from a more specific point of view, from an economic, 
a political or a social perspective, then things become much clearer. There are winners 
and losers. There are those groups who have achieved their political, economic or social 
objectives and those groups who have not, those who control the state power and rule and 
those who submit to the will and might of their victorious opponents.
In the case of Greece, the armed conflict between the right and the left started 
during the occupation, it underwent a number of stages and it reached its peak with the 
1946-1949 civil war between the royalist, right-wing government and the “Democratic 
Army” controlled by the Greek Communist Party. Eventually, that bloody civil conflict 
ended with a victory for the Greek right and a bitter defeat for the left. During that period, 
the left suffered tremendously brutal persecutions. The official Greek State, in full co-
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ioperation with its non-institutional and paramilitary instruments violated every sense of 
legality in the persecution of the left. Thousands of communists were murdered by the 
police or lynched by royalist mobs, thousands more were executed or sent to prison by 
special court-martials.
Even after the end of the 1946-1949 civil war, and although apparently Greece 
was a democracy, anti-communism continued being the dominant doctrine for the official 
Greek state. More than 80,000 fighters and supporters of the “Democratic Army of 
Greece” were forced to flee Greece and seek refuge in various countries of the eastern 
bloc. The left continued being under a state of persecution and all those who had been 
stigmatised as communists or left-wing sympathisers were incriminated and excluded 
from the economic, social and political life of Greece. Since the onset of the Colonels 
dictatorship in 1967, the left suffered a new reign of persecution and thousands of people 
suffered further violations of their constitutional rights. Ultimately, in 1974 democracy 
was re-established and only then was Pandora’s box permanently sealed for the left.
For almost three decades, the right and the left played rather stereotypical roles in 
Greek history. The right was the usual aggressor and the left was the usual victim. 
However, the regiment’s tragic history stands rather uneasy against the stereotypical roles 
that the left and the right played during that period. In the regiment’s case, ELAS was the 
aggressor and the 5/42 was the victim, ELAS was mighty and arrogant, while the 5/42 
was weak and powerless. Therefore, the 5/42’s case is an indication that the identity of 
the victim and the identity o f the villain cannot be taken for granted and that it is very 
easy for these identities to change during a civil war.
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Even though the side to which the 5/42 belonged was the side of the “villains”, 
the officers and antartes who joined the 5/42 were themselves victims of ELAS. On the 
other hand, even though the side to which ELAS belonged was the side of the “victims”, 
many from that side were themselves villains -as far as the 5/42 was concerned. The 
case of the 5/42 regiment of evzones is a historical example, which indicates that the 
defeated of a civil war are not always the innocent victims, the martyrs who suffer the 
menace of the victorious. On the other hand, it indicates that the winners of a civil war 
are not always -or better, had not always been- the barbarians who sadistically tortured 
their weak opponents.
The case of the 5/42 does not challenge any cliche or stereotype over the outcome 
of civil wars. The stereotype that after any civil war, there is always a winner and always 
a loser is correct and it is justified in many cases throughout history. However, the case of 
the 5/42 challenges the roles that the winners and the losers play during and after a civil 
war. It proves that these roles are not stereotypical and cannot be easily labelled. 
Although there is no doubt that the losers of all civil wars are victimised, the historical 
case of the 5/42 regiment of evzones is there to remind us that in some cases the winners 
are also themselves victims. It is there to remind us that after any civil war it would be 
more accurate to talk about victimised winners and victimised losers, rather than just 
winners and losers.
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IAPPENDIX
A. INTERVIEWS (List in alphabetical order)
NAME
(and Pseudonym)
POSITION-CAPACITY PLACE OF 
INTERVIEW
DATE OF 
INTERVIEW
Mr Kyriakos Angelidis ELAS antartis Athens 7 August 2000
Mr Vasilios Angelidis ELAS antartis Athens 7 August 2000
Mr Spyros Bekios 
“Labros”
ELAS kapetanios, veteran 
of Gorgopotamos sabotage
Athens 8 May 2000
Mr Petros Deniozos ELAS antartis Amfissa 21 August 2000
Mr Anastasios Giangis ELAS reserve antartis Penteoria 17 August 2000
Mrs Gianio Giangi ELAS sympathiser, wife of 
Anastasios Giangis
Penteoria 17 August 2000
Gen. Georgios Kaimaras 5/42 pioneer, Commander 
of 5/42* s 4th Company
Athens
Athens
18 December 1999 
11 May 2000
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Gen. Euthimios Karagiannis 5/42 antartis, ex Chief of 
the General Military 
Command
Athens 23 January 2000
Mr Georgios Karagiannis Son of national resistance 
heroine Lela Karagianni, 
liaison and translator of 
various British military 
missions in Roumeli
Athens 12 May 2000
Mr Dimitrios Karaliotis 5/42 follower Athens 4 May 2000
Mr Drosos Karavartogianos Publisher of the 
“Tetramina” historical and 
literary newsletter, expert 
in the history of Fokida
Amfissa
Amfissa
19 May 2000 
22 August 2000
Mr Michalis Kasoutsas 5/42 sympathiser, son of 
priest Argyrios Kasoutsas -  
member of the 5/42 
struggle committee in Itea
Itea 23 August 2000
Mr Athanasios Kokoris 5/42 antartis Penteoria 19 August 2000
Mr Ioannis Kokoris 5/42 reserve antartis Penteoria 16 August 2000
Col. Athanasios Koutras 5/42 pioneer, Commander 
of 5/42’s 1st company
Athens 9 January 2000
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Gen. Konstantinos Koutras Son of Colonel Koutras, 
President of the 5/42 
veterans association
Athens 9 January 2000
Mr Georgios Koutroukis ELAS reserve fighter Athens 22 April 2000
Mr Athanasios Koutsoklenis 5/42 antartis Amfissa 18 May 2000
Mr Georgios Koutsoklenis 5/42 follower, director of 
the Fokida Studies Society, 
director of the 5/42 
veterans association in 
Amfissa
Amfissa 17 May 2000
Mr Nikolaos Kouvelis 5/42 reserve antartis Stromi 18 April 2000
Gen. Athanasios Mamarelis 5/42 antartis Athens
Athens
Penteoria
Penteoria
Athens
Athens
Athens
3 December 1999
15 January 2000
16 May 2000 
14 August 2000 
11 January 2001 
3 January 2002 
18 May 2002
Mrs Niki Mamareli Member of the 5/42 
struggle committee in 
Amfissa
Amfissa 19 May 2000
Dr Ioannis Mannaios Son of Major Loukas 
Mannaios-Commander of 
the Desfina/Arachova 
double company
Athens 5 May 2000
Mr Themis Marinos Member of the “Harling” 
mission which organised 
the sabotage of the 
Gorgopotamos bridge
Athens 10 January 2000
Mr Vagelis Papadakis 
“Tasos Leuterias”
ELAS kapetanios, Chief 
political commissar in the 
Roumeli Headquarters of 
ELAS, Comander of ELAS 
Roumeli Headquarters
Athens 13 September 
2000
Col. Omiros Papadopoulos Member of organisation 
“X”
Athens 10 May 2000
Mr Stamatis Papathanasiou Son of Major Ioannis 
Papathanasiou -member of 
EKKA’s delegate in the
Athens 11 January 2000
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iCommon General Antartes 
Headquarters in Karpenisi, 
Commander of the 1st 5/42 
battalion of Pamassida
Mr Ioannis Polyzos 5/42 antartis Penteoria 16 August 2000
Mr Elias Protopapas 
“Aetos”
5/42 antartis, Vice 
president of Panhelenic 
League of National 
Resistance Organisations 
(PSEAO), ex President of 
5/42” veterans association
Athens
Athens
6 May 2000 
14 January 2000
Mr Nikolaos Raptis 5/42 follower Itea 23 August 2000
Mr Periclis Rodakis EAM member Athens 21 April 2000
Mr Bambis Roupas ELAS wireless operator 
attached to Velouchiotis’ 
guard, editor of the “EAM- 
Resistance” newsletter, 
administrative member of 
the Panhelenic League of 
EAM National Resistance 
Fighters (PSAEEA)
Athens 24 April 2000
Mr Athanasios Siderakos ELAS antartis Penteoria 18 August 2000
Mr Bambis Stathopoulos 5/42 sympathiser Athens 8 January 2000
Mr Ioannis Talamangas Researcher of Fokida’s 
history
Amfissa 20 May 2000
Mr Euthymios Talantis Son of 5/42 antartis 
Haralambos Talantis
Amfissa 23 August 2000
Mr Thomas Zacharias Member of the 5/42 
struggle committee in 
Penteoria
Penteoria
Penteoria
16 May 2000 
19 August 2000
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• DIS/GES Dieuthinsi Istorias Stratou / Geniko Epiteleio Stratou Bureau of Army 
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F 928 
F 929 
F 954 
F Agorou 
FKKE
• ASKI Arheia Synhronis Koinonikis Istorias [Archives of Contemporary Social 
History]
The Archives of EAM-ELAS, Files:
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F 30/1/3 
F 30/1/111 
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• The Private Archive of Mr Ioannis Papathanasiou
Report of the Pamassida Headquarters (Andreas Mitalas)
Request of Andreas Mitalas to the Greek Military
Manuscript of the speech delivered by C.M Woodhouse in Athens in 9 April 1987 
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Correspondence between Stamatis Papathanasiou and General Georgios Kaimaras
• The Private Archive of Mr Michalis Giakoumos
The hand-written memoirs of an unknown 5/42 antartis
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HS 5/340 -  1942-1945. Midas report and claims with Greek language documents 
HS 5/341 -  1945. Midas reports; personnel payments with Greek language documents 
HS 5/346 -  1943. Operations WASHING and LOCKSMITH; demolition of
Gorgopotamos viaduct; political developments in Greek resistance; Greek army 
crisis
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HS 5/355 -  1944. Telegrams from field; political reports by BLOs 
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HS 5/364 -  1942-1943. Personnel: Greek-speaking BLO
HS 5/365 -  1944-1945. Casualties: individual cases A-Z
HS 5/371 -  1942. Personnel: Greek A-L
HS 5/372 -  1942. Personnel: Greek M-Z
HS 5/376 -  Foreign personnel suggested for SOE employment
HS 5/382 -  1942-1944. Personel: ex-agents
HS 5/383 -  1943-1945. Personel: agents in field
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HS 5/425 -  Jul-Oct; six Greeks brought to Cairo by SOE
HS 5/477 -  1943. National bands: guerrilla activities; propaganda; publicity
HS 5/501 -  1942-1943. Reports; PROMITHEUS I and II
HS 5/534 -  1942. Colonel Bakirtzis’ visit to Cairo
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Organisations in Greece 
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Fokida
• The Private Archive of Mr Georgios Koutsoklenis
The hand-written memoirs of Georgios Koutsoklenis
The hand-written Chronicle of the Italian raid against the Elaionas village
The hand-written Chronicle of the 5/42’s medical service
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• The Private Archive of Mr Euthimios Talantis
The manuscript memoirs of Haralampos Talantis
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